Warrix v. Western Regional Jail, No. 3:2018cv00253 - Document 4 (S.D.W. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing the Plaintiff to pay the filing fee of $400 or submit to the Court an amended Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs; further directing Plaintiff to amend his complaint within forty-fiv e (45) days and cure the deficiencies in the pleading as indicated herein; failure to amend the complaint as ordered may result in a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed; Plaintiff's 1 Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs shall be held in abeyance pending initial review of Plaintiff's amended complaint or pending other further proceedings in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 2/8/2018. (cc: Plaintiff) (jsa)
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Warrix v. Western Regional Jail Doc. 4 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E SOU TH ERN D ISTRICT OF W EST VIRGIN IA H U N TIN GTON D IVISION SH AN N ON D AVID W ARRIX, Plain tiff, v. Cas e N o . 3 :18 -cv-0 0 2 53 W ESTERN REGION AL JAIL, D e fe n d an t. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION AN D ORD ER Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without Prepaym ent of Fees and Costs, (ECF No. 1), and Plaintiffs’ Com plaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (ECF No. 2). The undersigned notes that Plaintiff’s Application is incom plete. Before the Application can be accepted for review, the institution of incarceration m ust com plete the certificate located at the bottom of page 2 of the Application, or Plaintiff m ust subm it a transaction record of his inm ate account. For that reason, Plaintiff is hereby ORD ERED to pay the filing fee of $ 40 0 , or subm it to the Court an am ended Application to Proceed Without Prepaym ent of Fees and Costs, which includes the institutional certification, or an inm ate account transaction record. Plain tiff is n o tifie d that failure to pay the fee or subm it the application as instructed within th irty ( 3 0 ) d ays of the date of this Order shall result in a recom m endation that the com plaint be dism issed. In keeping with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned has conducted a prelim inary review of Plaintiff’s com plaint to determ ine if the action is frivolous, fails to 1 Dockets.Justia.com state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted, or seeks m onetary relief from a defendant who is im m une from such relief. Although pro se com plaints, such as the one filed in this case, m ust be liberally construed to allow the developm ent of potentially m eritorious claim s, the court m ay not rewrite the pleading to include claim s that were never presented, Parker v. Cham pion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10 th Cir. 1998), develop the plaintiff’s legal theories for him , Sm all v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court. Beaudett v. City of Ham pton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). At the sam e tim e, to achieve justice, the court m ay allow a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to am end his com plaint in order to correct deficiencies in the pleading. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff alleges that the staff at the Western Regional J ail in Barboursville, West Virginia intentionally provided him with a sleeping m at that had hum an excrem ent on it. When Plaintiff confronted the shift sergeant and two correctional officers about the condition of the m at, they im plied that he was the source of the excrem ent. Plaintiff seeks $ 10 ,0 0 0 for m ental distress. (ECF No. 2). As currently written, Plaintiff’s com plaint fails to state a claim sufficient to withstand dism issal on initial screening, as explained below. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a rem edy to parties who are deprived of federally protected civil rights by persons acting under color of any state “law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage.” To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege facts showing that: (1) an official deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected civil right, privilege or im munity and (2) that the official did so under color of State law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Perrin v. Nicholson, C/ A No. 9:10 -1111-HFF-BM, 20 10 WL 3893792 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 20 10 ). If either of these elem ents is m issing, the com plaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, for an official to be liable 2 under § 1983, it m ust be “affirm atively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 20 3, 214 (D.Md. 1971)). Plaintiff alleges that the Western Regional J ail subjected him to cruel and unusual punishm ent in violation of the Eighth Am endm ent to the United States Constitution by providing him with a soiled sleeping m at. The Eighth Am endm ent “im poses duties on [prison] officials who m ust provide hum ane conditions of confinem ent; prison officials m ust ensure that inm ates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and m edical care, and m ust ‘take reasonable m easures to guarantee the safety of the inm ates.’” Farm er v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (citing Hudson v. Palm er, 468 U.S. 517, 526– 27 (1984)). However, “[p]rison conditions m ay be ‘restrictive and even harsh.’” Farm er, 511 U.S at 833 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapm an, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (“To the extent that [prison] conditions are restrictive or even harsh, they are part of the penalty that crim inal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”). “The Eighth Am endm ent does not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions; it prohibits cruel and unusual punishm ents.” Strickler v. W aters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, not every uncom fortable condition of confinem ent is actionable. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Ultim ately, this prohibition “does not m andate com fortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying the ‘m inim al civilized m easure of life's necessities’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Am endm ent violation.” W ilson v. Seiter, 50 1 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). In order for Plaintiff to m aintain a prim a facie case that his conditions of confinem ent violated the Eighth Am endm ent, he m ust show both (1) the deprivation of a 3 basic hum an need that was “sufficiently serious,” when m easured by an objective standard, and (2) that the responsible prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of m ind.