Riggs v. Colvin, No. 3:2014cv14050 - Document 15 (S.D.W. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that theCommissioners decision IS supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, by JudgmentOrder entered this day, the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and thismatter is DISMISSED from the docket of this Court Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 7/23/2015. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (skm)
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Riggs v. Colvin Doc. 15 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E SOU TH ERN D ISTRICT OF W EST VIRGIN IA H U N TIN GTON D IVISION MARK ERIC RIGGS, Plain tiff, v. Cas e N o .: 3 :14 -cv-14 0 50 CAROLYN W . COLVIN , Actin g Co m m is s io n e r o f th e So cial Se cu rity Ad m in is tratio n , D e fe n d an t. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION This is an action seeking review of the decision of the Com m issioner of the Social Security Adm inistration (hereinafter the “Com m issioner”) denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplem ental security incom e (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 40 1-433, 1381-1383f. The case is presently before the Court on the parties’ m otions for judgm ent on the pleadings as articulated in their briefs. (ECF Nos. 11, 14). Both parties have consented in writing to a decision by the United States Magistrate J udge. (ECF Nos. 4, 5). The Court has fully considered the evidence and the argum ents of counsel. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the decision of the Com m issioner is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirm ed. I. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry Plaintiff, Mark Eric Riggs (“Claim ant”), filed for DIB and SSI on October 22, 20 10 , alleging a disability onset date of February 15, 20 0 7, (Tr. at 175, 177), due to “depression, - 1Dockets.Justia.com anxiety, seizures, m ental stability, arthritis, bone degeneration.” (Tr. at 20 3). The Social Security Adm inistration (“SSA”) denied the applications initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. at 25). Claim ant filed a request for a hearing, which was held on Decem ber 26, 20 12 before the Honorable Robert B. Bowling, Adm inistrative Law J udge (“ALJ ”). (Tr. at 42-75). By written decision dated February 6, 20 13, the ALJ determ ined that Claim ant was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. at 25-36). The ALJ ’s decision becam e the final decision of the Com m issioner on February 6, 20 14, when the Appeals Council denied Claim ant’s request for review. (Tr. at 1-3). On April 3, 20 14, Claim ant filed the present civil action seeking judicial review of the adm inistrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 40 5(g). (ECF No. 2). The Com m issioner filed an Answer and a Transcript of the Proceedings on J une 12, 20 14. (ECF Nos. 9, 10 ). Thereafter, the parties filed their briefs in support of judgm ent on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 11, 14). Accordingly, this m atter is fully briefed and ready for disposition. II. Claim an t’s Backgro u n d Claim ant was 40 years old at the tim e of his alleged onset of disability, 44 years old when he filed the applications for benefits, and 46 years old at the tim e of the ALJ ’s decision. (Tr. at 46). He com pleted the tenth grade in school and com m unicates in English. (Tr. at 47, 20 2). Claim ant’s prior work experience includes jobs as a truck driver, tire-changer, and owner of an appliance repair business. (Tr. at 34, 20 4). III. Su m m ary o f ALJ’s Fin d in gs Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), a claim ant seeking disability benefits has the burden of proving a disability. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). A disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason -2- of any m edically determ inable physical or m ental im pairm ent which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 m onths.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations establish a five step sequential evaluation process for the adjudication of disability claim s. If an individual is found “not disabled” at any step of the process, further inquiry is unnecessary and benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1520 (a)(4), 416.920 (a)(4). First, the ALJ determ ines whether a claim ant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employm ent. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 (b), 416.920 (b). Second, if the claim ant is not gainfully em ployed, then the inquiry is whether the claim ant suffers from a severe im pairm ent. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 (c), 416.920 (c). Third, if the claim ant suffers from a severe im pairm ent, the ALJ determ ines whether this im pairm ent m eets or equals any of the im pairm ents listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Adm inistrative Regulations No. 4 (the “Listing”). Id. §§ 40 4.1520 (d), 416.920 (d). If the im pairm ent does m eet or equal a listed im pairm ent, then the claim ant is found disabled and awarded benefits. However, if the im pairm ent does not m eet or equal a listed im pairm ent, the adjudicator m ust determ ine the claim ant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the m easure of the claim ant’s ability to engage in substantial gainful activity despite the lim itations of his or her im pairm ents. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 (e), 416.920 (e). In the fourth step, the ALJ ascertains whether the claim ant’s impairm ents prevent the perform ance of past relevant work. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 (f), 416.920 (f). If the im pairm ents do prevent the perform ance of past relevant work, then the claim ant has established a prim a facie case of disability and the burden shifts to the Com m issioner to prove the final step. McLain v. Schw eiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983). Under the fifth and final inquiry, the Com m issioner m ust dem onstrate that the claim ant is able to perform other form s of -3- substantial gainful activity, while taking into account the claim ant’s rem aining physical and m ental capacities, age, education, and prior work experiences. 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1520 (g), 416.920 (g); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992). The Com m issioner m ust establish two things: (1) that the claim ant, considering his or her age, education, skills, work experience, and physical shortcom ings has the capacity to perform an alternative job, and (2) that this specific job exists in significant num bers in the national econom y. McLam ore v. W einberger, 538 F.2d 572, 574 (4th Cir. 1976). When a claim ant alleges a m ental im pairm ent, the ALJ “m ust follow a special technique” when assessing disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1520 a, 416.920 a. First, the ALJ evaluates the claim ant’s pertinent signs, sym ptom s, and laboratory results to determine whether the claim ant has a m edically determ inable m ental im pairm ent. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 a(b), 416.920 a(b). If such im pairm ent exists, the ALJ docum ents the findings. Second, the ALJ rates and docum ents the degree of functional lim itation resulting from the im pairm ent according to criteria specified in the Regulations. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 a(c), 416.920 a(c). Third, after rating the degree of functional lim itation from the claim ant’s im pairm ent(s), the ALJ determ ines the severity of the lim itation. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 a(d), 416.920 a(d). A rating of “none” or “m ild” in the first three functional areas (activities of daily living, social functioning, and concentration, persistence or pace) and “none” in the fourth (episodes of decom pensation) will result in a finding that the im pairm ent is not severe unless the evidence indicates that there is more than m inim al lim itation in the claim ant’s ability to do basic work activities. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 a(d)(1), 416.920 a(d)(1). Fourth, if the claim ant’s im pairm ent is deem ed severe, the ALJ com pares the m edical findings about the severe im pairm ent and the degree of functional lim itation against the criteria of the appropriate listed m ental disorder to determ ine if the severe im pairm ent -4- m eets or is equal to a listed mental disorder. Id. §§ 40 4.1520 a(d)(2), 416.920 a(d)(2). Finally, if the ALJ finds that the claim ant has a severe m ental im pairm ent that neither m eets nor equals a listed m ental disorder, then the ALJ assesses the claim ant’s residual function. 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1520 a(d)(3), 416.920 a(d)(3). In this case, the ALJ determ ined as a prelim inary m atter that Claim ant m et the insured status requirem ents of the Social Security Act through Decem ber 31, 20 0 9. (Tr. at 27, Finding No. 1). The ALJ acknowledged that Claim ant satisfied the first inquiry because he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 15, 20 0 7, the alleged disability onset date. (Id., Finding No. 2). Under the second inquiry, the ALJ found that Claim ant suffered from severe im pairm ents of a seizure disorder, an anxietyrelated disorder, and an affective disorder. (Tr. at 27-28, Finding No. 3). Claim ant also had two non-severe im pairm ents; that being, post-traum atic stress disorder and disorders of the spine. (Id.). Under the third inquiry, the ALJ concluded that Claim ant’s im pairm ents, either individually or in com bination, did not m eet or m edically equal any of the listed im pairm ents. (Tr. at 28-30 , Finding No. 4). Therefore, the ALJ determ ined that Claim ant had the RFC to: [P]erform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional lim itations: the claim ant can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and clim b ram ps and stairs, but can never clim b ladder, ropes, or scaffolds. Further, claim ant m ust avoid all exposure to the use of m oving m achinery and unprotected heights. Moreover, the work m ust be lim ited to sim ple, routine, repetitive tasks perform ed in a work environm ent free of fast-paced production requirem ents, involving only sim ple work-related decisions and with few, if any work place changes. Finally, the claim ant should only occasionally interact with the public and coworkers. (Tr. at 30 -34, Finding No. 5). At the fourth step of the analysis, the ALJ determ ined that Claim ant was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. at 34, Finding No. 6). Consequently, the ALJ considered Claim ant’s past work experience, age, and education in -5- com bination with his RFC under the fifth and final step to determ ine if he would be able to engage in substantial gainful activity. (Tr. at 35-36, Finding Nos. 7-10 ). The ALJ considered that (1) Claim ant was born in 1966 and was defined as a younger individual on the alleged disability onset date; (2) he had a lim ited education but could com m unicate in English; and (3) transferability of job skills was not m aterial to the ALJ ’s disability determ ination because the Medical-Vocational Rules supported a finding of nondisability regardless of Claim ant’s transferable job skills. (Tr. at 35, Finding Nos. 7-9). Taking into account all of these factors, and Claim ant’s RFC, and relying upon the opinion testim ony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determ ined that Claim ant could perform jobs that exist in significant num bers in the national econom y. (Tr. at 35-36, Finding No. 10 ). At the m edium exertional level, Claim ant could work as a hand packager and laundry worker; at the light level, he could be a price m arker or house sitter; and at the sedentary level, Claim ant could perform jobs such as a grader/ sorter or bench worker. (Tr. at 35-36). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Claim ant was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act from February 15, 20 0 7 through the date of the decision. (Tr. at 36, Finding No. 11). IV. Claim an t’s Ch alle n ge to th e Co m m is s io n e r’s D e cis io n Claim ant argues that the Com m issioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, because the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinion of Claim ant’s treating physician, Dr. Mark B. Kingston, who stated that Claim ant’s post-traum atic stress disorder and seizure disorder rendered him totally disabled. (ECF No. 11 at 5-7). Claim ant also contends that the ALJ failed to give good reasons why he rejected Dr. Kingston’s opinions although they were fully corroborated by the m edical records. Claim ant concedes that an ALJ m ay discount the opinion of a treating physician, but only -6- when there is “persuasive contradictory evidence” in the record supporting the ALJ ’s position. Otherwise, the “treating source rule” obligates the ALJ to give the opinions of a treating physician substantial, and even controlling weight. (Id.). The Com m issioner responds by pointing out that the ALJ acted well within his authority to reject Dr. Kingston’s opinion because (1) the opinion was inconsistent with the treatm ent records, which reflected only conservative therapy; (2) Dr. Kingston’s opinion was not well-supported by the evidence; and (3) Dr. Kingston is a fam ily care physician, not a m ental health specialist or a neurologist. Furtherm ore, the Com m issioner em phasizes that Dr. Kingston was not Claim ant’s prim ary health care provider for his m ental health and seizure