Slater et al v. Clarke et al, No. 3:2010cv05822 - Document 53 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER denying 28 Motion to Dismiss Defendant Range. Granting in part and denying in part 29 Motion to Dismiss Defendants Clarke Burke, Lochrie and Donnelly; Granting Dismissal of Defendant William Lochrie and Denying Dismissal of Clarke Burke and Donnelly; William Lochrie has been terminated from this matter. Signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN) Modified on 7/22/2011 (JAB).
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Slater et al v. Clarke et al Doc. 53 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 KAREN SLATER, individually and on behalf of the ESTATE OF BEVERLY JEAN MAUCK, a deceased person, ALLEN MAUCK and PAMELA MAUCK, individually and RYAN REHBERG, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE on behalf of the ESTATE OF BRIAN MAUCK, a deceased person, 9 10 11 12 Plaintiffs, 13 No. 3:10-cv-05822-RBL ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). [Dkt. #28, 29]. v. 14 HAROLD W. CLARKE, KEVIN BURKE, individually, RICHARD RANGE, individually, WILLIAM LOCHRIE, individually, ERIN DONNELLY, individually, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. 15 16 17 18 19 THIS MATTER comes before the court on Defendants Burke, Donnelly, Lochrie, and 20 Range’s Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).1 21 [Dkt. #s 28, 29]. 22 On November 17, 2007, Daniel Tavares brutally murdered Beverly and Brian Mauck in 23 24 their Washington home. Tavares is a convicted felon with documented extremely violent 25 propensities. He was improperly and prematurely released from prison in Massachusetts and 26 27 28 1 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss on other bases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) will be addressed in a subsequent order. ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 absconded to Washington. [Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt. #1, p. 1, 2]. Tavares is currently serving life in prison in Washington State after pleading guilty to the Maucks’ murders. Plaintiffs are Karen Slater (mother of Beverly Mauck and personal representative of her 3 4 estate), Pamela and Allen Mauck (parents of Brian Mauck), and Ryan Rehberg (personal 5 representative of Brian Mauck’s estate) on behalf of the deceased. 6 Defendants were all employees of the Massachusetts State government at the relevant 7 8 times. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendant Sergeant Richard S. Range, of the 9 Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center (“CFC”)2, solicited and depended on Washington 10 authorities to locate Tavares in Washington and then instructed them to leave him there. 11 Defendant William Lochrie, an employee of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections 12 13 Fugitive Apprehension Unit (“FAU”),3 allegedly worked with Range to contact the FBI about 14 Tavares.4 15 Defendant Erin Donnelly was a Worcester County Assistant District Attorney. She 16 worked with the CFC and FBI to locate Tavares in Washington, but decided to not extradite him 17 18 to Massachusetts. Defendant Kevin Burke was the Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive 19 20 21 22 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center provides statewide information sharing among local, state and federal public safety agencies and private sector organizations on matters of terrorism and public safety. 3 The Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Office of Investigate Services, Fugitive Apprehension Unit is responsible for returning escapees to custody. The unit works closely with the Massachusetts State Police and FBI. 4 There are some discrepancies between the dates in the Plaintiffs’ complaint and those in documents obtained and submitted by the Plaintiffs. These are generally contained in dkt. #s 1, 45, 46, and 47. ORDER - 2 1 2 Office of Public Safety and Security (“Executive Security”).5 He allegedly authorized Range and Lochrie’s efforts to locate Tavares, and participated in the decision to leave him in Washington. 3 I. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 4 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendants willfully failed to prevent Tavares from 5 being improperly released from prison, and subsequently absconding to Washington. Plaintiffs 6 7 allege Defendants knew of Tavares’ danger, issued a warrant for his arrest, and located him in 8 Washington. But Defendants then decided not to extradite Tavares to Massachusetts, and left 9 him in Washington. 10 Plaintiffs allege that these decisions subjected the Maucks to unnecessary danger and 11 harm, which resulted in the deprivation of their constitutionally protected rights to life, liberty, 12 13 and bodily security. The parent Plaintiffs assert claims for loss of their right to the 14 companionship, love, and affection of their children under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs 15 bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985 for monetary damages against Defendants 16 Range, Lochrie, and Donnelly, in their individual and official capacities. They bring these 17 18 actions against Range, Lochrie, and Donnelly for punitive damages in their non-municipal 19 capacities. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against Defendants Clarke and Burke. Plaintiffs also 20 assert state law claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against each 21 Defendant. [Dkt. #1]. 22 Plaintiffs allege that this court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant based on 23 24 their deliberate and extensive contacts with Washington authorities, and specifically their 25 26 27 28 5 Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security is the umbrella agency for multiple Massachusetts State agencies including: Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Massachusetts State Police, and the Commonwealth Fusion Center. ORDER - 3 1 2 decision to locate and then leave Tavares in Washington. Defendants claim their contacts are insufficient as a matter of law to subject them to personal jurisdiction in Washington State. 3 4 II. BACKGROUND A. Defendants Knew Tavares Was Dangerous 5 Daniel Tavares murdered his mother in 1991.6 He was sentenced to seventeen to twenty 6 7 years in Massachusetts State prison. Tavares was frequently violent to staff and inmates while in 8 prison, earning the highest available Massachusetts DOC security rating and accumulating at 9 least 120 disciplinary reports. Between 1993 and 2006, eleven of these disciplinary reports 10 resulted in his loss of 4.38 years good time credit. Six additional disciplinary reports for violent 11 actions should have resulted in the loss of an additional 689 days of good time credit. 12 In a 2006 letter, Tavares made threats against then-Governor Romney and Attorney 13 14 General Reilly. In February 2006, the Mass. DOC notified the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) 15 about Tavares’ violence and threats. Executive Security and the DOC prepared months in 16 advance for Tavares’ release. DOC collected information on Tavares’ violence, his telephone 17 18 contact list, and visitor’s card, updated photographs of Tavares, and placed him on mail monitor. 19 All of this was in anticipation of future law enforcement requests. In April 2007, Executive 20 Security7 contacted numerous organizations, including the U.S. Secret Service, MSP, DOC 21 Victim Services, and the Criminal History Systems Board, about Tavares’ pending release. 22 B. Tavares Still Manages to Abscond 23 In early June 2007, the Worcester DA’s Office filed charges against Tavares for 24 25 assaulting prison staff. Prior to arraignment, police officer Lt. James Hanafin warned Worcester 26 6 27 28 The Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are generally found in Dkt. #1; Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkt. #45; and Scudder Decl., Dkt. #46. 7 Many of the documents obtained and submitted by the Plaintiffs contain only the agency name and do not specify the individual agent. ORDER - 4 1 ADA Donnelly about Tavares’ violence and threats. Tavares was arraigned on June 11, 2007. 2 Donnelly represented the State, and bail was set at $50,000 on each of the two assault charges. 3 On June 14, 2007, Tavares completed his sentence for the murder conviction, 689 days 4 early. This was a result of the DOC improperly calculating his forfeiture of good time. Mass 5 DOC notified special investigators, DOC Victim Services, and the Bristol County Sheriff’s 6 7 Office about Tavares’ release because of his danger to the public. A Superior Court Judge 8 released Tavares on his personal recognizance on June 17, 2007, after he appealed his bail on the 9 two assault charges.8 10 Executive Security remained concerned about Tavares’ danger to others. Executive 11 Security met with both the MSP Violent Fugitive Apprehension Section9 (VFAS) and FAU on 12 13 July 16 or 17, 2007. Within days, VFAS investigated and learned Tavares had fled 14 Massachusetts. VFAS confirmed that Tavares’ stepbrother had driven him to the airport in 15 Providence, Rhode Island, where he boarded a flight to Washington State. 16 Tavares defaulted in Clinton County District Court on July 23, 2007.10 The next day two 17 18 warrants were issued for his arrest. VFAS learned Tavares applied for SS/ID and credit cards 19 using the Washington State address of his “jailhouse wife,” Jennifer Tavares. VFAS told 20 Executive Security on July 25, 2007, that it had credible information Tavares was in 21 Washington. Executive Security forwarded this information on to the CFC. VFAS acted on its 22 knowledge by asking the Worcester DA to extradite Tavares from Washington. 23 24 25 8 26 9 27 28 It is unclear from the parties’ briefing where Tavares was located during the interim. VFAS identifies and arrests the most violent criminals by serving as a liaison and assisting in investigations among Massachusetts and national agencies with the common purpose of apprehension of fugitives. 10 Plaintiffs do not provide any detail on the nature of this hearing. ORDER - 5 On August 1, 2007, Executive Security confirmed that Romney was scheduled to be in 1 2 Seattle on November 19, 2007. VFAS notified Executive Security that it had asked the 3 Worcester DA’s office to extradite Tavares from Washington. 