State of Idaho v. Fred K. Huffman Denial of Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence re examination of determinate portion of sentence
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 33015
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
) Boise, November 2006 Term
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) 2006 Opinion No. 3
v.
)
FRED K. HUFFMAN,
) Filed: January 22, 2007
)
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin
Falls County. Honorable G. Richard Bevan, District Judge.
District court decision denying Rule 35 motion, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Diane M.
Walker, Deputy Appellate Public Defender argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Thomas
Tharp, Deputy Attorney General argued.
__________________________________
BURDICK, Justice
Fred K. Huffman seeks review from a Court of Appeals opinion affirming a district court
decision denying Huffman’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. We affirm his
sentences.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While on parole from 1997 robbery and grand theft convictions, Huffman absconded. He
then attempted to rob one bank in Twin Falls and successfully robbed another before leaving
Idaho for Nevada. Huffman was charged with burglary, I.C. § 18-1401, and grand theft, I.C. §§
18-2403, 18-2407. He pled guilty to these charges, and on November 8, 2004, the district judge
sentenced him to a unified term of ten years with six years fixed for the burglary concurrent with
a unified fourteen year term with eight years fixed for grand theft. The court also ordered these
sentences to run concurrent with the seven and one-half years remaining on Huffman’s previous
grand theft and robbery sentences.
1
After sentencing, Huffman moved for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35, Idaho
Criminal Rules, based on the parole commission’s decision made in another case prior to his
sentencing in this case. Before Huffman’s sentencing in the instant case the Commission of
Pardons and Parole revoked Huffman’s parole from the 1997 robbery and grand theft
convictions. In an October 2004 parole revocation hearing on Huffman’s previous grand theft
and robbery sentences, the hearing officer provided: “It is my recommendation that the subject
never again be granted the privilege of parole release. I recommend that he be required to serve
out his sentences to their full term release dates.” The parole board adopted these findings,
considered Huffman unsupervisable, and ordered that he serve his full indeterminate sentences
for the 1997 convictions.
The district court denied Huffman’s Rule 35 motion. Huffman then appealed this denial
to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion and claiming that special circumstances exist which require the examination of more than
the determinate portion of his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Huffman, 2006
WL 241130 (Idaho App. 2006). This Court then granted Huffman’s petition for review.
II. ANALYSIS
Although he appeals only the denial of his Rule 35 motion Huffman urges this Court to
review the entire unified portion of his sentence. Since we have never adopted the Court of
Appeals language that an appellate court never wholly disregards the indeterminate portion of a
sentence, see State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989), we
should, Huffman urges, decline to adopt the “special circumstances” test from State v. Herrera,
130 Idaho 839, 949 P.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1997), and instead always review both the determinate
and indeterminate portion of a sentence. This standard, he contends, would better recognize that
parolees enjoy less freedom than citizens free from State custody of any form, that parole is
merely a variation of imprisonment and that criminal punishment should never be more severe
than necessary to accomplish sentencing objectives. The state agrees, for different reasons, that
we should decline to adopt the special circumstances test articulated by our Court of Appeals.
However, this argument assumes that the “special circumstance” test derives from a
refusal to review a defendant’s aggregate sentence (the determinate and indeterminate portions of
a sentence). We have never held that we will not review the aggregate portion of a defendant’s
sentence to see if it is reasonable under the facts of the case when the sentence is appealed.
2
However, Rule 35 does not function as an appeal of a sentence. Instead, it is a narrow
rule allowing a trial court to correct an illegal sentence (at any time) or to correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner (within 120 days). If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a
motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, __, 144 P.3d 23, 24
(2006); State v. Albee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). When presenting a
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion. Knighton, 143 Idaho at __, 144 P.3d at 25; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77
P.3d 956, 974 (2003); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 463, 50 P.3d 472, 478 (2002); see also
State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 79, 996 P.2d 292, 298 (2000). An appeal from the denial of a
Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information. As such, because Huffman only appeals the denial of his Rule
35 motion, his request to change the standard of review for an appeal of a sentence is not
properly before this Court.
We turn, then, to Huffman’s appeal of the Rule 35 motion. As his new information
presented in support of his Rule 35 motion to reduce the 2004 sentences, Huffman argues that
the Court should consider the statements made by the parole board when revoking his probation
on the 1997 sentences. However, such consideration would be improper. The Commission on
Pardons and Parole is vested with the discretion to grant or deny parole at any time after the
completion of the determinate portion of a defendant’s sentence. I.C. § 20-223(c). Courts cannot
intrude on this discretion when fashioning a sentence nor when reviewing a sentence. Brandt v.
State, 118 Idaho 350, 352, 796 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1990); see also State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho
614, 616, 21 P.3d 936, 938 (Ct. App. 2001); Vittone v. State, 114 Idaho 618, 619, 759 P.2d 909,
910 (Ct. App. 1988).1
Huffman also argues that his sentences are excessive because he expressed remorse,
recognized the role alcohol played in his crimes, and is willing to receive treatment for his
alcohol addiction. These mitigating factors, Huffman contends, should have led the district judge
to reduce his sentences pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. These factors, however, were considered
1
However, conduct while incarcerated or any unusual risks faced by a particular defendant while incarcerated may
be properly considered. Sanchez, 115 Idaho at 778, 769 P.2d at 1150.
3
by the district judge at the original sentencing. Huffman has presented no new information that
the court could properly consider. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion,
Knighton, 143 Idaho at ___, 144 P.3d at 25, and we affirm the district court’s denial of
Huffman’s Rule 35 motion.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that actions by the parole board cannot be considered when reviewing a Rule 35
motion as this would be a collateral attack on an executive decision. We also affirm the district
court’s denial of Huffman’s Rule 35 motion because he failed to present new information the
district court could properly consider.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER and Justices TROUT, EISMANN and JONES, CONCUR.
4
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