issues, and generally did little m ore than refill his prescriptions. (ECF No. 14 at 10 -11). According to the Com m issioner, the ALJ gave appropriate weight to Dr. Kingston’s opinion and reasonably accounted for all of the lim itations supported by the record in the RFC finding. V. Re le van t Me d ical Re co rd s The Court has reviewed the transcript of proceedings in its entirety including the m edical records in evidence. The Court has con fined its sum m ary of Claim ant’s treatm ent and evaluations to those entries m ost relevant to the issues in dispute. A. Tr e a t m e n t R e co r d s On February 15, 20 0 7, Claim ant presented to the Em ergency Departm ent (“ED”) at Three Rivers Medical Center (“TRMC”) com plaining of weakness and an episode of syncope that had occurred that m orning before breakfast. (Tr. at 310 , 334). Claim ant stated that his eyes suddenly becam e dim , his entire head was num b, and he was weak throughout. The episode lasted approxim ately two hours. (Tr. at 310 ). Claim ant indicated that he had experienced sim ilar episodes in the distant past, but never to the extent of the -7- recent one. He voiced no other com plaints. Claim ant had no significant fam ily or m edical history. He adm itted to sm oking one and one half packs of cigarettes per day and occasionally drinking alcohol, but he denied illicit drug use. Claim ant was exam ined on February 16, 20 0 7 by Dr. Mark Kingston, who was assigned to provide in-patient care by the ED. (Tr. at 311). Dr. Kingston found no abnorm al physical findings. An EKG and a CT scan of the head were norm al, as were m ost of Claim ant’s laboratory studies, including cardiac enzym es, although Claim ant’s blood glucose level was elevated. (Tr. at 316). Claim ant’s drug and alcohol screens were negative. A carotid duplex ultrasound study was ordered, and it showed no significant stenosis. (Tr. at 315). Claim ant was discharged from TRMC later that day with instructions to eat a heart healthy diet and see Dr. Kingston in follow-up on February 23, 20 0 7. (Tr. at 345). On February 17, 20 0 7, Claim ant returned to TRMC’s ED with confusion. (Tr. at 287-88). According to the ED record, Claim ant had previously been at TRMC due to confusion and was released a day earlier with no known cause of his sym ptom s. The m orning of this adm ission, Claim ant experienced another episode of trem orous activity and confusion, which lasted about an hour. During the episode, Claim ant did not recognize his wife. (Tr. at 287). Claim ant was evaluated in the ED by Dr. Kingston. Dr. Kingston noted Claimant’s com plaints as including weakness, nausea, change in m ental status, trem ulousness, m em ory loss, change in behavior, and confusion. He had no significant m edical history. On exam ination, Claim ant appeared confused and in m oderate distress. However, his physical findings were norm al, including his thought content and orientation to person and place. He was adm itted to the hospital for further evaluation. (Tr. at 288). Claim ant underwent an EEG that was norm al, but was -8- nonetheless started on an anti-seizure m edication, Dilantin. (Tr. at 286). He was scheduled for an outpatient MRI of the head and was discharged on February 21, 20 0 7. (Id.). Claim ant’s MRI was perform ed later that day and was interpreted as norm al. (Tr. at 385). Claim ant consulted with Dr. Carl McCom as, a neurologist, on J uly 12, 20 0 7 at the request of Dr. Kingston. (Tr. at 351). With respect to Claim ant’s history, Dr. McCom as recorded that Claim ant had experienced spells of altered consciousness as far back as 1986. He had m ultiple evaluations with no real diagnosis. In February 20 0 7, Claim ant began having episodes during which the back of his neck tingled, he felt a pressure sensation in his head, he shook all over, and he becam e confused. He was hospitalized for these episodes and recently was started on Dilantin. On physical exam ination, Claim ant had a norm al weight and blood pressure. His neurological exam ination was entirely norm al, although his m ood appeared depressed. (Id.). Dr. McCom as concluded that Claim ant m ight be having pseudoseizures related to panic attacks, rather than epileptic seizures. He decided to order an EEG and decrease Claim ant’s dosage of Dilantin. Claim ant underwent the EEG on J uly 17, 20 0 7. (Tr. at 350 ). The study revealed norm al findings during wakefulness, but reflected a 14-m inute psuedoseizure when applying photic stim ulation. On December 10 , 20 0 7, Claim ant went to TRMC’s ED with com plaints of pain at m ultiple sites, prim arily the left side. (Tr. at 352-53, 361). He advised the ED nurse that he had been kicked by a horse, and the horse had also stepped on him . (Tr. at 36162).Claim ant was seen by an ED physician to whom Claim ant reported that the pain was largely in his lower back, was m oderate in intensity, and was not relieved by anything. (Tr. at 352). The ED physician found nothing abnorm al on exam ination, and Claim ant’s -9- laboratory studies likewise revealed no clinically significant abnorm alities. A CT scan of the abdom en/ pelvis was unrem arkable. (Tr. at 355). The final clinical im pression of the ED physician was contusion of the left kidney. (Tr. at 353). Claim ant was discharged hom e after being given som e pain m edications and instructions to see Dr. Kingston in follow-up. (Tr. at 362-64). On April 24 and J une 4, 20 0 8, Claim ant was seen in TRMC’s ED for sudden onset of seizures. (Tr. at 390 -91, 40 9-10 ). In April, Claim ant’s wife advised that the seizure lasted approxim ately twenty m inutes and “was worse than any he had ever had.” (Tr. at 414). In both cases, the ED physician perform ed an exam ination, noting the absence of external traum a or abnorm al physical findings, although Claim ant appeared anxious and in m oderate distress during the J une visit. (Tr. at 391, 410 ). His laboratory studies were norm al at both visits, and a CT scan of the brain taken on J une 4, 20 0 8 was also norm al. Claim ant was diagnosed with chronic seizures and then pseudoseizures and was discharged hom e in stable condition. (Tr. at 391, 40 2, 410 ). On February 16, 20 0 9, Claim ant presented to TRMC’s ED with a seizure that had occurred one hour prior to his arrival. (Tr. at 444). Claim ant’s wife stated that she witnessed the seizure, and it lasted approxim ately 5-6 m inutes. She reported that Claim ant had not taken his Dilantin that m orning. (Tr. at 442). Claim ant was exam ined by the ED physician, who found no obvious abnorm alities. (Tr. at 436). Claim ant was diagnosed with chronic seizures, given Percocet for a headache, and discharged home. (Tr. at 436, 445). He was instructed to follow-up with Dr. Kingston. Claim ant presented to the ED at TRMC on October 11, 20 10 at the suggestion of Dr. Kingston