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing W illiam s v. Benjam in, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). “These requirem ents spring from the text of the am endm ent itself; absent intentionality, a condition im posed upon an inm ate cannot properly be called ‘punishm ent,’ and absent severity, a punishm ent cannot be called ‘cruel and unusual.’” Iko, 535 F.3d at 238. To satisfy the objective component, Plaintiff m ust show that the challenged condition caused or constituted an extrem e deprivation. De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 , 634 (4th Cir. 20 0 3). “[T]o dem onstrate such an extrem e deprivation, [Plaintiff] m ust allege a serious or significant physical or em otional injury resulting from the challenged conditions or dem onstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from [his] exposure to the challenged conditions.” Odom v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 20 0 3) (quoting De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634). “Com pelling a showing of significant physical or em otional harm , or a grave risk of such harm , infuses an elem ent of objectivity into the analysis, lest resolution of the seriousness of the deprivation devolve into an application of the subjective views of the judges deciding the question.” Shakka v. Sm ith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Strickler v. W aters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1370 – 80 (4th Cir. 1993)). To fulfill the subjective com ponent, Plaintiff m ust dem onstrate a “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety by the defendants. Farm er, 511 U.S. at 834. The Suprem e Court explained: [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Am endm ent for denying an inm ate hum ane conditions of confinem ent unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inm ate health or safety; the official m ust both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he m ust also draw the 4 inference. Farm er, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference is m ore than m ere negligence but less than m alice. Flores v. Stevenson, Civil Action No. 2:11– cv– 0 1278– TMC– BHH, 20 12 WL 280 3721 (D.S.C. May 11, 20 12). Put sim ply, the staff at the Western Regional J ail had a sufficiently culpable state of m ind if they were aware of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health or safety, but disregarded it. See W ilson, 50 1 U.S. at 298; Brow n v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d 720 , 723 (4th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Case v. Ahitow , 30 1 F.3d 60 5, 60 7 (7th Cir. 20 0 2)) (“[T]he test is whether the guards know the plaintiff inm ate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.”) In addition to the legal principles set forth above, Plaintiff’s claim is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The PLRA expressly prohibits the filing of civil actions by prisoners “confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for m ental or em otional injury suffered while in custody w ith o u t a p rio r s h o w in g o f p h ys ical in ju ry.” (em phasis added). Although the PLRA does not define “physical injury” and the Fourth Circuit has not provided a definition, other courts have held that the “physical injury” referenced by the Act need not be significant, but it m ust be m ore than de m inim is. See, e.g., Flanory v. Bonn, 60 4 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 20 10 ); Mitchell v. Brow n & W illiam son Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 130 9, 1312– 13 (11th Cir. 20 0 2); Siglar v. Hightow er, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318 (S.D. Ind. 1997). In addition, “[a] plaintiff seeking com pensatory dam ages for em otional distress cannot rely on conclusory statem ents that the plaintiff suffered em otional distress [or] the m ere fact that a constitutional violation occurred, but, rather, the testim ony m ust establish that the plaintiff suffered dem onstrable em otional distress, 5 which m ust be sufficiently articulated.” Knussm an v. Mary land, 272 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 20 0 1), quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation m arks om itted). In light of the governing standards and principles, Plaintiff m ust am end his com plaint in order for the undersigned to com plete a prelim inary review of the m erits and rule on the m otion to proceed in form a pauperis. Without such an am endm ent, Plaintiff’s com plaint will be subject to dism issal. Therefore, Plaintiff is ORD ERED to am end his com plaint within fo rty-five ( 4 5) d ays and cure the following deficiencies in pleading as indicated below: 1. The Western Regional J ail is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, if Plaintiff claim s that a person or persons acting under color of state law violated his federal civil or constitutional rights, he m ust am end his com plaint to nam e the individual or individuals as defendant(s). If Plaintiff does not know the nam e of a relevant person, Plaintiff shall list that person as a J ohn Doe or J ane Doe (e.g. Correctional Officer J ohn Doe) and shall further identify the person in the body of the com plaint by description, date/ tim e of contact, alleged act, or in som e other m anner that assists the Court in determ ining the identity and num ber of individual defendants in the action, as well as the specific reason that each person is included in the com plaint. To the extent Plaintiff knows partial nam es, he shall include those parts (e.g. Correctional Officer Ronald LKU (‘last nam e unknown”)). 2. Plaintiff m ust set forth a factual basis upon which the Court can conclude that the soiled m at constituted an extrem e deprivation of the basic necessities of life, and that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety by providing him with the m at. 6 3. Plaintiff m ust identify the nature of the physical and em otional injuries he claim s to have suffered as a result of the alleged wrongdoing. Plain tiff is h e re by give n n o tice that a failure to am end the com plaint as ordered m ay result in a recomm endation that the com plaint be dism issed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/ or for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and L. R. Civ. P. 41.1. Plain tiff is als o re m in d e d of his obligation to prom ptly notify the Clerk of Court of any change in his contact inform ation. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without Prepaym ent of Fees and Costs, (ECF No. 1), shall be held in abeyance pending initial review of Plaintiff’s am ended com plaint or pending other further proceedings in this case. The Clerk is instructed to provide a copy of this order to Plaintiff. EN TERED : February 8, 20 18 7
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