Georgia-Pacific Gypsum LLC v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 117, et al, No. 3:2011cv05497 - Document 22 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment granting 14 cross-motion. Signed by Judge Benjamin H. Settle. (MGC)
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Georgia-Pacific Gypsum LLC v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 117, et al Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 11 GEORGIA-PACIFIC GYPSUM, LLC, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 15 v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL 117 and ARTHUR POLO, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 CASE NO. C11-5497BHS ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT This matter comes before the Court on Defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 117’s (“Union”) motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 11) and Plaintiff Georgia-Pacific Gypsum, LLC’s (“GP”), cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 14). 21 The Court has reviewed the briefs filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and 22 23 24 the remainder of the file and hereby grants GP’s motion and denies the Union’s motion for the reasons stated herein. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 25 26 27 On June 29, 2011, GP filed a complaint against the Union requesting that the Court vacate an arbitration award. Dkt. 1. 28 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 On September 9, 2011, the Union filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 11. 2 On September 21, 2011, GP responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 3 Dkt. 14. On October 7, 2011, the Union replied to its motion and responded to GP’s 4 motion. Dkt. 20. On October 14, 2011, GP replied to its motion. Dkt. 21. 5 6 7 8 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The relevant facts are not disputed. Arthur Polo (“Polo”) has worked for GP for over 25 years. Polo has never been disciplined for violating any company policy, has no 9 history of drug or alcohol abuse, and has no record of being intoxicated on the job. 10 11 12 13 14 15 The weekend prior to September 27, 2010, Polo visited a family friend who had been recently diagnosed with terminal cancer. Polo admits that he drank and snorted a small amount of cocaine with the friend. On September 27, 2010, Polo submitted to a random drug test. Polo failed the test and a subsequent retest of Polo’s sample confirmed the failure. 16 On October 12, 2011, GP terminated Polo’s employment. GP contends that it was 17 contractually bound to terminate Polo pursuant to Article 19 of the Collective Bargaining 18 Agreement (“CBA”) between the Union and GP, which provides as follows: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Georgia-Pacific is committed to providing a safe workplace for all employees. It is in the interest of the employees, the Company, the Local Union and the community that the Tacoma, WA facility remains free from employees reporting for work or working under the influence of illegal drugs, controlled substances and/or alcohol. This policy is considered a living document and is subject to change as applicable with Federal and/or State law. The Union will be notified of changes as they occur. Elements of the Drug Testing plan include: (1) An employee assistance plan (2) A Medical Review Officer review of all positive results (3) Random testing procedure (4) Reasonable suspicion, for cause, and post accident testing (5) All positive test results will result in termination Dkt. 15, Declaration of Scott G. Seidman (“Seidman Decl.”), Exh. 1 at 22 (emphasis 27 added). 28 ORDER - 2 The Union filed a grievance on the termination. The parties selected an arbitrator 1 2 and a hearing was held on March 29, 2011. On June 6, 2011, the arbitrator issued a 3 decision and found as follows: “There was not just cause for the termination of Mr. Polo 4 after 25 years of unblemished service. The punishment is excessive based on the work 5 record of [Polo].” Seidman Decl., Exh. 2 (“Decision”) at 9 (Decision pagination). The 6 7 arbitrator ordered that Polo be conditionally reinstated pending subsequent drug tests. Id. at 9–10. 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. Summary Judgment Standard 10 Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 11 12 13 14 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this case, the facts are undisputed and the parties only ask for a determination whether 15 the Decision should be vacated as a matter of law. 16 B. Standard of Review 17 “It is well-settled that federal labor policy favors the resolution of disputes through 18 arbitration; thus, judicial scrutiny of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.” S. Cal. 19 Gas Co. v. Utility Workers Union of Am., Local 132, AFL–CIO, 265 F.3d 787, 792 (9th 20 Cir. 2001). Under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, an arbitration award is 21 subject to vacatur only in a “narrow” set of circumstances: 22 23 24 25 (1) when the award does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator is dispensing his own brand of industrial justice; (2) where the arbitrator exceeds the boundaries of the issues submitted to him; (3) when the award is contrary to public policy; or (4) when the award is procured by fraud. Id. at 792–93. 26 27 28 ORDER - 3 1 C. The Parties’ Motions 2 GP contends that the Decision must be vacated because it did not draw its essence 3 from the CBA and the arbitrator dispensed “his own brand of industrial justice.” Dkt. 14 4 at 5. The Court agrees. Although sympathetic to what the arbitrator deemed “excessive” 5 punishment, the Court finds that the Decision does not draw its essence from the parties’ 6 7 8 CBA. The arbitrator’s desire to enforce a just punishment based on the facts, or dispense his own brand of justice, is the only plausible explanation for the Decision and his award of conditional reinstatement. 9 The arbitrator determined that “just cause” was an element of the CBA’s drug 10 11 12 13 14 policy. See Decision at 4–5. Under Ninth Circuit case law, an arbitrator decision “draws its essence from the CBA when it is based on language in the CBA.” SFIC Props., Inc. v. District Lodge No. 94, 103 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1996). The arbitrator is deemed not to have been construing or applying the CBA if his interpretation fails to qualify as a 15 “plausible interpretation of the contract.