for sym ptom s of severe anxiety and depression. (Tr. at 479). The sym ptom s had started three days prior to adm ission and had gotten progressively worse. According - 10 - to the record, Claim ant had been to TRMC on two occasions in the prior four days and was treated for seizures, anxiety, and low Dilantin levels. (Tr. at 497-98, 515-17). On those visits, Claim ant was told to resum e taking Dilantin at hom e and was given two doses of Dilantin while in the ED. He was released and told to follow-up with Dr. Kingston. (Tr. at 50 8, 522). On this ED visit, Claim ant was evaluated by the ED physician, who adm itted Claim ant to the Behavioral Medicine Unit for further assessm ent. The working diagnosis was acute depressive disorder, suspected m edication non-com pliance. (Tr. at 481). The following m orning, Claim ant was interviewed and exam ined by Dr. Corazon Chua, a psychiatrist at TRMC. (Tr. at 455-58). Dr. Chua docum ented Claim ant’s reason for adm ission as “hearing voices.” Claim ant reported that he had stopped taking Dilantin approxim ately 3-4 m onths earlier and had started to hear voices and have strange ideas. He described being very “hyper” about his ideas in the m orning and then slowing down in the afternoon, often repeating things 4 or 5 tim es. Claim ant indicated that the voices and ideas had disappeared since he started taking Dilantin again. He also reported that he felt severely depressed, although he was not suicidal. His m edical history was significant for pseudoseizures. There was no history of psychiatric problem s in his fam ily. Dr. Chua perform ed a m ental status exam ination, noting that Claim ant was cooperative and verbal, with clear and coherent speech. (Tr. at 456). His affect/ m ood was depressed, but his thought processes were norm al and sensorium was clear. Claim ant was found to be oriented to person, place, and tim e. However, his insight and judgm ent were poor. (Id.). Claim ant’s attention, concentration, and abstract reasoning were intact; his m em ory was “fair,” and he was “fairly reliable.” (Tr. at 456-57). Dr. Chua diagnosed Claim ant with depressive disorder, not otherwise specified (“NOS”); rule out psychosis, - 11 - NOS; rule out m edication induced disorder; rule out conversion disorder. (Tr. at 458). Claim ant rem ained in the hospital an additional day and received m edications. On the m orning of October 13, 20 10 , he reported feeling fine, with no depression or anxiety and no suicidal thoughts. (Tr. at 453). He felt the m edications were working. Claim ant was discharged to hom e with instructions to follow-up at Prestera Centers for Mental Health (“Prestera”). His final diagnosis was depressive disorder, NOS; anxiety disorder, NOS; and factitious disorder. (Id.). Claim ant had his initial visit with Prestera on October 20 , 20 10 . (Tr. at 694-98). At that tim e, several staff m em bers m et with Claim ant and com pleted a patient database. Claim ant described his chief com plaint as longstanding depression and anxiety, which he related to abuse he suffered as a child. (Tr. at 694). Claim ant denied any prior outpatient counseling, but stated that he had two psychiatric adm issions to TRMC. Claim ant provided social, fam ily, work, and legal history. His working diagnosis was m ajor depressive disorder, m oderate, and anxiety disorder, NOS. (Tr. at 697). His GAF score was 60 .1 A second database was com pleted by Tam m y Chaney, B.A., which provided m ore detail about Claim ant’s sym ptom s, history, and level of functioning. (Tr. at 681-88). Under level of functioning, Claim ant was noted to have no im pairm ent related to 1 The Global Assessm ent of Functioning (“GAF”) Scale is a 10 0 -point scale that scores “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of m ental health-illness,” but “do[es] not include im pairm ent in functioning due to physical (or environm ental) lim itations.” Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Americ. Psych. Assoc, 32 (4th Ed. 20 0 2) (“DSM-IV”). On the GAF scale, a higher score correlates with a less severe im pairment. In the past, this tool was regularly used by m ental health professionals; however, in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-5, the GAF scale was abandoned in part due to its “conceptual lack of clarity” and its “questionable psychom etrics in routine practice.” DSM-5 at p. 16. GAF scores between 51 and 60 indicate “Moderate sym ptom s (e.g., flat affect and circum stantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR m oderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” DSM-IV at 32. - 12 - activities of daily living, and lim ited im pairm ent with relationships and social situations. (Tr. at 684). Claim ant had a variety of sym ptom s, which on a scale of “not present,” “m ild,” “m oderate,” “severe,” and “acute/ crisis,” had an acuity ranging from “m ild” to “m oderate.” (Tr. at 666). Ms. Chaney perform ed a m ental status exam ination, docum enting norm al findings for the m ost part, with the exception that Claim ant was withdrawn in sociability, overwhelm ed in coping, and displayed a restricted affect. (Tr. at 687-88). He was scheduled to see both a psychiatrist and an individual therapist. Claim ant’s initial appointm ent with Dr. Nika Razavipour, a psychiatrist working at Prestera, occurred on Novem ber 11, 20 10 . (Tr. at 699). Dr. Razavipour went through Claim ant’s recent sym ptom s and concerns, as well as his m edications, and discussed his m edical treatm ent. Dr. Razavipour also conducted a mental status exam ination, finding Claim ant to be depressed and anxious. Claim ant described having auditory hallucinations in which God told him how to kill him self. Dr. Razavipour diagnosed Claim ant with posttraum atic stress disorder and assigned him a GAF score of 48. 