Alvarado-Young et al v. State of Washington et al, No. 3:2015cv05883 - Document 44 (W.D. Wash. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 21 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Defendants Jennifer Hoerner, John Doe Hoerner (wife and husband, individually and marital community thereof), Christina Murillo, John Doe Murillo (wife and husband, individua lly and the marital community thereof), State of Washington (a sovereign state), Child Protective Services (agencies of the State of Washington), and Department of Social & Health Services (agencies of the State of Washington) ONLY are DISMISSED with prejudice and have been terminated from this matter; other claims remain; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)
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Alvarado-Young et al v. State of Washington et al 1 Doc. 44 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 9 ALEXANDRO ALVARADO-YOUNG, et al. 10 11 12 13 Plaintiffs, CASE NO. C15-5883-RBL ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., DKT. #21 Defendants. 14 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Department of Social & Health 15 Services, Child Protective Services, Jennifer Hoerner, Christina Murillo, and the State of 16 Washington’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 21]. This case considers whether three-year 17 old A.A. and her one-year old brother W.A. were properly removed from the custody of their 18 parents, Plaintiffs Alexandro and Angela Alvarado-Young. The Alvarado-Youngs claim the 19 Defendants’ actions in taking custody of their children and initiating dependency proceedings 20 violated their rights to be free from unconstitutional searches and seizures, the use of excessive 21 force, and interference with their familial association, as well as a host of state law claims. 22 Defendants contend they did not violate the Alvarado-Youngs’ rights or tortiously harm them 23 because the police alone took A.A. and W.A. into protective custody, and once they did so, the 24 ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Defendants were statutorily obliged to care for the children by initiating dependency 2 proceedings. They claim qualified immunity. 3 On Friday, March 29, 2013, Department of Social and Health Services social worker 4 Jennifer Hoerner visited a daycare operated by Lillian Vazquez-Hanson. Hoerner noticed one 5 child, W.A., had bruising and cuts on his face. She told Vazequez-Hanson to report W.A.’s 6 injuries to DSHS’s Child Protective Services, which Vazquez-Hanson did on Monday. She 7 provided the caveats that W.A.’s mother had told her he had fallen at home, and she did not think 8 he was being abused. CPS assigned the case to social worker Christina Murillo. 9 Murillo called Vazquez-Hanson the next morning to say she would visit the daycare to 10 check on W.A. and to photograph his injuries. The Alvarado-Youngs overheard the call, told 11 Vazquez-Hanson they did not want the State photographing their children, and left with them. 12 Murillo called Angela later that day, asking to see W.A., and Angela referred her to her attorney. 13 The next day, Tacoma Police Detective Paula Kelley accompanied Murillo to the 14 daycare. The Alvarado-Young children were absent, so Kelley and Murillo went to their house. 15 Angela answered the door when Kelley knocked, but did not let her or Murillo inside to check on 16 W.A. because they did not have a warrant, referring them again to her attorney. Kelley called for 17 assistance of patrol officers and a supervisor. She walked through the neighbor’s yard to the 18 other side of the house, where Alexandro was. She spoke to him across a fence, reiterating that 19 she and Murillo were there to conduct a welfare check. 20 Back-up arrived and noticed that Alexandro had a gun. Sergeant Roberts yelled for him 21 to keep his hands visible. Alexandro held his cell phone to his ear with his right hand, and he 22 repeatedly put his left hand in his pocket. Alexandro alleges he was attempting to produce his 23 wallet with his concealed pistol license, which he says he did. Defendants allege that Alexandro 24 DKT. #21 - 2 1 then turned to walk back into his house, and so Roberts and Kelley seized him for allegedly 2 violating their commands. They arrested him for obstruction. Angela still did not open the door 3 to allow a welfare check of W.A., so officers broke it. Kelley arrested Angela for obstruction and 4 took protective custody of the children. Custody was immediately transferred to Murillo, who 5 during Alexandro’s exchange with the police had been hiding behind a squad car. Murillo picked 6 W.A. off of Angela’s lap, and an officer carried A.A. outside. 7 Alexandro and Angelo were taken to separate jails, and their children were taken to the 8 DSHS office. Murillo observed A.A. had a large bruise to her right temple. Besides the bruising 9 and cuts that she had earlier observed on W.A.’s face, Murillo also noticed W.A. had bruises on 10 his legs and second-degree, blistered burns on both ankles. Alexandro was released on bail that 11 night, and Angela was released a few hours later in the early morning. 12 That Friday, April 5, Murillo filed dependency petitions for W.A. and A.A. and asked the 13 Pierce County Juvenile Court to place them in shelter care. The court concluded there was a risk 14 of imminent harm to the children, and services could not be offered to the Alvarado-Youngs to 15 keep their children at home. It took W.A. and A.A. into custody and placed them in foster care. 16 At the shelter care hearing approximately one week later, the Alvarado-Youngs agreed to 17 participate in a supervision-program, which permitted DSHS to visit their home unannounced 18 and required the Alvarado-Youngs to use a new daycare. The court allowed the children to return 19 home that day. The Alvarado-Youngs allege Angela lost her ability to lactate in the interim. The 20 state dismissed the children’s dependency action approximately one month later, and the City of 21 Tacoma dropped its criminal charges against the Alvarado-Youngs. 