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix Mailers 16 Union, Local 752, 989 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1993); accord SFIC Props., Inc., 103 17 F.3d at 924. An arbitrator’s award is reversible when the arbitrator “‘manifestly 18 disregard[ed]’ the contours of the agreement.” Phoenix Newspapers, 989 F.2d at 1081 19 (quoting Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge. No. 1173, 886 F.2d 20 1200, 1205 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)); see also United Food & Commercial Workers 21 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A court must limit its review 22 to whether the arbitrator’s solution can be rationally derived from some plausible theory 23 of the general framework or intent of the agreement.”). 24 25 26 In this case, the language of the CBA is clear and unambiguous: “All positive test results will result in termination.” The arbitrator, however, found that this clause placed the burden on GP to show just cause for Pope’s termination. Neither the arbitrator nor the 27 Union cite a provision of the CBA that lends a plausible explanation to the arbitrator’s 28 ORDER - 4 1 amendment. Therefore, the arbitrator’s amendment is not based on any specific language 2 in the CBA. 3 The Union argues that the amendment was based on the general framework and 4 intent of the agreement. The first element of the CBA’s drug testing plan is an “employee 5 assistance plan.” With regard to this element, the Decision provides as follows: 6 8 The Arbitrator questions who can take advantage of the “employee assistance plan” if “all positive test results will result in termination.” It does not appear that a person testing positive could take advantage of the employee assistance plan and/or being given a second or last chance. 9 Decision at 8. If the employee assistance plan was for employees who failed a drug test 7 10 as well as employees who voluntarily sought assistance with their problem, then there 11 would be no need for the explicit provision that “all positive tests will result in 12 termination.” Regardless, it is not a plausible interpretation of the general framework of 13 the agreement to vitiate an employer’s bargained for right, termination for positive results 14 of a drug test, by expanding the employee’s bargained for right, the assistance program. 15 16 17 The Union also argues that the arbitrator based his decision on his “substantial experience as a labor arbitrator. . . .” Dkt. 11 at 14. The Ninth Circuit has held that an award may also be upheld if it is based on the arbitrator’s understanding of industry 18 practices. Federated Dept. Stores v. United Foods & Commercial Workers Union, Local 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1442, 901 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 1990). An arbitrator is “not confined to the express terms of the contract” but may also consider the “industrial common law” which “is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it.” Id. “The arbitrator’s finding is not beyond the essence of the contract if it is derived from the arbitrator’s unique expertise.” Id. In this case, the only unique aspect of the matter that was cited by the arbitrator 26 was the severity of Polo’s punishment compared to his pristine work record. On this 27 issue, the arbitrator stated as follows: 28 ORDER - 5 1 2 3 4 5 This Arbitrator finds this case unique. It is the first time in 39 years of serving as an arbitrator that I have encountered a case where a 25 year employee with an unblemished work record is being terminated. There was no negative testimony with regard to Mr. Polo. There was no discipline problems or absenteeism. It appears he performed his job well and valued his job. It is this Arbitrator’s opinion that Mr. Polo’s work and performance record of 25 years with the Company overrides his off-duty mistake and termination in this case is excessive punishment. 6 Decision at 9. The arbitrator failed to show that his implementation of just cause was 7 even remotely based on “industrial common law” or unique employment expertise. The 8 clear intent of the arbitrator’s decision was based on Polo’s unique circumstance. 9 However, amending or altering the CBA based on a unique set of facts is not an action 10 11 that derives its essence from the CBA. Furthermore, the non-precedential nature of the Decision supports the conclusion 12 that the arbitrator sought to enforce his own brand of justice. Individual justice is the 13 only plausible explanation for an arbitrator to significantly alter or amend a CBA, which 14 applies to every Union employee at GP, only to conclude that the alteration or amendment 15 16 17 is non-precedential and “shall not be used by the Union or Employer as an example at a later date.” If “just cause” was drawn from the essence of the drug treatment provision, then it would apply to Polo, an employee with greater tenure and a pristine record, or an 18 employee with less tenure and a record of multiple violations. This was not the case as 19 20 21 22 23 the arbitrator confined the holding only to Polo. Therefore, the Court concludes that the arbitrator did not draw the “just cause” standard from the CBA. The only plausible conclusion is that the standard was drawn from the unique facts of the matter. While Polo’s punishment seems excessive, the Ninth 24 Circuit has held that an arbitrator may not provide individual justice based on unique 25 factual situations. The Court is compelled to conclude that the arbitrator “dispensed his 26 own brand of industrial justice by making an award that does not draw its essence from 27 the collective bargaining agreement.” S. Cal. Gas Co., 265 F.3d at 792 28 ORDER - 6 IV. ORDER 1 2 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Union’s motion for summary judgment 3 (Dkt. 11) is DENIED and GP’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 14) is GRANTED. 4 The arbitrator’s Decision is VACATED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for GP. 5 DATED this 8th day of November, 2011. 6 A 7 8 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER - 7
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