2 Claim ant was placed on a trial of Celexa and Clonidine, and told to continue Klonopin, reduce Effexor, and initiate individual therapy. Claim ant began individual therapy with Debra Stephens, Licensed Social Worker, MSW, on Novem ber 17, 20 10 . (Tr. at 650 ). Ms. Stephens noted that Claim ant had depression and anxiety related to childhood abuse. At the present, he was feeling hopeless and helpless due to his unem ploym ent and seizure activity. Ms. Stephens discussed these issues with Claim ant and recom m ended continued therapy. On Novem ber 22, 20 10 , at a follow-up session, Dr. Razavipour learned that 2 A GAF of 41-50 indicates serious symptom s (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious im pairm ent in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. no friends, unable to keep a job). DSM-IV at 32. - 13 - Claim ant was taking Dilantin and Clonidine, but still had sym ptom s, including poor concentration ringing in his ears, irritability, and anger. (Tr. at 643). Claim ant’s GAF score was 50 . Dr. Razavipour decided to continue Claim ant on Celexa and increase his Clonidine dosage. Claim ant was instructed to continue therapy with Ms. Stephens. By Decem ber 6, 20 10 , Claim ant reported having som e issues with Clonidine. (Tr. at 70 2). He also indicated that his fam ily doctor would no longer prescribe Klonopin and Dilantin. Dr. Razavipour decided to gradually taper off Claim ant’s Dilantin given a recent EEG that was negative for epileptic activity. Dr. Razavipour also stopped Clonidine. In place, Claim ant was given Risperdal, and was told to continue Klonopin and Celexa. He was also instructed to continue individual therapy. On this visit, Claim ant’s GAF score was 55. Claim ant returned to Dr. Razavipour in J anuary and February 20 11, and his m edications were tweaked. (Tr. at 70 3-0 4). Claim ant m issed m ultiple individual therapy sessions, but returned to Prestera to see Ms. Stephens on March 14, 20 11. (Tr. at 678). Claim ant reported having recent stressors involving his lack of incom e and his father-in-law. Ms. Stephens discussed the stressors with Claim ant and m ade suggestions on how to cope with them . She felt that they would need to work on im proving Claim ant’s m ood while addressing his childhood history of abuse. On May 2, 20 11, Claim ant m et with Dr. Razavipour. (Tr. at 624). Claim ant reported that he was still depressed, angry, irritable, and anxious. He stated that he had auditory hallucinations that he believed was God’s voice telling him how to kill him self, or encouraging him to build a power plant. He continued to have problem s sleeping, as well. Claim ant’s m edication dosages were tweaked, and he was instructed to follow-up with Ms. Stephen’s for individual therapy. (Id.). Claim ant had individual therapy with Ms. - 14 - Stephens on May 8, 20 11, and they agreed to work on his core negative feelings. (Tr. at 629). Claim ant next Dr. Razavipour on J une 30 , 20 11. (Tr. at 618). On this visit, Claim ant reported feeling less anxious and depressed. His m edication regim en of Risperdal, Celexa, and Klonopin was continued. Claim ant returned to Dr. Razavipour’s office on Novem ber 3, 20 11. (Tr. at 60 8). He advised that he could no longer afford Risperdal due to his wife being out of work. Claim ant continued to com plain of sleeprelated issues and nervousness. Dr. Razavipour increased Claim ant’s Risperdal prescription and arranged get him assistance with the cost of the drug. Claim ant was additionally ordered to take Haldol, Celexa, and Klonopin. Claim ant had individual therapy with Ms. Stephens on October 20 , 20 11 and Novem ber 17, 20 11. (Tr. at 613, 615). They prim arily discussed Claim ant’s grave financial situation and his feelings related to that issue. Ms. Stephens indicated in October that Claim ant was depressed and anxious, and was feeling overwhelm ed with his situation. However, by the Novem ber session, Claim ant’s m ood was noted to be im proving. (Tr. at 613). B. R FC Op in io n s On March 1, 20 11, Bob Marinelli, Ed.D., com pleted a Psychiatric Review Technique. (Tr. at 552-64). Dr. Marinelli opined that there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish the presence of a psychiatric im pairm ent. (Tr. at 552, 564). Dr. Caroline William s reached a sim ilar conclusion on March 8, 20 11 with respect to Claim ant’s Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessm ent, noting that the evidence was not adequate to assess Claim ant’s allegations for the tim e period of February 15, 20 0 7 to Decem ber 31, 20 0 9, the date Claim ant was last insured for DIB. (Tr. at 573). - 15 - Dr. William s re-evaluated Claim ant’s allegations on March 15, 20 11 and this tim e com pleted a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessm ent form . (Tr. at 574-81). She opined that Claim ant had no exertional, m anipulative, visual, or com m unicative lim itations. However, Dr. William s felt Claim ant should never clim b ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and should avoid all exposure to hazards, such as m achinery and heights. She did not find Claim ant’s allegations to be entirely credible, stating that his purported sym ptom s and alleged disability were disproportionate to the m edical evidence. (Tr. at 579). Dr. William s’s assessm ent was affirm ed by Dr. Pedro Lo on October 4, 20 11, after he com pleted a review of the record. (Tr. at 60 7). On April 25, 20 11, Claim ant was assessed by Lisa Tate, a Master’s Degree-level psychologist, at the request of the West Virginia Disability Determ ination Service. (Tr. at 582-86). Claim ant drove him self to the exam ination and was accom panied by his wife. He was well-groom ed, with good posture and a norm al gait. He had no vision or hearing problem s and presented an Ohio driver’s license for identification. Claim ant’s chief com plaints were depression, anxiety, and m edical problem s. He reported that he felt depressed all of his life, but five years earlier, the sym ptom s had worsened. (Tr. at 583). He described having continuous depression with associated sym ptom s of fatigue, sleep difficulty, social withdrawal, loss of interest in activities, varied appetite, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, irritability, and daily anger spells. Claim ant also reported feelings of anxiety that had been present approxim ately eight years and were accom panied by panic attacks during which he would have difficulty breathing, heart palpitations, chest pain, and hyperventilation. (Id.). Ms. Tate reviewed records from Claim ant’s psychiatric adm ission to TRMC, as well as a clinical interpretative sum m ary from Prestera. She asked Claim ant about his m edical - 16 - history, and he advised that he had no recent injuries, illnesses, or hospitalizations. Claim ant reported his history of pseudoseizures and provided a list of his current m edications. He adm itted to sm oking two packs of cigarettes per day, having started sm oking at age 17. His fam ily history was negative for any significant health problem s. He stated that his parents and siblings were all alive and had no known m edical issues. (Tr. at 584). Claim ant described his psychiatric history as including one adm ission to TRMC and four to five m onths of outpatient therapy offered through Prestera. Claim ant detailed his educational and vocational history, indicating that he dropped out of high school in the 11th grade and worked as a truck driver for approxim ately twenty years. His last job involved working in appliance repair at a shop owned by his father, but the job ended four or five years earlier when the business closed. Ms. Tate perform ed a m ental status exam ination. (Tr. at 584-85). She found Claim ant to be alert and oriented, although his m ood was depressed and his affect was m ildly restricted. Claim