In re C.C.

October 20, 1998
                          NO. 5-97-0401

                              IN THE

                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                          FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________

In re C.C. and C.R., Minors          )  Appeal from the
                                     )  Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois,)  Massac County.
                                     )
     Petitioner-Appellee,            )
                                     )
v.                                   )  Nos. 93-J-27 & 93-J-28
                                     )
Rebecca R.,                          )  Honorable
                                     )  Terry Foster,
     Respondent-Appellant).          )  Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

     JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
     Mother appeals from the order entered by the circuit court of
Massac County terminating her parental rights to both her daughter
and her son.  We affirm.
     Mother had two children, one daughter (C.R.), born in August
1988, and one son (C.C.), born in September 1991.  Both children
have been in foster care since 1993, when their home environment
was found to be injurious to their welfare.  According to the
petition for adjudication of wardship, the children had been left
with caretakers who had previously been convicted of sexual
offenses against children.  At that time, the Department of
Children and Family Service (DCFS) recommended a service plan that
included such items as mother not having any contact with known sex
offenders, not having any overnight guests at her residence,
maintaining her house in proper order, and attending counseling and
parenting classes.  
     In 1995, mother filed a petition for the return of her
children.  Mother had divorced her abusive husband (not the father
of either child) by this time and had moved out of low-income
housing.  She had obtained employment and had begun residing with
another individual in his trailer.  At the court's suggestion,
mother's new fiancé attended parenting classes and sexual abuse
counseling with mother.  Mother's petition was denied, however,
after the trial court concluded that it was not in the best
interests of the children that custody be restored to mother at
that time.  The evidence revealed that the trailer in which mother
was then living was unfit and that her children did not know the
fianc.  Mother also had kept in contact with convicted child
molesters and refused to believe that C.R. had been a victim of
sexual abuse.  Mother came from a family in which the sexual abuse
of children was an accepted tradition, and she was a victim of such
abuse herself.  Mother was reported to have told her social worker
that such abuse did not kill her and will not hurt her children
either.  The evidence shows, however, that while in mother's care,
C.R. had been sexually and physically abused by at least two men
and now suffers from permanent psychological damage.  She is
hyperactive, violent, and sexually aggressive.  She has tried twice
to smother her little brother and had to be placed in separate
foster care.  Her behavior has become so bad that she requires
medication to calm her down and constant adult supervision.  
     In 1995 DCFS filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and
for appointment of guardian with power to consent to the adoption
of both children.  The trial court subsequently terminated mother's
parental rights on May 8, 1997, because mother failed to protect
the children from conditions within their environment injurious to
the children's welfare and also because she failed to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the children within 12
months after the adjudication of neglect.  All putative fathers'
rights had already been terminated.  Mother believes she made
reasonable progress toward the return of her children.  She points
out that she moved into her own trailer, completed parenting
classes, and attends regular counseling sessions for herself and
her daughter.  She does not believe it to be in the best interests
of her children to have her parental rights terminated.
     Courts will not lightly terminate parental rights.  In re
J.P., 261 Ill. App. 3d 165, 174, 633 N.E.2d 27, 34 (1994). 
Accordingly, the parental rights of a nonconsenting parent may be
terminated only upon a finding of unfitness, and such a finding
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.  In re L.N.,
278 Ill. App. 3d 46, 49, 662 N.E.2d 152, 154 (1996); J.P., 261 Ill.
App. 3d at 174, 633 N.E.2d  at 34.  We, as a reviewing court, will
not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the
trial court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence.  L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d at 49, 662 N.E.2d  at 154; J.P.,
261 Ill. App. 3d at 174, 633 N.E.2d  at 34.
     A parent may be found unfit if he or she fails to make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis
for the removal of the child or fails to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child within 12 months after an
adjudication of neglect.  In re Clarence T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 85,
101, 574 N.E.2d 878, 889 (1991); 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1996); 750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996).  Each case of an adjudication of
parental unfitness is unique, and comparisons with other cases are
not appropriate.  T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 101, 574 N.E.2d  at 889. 
     Whether a parent's efforts to correct conditions that were the
basis for the removal of the child or children are reasonable
involves a subjective judgment based upon the amount of effort
reasonable for the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated. 
J.P., 261 Ill. App. 3d at 174, 633 N.E.2d  at 34.  An assessment as
to whether a parent has made reasonable progress toward the return
of his or her children involves an objective judgment based upon
the amount of progress made by the parent.  At a minimum, some
reasonable or demonstrable progress toward the goal of
reunification must be shown.  J.P., 261 Ill. App. 3d at 175, 633 N.E.2d  at 35; see also L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d at 50, 662 N.E.2d  at
154.  Whether a small amount of progress is reasonable must also be
determined with proper regard for the best interests of the child
or children.  In re A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d 522, 530, 575 N.E.2d 261, 266 (1991).  Courts must not allow children to live
indefinitely with the lack of permanence inherent in foster homes. 
A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 575 N.E.2d  at 267.  A trial court
does not have to wait forever for a parent to make reasonable
efforts or progress toward regaining the custody of his or her
children.  In re D.J., 262 Ill. App. 3d 584, 591, 634 N.E.2d 1306,
1311 (1994).  Ultimately, all parental rights must yield to the
best interests of the child.  In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 593,
598, 660 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (1996); A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 531,
575 N.E.2d  at 267.  In this instance, the trial court waited almost
four years, and still mother was not close to being able to provide
for the needs of her children.  Accordingly, we find no error in
the trial court's decision to terminate mother's parental rights.
     The evidence clearly reveals that mother has not made
reasonable progress toward regaining the custody of her children. 
Since the adjudication of neglect, she has lived in several places
with several different people.  She ultimately moved into her
fianc's trailer and requested that the children be allowed to move
in with them--with a man they did not even know.  The court allowed
visitation with the fianc, and he attended parenting classes and
counseling sessions with mother.  While mother's fiancé may be an
acceptable parent, the home environment into which they planned to
bring the children was not.  The trailer was not fit for human
habitation and at times did not even have running water or heat. 
Mother claims they made all necessary repairs, but those social
workers who visited the trailer still found the environment
lacking.  Shortly before the final hearing, mother moved into her
own trailer.  A recent "flurry of activity" regarding her goals
immediately prior to the adjudicatory hearing on the petition to
terminate her parental rights can hardly overcome years when her
efforts were minimal at best.  See A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d at 599,
660 N.E.2d  at 1011.  Mother has completed parenting classes three
times (although the evidence suggests that her attendance was
sporadic), yet she still does not know how to best care for her
children.  She still does not even accept the fact that C.R. was
sexually abused while in her care.  She has little concept how to
care for her psychologically disturbed daughter and believes the
child's problems stem from foster care.  The failure to acknowledge
that a child has been sexually abused, which precludes taking
adequate steps to protect the child in the future, justifies a
finding that the parent has failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of a child.  T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 101, 574 N.E.2d  at 889.  Given such circumstances, the trial court could
reasonably conclude that both children probably would be left
unprotected from molestation if ever they were put back in mother's
custody.  Additionally, mother's son has spent most of his life in
foster care and has no real parent-child relationship with her. 
Mother may have a steady job and continue to attend counseling
sessions, but the question still remains whether mother understands
her children's problems and can protect them from further neglect
and abuse.  The rate of mother's progress is not reasonable
considering the right of the children not to be left in limbo for
such a length of time.  The best interests of the children, in this
instance, demand the termination of mother's parental rights.
     For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court of Massac County.

     Affirmed.

     MAAG and KUEHN, JJ., concur.