State of Idaho v. Gilbert Heredia Motion to withdraw guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter after sentencing re alleged failure to be informed of consequences of plea
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 32249
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GILBERT HEREDIA,
Defendant-Respondent.
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Boise, December 2006 Term
2007 Opinion No. 25
Filed: February 15, 2007
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Honorable Renae J. Hoff, District Judge. Honorable James A.
Schiller, Magistrate Judge.
The decision of the magistrate court denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
reversed.
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant.
Courtney E. Beebe argued.
Wiebe & Fouser, P.A., Caldwell, for respondent. Dayo O. Onanubosi argued.
SCHROEDER, Chief Justice.
Gilbert Heredia seeks to withdraw his guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter after
sentencing, alleging that he was not informed of a direct consequence at the time of pleading.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Heredia was charged and pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter as a misdemeanor due
to his involvement in a fatal automobile accident. The magistrate judge did not inform him prior
to the plea that under Idaho Code Section 18-4007(3)(d) he could be ordered to pay child support
for the victim’s children. At sentencing the magistrate court ordered him to pay child support for
the victim’s five minor children in addition to license suspension, fine, jail sentence, probation,
and community service. Heredia filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on the fact that
he had not been advised of the child support consequence prior to his plea. The magistrate court
denied the motion based on its finding that Heredia failed to demonstrate manifest injustice since
he and his counsel knew the court could order child support and that child support is a collateral
consequence of which Heredia need not be informed.
Heredia appealed to the district court which reversed the magistrate court’s decision,
concluding that child support is a direct consequence of which Heredia should have been
informed before he pled guilty and that Heredia established manifest injustice because the record
did not show that he knew the court could order him to pay child support. The State appeals,
alleging that the district court erred.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, the
Supreme Court will review the record and the magistrate court’s decision independently of, but
with due regard for, the district court’s decision. Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002).
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after sentencing will only be granted to
correct manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55
P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002). Because a guilty plea by a criminal defendant waives certain
constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial,
and the right of confrontation, a guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record demonstrates
that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,
99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999); accord State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 33-34, 557 P.2d 626, 627-28
(1976). Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver is not met. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887, 55 P.3d at 880.
III.
THE POSSIBILITY OF CHILD SUPPORT IS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF A
GUILTY PLEA TO VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER
Heredia pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter, defined in I.C. § 18-4006(3)(c) as
“vehicular – in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause contributing to the
death because of: … (c) the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without
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gross negligence.”
The possible punishments for non-felony vehicular manslaughter as
described in I.C. § 18-4007(3) are:
(c) For a violation of section 18-4006 3.(c), Idaho Code, by a fine of not
more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by a jail sentence not exceeding one
(1) year, or by both such fine and jail sentence.
(d) In addition to the foregoing, any person convicted of a violation of
section 18-4006 3., Idaho Code, which resulted in the death of the parent or
parents of minor children may be ordered by the court to pay support for each
such minor child until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years. Support
shall be established in accordance with the child support guidelines then in effect,
and the nonpayment of such support shall be subject to enforcement and
collection by the surviving parent or guardian of the child in the same manner that
other child support orders are enforced as provided by law. In no event shall the
child support judgment or order imposed by the court under this section be paid or
indemnified by the proceeds of any liability insurance policy.
(e) In addition to the foregoing, the driver’s license of any person
convicted of a violation of section 18-4006 3., Idaho Code, may be suspended for
a time determined by the court.
Heredia was not informed prior to his plea of the provision in I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d) that he
might be ordered to pay child support. A guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record
demonstrates that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ray, 133 Idaho
at 99, 982 P.2d at 934; Colyer, 98 Idaho at 33-34, 557 P.2d at 627-28. There is a prima facie
showing that a plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily when the minimum requirements
of I.C.R. 11 are met. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99, 982 P.2d at 934. Idaho Criminal Rule 11 states that
when a defendant in Idaho enters a guilty plea “the record of the entire proceedings, including
reasonable inferences therefrom, must show: … the defendant was informed of the consequences
of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences
which may apply.” I.C.R. 11(c)(2). The trial court is not required to inform a defendant of
consequences that are collateral or indirect. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887, 55 P.3d at 880; Ray, 133
Idaho at 99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36.
