GS Holistic LLC v. Seattle Smoke Shop LLC et al, No. 3:2023cv05181 - Document 17 (W.D. Wash. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's 12 Motion for Default Judgment. The Court GRANTS GS Holistic's request for entry of default judgment against Seattle Smoke Shop and Shireen Aljebori; AWARDS GS Holistic statutory dam ages in the amount of $5,000 and litigation costs in the amount of $592.00; and DENIES GS Holistic's requests for entry of a permanent injunction and for an order directing the destruction of infringing products. Signed by Judge James L. Robart. (SS)
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GS Holistic LLC v. Seattle Smoke Shop LLC et al Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 GS HOLISTIC, LLC, CASE NO. C23-5181JLR ORDER Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 SEATTLE SMOKE SHOP LLC, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC’s (“GS Holistic”) motion for entry 17 of default judgment against Defendants Seattle Smoke Shop LLC d/b/a Seattle Smoke 18 Shop (“Seattle Smoke Shop”) and Shireen Aljebori (together, “Defendants”). (Mot. (Dkt. 19 # 12); see Prop. Judgment (Dkt. # 12-3).) Neither Defendant has appeared in this action, 20 and the Clerk has entered default against both Defendants. (See Dkt.; 6/23/23 Entry of 21 Default (Dkt. # 10).) The court has considered GS Holistic’s motion, the materials it 22 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 submitted in support of its motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing 2 law. Being fully advised, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part GS Holistic’s 3 motion for entry of default judgment. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 GS Holistic is a Delaware limited liability corporation (“LLC”) that has its 6 principal place of business in California. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 4.) It alleges that it is the 7 owner of the “Stündenglass” trademark, has worked to distinguish the Stündenglass 8 brand as “the premier manufacturer of glass infusers,” and has devoted significant time 9 and resources to promoting and protecting its trademark. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 7-9, 14.) GS Holistic 10 has registered the following trademarks: (1) U.S. Trademark Registration No. 6,633,884 11 “for the standard character mark ‘Stündenglass’ in association with goods further 12 identified in registration in international class 011”; (2) U.S. Trademark Registration No. 13 6,174,292 “for the design plus words mark ‘S’ and its logo in association with goods 14 further identified in the registration in international class 034”; and (3) U.S. Trademark 15 Registration No. 6,174,291 “for the standard character mark ‘Stündenglass’ in association 16 with goods further identified in registration in international class 034” (together, the 17 “Stündenglass Marks”). (Id. ¶ 10; see also Mot., Ex. A (screenshots of pages from the 18 United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Electronic Search System that 19 describe each trademark).) GS Holistic asserts that consumers are willing to pay more 20 for “the recognized quality and innovation associated with the Stündenglass Marks.” 21 (Compl. ¶ 20.) Thus, genuine Stündenglass glass infusers are priced at $599.95, while 22 non-Stündenglass infusers sell for between $199.00 and $600.00. (Id.) ORDER - 2 1 Defendant Seattle Smoke Shop is a Washington LLC that has its principal place of 2 business in Washington. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant Shireen Aljebori is a resident and citizen of 3 Washington. (Id. ¶ 6.) GS Holistic asserts that Defendants sold counterfeit products 4 bearing the Stündenglass Marks. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.) On January 30, 2023, according to GS 5 Holistic, its investigator visited Seattle Smoke Shop’s location; observed that the shop 6 had “an excess” of glass infusers that displayed the Stündenglass Marks; purchased a 7 glass infuser “with a Stündenglass Mark affixed to it” for $550.00; and determined the 8 glass infuser was a counterfeit product that displayed “the Infringing Marks.” (Id. ¶ 29; 9 see also id. ¶ 25 (defining the “Infringing Marks” as “reproductions, counterfeits, copies, 10 11 and/or colorable imitations of one or more of the Stündenglass Marks”).) GS Holistic filed its complaint on March 6, 2023. (See id. at 1.) It alleges claims 12 under the Lanham Act against both Defendants for counterfeiting and trademark 13 infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and for false designation of origin and 14 unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). (Id. ¶¶ 51-68.) Among other 15 relief, it seeks damages, costs of suit, a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants 16 from continuing to infringe its Stündenglass trademarks, and an order requiring 17 Defendants to deliver all infringing products to GS Holistic for destruction. (Id. at 18 12-14.) 19 GS Holistic served Seattle Smoke Shop and Ms. Aljebori on April 13, 2023. (See 20 Service Affs. (Dkt. ## 7-8).) The Clerk entered default against both Defendants on June 21 23, 2023. (6/23/23 Entry of Default.) GS Holistic filed this motion for entry of default 22 judgment on October 31, 2023. (Mot.) ORDER - 3 1 III. 2 ANALYSIS Below, the court sets forth the relevant legal standard and then evaluates GS 3 Holistic’s motion for entry of default judgment. 