4 C. The Worcester DA’s Office Refuses to Extradite Tavares 5 In late August 2007, Range, of the CFC, and Lochrie, of the FAU, talked multiple times 6 7 about Tavares’ history of violence and the fact he had absconded to Washington. Range 8 discussed with Special Projects Manager Paul Pellegrino at VFAS that Tavares was dangerous, 9 but the Worcester DA did not want to extradite him from Washington. Range located DOC files 10 with Jennifer Tavares’ mailing address and phone number in Washington. Range was still 11 concerned about Tavares and he, along with other CFC and VFAS agents, updated the NCIC 12 13 entry with information on Tavares’ known violence, but noted that it was for “officer safety” 14 only. 15 In September 2007, Range spoke with ADA Donnelly. Donnelly said that the DA’s office 16 was not aware of all the information about Tavares when they initially decided not to extradite 17 18 him and would review the matter. The Worcester DA’s Office again refused to take Tavares’ 19 danger seriously. The Worcester DA’s Office sent a letter to VFAS authorizing Tavares’ 20 extradition only from New England states (after VFAS confirmed Tavares was in Washington). 21 The Worcester DA told the CFC about this limited extradition and instructed the CFC to enter it 22 in the NCIC database. 23 24 25 26 27 D. Washington Authorities Are Involved In late September 2007, Range acted on his knowledge of Tavares’ potential for violence and his presence in Washington by contacting the Boston FBI. On September 25, the CFC left a message for Sgt. Lance Ladines of the WSP at the Washington Joint Analytical Center 28 ORDER - 6 1 (WAJAC) (maintained by the FBI). A few days later, Range followed up with the Boston FBI. 2 Range confirmed that Intelligence Analyst Wells would request that Washington personnel 3 determine whether Tavares had established a permanent residence in Washington, and whether 4 he was engaged in any criminal activity. The FBI agreed to advise Range of Washington’s 5 findings. 6 7 The Seattle FBI Office received Range’s request from Boston the first week of October. 8 WAJAC was asked to physically locate Tavares, but not to arrest him, and determine whether 9 Tavares planned to remain in Washington. Boston FBI picked up a packet on Tavares prepared 10 by Executive Security. 11 WSP Task Force Officer George Mars spent all of October 24, 2007, surveying Tavares’ 12 13 residence in Graham. A neighbor confirmed seeing Jennifer Tavares, but when shown a photo of 14 Daniel Tavares, he stated that he had never seen him there. 15 On November 17, 2007, Tavares entered Beverly and Brian Mauck’s home and shot them 16 both in the head at close range. The Maucks’ murder took place very near where Defendants had 17 18 19 located Tavares’ jailhouse wife three weeks earlier. A few days later, unaware of the murders, the CFC confirmed with the Boston FBI that 20 WAJAC’s written findings would be sent back to the CFC. These findings included information 21 obtained by WAJAC through Washington databases. On November 20, 2007, the CFC received 22 the FBI’s written response from WAJAC about Tavares. 23 24 25 On November 10, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed their complaint. The issue before the Court is whether it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants on the facts alleged by the Plaintiffs. 26 27 28 ORDER - 7 1 III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 2 Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists. Rio Properties, 3 Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). Where 4 the 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, 5 “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Schwarzenneger v. 6 7 Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). “The 8 plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” 9 Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Any “uncontroverted allegation in the complaint must be taken as true…[and] [c]onflicts 11 between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” 12 13 Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 14 But, the plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Amba Marketing 15 Systems, Inc. v. Jobar Int’l Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977). 16 A. Personal Jurisdiction in Washington Comports with Due Process 17 18 “Jurisdiction must comport with the state long-arm statute, and with the constitutional 19 requirement of due process. Because the Washington long-arm statute reaches as far as the Due 20 Process Clause, all [the Court] need analyze is whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comply 21 with due process.” Omuluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbygger A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995) 22 (internal citation omitted). “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in 23 24 not being subject to binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 25 ‘contacts, ties or relations.’” Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985), quoting 26 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 27 28 ORDER - 8 1 To exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, due process requires the 2 defendant “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of 3 the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International 4 Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotations omitted). These minimum contacts make personal 5 jurisdiction foreseeable when the non-resident defendant’s connection to, and conduct within, the 6 7 forum state is such that “he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World- 8 Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 9 B. Specific Jurisdiction in Washington 10 Defendants lack the “continuous and systematic” contacts of general jurisdiction. Perkins 11 v. Benguet Consolidate Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S.Ct. 413 (1952). Plaintiffs argue that 12 13 Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction on claims related to their contacts in the forum 14 state. Washington looks at three criteria when determining whether there is specific jurisdiction: 15 16 1. Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 17 2. The cause of action arose from, or was connected with, such act or transaction; 18 3. The assumption of jurisdiction must be reasonable and not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 19 20 21 See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 (9th Cir. 2001). The question is not whether the individual defendants collectively purposefully availed 22 themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Washington, but it is instead whether each 23 24 25 individual defendant purposefully availed him or herself of the jurisdiction of Washington. Lee, 250 F.3d at 693. 26 27 28 ORDER - 9 1 1. Purposeful Direction Analysis 2 Because this is a case sounding in tort, not contract, the standard is a “purposeful 3 direction analysis,” rather than purposeful availment. Schwarzenneger, 374 F.3d at 802 (internal 4 citations omitted). 5 Purposeful direction is evaluated under the three-part “Calder-effects” test. 6 7 Schwarzenneger, 374 F.3d at 803, quoting Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111. A defendant 8 purposefully directs its activities at the forum state if it has “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) 9 expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be 10 suffered in the forum state.” Id. 11 2. Cause of Action Analysis 12 13 The plaintiffs must show that their cause of action arises out of the Defendants’ 14 Washington-related activities. The cause of action test is whether “but for” the alleged contacts 15 between the Defendants and Washington, the Plaintiffs’ claims would not have arisen. Lee, 250 16 F.3d at 694, citing Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 18 19 3. Reasonableness of Jurisdiction “[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents 20 seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other 21 considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 22 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). 23 24 The Court looks to seven factors in determining whether jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) 25 the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden 26 on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of 27 the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most 28 ORDER - 10 1 efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s 2 interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. Burger 3 King, 471 U.S. at 476-477; Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 4 1998). 5 C. Direct Coordination of Extradition Proceedings Establishes Personal Jurisdiction 6 7 Purposeful availment is established by intentional and continuous contacts between out- 8 of-state authorities and the forum state. In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, two New York police 9 officers entered information into the NCIC database and then had extensive contact with 10 California authorities (including visiting the forum state). 250 F.3d 668, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). The 11 Ninth Circuit held that the officers’ contacts with the California justice system to accomplish 12 13 extradition were “deliberate, extensive, aimed at, and had an effect in California.” Id. at 694. It 14 therefore held California had personal jurisdiction over the two New York officers. Id. 15 When an out-of-state DA’s office coordinates extradition with forum state authorities, it 16 invokes the benefits and protections of the forum state’s laws. In Maney v. Ratcliff, a Louisiana 17 18 DA and ADA entered information into the NCIC database and told Wisconsin authorities 19 Louisiana wanted to extradite the plaintiff and would send the necessary papers. 