ant’s thought content was norm al, as was his thought processes. Claim ant denied suicidal thoughts, and his judgm ent was gauged to be norm al, while his insight was fair. Claim ant’s rem ote, recent, and imm ediate mem ory and concentration were norm al. Ms. Tate diagnosed Claim ant with m ajor depressive disorder, single episode, chronic with anxious features, and panic disorder without agoraphobia. (Tr. at 585). She docum ented Claim ant’s daily activities as including watching television, sleeping interm ittently throughout the day, and trying to “m ess around the house with som e stuff.” (Id.). Claim ant showered once or twice each week; checked at least once per week on his in-laws’ horses; went to the convenience store two or three tim es per week; and visited his parents once or twice each m onth. He liked to “tinker” with item s, like his lawn m owers. Claim ant’s social functioning, persistence, and pace were observed to be - 17 - within norm al clinical lim its. (Tr. at 586). On May 10 , 20 11, based in part on Ms. Tate’s clinical evaluation, Dr. Marinelli com pleted a second Psychiatric Review Technique. (Tr. at 588-60 1). He opined that Claim ant had nonsevere im pairm ents of affective disorder and anxiety-related disorder. (Tr. at 588). The affective disorder was identified as m ajor depressive disorder with anxious features, and the anxiety-related disorder was panic disorder without agoraphobia versus post-traum atic stress disorder. Dr. Marinelli felt that Claim ant’s im pairm ents m ildly lim ited his activities of daily living, social functioning, and ability to m aintain concentration, persistence, and pace. (Tr. at 598). Claim ant had no episodes of decom pensation of extended duration. According to Dr. Marinelli, the evidence did not establish paragraph “C” criteria for either im pairm ent. He felt that Claim ant’s reported sym ptom s were generally consistent with Ms. Tate’s evaluation and, therefore, appeared credible. (Tr. at 60 0 ). Dr. Marinelli’s opinions were affirm ed on Septem ber 17, 20 11 by J am es Binder, M.D., who perform ed a review of the record and com pleted a case analysis. (Tr. at 60 6). On February 28, 20 12, Claim ant was evaluated at the request of his attorney by Susan Bartram , a Master’s Degree-level psychologist working at River Valley Associates in Barboursville, West Virginia. (Tr. at 70 5-0 9). Ms. Bartram ’s initial observations of Claim ant were quite sim ilar to those of Ms. Tate, and Claim ant’s sym ptom s and chief com plaints were also largely the sam e. (Tr. at 70 5). Ms. Bartram reviewed m edical records from Dr. McCom as and Prestera. She apparently also had the evaluation report prepared by Ms. Tate, although Ms. Bartram ’s reference to the report is som ewhat confusing given that she discussed a report prepared on May 13, 20 11, when Ms. Tate actually saw Claim ant on April 25, 20 11 and issued her report on May 4, 20 11. In any - 18 - event, the m edical, social, fam ily, educational, and vocational history provided by Claim ant to Ms. Bartram was consistent with the inform ation he provided to Ms. Tate. (Tr. at 70 6). Ms. Bartram adm inistered a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and a Wide Range Achievem ent Test. Claim ant had a full scale IQ of 82, which Ms. Bartram determ ined was a valid score. (Tr. at 70 6-0 7). She also conducted a m ental status exam ination. (Tr. at 70 7-0 8). She observed that Claim ant appeared depressed with a blunt affect, but had norm al thought processes and thought content. Claim ant’s insight was noted to be fair; his judgm ent was norm al; his rem ote m em ory and im m ediate mem ory were norm al, but his recent m em ory was im paired. Ms. Bartram diagnosed Claim ant with post-traum atic stress disorder; m ajor depressive disorder, recurrent, chronic with anxious features; and panic disorder, without agoraphobia. (Tr. at 70 8). Ms. Bartram described Claim ant’s activities to include sleeping, some shopping, periodic tending to his in-laws’ horses, and watching television. She opined that Claim ant’s concentration and social functioning were im paired, but his persistence and pace were norm al. (Tr. at 70 9). However, based upon Claim ant’s intellectual ability, reading and writing scores, and her clinical observations, Ms. Bartram felt Claim ant’s prognosis was poor, even with continued therapy. On December 21, 20 12, Dr. Kingston wrote a letter addressed to Claim ant’s attorney in which he stated that Claim ant suffered from post-traum atic stress disorder with severe sym ptom s at tim es, including panic episodes, chronic anxiety, and depression, and he was being followed by Prestera for these issues. (Tr. at 717). In addition, Dr. Kingston noted that Claim ant had pseudoseizures for which he saw a neurologist. Dr. Kingston opined that “[b]oth of these conditions have disabled - 19 - [Claim ant] from gainful em ploym ent.” (Id.). Dr. Kingston expressed his belief that the conditions were perm anent and would likely disable Claim ant perm anently. (Id.). VI. Sco p e o f Re vie w The issue before this Court is whether the final decision of the Com m issioner denying Claim ant’s application for benefits is supported by substantial evidence. The Fourth Circuit has defined substantial evidence as: evidence which a reasoning m ind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of m ore than a m ere scintilla of evidence but m ay be som ewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is “substantial evidence.” Blalock, 483 F.2d at 776 (quoting Law s v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640 , 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). Additionally, the adm inistrative law judge, not the court, is charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Hay s v. Sullivan, 90 7 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990 ). The Court will not re-weigh conflicting evidence, m ake credibility determ inations, or substitute its judgm ent for that of the Com m issioner. Id. Instead, the Court’s duty is lim ited in scope; it m ust adhere to its “traditional function” and “scrutinize the record as a whole to determ ine whether the conclusions reached are rational.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Thus, the ultim ate question for the Court is not whether the Claim ant is disabled, but whether the decision of the Com m issioner that the Claim ant is not disabled is well-grounded in the evidence, bearing in m ind that “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable m inds to differ as to whether a claim ant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Com m issioner].” W alker v. Bow en, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987). VII. An alys is As previously stated, Claim ant’s sole challenge to the Com m issioner’s disability - 20 - determ ination involves the weight given by the ALJ to the Decem ber 20 12 letter supplied by Dr. Kingston, Claim ant’s prim ary care physician. When evaluating a claim ant’s application for disability benefits, the ALJ “will always consider the m edical opinions in [the] case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence [he] receives.