4 A. Legal Standard 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes the court to enter default 6 judgment against a defaulting defendant upon the plaintiff’s motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 55(a), (b)(2). After default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, 8 except those related to damages, are considered admitted and are sufficient to establish a 9 defendant’s liability. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 10 11 1987) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Entry of default judgment is left to the court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 12 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In exercising its discretion, the court considers 13 seven factors (the “Eitel factors”): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief 14 is denied; (2) the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims; (3) the sufficiency of the 15 claims raised in the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in relationship to the 16 defendant’s behavior; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 17 (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on 18 the merits when reasonably possible. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 19 1986). After the court determines that default judgment is appropriate, it must then 20 determine the amount and character of the relief that should be awarded. See TeleVideo, 21 826 F.2d at 917-18. 22 ORDER - 4 1 2 B. Whether the Eitel Factors Favor Default Judgment The court preliminarily determines that default judgment is warranted in this case 3 because, on balance, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of such judgment. The court 4 discusses each factor in turn. 5 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 6 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if default 7 judgment is not entered. See PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 8 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Without default judgment, GS Holistic will suffer prejudice 9 because it will “be denied the right to judicial resolution” of its claims and will be 10 “without other recourse for recovery.” Elektra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 11 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, the first Eitel factor weighs in favor of entering default 12 judgment. 13 2. 14 The second and third Eitel factors—the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claim Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint 15 and the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint—are frequently analyzed together. 16 PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. For these two factors to weigh in favor of default 17 judgment, the complaint’s allegations must be sufficient to state a claim for relief. 18 Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). A complaint satisfies this 19 standard when it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 20 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 21 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)). At the default judgment 22 stage, the court “must take the well-pleaded factual allegations [in the complaint] as true” ORDER - 5 1 but “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally 2 insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 3 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 4 GS Holistic alleges claims for trademark counterfeiting and infringement under 15 5 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. 6 § 1125(a). (Compl. ¶¶ 51-68.) The court reviews each in turn. 7 8 9 a. Trademark Counterfeiting and Infringement To prove liability for trademark infringement, the trademark holder must demonstrate: (1) “ownership of a valid mark (i.e., a protectable interest)”; and (2) the 10 alleged infringer’s use of the mark “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 11 deceive” consumers. Reno Air Racing Ass’n., v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 12 2006) (quoting KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 13 602 (9th Cir. 2005)). 14 First, uncontested proof that the plaintiff has registered the mark is sufficient to 15 establish ownership of a valid mark. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 16 1124 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, because GS Holistic alleges that it registered the 17 Stündenglass Marks (Compl. ¶ 10), it satisfies the first element of trademark 18 infringement for the purpose of default judgment. 19 Second, “[l]ikelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark 20 would probably assume that the goods it represents are associated with the source of a 21 different product identified by a similar mark.” KP Permanent Make-Up, 408 F.3d at 22 608. Courts generally evaluate eight factors to determine whether confusion is likely: ORDER - 6 1 “1) the strength of the mark; 2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; 3) the similarity of 2 the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) the marketing channels used; 6) the degree 3 of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods; 7) the defendant’s intent 4 in selecting the mark; and 8) the likelihood of expansion into other markets.” Id. Where 5 a defendant uses a counterfeit mark, however, courts both within and outside the Ninth 6 Circuit presume a likelihood of consumer confusion. See Coach, Inc. v. Pegasus Theater 7 Shops, No. C12-1631MJP, 2013 WL 5406220, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2013) 8 (compiling cases); see also Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse 9 Corp., 689 F. Supp. 2d 585, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To find a likelihood of confusion, a 10 court need only determine that the items at issue are counterfeit and that the defendant 11 distributed, offered for sale, or sold the items.”). The Lanham Act defines a “counterfeit” 12 as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 13 registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 14 Here, GS Holistic alleges that its investigator purchased a glass infuser with a 15 Stündenglass Mark “affixed” to it and determined that it was a counterfeit product that 16 displayed the “the Infringing Marks.