399 F.Supp. 20 760, 769 (D. Wis. 1975). The attorneys sent the Wisconsin authorities a telegram asking them to 21 arrest the plaintiff and notify Louisiana when the arrest was completed. Id. The District Court 22 held that personal jurisdiction was appropriate in Wisconsin because the attorneys engaged 23 24 25 26 27 directly with Wisconsin authorities for arrest and extradition, invoking the benefits and protections of Wisconsin law. Id. Even without substantial direct contacts with the forum state, purposeful availment can exist when a party relies on the forum state. See, e.g., Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1497 (9th 28 ORDER - 11 1 Cir. 1995). There, an Austrian bank did not advertise or significantly solicit business in the U.S., 2 but it depended on California residents for a substantial amount of its business. Ballard, 65 F.3d 3 at 1497. The Ninth Circuit held the Austrian bank purposefully availed itself of California State 4 law because it intentionally relied on California residents for well over half its business. Id. at 5 1499. 6 7 D. Use of the NCIC Database and Unsolicited Acts by the Forum State Are Insufficient for Personal Jurisdiction 8 An on-going relationship distinguishes between random, fortuitous contacts and 9 10 purposeful availment. In Cook v. Holzberger, a Michigan sheriff arrested the plaintiff based on 11 an Ohio warrant in the NCIC database. 788 F. Supp. 347, 351 (D. Ohio 1992). He then spoke to 12 Ohio authorities about extradition. The Southern District Court of Ohio held that this limited 13 contact, without an on-going relationship with the forum state, did not constitute purposeful 14 availment. Id.; See also Snyder v. Snyder, U.S. Dist. WL 894415, at *4 (D. Minn. 2007);11 15 16 Williams v. Ponder, U.S. Dist. WL 3152129, at *4 (D. Penn. 2009).12 17 E. Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Range 18 Plaintiffs allege that personal jurisdiction over Range is appropriate because of his 19 relationship with Washington authorities and his involvement in the decision to leave Tavares in 20 21 Washington. [Dkt. #1, p. 9, 12, 14, 19, 23; Dkt. #45, p. 9-10; Dkt. #46, Exh. C, D]. Range denies entering the New England extradition into the NCIC database or being 22 23 involved in the decision to not extradite Tavares from Washington. Range admits using the 24 25 26 27 28 11 Holding that Colorado authorities’ NCIC database entry followed by a fax between Colorado and Minnesota authorities was not a purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Minnesota. 12 Holding that a Georgia ADA’s request that Governor of Georgia ask that Pennsylvania extradite the plaintiff was a significantly more tenuous connection “than the direct coordination of extradition proceedings found in Lee and Maney.” ORDER - 12 1 Boston FBI as a liaison with Washington State, but denies directly contacting anyone in 2 Washington. Range alleges that he did not know Tavares was actually in Washington State until 3 November 19, 2007, when he learned of Tavares’ arrest for the Maucks’ murder. [Dkt. #28, 4 Range Decl.]. 5 Plaintiffs’ factual allegations regarding Defendant Range’s conduct support personal 6 7 jurisdiction over him. As a CFC employee, Range deliberately acted on behalf of Burke (the 8 Secretary of Executive Security) and made substantial contacts with Washington (through the 9 FBI). While Range did not travel to the forum state as the defendants did in Lee, he nevertheless 10 had extensive and deliberate contacts with Washington. 250 F.3d at 698. Range requested and 11 received Washington’s cooperation in his investigation of Tavares. Range’s contacts were not of 12 13 the impersonal and nonspecific variety. He did not simply input information into the NCIC 14 database. Instead, he used the FBI to rely on the work of WSP. Similar to the defendants in 15 Maney, Range invoked Washington law by engaging WSP (through the FBI chain of command) 16 to gain information on Tavares’ whereabouts and activities in Washington. [Dkt. #1, p. 14, 23; 17 18 Dkt. #45, p. 10; Dkt. #46, Exh. D]; 399 F.Supp. at 769. 19 Range expressly aimed his actions at Washington with his involvement in the decision to 20 leave Tavares in Washington. Range solicited and relied on the work of Washington authorities. 21 He instructed the FBI and WSP not to arrest Tavares because the Worcester DA would not 22 extradite Tavares to Massachusetts. Yet he relied on the WSP to obtain a variety of information 23 24 on Tavares’ activities in Washington. As the Austrian bank relied on California customers for its 25 business in Ballard, Range purposefully relied on the work of the WSP, but ensured Tavares 26 would not be sent back to Massachusetts. [Dkt. #1, p. 9, 14]; 65 F.3d at 1499. 27 28 ORDER - 13 Range’s actions caused a harm that he knew was likely to occur. He told the DA’s office 1 2 that Tavares was dangerous and in Washington. Range (along with Lochrie and Donnelly) then 3 chose to leave Tavares in Washington without any reasonable precautions such as supervision, 4 monitoring, or warning citizens in his vicinity. 5 But for the decision to leave Tavares in Washington, unsupervised and without any 6 7 warning to those around him, Beverly and Brian Mauck would not have been subject to Tavares’ 8 violence. Range’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED. 9 F. Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Donnelly 10 Plaintiffs allege that personal jurisdiction over Donnelly is appropriate because she knew 11 Tavares was dangerous and in Washington, but she declined multiple times to extradite him to 12 13 Massachusetts. All the while, Donnelly was in contact with the FBI about Tavares’ location in 14 Washington. 