Barber v. Heslep, No. 3:2014cv27349 - Document 326 (S.D.W. Va. 2017)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER denying Defendant's 298 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents; granting Plaintiff's 307 MOTION to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum on Camden Clark Memorial Hospital. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 7/20/2017. (cc: counsel of record) (jsa)

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Barber v. Heslep Doc. 326 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E SOU TH ERN D ISTRICT OF W EST VIRGIN IA H U N TIN GTON D IVISION JILL C. BARBER, Plain tiff, v. Cas e N o .: 3 :14 -cv-2 73 4 9 JAMES W . H ESLEP, D e fe n d an t. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION an d ORD ER This case involves alleged fraudulent conduct by Defendant in the course of resolving a Workers’ Com pensation claim . As part of the prayer for dam ages, Plaintiff seeks com pensation for em otional distress, m ental anguish, and m ental pain and suffering. During discovery, Defendant learned that Plaintiff had received mental health care in the early 1980 ’s, when she was a teenager. Accordingly, Defendant served Plaintiff with a request for production of docum ents, seeking the m ental health records from Plaintiff’s earlier treatm ent. Plaintiff acknowledged that she had possession of the records, but after som e consideration, she refused to supply them to Defendant. Around the sam e tim e, Defendant served Cam den Clark Mem orial Hospital, the successor to the m ental health provider that treated Plaintiff in the 1980 ’s, with a subpoena requiring production of her records. Currently pending are Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash the subpoena, (ECF No. 30 7), and Defendant’s Motion to Com pel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of docum ents, (ECF No. 298). The issue in both m otions is whether Plaintiff’s thirty-year-old m ental health records should be 1 Dockets.Justia.com disclosed to Defendant. The parties appeared on J uly 19, 20 17, by counsel, to argue the m erits of their m otions. Having carefully considered the argum ents, and for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the records should not be disclosed and, therefore, GRAN TS the m otion to quash and D EN IES the m otion to com pel. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) sets forth the protections available to a person subject to or affected by a subpoena. In particular, Rule 45(d)(3) outlines when a court m ust quash or m odify a subpoena, when it m ay do so, and when the court m ay direct compliance under specified conditions. In the context of discovery, “Rule 45 adopts the standards codified in Rule 26.” Schaaf v. Sm ithKline Beecham Corp., 233 F.R.D. 451, 453 (E.D.N.C. 20 0 5). Therefore, the scope and lim itations of discovery set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 are controlling in both m otions. Rule 26 allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged m atter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). As part of the proportionality analysis, the court m ust consider the significance of the issues at stake in the action, the am ount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to inform ation, the parties’ resources, the im portance of the discovery to resolving the issues, and the burden or expense of the proposed discovery. In addition to defining the scope of discovery, Rule 26 contains lim itations to discovery. For exam ple, when a protective order is sought, the court m ay forbid proposed discovery in order to protect a party or person from suffering em barrassm ent or oppression. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). In considering the pending m otions, the first question that m ust be answered is whether Plaintiff’s m ental health care records are privileged; thus, rem oving them from the scope of inform ation subject to discovery under Rule 26. In an action based on 2 diversity of citizenship, where state law supplies the rule of decision, the existence of a privilege is determ ined in accordance with state law; in this case, the law of West Virginia. Fed. R. Evid. 50 1. The parties im plicitly agree that West Virginia does not recognize a psychotherapist/ patient privilege; accordingly, Plaintiff’s m ental health care records are not privileged and m ay be discovered. Nevertheless, the West Virginia legislature has m andated that m ental health care inform ation be treated differently from other health care m atters, providing m ental health care records with heightened protection from disclosure. See W. Va. Code § 27-3-1. According to W. Va. Code § 27-3-1: Com m unications and inform ation obtained in the course of treatm ent or evaluation of any [psychiatric] client or patient are confidential inform ation. Such confidential inform ation includes the fact that a person is or has been a client or patient, inform ation transm itted by a patient or client or fam ily thereof for purposes