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) GS Holistic further alleges that the 17 “Infringing Marks” are “reproductions, counterfeits, copies and/or colorable imitations of 18 one or more of the Stündenglass Marks.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Accordingly, the court concludes 19 that GS Holistic has sufficiently alleged that Defendants sold a product bearing a 20 counterfeit mark and, as a result, there is a presumption of consumer confusion. See 21 Coach, Inc., 2013 WL 5406220, at *3. Thus, because GS Holistic has demonstrated that 22 it owns a valid mark and that Defendants’ use of the mark is likely to cause consumer ORDER - 7 1 confusion, the court concludes that GS Holistic has sufficiently alleged its trademark 2 counterfeiting and infringement claim. 3 4 b. False Designation of Origin To show liability for false designation of origin, the plaintiff must show that the 5 defendant “(1) use[d] in commerce (2) any word, false designation of origin, false or 6 misleading description, or representation of fact, which (3) is likely to cause confusion or 7 misrepresents the characteristics of his or another person’s goods or services.” Freecycle 8 Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007). As to the first two elements, GS 9 Holistic alleges that Defendants sold (and thus, used in commerce) at least one glass 10 infuser bearing at least one of its registered trademarks. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) And the 11 court concluded above that GS Holistic has plausibly alleged a likelihood of confusion 12 resulting from Defendants’ use of the trademarks. Accordingly, GS Holistic has stated a 13 false designation of origin claim. 14 Because GS Holistic has demonstrated that its claims have substantive merit and 15 that it has sufficiently alleged those claims in its complaint, the court concludes that the 16 second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment. 17 3. 18 Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at Sum of Money at Stake 19 stake in relation to the seriousness of the [d]efendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 20 2d at 1176. Here, GS Holistic seeks (1) $150,000 in statutory damages—$50,000 per 21 registered Stündenglass trademark—for willful trademark counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. 22 § 1117(d) and (2) costs in the amount of $1,207.00. (See Mot. at 2.) The court concludes ORDER - 8 1 that the requested statutory damages and costs are not so unreasonable in relation to the 2 conduct alleged in the complaint as to weigh against entry of default judgment. 3 4. Possibility of a Dispute over Material Facts 4 “The fifth Eitel factor considers the possibility of dispute as to any material facts 5 in the case.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Where, as here, the defendant has 6 defaulted, the court must take all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, except 7 those related to damages. TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917-18; see also Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG 8 Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Where a plaintiff has filed 9 a well-pleaded complaint, the possibility of dispute concerning material facts is 10 remote.”). Thus, the court concludes there is little risk of dispute over material facts and 11 the fifth Eitel factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 12 5. 13 The sixth Eitel factor considers the possibility that the defendant’s default resulted Excusable Neglect 14 from excusable neglect. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, GS Holistic has 15 provided evidence that Defendants were properly served (see Service Affs.), and there is 16 no evidence in the record that Defendants’ failure to answer or respond is the result of 17 excusable neglect. Accordingly, the court concludes that the sixth Eitel factor weighs in 18 favor of default judgment. 19 6. 20 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 21 782 F.2d at 1472. Where, as here, a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in action, 22 however, the policy favoring decisions on the merits is not dispositive. PepsiCo, 238 F. ORDER - 9 1 Supp. 2d at 1177. Therefore, the court concludes that the seventh Eitel factor does not 2 preclude entry of default judgment. 3 In sum, because the Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment, the court 4 concludes that entry of default judgment is warranted in favor of GS Holistic on its 5 claims against Defendants. 6 C. Requested Relief 7 The court now turns to the issue of remedies. “A default judgment must not differ 8 in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the [complaint].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 54(c); see Fong v. United States, 300 F.2d 400, 413 (9th Cir. 1962). Defaulting 10 defendants are not deemed to have admitted the facts alleged in the complaint concerning 11 the amount of damages. TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917. Rather, the plaintiff “must ‘prove 12 up’ the amount of damages that it is claiming.