Nappi v. Timberline Regional Library, No. 3:2014cv05945 - Document 28 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER granting 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge J Richard Creatura. Plaintiffs claims against defendant are DISMISSED with prejudice. (A copy of this Order mailed to plaintiff via regular U.S. Mail.)(SH)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Nappi v. Timberline Regional Library Doc. 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 AMEDEO NAPPI, 9 CASE NO. C14-5945 JRC Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 TIMBERLINE REGIONAL LIBRARY, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 Defendant. 13 14 Plaintiff, a public library patron, was “trespassed” from the library for allegedly 15 inappropriate behavior. Although plaintiff has a limited constitutional due process interest in 16 maintaining his access to a public library, the library provided him an opportunity to contest the 17 trespass order and he never took that opportunity. Instead, he filed this lawsuit claiming that his 18 due process rights were violated. Under these circumstances, his claim that defendant violated 19 his due process rights fails. 20 Factual Summary 21 Defendant Timberline Regional Library (“TRL”) is a regional library pursuant to RCW 22 27.12.010(4), and is a public entity created by law pursuant to RCW 27.04, which operates and 23 administers libraries in five counties in the State of Washington, including Thurston County, for 24 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 use by the public and is funded by taxation (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶ 3, Dkt. 3, ¶ 3). TRL operates under 2 the supervision of a board of trustees and bylaws (Dkt. 16-1). Plaintiff, Amedeo Nappi, is a 3 resident of Olympia, who frequented the library (id.). 4 On or about November 13, 2012, a female librarian at the Olympia library (“library”) 5 asked plaintiff if he preferred an upright computer or a recessed one and plaintiff reportedly 6 responded that he liked girls lying down, but that either computer would do (Dkt. 21, Exhibit 1). 7 The librarian reported the comment and library staff asked plaintiff to come to the library office 8 to discuss the matter (Dkt. 20, ¶¶ 2-3, Dkt. 18, ¶ 1). Plaintiff refused and left the library in a 9 disruptive manner (Dkt. 20, ¶¶ 4-5, Dkt. 18, ¶ 2). 10 Three days later, on November 16, 2012, plaintiff returned to the library and was again 11 asked to meet with library staff to discuss the incident. He again refused and became disruptive. 12 The Olympia Police were called in response (Dkt. 18, ¶¶ 3-5, Dkt. 15, ¶1). When the police 13 arrived, they spoke to plaintiff and advised him that he had been “trespassed” – meaning that he 14 was barred from the premises. Plaintiff left without being arrested (Dkt. 18, ¶¶ 3-5, Dkt. 15, ¶1). 15 Defendant’s acting director, Gwen Culp, sent plaintiff a letter of trespass after the November 16 16 incident advising plaintiff that he was prohibited from coming onto the premises for six months 17 and invited him to challenge the decision (Dkt. 16, Ex. 4). Plaintiff admits that in December of 18 2012, defendant had offered him a telephone hearing to contest the acting director’s decision to 19 trespass but that he refused to participate in such a hearing (Dkt. 24, p. 2, 3). Instead, plaintiff 20 demanded copies of defendant’s policies and procedures and other documents and served 21 defendant with a summons and complaint (id.). 22 // 23 // 24 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 1 Procedural History 2 On or about November 10, 2014, plaintiff filed a pro se action in Thurston County 3 Superior Court (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1). Although not specifically stated, plaintiff appears to be making a 4 claim for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id.). Plaintiff alleges that 5 he was denied procedural due process under the United States Constitution (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, ¶17). 6 Defendant removed the case from Thurston County Superior Court to federal court on 7 December 2, 2014 (Dkt. 1). The parties filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge on 8 January 29, 2015 (Dkt. 10), giving this Court authority to decide the case. 9 On April 14, 2015, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 14), together 10 with supporting declarations (see Dkts. 15 - 22). Plaintiff filed a response (Dkt. 24) and 11 declarations (Dkts. 25, 26). Defendant filed a reply (Dkt. 27). The Court has reviewed all of 12 said materials. 13 14 Standard of Review In federal court, summary judgment is required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) if the 15 evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no 16 genuine dispute as to any material fact. Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 17 (9th Cir.1997). Once a party has moved for summary judgment Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) requires 18 the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify facts that show that a genuine issue 19 for trial exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty 20 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 21 In order to recover pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must prove: (i) the conduct 22 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (ii) the conduct 23 deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the 24 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 1 United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels 2 v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy an alleged 3 wrong only if both of these elements are present. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th 4 Cir. 1985). Initially, if plaintiff moves for summary judgment, plaintiff has the burden of 5 presenting admissible evidence to support each of these elements. See Lujan v. Wildlife Fed., 6 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990). 7 8 Analysis The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that municipalities and other bodies of local 9 government are “persons” within the meaning of this statute. See, e.g., City of St. Louis. v. 10 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, (1988); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 11 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Also, the Supreme Court has regularly noted that other governmental 12 entities that derive revenues from taxation, are considered “municipalities” for purposes of 42 13 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Monell, supra, at 689; Board of County Commissioners of Bryan 14 County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402 (1997). 15 To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a 16 constitutional right; (2) that the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate 17 indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the 18 constitutional violation. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). If there is 19 no express policy, then plaintiff must prove that there is a widespread practice that is so 20 permanent and well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law or that the 21 constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority. See City of St. 22 Louis v. Paprotinik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988). 23 24 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 1 Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment to prove that 2 defendant is a “person” acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 Plaintiff has only named TRL as a defendant and defendant impliedly concedes that TRL is a 4 “person” acting under color of state law for purposes of showing a §1983 violation (Dkt. 8, ¶ 3; 5 Dkt. 14, page 6). Nevertheless, plaintiff has failed to present admissible evidence as to the 6 second requirement – that defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 7 Plaintiff’s only argument is that he was denied due process. The due process clause of the 8 Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 9 without due process of law. In analyzing a procedural due process claim, a court must first 10 determine whether the claimant has been deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by 11 the Constitution; if so, the court must determine whether the procedures attendant upon that 12 deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 13 U.S. 454 (1989). 14 Arguably, the suspension of library privileges involves a cognizable liberty interest. See 15 Wayfield v. Town of Tisbury, 925 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Mass. 1996); Doyle v. Clark County 16 Public Library, 2007 WL 2407051, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2007). But see Grigsby v. City of 17 Oakland, 2002 WL 1298759, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2002). Since plaintiff was denied access 18 to the public library, he was deprived of this arguable liberty interest. But plaintiff fails to 19 submit proof that the procedures attendant upon that deprivation was constitutionally 20 insufficient. 21 “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 22 situation demands.” Armstrong v. Meyers, 964 F.2d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Matthews v. 23 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). Here, the library advised plaintiff of the reason he was 24 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 1 trespassed both orally and in writing. On several occasions, by his own admission, the library 2 offered plaintiff an opportunity to explain his side of the situation. Instead, in each of these 3 instances, he refused. 4 A library’s primary purpose is to provide a platform for the public to gain knowledge 5 through reading, writing and quiet contemplation. See Crimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town 6 of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1992). Disruptive behavior, such as the behavior 7 reportedly engaged in by plaintiff, defeats that purpose. State law allows a library board of 8 trustees to exclude any person who willfully and persistently engages in dangerous or offensive 9 conduct from the use of the library. See RCW 27.12.290. Under TRL’s bylaws, the executive 10 director has discretion to limit access to the facilities to a person who engages in such conduct 11 (see Dkt. 16, Ex. 2, p.1). The acting director exercised that authority and allowed plaintiff the 12 opportunity to appeal her decision. Such due process is sufficient under these circumstances. 13 Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 14 All other issues regarding access to public documents are, at best, state law claims, for 15 which this Court chooses not to exercise jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 16 484 U.S. 343, 349-51 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 17 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is 18 directed to mail a copy of this Order to pro se plaintiff at his last known address and close the 19 case. 20 Dated this 26th day of June, 2015. A 21 22 J. Richard Creatura United States Magistrate Judge 23 24 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
