Chambers v. State
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2007
RYAN CHAMBERS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D06-2273
[October 3, 2007]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Ryan Chambers raises three issues on appeal, only one of which
results in a reversal of his conviction and sentence. Chambers contends
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a recorded
statement and confession which he alleges was unconstitutional because
it was involuntary and coerced.
Chambers was charged with six counts stemming from an incident on
December 29, 2003: burglary (dwelling/battery) (Count I); attempted
robbery (deadly weapon) (Count II, Pauline Crooks, and Count III, Nicki
Crooks); aggravated battery (deadly weapon) (Count IV, Pauline Crooks,
and Count V, Nicki Crooks); and aggravated assault (deadly weapon)
(Count VI, Nicki Crooks).
These charges were the result of the police interrogation of Chambers,
which was recorded and during which Chambers confessed. After the
detectives obtained biographical information, Chambers was read his
Miranda rights and signed a waiver form. Chambers was questioned
about three separate crimes during the interrogation, including the
incident involved in this case. Regarding this incident, the detective
asserted that a neighbor witnessed the incident and that Nicki Crooks
identified Chambers as the perpetrator, so that he would be going away
for thirty years for home invasion robbery with a firearm. The detectives
also told Chambers that judges were not lenient toward people that did
not come clean, especially when the victims could be put on the stand to
testify about their fears at the time of the incident. The detectives
explained to Chambers that if he told them who else was involved with
the incident, they would put in a good word with the prosecutor. The
detectives further suggested to Chambers that if he did not tell the truth
about the other perpetrators and he knew they had guns and they went
out and killed someone, he could be charged with murder. Shortly
following this suggestion that he could be charged with murder,
Chambers confessed to his involvement in the incident in question.
Subsequently, the detectives again explained that they could put a good
word in with the prosecutor and the trial judge, but that they had no say
in what happened to Chambers and it was up to the judge to determine
his sentence.
After he was charged, Chambers filed a motion to suppress.
Chambers contended that his statement to law enforcement and
confession were not voluntary so that they should be suppressed.
Chambers specified certain incidences within his recorded statement
that constituted coercion, including the suggestion that he could face a
murder charge if he did not tell the truth. Judge Alemán denied
Chambers’s motion to suppress, and the case proceeded to jury trial
before Judge Weinstein.
The jury found Chambers guilty of the lesser included offense of
burglary of a dwelling as to Count I and the lesser included offense of
attempted robbery with a weapon as to Count II and Count III, but
acquitted Chambers of Count IV, Count V, and Count VI. Chambers was
then adjudicated guilty and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for each
of the three convictions, all to run concurrently.
“‘The standard of review applicable to a motion to suppress evidence
requires that this Court defer to the trial court’s factual findings but
review legal conclusions de novo.” Pantin v. State, 872 So. 2d 1000,
1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(citations omitted).
The following principles apply to the review of motions to suppress
statements and confessions:
For a confession to be admissible, it must be made
voluntarily. Brewer v. State, 386 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 1980).
It may not be obtained by threats, promises, or the exertion
of any improper influence. Id. “The constitution does not bar
the use...of any statements that could be construed as a
threat or promise, but only those which constitute
outrageous behavior and which in fact induce a confession.”
2
Nelson v. State, 688 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Thus, there must be a causal nexus between the improper
conduct or questioning and the confession. Id. A confession
is not involuntary if officers merely inform a suspect of
realistic penalties and encourage or request that person to
tell the truth. Id. This is equally true if officers tell the
suspect that things would be easier on that person if he or
she told the truth. Id. at 973; Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16,
22 (Fla. 1958).
An officer's promise to inform prosecutors or the trial court
of a suspect's cooperation does not make a confession
involuntary. Maqueira v. State, 588 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla.
1991); see also Nelson, 688 So. 2d at 973. On the other
hand, promises not to prosecute may render a confession
invalid. See Interest of K.H., 418 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982)(finding confession involuntary where officer promised
juvenile he would not be charged, promise was withdrawn,
and juvenile, who was “none too bright,” assumed confession
would revive initial promise).
Edwards v. State, 793 So. 2d 1044, 1047-1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Although Chambers contends that he was coerced during the
interrogation in several different fashions, we conclude that only one
alleged incident amounts to coercion.
Chambers challenges law
enforcement’s suggestion that he could face murder charges unless he
told the truth as an impermissible promise not to prosecute in exchange
for the truth. Two decisions cited by Chambers and rendered by this
Court support his contention.
First, in Edwards v. State, 793 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), this
Court held a confession involuntary where it ensued from an
investigator’s threat to hit a suspect with every charge he could if the
suspect did not tell the truth, and wrote:
Certainly, a threat to charge a suspect with more, and more
serious, crimes unless he or she confesses is coercive.
Further, it is essentially a promise not to prosecute to the
fullest extent allowed by law if that person confesses. Hence,
the investigators’ threats amounted to an exertion of
improper and undue influence, rendering the affected
portion of Edwards’ statement involuntary.
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Id. at 1048. Likewise, in Samuel v. State, 898 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA
2005), this court held a confession involuntary where it ensued from an
officer’s threat to charge the suspect with fifteen robberies, where there
was evidence of at most nine and probable cause for only one, if he did
not tell the truth, writing that “Fowler’s promise not to prosecute the
other fictional crimes” was coercive and rendered the confession
involuntary. Id. at 237.
Based on Edwards and Samuel, we reach the inescapable conclusion
that Chambers’s confession which almost immediately ensued from what
was essentially a promise not to charge him with a “fictional” murder if
he told the truth rendered his recorded statement and confession
unconstitutional as coerced and involuntary. Therefore, Judge Alemán
erred by denying his motion to suppress. Consequently, this case is
reversed and remanded for a new trial (on Counts I, II, and III) at which
Chambers’s recorded statement and confession shall be excluded from
evidence. We affirm in all other respects without further comment.
Reversed and Remanded.
GUNTHER, FARMER and MAY, JJ., concur.
*
*
*
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Peter M. Weinstein and Cheryl J. Alemán, Judges; L.T.
Case No. 04-000699 CF10A.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. McIntire, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Final upon disposition, no further motion for rehearing will be
entertained.
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