The Court discussed three factors in Ray: (1) the defendant’s power to prevent the
consequence; (2) the punitive or remedial nature of the consequence; and (3) the amount of
control the sentencing judge has over imposing the consequence. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101, 982
P.2d at 934-36. The “power to prevent” analysis infers that where a possible consequence is
within the defendant’s power to prevent, such as persistent violator status, it is collateral to a
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guilty plea. Id. at 99, 982 P.2d at 934. The “amount of control” discussion by the Court infers
that where a judge has no control over a consequence, such as mandatory registration on the sex
offender watch list, it is collateral to a guilty plea. Id. at 101, 982 P.2d at 936. These factors
indicate that a direct consequence is involved where a judge has a large amount of control over
the consequence and the defendant had no power to prevent its occurrence. In Ray, the Court
also assessed the remedial or punitive nature of the consequence in determining whether sex
offender registration was a direct or collateral consequence, concluding that registering was not a
deterrent, that the primary intent of the legislature was informative, that it was not excessive in
relation to its non-punitive purpose, and that a defendant can petition to be relieved of the duty to
register. Id. at 99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36.
Analysis of the factors discussed in Ray lead to the conclusion that child support is a
direct consequence of a guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter. Heredia had no power to prevent
the consequence of child support. The judge had control of the consequence of child support.
Doubtless there are remedial elements in the possibility of child support in the vehicular
manslaughter statute. However, it is also clear that there is a strong punitive intent in the statute.
The possibility is listed under I.C. § 18-4007, entitled “Punishment for Manslaughter.” Also
showing the punitive nature of the consequence is the provision that “[i]n no event shall” the
child support be paid or indemnified by proceeds of a liability insurance policy. I.C. § 184007(3)(d). If the child support were purely remedial in nature, one of the ways to ensure
payment would be through an insurance policy.
Part of knowingly and intelligently pleading guilty involves understanding the nature of
the consequences which the Court may impose. This includes analysis of the disproportionate
nature of the consequence when compared to the other consequences of which the defendant was
informed. Heredia was told of the possibility of a maximum $2,000 fine, a year of jail time, and
suspension of his driving privileges. Child support for five minor children until they reach the
age of 18 is of major magnitude in comparison to the financial threat of the fine of which he was
advised. Heredia should have been advised of the potential by the magistrate court before
entering a plea.
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IV.
HEREDIA MAY WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA
The State argues that Heredia did not establish manifest injustice, pointing to the fact that
his attorney argued against child support in his sentencing memorandum and orally at the
sentencing hearing. Heredia did not indicate that he did not know child support was a possible
consequence when the magistrate asked if he wanted to say anything. The magistrate court
inferred that Heredia knew about the possibility of paying child support based upon his
attorney’s arguments and his failure to express surprise when child support was addressed at
sentencing.
Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with the
constitutional due process standards requiring that a guilty plea be entered into voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887, 55 P.3d at 880. While I.C.R. 11 meets
this standard, it has not been held to be constitutionally mandated in order to fulfill the
requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea. State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95, 90
P.3d 314, 320 (2004). The record of the entire proceedings must affirmatively show that the
defendant was informed of that consequence before the plea was accepted. State v. Rodriguez,
117 Idaho 292, 294-95, 787 P.2d 278, 280-81 (1990) (citing Colyer, 98 Idaho at 35, 557 P.2d at
629). This can be shown by statements other than from the defendant, such as statements by the
defendant’s counsel that the defendant has been fully informed. Id. This does not stand for the
proposition that knowledge of the defendant’s attorney can be imputed to the defendant absent
evidence that the knowledge of the attorney has been communicated to the defendant. Heredia
was informed of the constitutional rights he was giving up. The magistrate court informed
Heredia of the possible penalties by stating:
I’m free to impose any lawful sentence for vehicular manslaughter which
includes a fine of up to – let me double-check this. I want to make sure I don’t
state it incorrectly. This is not amounting to a felony. It’s charged under 3(c).
Okay. Without gross negligence. I’m free to impose a fine of up to $2,000. I’m
free to impose up to one year in jail or both.
In addition to that, I may suspend your driver’s license for a time to be
determined by the Court. And since there’s not a cap on that, I think that arguably
the Court could permanently suspend your driving privileges. So do you
understand that those are the maximum penalties and that I’m free to impose any
penalty up to the maximum?
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The record does not show that the defendant was informed of the consequence of child support.
It was not listed as a consequence of the plea when Heredia entered his guilty plea.
The only
mention of child support in the record is at sentencing. This is not “before a plea of guilty is
accepted” as required by I.C.R. 11. Heredia may withdraw his guilty plea.
V.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the magistrate court denying Heredia’s motion to withdraw guilty plea is
reversed.
Justices TROUT, EISMANN, BURDICK and JONES CONCUR.
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