Marsh v. Illinois Racing Board

FIRST DIVISION
September 22, 1997

No. 1-95-4265

RONALD MARSH, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, RICHARD GARRETT, )
BRAD DYE, JOHN EDDY, Acting Stewards, )
GARY STARKMAN, RICHARD BALOG, LORNA )
PROPES, RALPH GONZALEZ, GENE LAMB, )
JOSEPH KINDLON, JOHN SIMON and WILLIAM )
JACKSON, members of the ILLINOIS RACING )
BOARD, ) Honorable
) Albert Green,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants, who include the Illinois Racing Board (Board), its
individual members and the two stewards at Maywood Park Racetrack,
appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting
an injunction in favor of plaintiff restraining defendants from
enforcing the revocation of his license to own and drive
standardbred racehorses. Defendants contend that the trial court
erred in granting the injunction before the Board held an
administrative hearing and before plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies.
The record establishes that plaintiff was licensed by the
Board to own and drive standardbred racehorses and had raced in
over 22,500 races dating from 1973. On December 7, 1995, pursuant
to the Illinois Horse Racing Act of 1975 (Act) (230 ILCS 5/16 (West
1994)), the stewards at Maywood Park issued a ruling excluding
plaintiff from all racetracks and wagering locations pending
investigation of two races, which had occurred on November 11 and
December 5, 1995. On December 11, 1995, the stewards found that
plaintiff had furthered an unlawful betting scheme by failing to
give his best effort while driving in the two races. The stewards
revoked his license and declared him ineligible for future
licensing by the Board.
On December 15, 1995, plaintiff filed an emergency complaint
for temporary and preliminary injunctions to restrain enforcement
of the stewards' ruling pending the decision of the Board,
asserting that (1) he would be unable to pursue his livelihood
pending the administrative decision, (2) the revocation would cause
irreparable damage to his ability to pursue his occupation, and (3)
the revocation was in violation of his right to due process because
section 9(e) of the Act (230 ILCS 5/9(e) (West 1994)) and rules
1318.50(a) and 1320.70 (11 Ill. Adm. Code  1318.50(A), 1320.70
(1994)) are unconstitutionally vague. The complaint acknowledged
that the Board's hearing was scheduled for December 20, 1995, but
asserted that it was unlikely that the hearing would be completed
that day and, because the next scheduled Board meeting was not
until January 9, 1996, and it was not certain that the Board would
actually rule on his case at that time, he would be unfairly
deprived of his livelihood and property without due process. He
also asserted that because the provisions of section 16(c) of the
Racing Act (230 ILCS 5/16(c)(West 1994)) allow him to request a
hearing de novo before the Board, in effect he must be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. Attached to his complaint were
approximately 20 orders entered by other circuit court judges
granting injunctions to other racehorse drivers in allegedly
similar cases. On the same date that the complaint was filed, the
circuit court held a hearing and granted the injunction, finding as
follows:
"[T]he plaintiff will suffer immediate and
irreparable injury for the reason that he
practices his occupation as a driver/owner of
standardbred racehorses *** and this deprives
him of his means of livelihood and has no
adequate remedy at law."
The court also set a status date for December 22, 1995, two days
after the scheduled administrative hearing. Defendants immediately
filed their notice of interlocutory appeal.
Defendants contend that plaintiff was not entitled to
injunctive relief prior to the Board's administrative hearing and
that, even if he was eligible for injunctive relief, plaintiff
failed to satisfy any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.
Although plaintiff has not filed a brief in this case, we
elect to reach the merits of the appeal under the principles
enunciated in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
It generally has been held that parties aggrieved by the
actions of an administrative agency having exclusive jurisdiction
over a matter may not seek review in the courts without first
exhausting all of their administrative remedies. People v. NL
Industries, 152 Ill. 2d 82, 95-96 (1992). Limited exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine have been recognized by courts where (1)
an ordinance or statute is challenged as unconstitutional in its
entirety, (2) multiple remedies exist before the same
administrative agency and at least one has been exhausted, (3)
irreparable harm will result from further pursuit of
administrative remedies, or (4) it would be patently useless to
seek relief before the administrative agency. Knott v. Illinois
Racing Board, 198 Ill. App. 3d 364, 366-67 (1990). The
determination of whether injunctive relief is appropriate should
be made only where the Board has held a hearing but has failed to
render a decision within a reasonable period of time thereby
leaving the licensee without an adequate remedy. Knott, 198 Ill.
App. 3d at 367-68. Generally, prehearing suspensions pending a
prompt administrative hearing are not violative of due process.
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64, 61 L. Ed. 2d 365, 375, 99 S. Ct. 2642, 2649 (1979).
In the case at bar, we find that plaintiff was barred from
seeking injunctive relief from the circuit court because he did
not exhaust any of his administrative remedies. Further, we are
not persuaded by the arguments he makes in his complaint in
support of the injunction. Of the four exceptions to the
exhaustion doctrine listed above, only one and three arguably
apply here. Plaintiff asserted that his ability to pursue his
occupation would be irreparably harmed by the revocation because
of the likelihood that a decision would not be made by the Board
for several months. However, the third exception pertains to
irreparable harm that may result from further pursuit of
administrative remedies and does not call for an injunction
preempting any attempt at resolving the matter administratively.
Knott, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 366-67. Further, the hearing was to
be held only five days after plaintiff filed his complaint, and
the loss of income and future business for a brief period pending
administrative proceedings does not constitute irreparable harm.
Knott, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 368. Accordingly, we find that
plaintiff prematurely filed his complaint, and the trial court
erred in granting the injunction.
Plaintiff also asserted without citing to any authority that
one section of the Act and two of the Board's rules were
unconstitutional. We find that plaintiff's arguments were
legally insufficient to support his contention and therefore did
not satisfy the first exception to the exhaustion doctrine.
Further, we also note that the trial court did not rule on this
issue when granting the injunction.
Finally, we know of no authority, nor did plaintiff provide
any to the circuit court, to support his novel theory that his
request for a de novo hearing before the Board automatically
vacated the decision of the stewards so that "in the eyes of the
law" he was "innocent of any wrongdoing." Accordingly, we find
his assertion without merit.
For these reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court
of Cook County.
Reversed.
CAMPBELL, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.