22 The Alvarado-Youngs throw the book of claims at Defendants. They maintain that by 23 entering their home without a warrant, taking their children, and initiating dependency 24 DKT. #21 - 3 1 proceedings, the Defendants violated their constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable 2 searches and seizures, excessive force, and interferences with their familial association. They 3 allege related Monell claims. The Alvarado-Youngs also argue that the Defendants’ actions give 4 rise to state law claims of negligent investigation, trespass, malicious civil prosecution, 5 interference with family relations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and outrage.1 6 The Defendants argue they are not liable for the police officers’ decision to take the 7 children into custody, and once the officers did, Defendants had a statutory obligation to care for 8 the children, including initiating dependency proceedings. They argue they are immune from 9 suit. They also argue that because Murillo and Hoerner are not liable to the Alvarado-Youngs, 10 DSHS cannot be vicariously liable, and Monell claims do not apply to states or their agencies. 11 The Alvarado-Youngs provide few arguments to the contrary, although they do supply their 12 version of the facts, which in the main are not in dispute. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Standard of Review 15 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 16 file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 17 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether 18 an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 19 nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Anderson v. 20 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986); see also Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 21 22 1 The Alvarado-Youngs also assert claims against Defendants City of Tacoma, Tacoma 23 Police Department, Detective Paula Kelly, and the police officers who responded to Kelly’s call for assistance. They do not join in this motion, and many of the facts surrounding the police 24 officers’ involvement have not been relayed to the Court. DKT. #21 - 4 1 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is sufficient evidence 2 for a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The 3 inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 4 jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52. 5 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing no evidence exists that supports an element 6 essential to the nonmovant’s claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once 7 the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must show the existence of a genuine 8 issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party fails to establish the 9 existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 10 matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24. 11 B. Qualified Immunity. 12 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 13 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 14 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 15 231, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727 16 (1982)). It shields an official “from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally 17 deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances confronted. Even if the 18 [official’s] decision is constitutionally deficient, qualified immunity shields her from suit if her 19 misapprehension about the law applicable to the circumstances was reasonable.” Brosseau v. 20 Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). The purpose of the doctrine is “to recognize that holding 21 officials liable for reasonable mistakes might unnecessarily paralyze their ability to make 22 difficult decisions in challenging situations, thus disrupting the effective performance of their 23 public duties.” Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). Because “it is inevitable that 24 DKT. #21 - 5 1 law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable 2 cause is present,” qualified immunity protects officials “who act in ways they reasonably believe 3 to be lawful.” Garcia v. Cty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). It “gives ample 4 room for mistaken judgments” and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 5 knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); see also Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 6 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 7 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986)). 8 Qualified immunity protects government officials not just from liability, but from suit: “it 9 is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial,” and thus, the claim should be 10 resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 11 n.2, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). The Supreme Court has endorsed a two-part test for resolving such 12 claims: a court must decide (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged “make out a violation 13 of a constitutional right,” and (2) whether the “right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time 14 of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (referencing Saucier v. Katz, 15 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001)). Courts may address these two prongs in either order. 16 See id., 555 U.S. at 236. 17 C. Federal Claims 18 The Alvarado-Youngs claim, without additional specificity or support, that by entering 19 their home without a warrant, taking their children, and initiating dependency proceedings, the 20 Defendants violated their constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 21 seizures, excessive force, and interferences with their familial association. The Defendants argue 22 the police, not them, took the children into protective custody; Murillo properly entered the 23 Alvarado-Youngs’ home under the exigent circumstances exemption to the warrant requirement 24 DKT. #21 - 6 1 because their children needed to be cared for after they were arrested; and Murillo’s only 2 physical interaction with the Alvarado-Youngs was picking W.A. off of Angela’s lap, a non3 forceful act; and Murillo has quasi-prosecutorial immunity for initiating depending proceedings. 4 To state a claim of a violation of federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 5 set forth specific factual bases showing (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a 6 person acting under color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, 7 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or by laws of the United States. See Parratt 8 v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. 9 Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 10980). 10 Implicit in this second element is an element of causation; the constitutional violation must have 11 caused the deprivation of rights. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 12 274, 286, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977). 13 None of the Alvarado-Youngs’ federal claims against these Defendants are viable. First, 14 Hoerner’s only involvement was to remind Vazquez-Hanson of her duty as a licensed childcare 15 provider to report W.A.’s injuries to CPS. This act alone does not, and cannot, constitute a 16 violation of the Alvarado-Youngs’ constitutional rights. The Alvarado-Youngs’ § 1983 claims 17 against her are DISMISSED with prejudice. 18 Second, Washington State and DSHS (including the CPS division) are not persons, and 19 so cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Spurrel v. Block, 40 Wash. App. 854, 864, 701 20 P.2d 529 (1985) (State agencies, such as DSHS, are not “persons” within the meaning of the 21 Civil Rights Act of 1871.). Nor can they be sued under Monell v. Department of Social Services 22 of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), which declared only municipalities 23 and local government units, not states and their agencies, to be “persons” to whom the Civil 24 DKT. #21 - 7 1 Rights Act applies. Therefore, the Alvarado-Youngs’ § 1983 and Monell claims against 2 Washington State and DSHS are DISMISSED with prejudice. 3 Third, Murillo was not responsible for removing A.A. and W.A. from their home. As a 4 social worker, she must investigate suspected child abuse. See RCW 26.44.050. She did only that 5 while at the Alvarado-Youngs’ house—indeed, she hid behind a car during the officers’ 6 altercations with Alexandro and Angela—until the police had entered the house, transferred 7 custody of the children to DSHS, and directed her to pick W.A. off Angela’s lap.2 Because she 8 did not arrest the Alvarado-Youngs or decide to remove their children from their control, Murillo 9 did not cause, and is not liable for, the Alvarado-Youngs’ familial separation. See In re Scott Cty. 10 Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1166 (D. Minn. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Myers v. Scott Cty., 11 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989) (where officers arrested and decided to remove children from their 12 home, social worker was not “but for cause” of the alleged violation of parents’ liberty interests 13 in the care, custody, and management of their children). She also did not violate their right to be 14 free from excessive force, as the Alvarado-Youngs have alleged no facts suggesting Murillo used 15 excessive force on Angela or W.A. when picking up W.A. 16 Moreover, Murillo has qualified immunity for entering the Alvarado-Youngs’ house to 17 collect W.A. at the officers’ instruction and for initiating dependency proceedings. A reasonable 18 social worker would defer to officers’ instructions and not second-guess their decision to enter a 19 house without a warrant. See Jordan v. Murphy, 145 F. App’x 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2005) (social 20 21 2 The propriety of the Alvarado-Youngs’ arrest and of the police’s resultant decision to 22 take the children into custody are not presently before the Court; those questions will be briefed and considered if the police officers and the City seek dismissal of the claims against them. The 23 Court only answers here whether Murillo violated the Alvarado-Youngs’ clearly established constitutional rights by entering their home after they had been arrested and collecting their 24 child, who the police had transferred to DSHS’s custody. DKT. #21 - 8 1 worker had qualified immunity for entering plaintiff-guardian’s house with officers without a 2 warrant). By reasonably relying on the officers’ decisions and her duty to investigate suspected 3 child abuse, Murillo was not plainly incompetent. Finally, she had a statutory obligation to seek a 4 court order placing the children in shelter care. See RCW 13.34.060(1) (requiring a child taken 5 into custody to be placed in shelter care immediately). She has quasi-prosecutorial immunity for 6 doing so. See Meyers v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1156–57 (9th 7 Cir. 1987) (holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi8 prosecutorial functions associated with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency 9 proceedings). The federal claims against her are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. 10 C. State Claims 11 The Alvarado-Youngs claim that by entering their home without a warrant, taking their 12 children, and initiating dependency proceedings, the Defendants also trespassed, negligently 13 investigated their children’s welfare, interfered with their familial relations, caused them 14 emotional distress, maliciously prosecuted them, and committed the tort of outrage. Defendants 15 argue the Alvarado-Youngs cannot make out a single prima facie claim, but even if they could, 16 Defendants have statutory immunity. 17 Hoerner and Murillo did not act tortiously. Hoerner’s only involvement was reminding 18 Vazquez-Hanson of her duty to report suspected child abuse. This action does not constitute a 19 tort violation. Similarly, Murillo’s involvement was limited to ensuring A.A. and W.A. were 20 cared for after their parents were arrested and they were placed in DSHS custody. The Alvarado21 Youngs would have a better case against her if she instead had ignored her duties and left their 22 infant children alone in the house. Murillo’s entry was to care for children in protective custody. 23 See RCW 13.34.060(1). The Alvarado-Youngs have not offered facts or arguments showing she 24 DKT. #21 - 9 1 acted with malice or caused their damages. And Murillo is excused from tort liability for her 2 emergent placement decisions. See RCW 4.24.595(1) (government officials are not liable in tort 3 for their acts or omissions in emergent placement investigations). She, too, is not liable in tort. 4 Finally, because Hoerner and Murillo are not liable in tort, DSHS cannot be liable under a 5 respondeat superior theory. The Alvarado-Youngs’ state law claims against Hoerner, Murillo, 6 DSHS, and the State are DISMISSED with prejudice. 7 8 CONCLUSION Defendants DSHS, CPS, Hoerner, Murillo, and the State of Washington’s Motion for 9 Summary Judgment [Dkt. #21] is GRANTED, and the claims against them are DISMISSED 10 with prejudice. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated this 15th day of December, 2016. 14 A 15 Ronald B. Leighton United States District Judge 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 DKT. #21 - 10
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