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld 13 Prod., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Local Rules W.D. Wash. 14 LCR 55(b)(2). 1 By analogy, plaintiffs must also “prove up” their entitlement to other 15 forms of relief, such as a permanent injunction. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Tyrrell–Miller, 16 678 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 17 1 18 19 20 21 22 This court’s Local Civil Rules require plaintiffs to support a motion for default judgment with: a declaration and other evidence establishing [the] plaintiff’s entitlement to a sum certain and to any nonmonetary relief sought. [The] [p]laintiff shall provide a concise explanation of how all amounts were calculated, and shall support this explanation with evidence establishing the entitlement to and amount of the principal claim, and, if applicable, any liquidated damages, interest, attorney’s fees, or other amounts sought[.] Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 55(b)(2). ORDER - 10 1 GS Holistic requests statutory damages, litigation costs, injunctive relief, and 2 destruction of the infringing products. (See Mot. at 11-14.) The court considers each 3 remedy below. 4 1. 5 Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff may elect whether to recover its actual damages Statutory Damages 6 caused by the defendants’ use of a counterfeit mark or statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. 7 § 1117(c). GS Holistic has elected to seek statutory damages. (Mot. at 11-12; see 8 Compl. at 12-13 (including statutory damages in its prayer for relief).) 9 The court has discretion to award statutory damages between $1,000 and $200,000 10 “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, 11 as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). If, however, the court finds that the 12 trademark violation was willful, it may award up to $2,000,000 for each infringement. 13 Id. § 1117(c)(2). “[S]tatutory damages may compensate the victim, penalize the 14 wrongdoer, deter future wrongdoing, or serve all those purposes.” Y.Y.G.M. SA v. 15 Redbubble, Inc., 75 F.4th 995, 1008 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. 16 Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1994)). When determining the 17 appropriate amount of statutory damages to award on default judgment, courts consider 18 whether the amount bears a “plausible relationship to [the p]laintiff’s actual damages.” 19 Yelp Inc. v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Adobe Sys., Inc. 20 v. Tilley, No. C 09-1085 PJH, 2010 WL 309249, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010)). That 21 is, although a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit is entitled to damages that will 22 compensate and serve as a deterrent, “it is not entitled to a windfall.” Id. ORDER - 11 1 GS Holistic requests statutory damages of $50,000 for each of its registered 2 trademarks, for a total of $150,000. (Mot. at 11-12.) GS Holistic’s evidence of its actual 3 damages caused by Defendants’ trademark violations, however, is limited to allegations 4 that its investigator observed “an excess of” glass infusers that displayed the 5 Stündenglass Marks and purchased a single glass infuser with an unspecified 6 Stündenglass Mark “affixed to it” for $550.00. (See Compl. ¶ 29.) GS Holistic contends 7 that its chief executive officer’s (“CEO”) declaration establishes that $150,000 is “only a 8 fraction of the actual losses to its business” caused by counterfeiters. (Mot. at 12.) That 9 declaration, however, provides no explanation of how GS Holistic’s CEO determined that 10 the company’s total U.S. sales would have quadrupled in 2021 if there were no 11 counterfeit products in the market and it says absolutely nothing about the damages 12 specifically caused by the Defendants in this case. (See generally 2d Folkerts Decl. (Dkt. 13 # 14) ¶¶ 15-16.) The court is sympathetic to the difficulties GS Holistic faces in 14 estimating actual damages with any degree of certainty without the benefit of 15 Defendants’ cooperation in discovery. (See Mot. at 12.) Without more evidence, 16 however, the court cannot conclude that an award of $50,000 in statutory damages for 17 each of GS Holistic’s three registered trademarks bears a “plausible relationship” to GS 18 Holistic’s actual damages. Yelp Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1102. 19 Because GS Holistic alleges only that the glass infuser its investigator purchased 20 had “a Stündenglass Mark affixed to it” (Compl. ¶ 29), the court concludes that GS 21 Holistic is entitled to statutory damages based on Defendants’ conduct with respect to 22 only one trademark. The court further concludes, in its discretion, that an award of ORDER - 12 1 $5,000 for one trademark violation will serve the compensatory, penal, and deterrent 2 purposes of statutory damages without resulting in an undue windfall for GS Holistic. 3 This amount equates to over nine times the price of the allegedly infringing glass infuser 4 purchased by GS Holistic’s investigator. (See id.) Accordingly, the court awards GS 5 Holistic statutory damages of $5,000. 6 2. 7 Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff who establishes that a defendant has violated a Litigation Costs 8 trademark “shall be entitled, . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover . . . the 9 costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Here, GS Holistic seeks costs in the total 10 amount of $1,193.00, consisting of the filing fee ($402.00), its process server fees 11 ($190.00), and its investigator’s fees ($615.03). (Mot. at 13 (citing Harris Decl. (Dkt. 12 # 15) ¶ 6); see Compl. at 12-13 (including costs of suit in its prayer for relief).) The court 13 awards GS Holistic its filing fee and process server fees because these are costs that are 14 routinely awarded in Lanham Act cases. GS Holistic has not, however, cited any 15 authority for the proposition that its investigator’s fees are recognized “costs of the 16 action” under the Lanham Act. (See generally Mot.) Therefore, the court awards GS 17 Holistic costs in the amount of $592.00. 18 3. 19 The Lanham Act empowers courts “to grant injunctions, according to the 20 principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent 21 the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). 22 ORDER - 13 Injunctive Relief 1 2 3 4 According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 5 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (interpreting similar 6 language in considering a motion for permanent injunctive relief under the Patent Act). 7 The Lanham Act provides, in the case of a motion for a permanent injunction, that a 8 “plaintiff seeking any such injunction shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 9 irreparable harm upon a finding of a [trademark] violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). 10 GS Holistic asks the court to enter the following permanent injunction enjoining 11 Seattle Smoke Shop, Ms. Aljebori, and “their agents, employees, officers, directors, 12 owners, representatives, successor companies, related companies, and all persons acting 13 in concern or participation with it” from: 14 15 16 17 (a) Import, export, making, manufacture, reproduction, assembly, use, acquisition, purchase, offer, sale, transfer, brokerage, consignment, distribution, storage, shipment, licensing, development, display, delivery, marketing advertising or promotion of the counterfeit Stündenglass product identified in the complaint and any other unauthorized Stündenglass product, counterfeit, copy or colorful imitation thereof; [and] 18 19 (b) Assisting, aiding or attempting to assist or aid any other person or entity in performing any of the prohibited activities referred to in Paragraph[] (a) above. 20 (Mot. at 13-14; see also Prop. Judgment.) 21 22 ORDER - 14 1 The court declines to enter the requested permanent injunction. First, GS Holistic 2 argues only that it is entitled to injunctive relief “[b]y the reasons explained in [its] 3 Complaint.” (Mot. at 13.) It does not address the factors a court must consider before 4 entering a permanent injunction. (See id.); see eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. Second, the 5 injunction GS Holistic seeks now is broader than the injunction outlined in its complaint, 6 which does not include an injunction against “[a]ssisting, aiding or attempting to assist or 7 aid” others against performing the actions listed in part (a) of the proposed injunction. 8 (Compare Compl. at 13, with Prop. Judgment at 2.) Third, although GS Holistic’s 9 complaint describes the sale of one counterfeit Stündenglass glass infuser displaying one 10 unspecified Stündenglass Mark, it requests a wider injunction relating to “the counterfeit 11 Stündenglass product identified in the complaint and any other unauthorized 12 Stündenglass product.” (Compare Compl. ¶ 29, with Prop. Judgment at 2.) Finally, 13 “every order granting an injunction” must “describe in reasonable detail—and not by 14 referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). GS Holistic’s proposed order violates this rule by referring to “the 16 counterfeit Stündenglass product identified in the complaint.” (See Prop. Judgment at 2.) 17 For these reasons, the court denies GS Holistic’s request for a permanent injunction. 18 4. 19 Finally, GS Holistic seeks an order directing Defendants, “at their cost, [to] deliver Destruction of Infringing Products 20 to [GS Holistic] for destruction all products, accessories, labels, signs, prints, packages, 21 wrappers, receptables, advertisements, and other material in their possession, custody or 22 control bearing any of the Stündenglass Marks.” (Mot. at 14; see also Prop. Judgment at ORDER - 15 1 2.) The Lanham Act authorizes the court to issue an order directing the destruction of 2 articles that infringe upon a trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1118. Here, however, GS Holistic 3 has not presented any argument or evidence supporting its entitlement to this relief, 4 and—as with its request for a permanent injunction—its request for destruction of any 5 article “bearing any of the Stündenglass Marks” is not supported by its investigator’s 6 purchase of a single glass infuser bearing an unspecified Stündenglass Mark. (See Mot. 7 at 14; Compl. ¶ 29.) As a result, the court denies GS Holistic’s request for an order 8 directing the destruction of allegedly infringing products. 9 10 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part GS 11 Holistic’s motion for default judgment (Dkt. # 12). Specifically, the court GRANTS GS 12 Holistic’s request for entry of default judgment against Seattle Smoke Shop and Shireen 13 Aljebori; AWARDS GS Holistic statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 and 14 litigation costs in the amount of $592.00; and DENIES GS Holistic’s requests for entry of 15 a permanent injunction and for an order directing the destruction of infringing products. 16 Dated this 8th day of November, 2023. 17 18 A 19 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 20 21 22 ORDER - 16
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