relating to diagnosis or treatm ent, inform ation transm itted by persons participating in the accom plishm ent of the objectives of diagnosis or treatm ent, all diagnoses or opinions form ed regarding a client's or patient's physical, m ental or em otional condition, any advice, instructions or prescriptions issued in the course of diagnosis or treatm ent, and any record or characterization of the m atters hereinbefore described. W. Va. Code § 27-3-1(a). The statute further prohibits the disclosure of confidential inform ation except in the following circum stances: (1) In a proceeding under section four, article five of this chapter to disclose the results of an involuntary exam ination m ade pursuant to section two, three or four of said article; (2) In a proceeding under article six-a of this chapter to disclose the results of an involuntary exam ination m ade pursuant thereto; (3) Pursuant to an order of any court based upon a finding that the inform ation is sufficiently relevant to a proceeding before the court to outweigh the im portance of m aintaining the confidentiality established by this section; (4) To provide notice to the federal National Instant Crim inal Background Check System , established pursuant to section 10 3(d) of the Brady Handgun 3 Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922, in accordance with article sevena, chapter sixty-one of this code; (5) To protect against a clear and substantial danger of im m inent injury by a patient or client to him self, herself or another; (6) For treatm ent or internal review purposes, to staff of the m ental health facility where the patient is being cared for or to other health professionals involved in treatm ent of the patient; and (7) Without the patient's consent as provided for under the Privacy Rule of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. § 164.50 6, for thirty days from the date of adm ission to a m ental health facility if: (i) The provider m akes a good faith effort to obtain consent from the patient or legal representative prior to disclosure; (ii) the m inim um inform ation necessary is released for a specifically stated purpose; and (iii) prom pt notice of the disclosure, the recipient of the inform ation and the purpose of the disclosure is given to the patient or legal representative. W. Va. Code § 27-3-1(b). Only subsection (3) applies to the instant action. Subsection (3) requires the court to conduct a two-step analysis before ordering the release of confidential inform ation. First, the court m ust determ ine whether the confidential inform ation is relevant to the proceeding. If the inform ation sought is not relevant, then it m ay not be disclosed. Next, if the inform ation is deem ed relevant, the court m ust determ ine if the inform ation is “sufficiently” relevant to outweigh the im portance of m aintaining its confidentiality. Considering the first step, Plaintiff acknowledges that she has m ade a claim for dam ages based on m ental anguish and em otional distress. She argues, however, that the inform ation sought by Defendant is not relevant, because her m ental health as a child has no bearing on her m ental state just prior to and after the alleged fraudulent conduct by Defendant. In response, Defendant points to case law in this district finding that a plaintiff’s m edical records, including m ental health care records, are relevant to em otional distress and m ental anguish claim s. Having reviewed the applicable law, the 4 undersigned agrees with Defendant. For the m ost part, a plaintiff’s m ental health treatm ent and history are relevant to claim s of m ental anguish and em otional distress. Carpenter v. Res-Care Health Servs., No. 3:12-cv-0 80 47, 20 13 WL 1750 464, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. April 23, 20 13). Turning to the second step, the court m ust weigh the evidentiary significance of the records against the statutory and public policy goals of keeping psychiatric inform ation confidential. At this step, Plaintiff’s argum ent that her thirty-year-old records lack “sufficient” relevance is persuasive. Mental health care records reflecting treatm ent received by Plaintiff three decades earlier, when she was a teenager, are sim ply too rem ote in tim e to be of great evidentiary significance. Defendant’s need for the records is further dim inished by the fact that Plaintiff did not receive any additional m ental health care after her treatm ent in early the 1980 ’s until 20 13, when she sought treatm ent in connection with the instant action. Thus, when com paring the potential litigation benefits associated with a release of the records against the need to protect their confidentiality, the im portance of the records is substantially outweighed by the Plaintiff’s right to keep those records confidential. Therefore, the records m ay not be disclosed under West Virginia law. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record. EN TERED : J uly 20 , 20 17 5

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