Becker v. Mays-Williams, et al, No. 3:2011cv05830 - Document 85 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER denying 64 Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge Benjamin H. Settle.(TG)
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Becker v. Mays-Williams, et al Doc. 85 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 6 7 LAWRENCE M. BECKER, 8 9 Plaintiff, v. 10 CARMEN STEPHANIE MAYS11 WILLIAMS and ASA WILLIAMS JR., CASE NO. C11-5830 BHS ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. 12 13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Asa Williams Jr.’s (“Asa Jr.”) 14 motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 64). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in 15 support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby denies 16 the motion for the reasons stated herein. 17 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 18 On October 10, 2011, Plaintiff Lawrence M. Becker (“Becker”), as fiduciary of 19 the Xerox Corporation Savings Plan (“Savings Plan”) and The Xerox Corporation 20 Retirement Income Guarantee Plan (“RIGP”), filed a complaint for interpleader for the 21 22 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Court to determine the proper beneficiaries of Asa Williams Sr.’s (“Asa Sr.”) employee 2 benefit plans. Dkt. 1. 3 On September 28, 2012, Defendant Carmen Stephanie Mays-Williams (“Carmen”) 4 filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 32. On December 11, 2012, the Court 5 granted the motion and judgment was entered in favor of Carmen. Dkts. 43 & 44. On 6 January 28, 2015, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Dkt. 55. 7 On September 21, 2015, Asa Jr. filed the instant motion for summary judgment. 8 Dkt. 64. On October 13, 2015, Carmen responded. Dkt. 78. On October 16, 2015, Asa 9 Jr. replied. Dkt. 82. 10 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 11 The relevant facts are set forth in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and need not be 12 repeated here. Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035, 1036–1038 (9th Cir. 2015). Although 13 the parties submitted additional evidence, only a few facts are necessary to resolve the 14 instant dispute and those facts are set forth in the analysis below. 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 A. Motions to Strike 17 Both parties move to strike evidence submitted by the other party. First, Carmen 18 renews her motion to strike declarations that were submitted in the first round of 19 summary judgment briefing. Dkt. 78 at 22. Carmen argued that the evidence is “replete 20 with unsupported legal claims, accusations, hearsay, conclusions and opinions not based 21 on the declarants’ personal knowledge.” Dkt. 38 at 10. While Carmen’s position has 22 merit, the Court declines to engage in a paragraph-by-paragraph evidentiary analysis. ORDER - 2 1 Instead, the Court will specifically identify the admissible evidence that it relies upon in 2 reaching its decision. 3 Next, Asa Jr. moves to strike Carmen’s declaration and her daughter Andrea 4 Elliot’s declaration because they are precluded from testifying under Washington’s 5 Deadman’s Statute and because their statements are irrelevant. Dkt. 82 at 2–6. With 6 regard to the former, the statute only applies to actions brought on behalf of the estate and 7 not to actions involving parties in their individual capacities. Erickson v. Robert F. Kerr, 8 M.D., P.S., Inc., 125 Wn. 2d 183, 189–190 (1994); Maciejczak v. Bartell, 187 Wn. 113, 9 60 P.2d 31 (1936) (Deadman Statute only applies to actions brought on behalf of estate). 10 Thus, despite Asa Jr.’s argument that the policy of the Deadman Statute may still be 11 applied to the present action (Dkt. 82 at 2–3), the Court declines to strike the declarations. 12 With regard to relevancy, the Court declines to engage in relevancy determination at this 13 stage of the proceeding. In other words, if the declarations are relevant, the Court will 14 specifically cite the facts relevant to the Court’s consideration. 15 B. Summary Judgment 16 The Ninth Circuit held that the designation forms were not plan documents, the 17 plan administrator did not exercise his discretion, and the remaining inquiry is “whether 18 Asa [Sr.] strictly or substantially complied with the governing plan documents.” Becker, 19 777 F.3d at 1041. 20 1. 21 Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure Standard 22 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material ORDER - 3 1 fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 2 The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party 3 fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which 4 the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 5 323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, 6 could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. 7 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must 8 present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”). 9 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists 10 if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or 11 jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 12 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 13 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The 15 Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must 16 meet at trial – e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477 17 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual 18 issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically 19 attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The 20 nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence 21 at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W. 22 Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory, ORDER - 4 1 nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be 2 presumed. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990). 3 2. 4 Carmen argues that the strict compliance standard does not apply to this Strict Compliance 5 interpleader action. Dkt. 78 at 10–12. While Asa Jr. “agree[s] that state law applies and 6 [the] doctrine of substantial compliance applies,” he also “believes” that Asa Sr. strictly 7 complied with the governing documents. Dkt. 82 at 9. Asa Jr., however, fails to cite any 8 Washington authority applying the doctrine of strict compliance to interpleader actions. 9 As such, the Court adopts Carmen’s position and the authority cited therein that 10 substantial compliance is the appropriate standard for this interpleader action. See Dkt. 11 78 at 10–12. Therefore, the Court declines to consider whether Asa Sr. strictly complied 12 with the plan documents. 13 3. 14 The issue of substantial compliance is determined by the law of the forum state. Substantial Compliance 15 BankAmerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 829–830 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying 16 California law). “Substantial compliance with the terms of the policy means that the 17 insured has not only manifested an intent to change beneficiaries, but has done everything 18 which was reasonably possible to make that change.” Allen v. Abrahamson, 12 Wn. App. 19 103, 105 (1974). With regard to intent, the court elaborated that 20 21 The rule requiring substantial compliance with the policy terms in effectuating a change of beneficiary becomes necessary for the purpose of demonstrating with a high degree of certainty that the deceased insured unequivocally desired to make that change, and that he did not some time 22 ORDER - 5 1 thereafter abandon his purpose by failing to take affirmative steps to carry out his intent. 2 Id. at 107. With regard to steps taken to effectuate the challenged change of beneficiary, 3 “substantial compliance mean[s] that the insured had done everything required by the 4 insurance policy that he could do to change the beneficiary and that only the ministerial 5 acts of the insurer were needed to effect the change.” Williams v. Bank of California, N. 6 A., 96 Wn.2d 860, 866 (1982). In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that 7 “[s]ummary judgment is notoriously inappropriate for determination of claims in which 8 issues of intent, good faith and other subjective feelings play dominant roles.” Becker, 9 777 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 10 1993)). 11 In this case, Carmen has shown that questions of material fact exist on the issue of 12 Asa Sr.’s intent. For example, Asa Sr. was repeatedly informed that he must sign and 13 return the beneficiary forms in order to complete the change of beneficiary. Although 14 these forms are not plan documents, failure to complete the simple task of signing and 15 returning them raises an inference that it was not Asa Sr.’s unequivocal desire to change 16 the beneficiary. This failure, combined with Carmen’s testimony that, to avoid 17 confrontation, Asa Sr. would pretend to do certain things to please people, but not 18 actually accomplish the requested task, could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that Asa 19 Sr. abandoned his manifested intent. Therefore, the Court finds that material questions of 20 fact preclude summary judgment. 21 22 ORDER - 6 1 2 IV. ORDER Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Asa Jr.’s motion for summary judgment 3 (Dkt. 64) is DENIED. 4 Dated this16th day of November, 2015. A 5 6 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ORDER - 7
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