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1527(b), 416.927(b). Medical opinions are defined as “statem ents from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable m edical sources that reflect judgm ents about the nature and severity of [a claim ant’s] im pairm ent(s), including [his] sym ptom s, diagnosis and prognosis, what [he] can still do despite [his] im pairm ent(s), and [his] physical or m ental restrictions.” Id. §§ 40 4.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). Title 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1527(c), 416.927(c) outline how the opinions of accepted medical sources will be weighed in determ ining whether a claim ant qualifies for disability benefits. In general, an ALJ should give m ore weight to the opinion of an exam ining m edical source than to the opinion of a non-exam ining source. Id. '§ 40 4.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1). Even greater weight should be allocated to the opinion of a treating physician, because that physician is usually m ost able to provide Aa detailed, longitudinal picture@ of a claim ant=s alleged disability. Id. §§ 40 4.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Indeed, a treating physician’s opinion should be given co n t r o llin g weight when the opinion is supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. Id. If the ALJ determ ines that a treating physician=s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ m ust then analyze and weigh all the m edical opinions of record, taking into account certain factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1527(c)(2)-(6) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)-(6), and m ust explain the reasons for the weight given to the opinions.3 3 The factors include: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of evaluation, (2) nature and extent of the treatm ent relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency, (5) specialization, and (6) other factors bearing on the weight of the opinion. - 21 - “Adjudicators m ust rem em ber that a finding that a treating source m edical opinion is not well-supported by m edically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record m eans only that the opinion is not entitled to ‘controlling weight,’ not that the opinion should be rejected ... In m any cases, a treating source’s opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (S.S.A. 1996). Nevertheless, a treating physician’s opinion m ay be rejected in whole or in part when there is persuasive contrary evidence in the record. Coffm an v. Bow en, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Ultim ately, it is the responsibility of the ALJ , not the court, to evaluate the case, m ake findings of fact, weigh opinions, and resolve conflicts of evidence. Hay s, 90 7 F.2d at 1456. Medical source statem ents on issues reserved to the Com m issioner are treated differently than other m edical source opinions. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (S.S.A. 1996). In both the regulations and SSR 96-5p, the SSA explains that “som e issues are not m edical issues regarding the nature and severity of an individual's im pairm ent(s) but are adm inistrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determ ination or decision of disability;” including the following: 1. Whether an individual's im pairm ent(s) m eets or is equivalent in severity to the requirem ents of any im pairm ent(s) in the listings; 2. What an individual's RFC is; 3. Whether an individual's RFC prevents him or her from doing past relevant work; 4. How the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience apply; and 5. Whether an individual is “disabled” under the Act. Id. at *2. “The regulations provide that the final responsibility for deciding issues such as - 22 - these is reserved to the Com m issioner.” Id. Consequently, a m edical source statem ent on an issue reserved to the Com m issioner is never entitled to controlling weight or special significance, because “giving controlling weight to such opinions would, in effect, confer upon the [m edical] source the authority to m ake the determ ination or decision about whether an individual is under a disability, and thus would be an abdication of the Com m issioner’s statutory responsibility to determ ine when an individual is disabled.” Id. at *2. Still, these opinions m ust always be carefully considered, “must never be ignored,” and should be assessed for their supportability and consistency with the record as a whole. Id. at *3. If conflicting m edical opinions are present in the record, the ALJ m ust resolve the conflicts by weighing the m edical source statem ents and providing an appropriate rationale for accepting, discounting, or rejecting the opinions. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 30 0 , 30 6 (7th Cir. 1995). A m inim al level of articulation of the ALJ 's assessm ent of the evidence is “essential for m eaningful appellate review;” otherwise, “‘the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or sim ply ignored.’” Zblew ski v. Schw eiker, 732 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d. 70 0 , 70 5 (3rd Cir. 1981)). Although 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1527(c),416.927(c) provide that in the absence of a controlling opinion by a treating physician, all of the m edical opinions m ust be evaluated and weighed based upon the various factors, the regulations do not explicitly require the ALJ to regurgitate in the written decision every facet of the analysis. Instead, the regulations m andate only that the ALJ give “good reasons” in the decision for the weight ultim ately allocated to m edical source opinions. Id. §§ 40 4.