White v. City of Tacoma et al, No. 3:2012cv05987 - Document 191 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER denying 170 Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial; denying 176 Defendants' Motion for Judgment; signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)
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1 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 8 9 10 LASHONN WHITE, Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 CASE NO. C12-5987 RBL ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW v. CITY OF TACOMA, et al. DKT. #170 AND #176 Defendants. 15 16 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Ryan Koskovich and Michael 17 Young’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law (Dkt. # 176) and Plaintiff LaShonn 18 White’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial (Dkt. #170). White sued Officers Koskovich and Young, 19 the City of Tacoma, and other defendants after she was tased, arrested, and taken to jail 20 following a fight inside her home. Some of her claims were dismissed before trial, including her 21 22 ADA claim against the City. After a seven-day trial, the jury found that Officers Koskovich and 23 Young had arrested White without probable cause. The jury returned defense verdicts on all of 24 White’s other claims. The jury was asked to fully compensate White for her injuries and 25 awarded only $1 as nominal damages. 26 The Officers move for judgment as a matter of law, despite the jury verdict. As they did 27 in their summary judgment motion (and at the time of the arrest, according to the jury), the 28 ORDER - 1 1 Officers again ignore the evidence that undermines their case for probable cause. Instead, they 2 focus only on the “uncontroverted facts” that support their decision to arrest White. They argue 3 that they had probable cause to arrest White based on those uncontroverted facts, so the jury 4 verdict cannot stand. 5 6 White moves for a new trial on her ADA and Monell claims against the City. On the 7 Friday before trial, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Sheehan v. San Francisco, 743 F.3d 8 1211 (9th Cir. 2014). In Sheehan, the 9th Circuit held for the first time that Title II of the ADA 9 applies to arrests. White argues that Sheehan is an intervening change in controlling law, and, 10 based on that new authority, that the Court erroneously dismissed her ADA claim on summary 11 judgment. In addition to asking for a new trial on her ADA claim, she also asks for a new trial 12 on her Monell claims against the City. She tried those claims and lost. She does not claim that 13 14 the jury was improperly instructed. Rather, she contends that her Monell claims were unfairly 15 prejudiced because the City’s attorney was allowed to tell the jury that the ADA did not require 16 the City to provide her with an ASL interpreter during the on-scene investigation. 17 A. 18 The Officers contend that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the The Officers Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 19 jury’s finding that they arrested White without probable cause. Their current motion rehashes 20 their summary judgment argument and their argument to the jury. Once again, they highlight the 21 22 23 24 25 26 “uncontroverted facts” that support a finding a probable cause and contend that everything else is irrelevant. A jury verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001). When considering a Rule 50(b) motion, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor 27 and cannot make credibility determinations, or otherwise weigh evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson 28 ORDER - 2 1 Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The question is whether sufficient evidence 2 was presented at trial that supports the verdict, not whether the jury could have come to a 3 different conclusion. Id. 4 While the facts that the Officers put emphasis on may be uncontroverted, that does not 5 6 mean that there are not other facts that are also significant when considering whether there was 7 probable cause at the time of arrest. Indeed, the jury heard evidence that before arresting White, 8 the Officers knew that White had called 911 to report that Johnson had assaulted her in her own 9 home, that the Officers were unable to meaningfully communicate with either White or Johnson 10 on the scene, and that the Officers were ultimately unable to determine who had started the fight. 11 The Officers also learned that White was deaf, which could explain why she failed to follow 12 their verbal orders to stop as she ran toward them. 13 14 While the facts that the Officers highlight would have certainly supported the jury’s 15 verdict if it had found in the Officers’ favor, the facts that they ignore support the jury’s 16 conclusion that they did not have probable cause to arrest White. Substantial evidence was 17 presented at trial that supports the jury’s verdict, so the Officers’ Rule 50(b) motion for judgment 18 as a matter of law [Dkt. #176] is DENIED. 19 B. White’s Motion for a New Trial 20 When the Court was considering the parties’ summary judgment motions, the Ninth 21 22 Circuit had not yet considered whether the ADA applies to arrests. Without the benefit of 23 binding Ninth Circuit authority, the Court relied heavily on the reasoning in Patrice v. Murphy, 24 43 F.Supp.2d 1156 (W.D. Wash 1999) and concluded that the ADA does not apply to on-the- 25 scene police investigations unless the plaintiff claims that he or she was arrested because of his 26 or her disability. Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment was granted. The Court 27 28 ORDER - 3 1 noted, however, that the City’s failure to provide White with an interpreter was relevant to her 2 wrongful arrest and Monell claims against the City. 3 On February 21, 2014, the Friday before trial, the Ninth Circuit held that a municipality 4 may be liable for violating the ADA if it fails to “reasonably accommodate [an individual’s] 5 6 disability in the course of an investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or 7 indignity in that process than other arrestees.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. White argues that 8 Sheehan was an intervening change in controlling law that renders this Court’s summary 9 judgment order erroneous. She moves for a new trial on her ADA claim and also asks for a new 10 trial on her Monell claims. She contends that she should get to re-try her Monell claims because 11 the City’s attorney was allowed to tell the jury that the ADA did not require it to provide White 12 with an ASL interpreter during the on-scene investigation while discussing the City’s Monell 13 14 liability. 15 A district court may grant a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) to correct manifest 16 errors of law or fact or if there has been an intervening change in controlling law. Turner v. 17 Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Harmless error does not 18 warrant a new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 19 The City contends first that White is not entitled to a new trial because she failed to raise 20 21 the issue before trial. While White could have conceivably raised the issue before voir dire, this 22 argument is nearly frivolous and does not warrant serious discussion. The Court will not fault 23 White’s attorneys for not knowing about a Ninth Circuit slip opinion that was issued on the 24 Friday before the start of trial on Monday. 25 The City also argues that the jury concluded that written communication was a 26 reasonable accommodation for White’s disability by finding that the County did not violate the 27 28 ORDER - 4 1 ADA. The City presented evidence at trial that the Officers tried to use similar means to 2 communicate with White during the investigation. Thus, it contends that the issues underlying 3 White’s ADA claim were, in fact, fully litigated at trial. Because it offered the same type of 4 accommodations as the County, the City argues that White should not be granted a new trial on 5 6 7 her ADA claim. The City is correct that, if asked, the jury would have likely concluded that the City 8 offered reasonable accommodations to White by offering to pass notes and finger-spell in sign 9 language. But the jury was not asked that question, and it is not the Court’s role to weigh 10 evidence. Whether an accommodation is reasonable is a highly fact-specific inquiry based on all 11 of the circumstances. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, while the 12 jury likely found for the County because it concluded that written communication was a 13 14 reasonable accommodation for White at the jail, the same accommodations are not necessarily 15 reasonable under different circumstances. 16 17 18 However, not allowing White to try her ADA claim at trial was harmless error because she was fully compensated for all of her damages. There is no intrinsic benefit in having an interpreter. For White, the value of having an interpreter (or other reasonable accommodation) 19 during the on-scene investigation would have been the ability to effectively communicate with 20 21 the officers so that she was not arrested. Logically, the only damages that she could claim to 22 have suffered for any ADA violation, then, would be her damages for being wrongfully arrested. 23 Accordingly, even if she had tried her ADA claim and prevailed, it is certain that the jury would 24 not have awarded more than the nominal damages that she has already received. 25 It was also harmless error for the Court to allow the City’s attorney to tell the jury that the 26 ADA did not require it to provide White with an interpreter during the investigation. Whether 27 28 ORDER - 5 1 the City was compelled to provide White with an interpreter is not relevant to the City’s § 1983 2 Monell liability. The jury was properly instructed and found that the City was not liable. Even if 3 counsel’s argument was improper, it was harmless. White’s motion for a new trial [Dkt. #170] is 4 DENIED. 5 II. 6 7 CONCLUSION After a week-long trial, based on competent evidence, the jury rendered defense verdicts 8 on all of White’s claim except her wrongful arrest claim against the Officers. Sufficient 9 evidence supports the verdict against the Officers, so their motion for judgment as a matter of 10 law [Dkt. #176] is DENIED. Regarding White’s motion, her ADA claim would have been 11 another pathway to recovery, but it would not have entitled her to more damages. The jury 12 found for White on her wrongful arrest claim and fully compensated her. Because she was fully 13 14 compensated for all of the damages that she could have claimed if she had prevailed on her ADA 15 claim, she was not prejudiced by not being allowed to present that claim to the jury. 16 Accordingly, any error was harmless and White’s motion for a new trial [Dkt. #170] is 17 DENIED. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 22nd day of August, 2014. 20 21 22 23 A RONALD B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER - 6
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