Vaillancourt v. Ziegler, No. 1:2009cv00162 - Document 36 (N.D.W. Va. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DKT. 29 GRANTING RESPONDENTS SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DKT. 32 AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 12/20/2010. (Copy counsel of record via CM/ECF, pro se Petitioner via certified mail)(jmm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/20/2010: # 1 Certified Mail Return Receipt) (jmm).
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dismisses this petition with prejudice. B. Vaillancourt’s claims are not moot. The BOP urges the Court to find that no “case or controversy” exists in this case because Vaillancourt could not possibly benefit from any finding of early release eligibility. It states that his projected release date is July 23, 2011, before which time he could not complete the RDAP program in its entirety and thus be eligible for a sentence reduction. Vaillancourt responds that his “statutory release date,” the point in time when he would complete his sentence in full if not awarded any reduction for good behavior, is not until April 12, 2012. He contends that, if denied some or all good conduct time, he could theoretically complete the RDAP program in time to benefit from the early release provisions. 6 VAILLANCOURT v. ZIEGLER 1:09CV162 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 29) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 32) AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE To hold that Vaillancourt’s complaint is moot would require a finding that there is no possibility he could gain any meaningful relief from a favorable ruling. Here, Vaillancourt could potentially benefit should he be denied good conduct time. He also correctly points out that several courts have held that a favorable ruling on early release eligibility, even if not secured in time to actually result in a reduction of sentence, can be relevant in a later motion for early termination of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). E.g., U.S. v. Williams, 4 F.3d 988 (4th Cir. 1993)(unpublished). Furthermore, even if Vaillancourt’s claims arguably are moot, the Court would hesitate to dismiss the action in this context. By their nature, disputes over early release eligibility arise near the end of an inmate’s term of incarceration. Dismissing such claims as moot creates a perverse incentive for the BOP to deny, delay and defend any review of early release eligibility, and thereby frustrate inmates’ access to justice. In this case, the BOP initially denied Vaillancourt early release eligibility on November 25, 2008. He appealed this determination on February 3, 2009. The BOP, at three different 7 VAILLANCOURT v. ZIEGLER 1:09CV162 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 29) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 32) AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE administrative levels, denied that appeal on March 12, 2009, April 21, 2009, and finally on August 4, 2009. Vaillancourt alleges in his petition that he did not receive this final ruling until November, 2009. Having exhausted his administrative remedies, he filed this habeas action on December 9, 2009. Thus, as he states, the administrative process alone has consumed nearly one year. After filing its customary motion for extension of time to answer, the BOP moved to dismiss Vaillancourt’s petition on February 11, 2010. The Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation on March 15, 2010, recommending that Vaillancourt’s claim be denied. Vaillancourt filed timely objections, but the Court did not rule on the Report and Recommendation until August 16, 2010, at which time it denied the BOP’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment without prejudice, and directed that the parties resubmit any dispositive motions. Both Vaillancourt and the BOP did so, and the matter is again ripe for the Court’s consideration. Vaillancourt’s claim thus has taken over two years to adjudicate. If, as he claims, he did not actually receive his final administrative denial until November, 2009, none of that delay is 8 VAILLANCOURT v. ZIEGLER 1:09CV162 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 29) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 32) AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE attributable to him. Unfortunately for inmates, such a length of time for this type of claim to work its way through the BOP and the courts is not unusual. C. The Court cannot overturn the BOP’s exercise of discretion. In the context of this case, the Court is constrained to ensure only that the BOP has not acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. From the BOP’s latest response, it is clear that Vaillancourt has received what he sought - an individualized assessment of his case and an explanation of the BOP’s decision. The BOP explains that it is faced with contradictory documents in Vaillancourt’s file. While the statements made by the judge who sentenced his co-defendant make it appear that Vaillancourt never possessed a weapon and should not be held accountable for it, Vaillancourt’s J&C, signed by the judge who actually sentenced him, clearly states that an enhancement for use or possession of a firearm was warranted, indeed was agreed to by the parties. The BOP states that to ignore this fact would contradict its policy of giving effect to the sentence imposed in each inmate’s case. Such a rationale is reasonable. There is an articulable basis for the BOP’s decision and it 9 has adequately explained its VAILLANCOURT v. ZIEGLER 1:09CV162 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 29) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 32) AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE reasoning. As the BOP has pointed out, Vaillancourt’s best remedy would have been to file a § 2255 motion with the court that sentenced him to correct what may have been an oversight by that court, his attorney, and the probation office. Unfortunately, this Court is without power to correct that particular problem. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS the Second Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (dkt. 32), DENIES Vaillancourt’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. 29), and DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE. It is so ORDERED. The Court directs the Clerk to prepare a separate judgment order, strike this case from the active docket, and transmit copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and all appropriate agencies, and to the pro se petitioner via certified mail, return receipt requested. DATED: December 20, 2010. /s/ Irene M. Keeley IRENE M. KEELEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10
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