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Here, the ALJ com plied with the applicable regulations by considering all of the - 23 - m edical source statem ents—including Dr. Kingston’s Decem ber 20 12 letter—in conjunction with the other evidence. (Tr. at 33-34). Starting first with anecdotal records and Claim ant’s testim ony, the ALJ observed that, despite having daily sym ptom s, Claim ant was capable of perform ing all activities of daily living independently. He was able to care for his two dogs and periodically care for his in-laws’ horses. (Tr. at 31). Claim ant was also able to load the dishwasher, help clean the house, watch television, drive, shop, and visit with fam ily. He had good relationships with his step-children, other fam ily m em bers, friends, and neighbors. Moving next to the m edical evidence, the ALJ reviewed the records pertaining to Claim ant’s seizures and pseudoseizures, pointing out that two CT scans of Claim ant’s head, two EEG studies perform ed five m onths apart, and an MRI of Claim ant’s brain failed to yield any significant findings. (Tr. at 31-32). Moreover, treatm ent notes confirm ed the absence of intracranial abnorm alities. The ALJ correctly concluded that the records showed no objective evidence of serious neurological im pairm ent. According to the ALJ , the clinical records suggested that m ost of Claim ant’s acute episodes were related to m edication non-com pliance, rather than an underlying condition that was disabling even when properly treated. With regard to Claim ant’s psychiatric im pairm ents, the ALJ stressed that m ost of Claim ant’s m ental status exam inations were norm al, and he adm itted to feeling less depressed when m edicated. (Tr. at 32). The ALJ agreed that Claim ant’s affective and anxiety-related disorders were severe, but not to the degree that they would prevent him from engaging in work-related activities. The ALJ discussed the consultative examinations perform ed by Ms. Tate and Ms. Bartram , highlighting the sim ilarities in their observations and findings. (Tr. at 32-33). After analyzing the m edical inform ation, the ALJ specifically addressed the - 24 - opinions of Dr. William s, Dr. Marinelli, Dr. Binder, Ms. Tate, Ms. Batram , and Dr. Kingston. (Tr. at 33-34). He gave great weight to Dr. William s’s assessm ent of Claim ant’s physical functional capacity because it was consistent with the m edical evidence. The ALJ noted that Dr. William s prohibited Claim ant from clim bing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and from exposure to hazards, to account for his pseudoseizures. The ALJ gave only partial weight to the opinions of Dr. Marinelli and Dr. Binder, who found Claim ant’s psychiatric im pairm ents to be non-severe. The ALJ explained that while he agreed that Claim ant had non-severe post-traum atic stress disorder, he felt the evidence supported a finding that Claim ant’s depression and anxiety were severe. He accepted Ms. Tate’s opinion that Claim ant’s social functioning, persistence, pace, and concentration were norm al, and also accepted sim ilar findings by Ms. Bartram related to Claim ant’s persistence and pace. He rejected Ms. Bartram ’s conclusion that Claim ant’s social functioning was “guarded,” because that conclusion was contrary to other findings included in Ms. Bartram ’s evaluation note. Finally, the ALJ explicitly gave little weight to the “treating source” statem ent expressed by Dr. Kingston in his Decem ber 20 12 letter, which indicated that Claim ant’s post-traum atic stress disorder and seizures were perm anently disabling, because the statem ent was “inconsistent with the m edical evidence noted above and with the other opinion evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 34). Clearly, the ALJ com plied with Social Security regulations and rulings in the m anner in which he assessed the opinions. He expressly weighed each opinion and briefly explained the reason for the weight given to the opinion. The ALJ considered all of the evidence in m aking his determ inations, including objective findings; testim ony; Claim ant’s reported daily, weekly, and m onthly activities; and the effects of treatm ent. Having assessed the substance of the ALJ ’s discussion, and com paring it to the record, - 25 - the undersigned agrees that substantial evidence supports a finding that Claim ant is not disabled under the Social Security Act. Physically, Claim ant has few problem s. Indeed, he was regularly observed as having a norm al gait; full range of m otion in all extrem ities and spine; norm al tone, m uscle strength, and sensation; norm al respirations; norm al cardiac rhythm and rate; and no obvious deform ities or abnorm alities. (Tr. at 287, 311, 351, 353, 391, 410 , 436, 480 , 498, 516). Claim ant alleges seizures as a physical im pairm ent; however, despite an extensive work-up, no objective testing corroborated the presence of epileptic seizures. In their place, Claim ant ultim ately was diagnosed with pseudoseizures, also called "psychogenic non-epileptic seizures" (PNES), a clinical feature of the psychological condition known as conversion disorder. See DSM-5 at 318-19. In 20 0 7, Claim ant began receiving psychotropic m edication from his fam ily physician, and in 20 10 , he initiated therapy with a psychiatrist and licensed social worker at Prestera. Claim ant’s m ental status exam inations have been largely unrem arkable with the exception of depressed m ood and restricted affect. His sym ptom acuity, as docum ented by Prestera in October 20 10 , was “m ild” to “m oderate” on a scale that included m ore acute ratings of “severe” and “crisis.” (Tr. at 658-59). Throughout this period, Claim ant was able to perform his daily activities, drive, shop, visit with fam ily and friends, care for animals, attend physician appointm ents, and “tinker” around the house. Claim ant could operate equipm ent, such as a m anual m etal grinder, (Tr. at 428), attend to horses, (Tr. at 361), m ow the yard, and help with household cleaning chores. (Tr. at 63). Further, the agency consultants that evaluated Claim ant’s m ental residual function opined that his psychiatric sym ptom s did not substantially interfere with his ability to work. Accordingly, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ ’s determ ination. Finally, contrary to Claim ant’s contention, the ALJ was not required to apply the - 26 - “treating source rule” to the opinion expressed by Dr. Kingston in his Decem ber 20 12 letter. Dr. Kingston’s statem ent that Claim ant’s conditions “disabled him from any gainful em ploym ent” plainly constitutes an opinion on an issue reserved to the Comm issioner; as such, it is treated under the regulations and rulings as an adm inistrative conclusion, not as a m edical opinion that m ust be given heightened consideration. While the ALJ was bound to consider Dr. Kingston’s statem ent, he was not obligated to give it controlling weight or special significance. 20 C.F.R. §§ 40 4.1527(d), 416.927(d); see also Morgan v. Barnhart, 142 F. App'x 716, 722 (4th Cir. 20 0 5). VIII. Co n clu s io n After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the Com m issioner’s decision IS supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, by J udgm ent Order entered this day, the final decision of the Com m issioner is AFFIRMED and this m atter is D ISMISSED from the docket of this Court. The Clerk of this Court is directed to transm it copies of this Order to counsel of record. EN TERED : J uly 23, 20 15 - 27 -
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