15 Donnelly argues that she told her supervisor at the Worcester DA’s Office about Range’s 16 concerns, but she was not involved in extradition decisions. Donnelly denies any involvement 17 18 19 with Tavares’ NCIC entry. Donnelly also denies contacting the FBI or Washington authorities. [Dkt. #29, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; Dkt. #31, Donnelly Decl.]. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Defendant Donnelly’s conduct support this Court’s 20 21 22 personal jurisdiction over her. Donnelly deliberately refused to extradite Tavares multiple times after state agents told her Tavares was believed to be in Washington.13 Despite this credible 23 24 information, the Worcester DA’s office expanded extradition only to the New England states. 25 26 13 27 28 In late July 2007, VFAS contacted Donnelly seeking authorization to extradite Tavares from Washington. [Dkt. #46, Exh. C]. Two months later Range told Donnelly about the danger of Tavares and was told that the DA’s office was unaware of this and would review its decision to not extradite Tavares. [Dkt. #1, p. 22]. ORDER - 14 1 2 3 4 Donnelly told the CFC to enter this revised extradition into the NCIC database. She then contacted the FBI about Tavares’ location in Washington. [Dkt. #1, p. 9, 23; Dkt. #45, p. 9-10]. Donnelly’s actions were aimed at Washington when she purposefully limited Tavares’ extradition to New England, thousands of miles away from Washington, where she had been told 5 he was located. Donnelly caused a harm that she knew was likely to occur in Washington when 6 7 she left a violent criminal on the loose, free to harm those around him; despite her knowledge 8 that Tavares was in Washington and dangerous. As did the DA and ADA in Maney, Donnelly 9 invoked the benefits and protections of Washington law by instructing WSP (through the FBI) 10 that Tavares was not to be extradited to Massachusetts. [Dkt. #45, p. 9-10; Dkt. #46, Exh. C]; 11 399 F.Supp. at 769. 12 13 But for Donnelly’s decision to not extradite Tavares and her contact with the FBI about 14 leaving Tavares in Washington, Beverly and Brian Mauck would not have been subject to the 15 danger of Tavares. Donnelly’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED. 16 G. Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Burke 17 18 Plaintiffs allege that personal jurisdiction over Burke is appropriate because of his 19 agents’ actions. As Secretary of Executive Security, he had knowledge of, directed, participated 20 in, and authorized his agents’ investigations of Tavares and their reliance on the FBI and WSP to 21 locate and then leave Tavares in Washington. [Dkt. #1, p. 10; Dkt. #45, p. 9, 24]. 22 Burke argues that he was not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the 23 24 Massachusetts DOC, the MSP, or the CFC. Burke denies investigating Tavares prior to the 25 murders of the Maucks. Burke denies making any extradition decisions. Lastly, Burke contends 26 that he had no contact with (or directed his agents to contact) Washington authorities about 27 Tavares. [Dkt. #29, 30]. 28 ORDER - 15 A corporation may be held under jurisdiction of the forum state where its agents operate. 1 2 International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 314, 665 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). 3 A supervisory position alone is not sufficient. “The supervisor must be directly and actively 4 involved in activities in the forum state.” Wag-Aero, Inc. v. United States, 337 F.Supp. 1479, 5 1485 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d 35 F.3d 569, 1994 WL 485810 (7th Cir. 1994). 6 Plaintiffs’ factual allegations regarding Defendant Burke’s conduct support this Court’s 7 8 personal jurisdiction over him. Burke initiated an investigation about Tavares’ threats against 9 Romney. Burke, through his agents, told VFAS and FAU about Tavares’ release, and asked 10 VFAS to investigate Tavares. Range acted on behalf of Burke to establish an ongoing 11 relationship with Washington authorities (through the FBI).14 [Dkt. #1, p. 10, 14, 23; Dkt. #45, p. 12 13 10; Dkt. #46, Exh. C, D, E]. Burke’s actions were expressly aimed at Washington because after VFAS informed 14 15 Executive Security of credible information that Tavares was in Washington, Executive Security 16 confirmed Tavares’ location. Executive Security decided to leave Tavares in Washington by 17 18 specifically limiting his extradition to New England. [Dkt. #1, p. 10]. Burke’s actions caused harm in Washington that he knew was likely to occur because he 19 20 knew Tavares was dangerous. So much so that he informed VFAS and the CFC about Tavares 21 release’ and he requested VFAS track down Tavares. [Dkt. #1, p. 10; Dkt. #46, Exh. C, E]. 22 Burke purposefully availed himself of the privileges and benefits of Washington State 23 24 law when he directed his agents to investigate Tavares, located him in Washington, and then 25 willfully decided to leave him there. Burke’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 26 is DENIED. 27 28 14 Range, as an employee of the CFC, worked under the umbrella agency Executive Security. ORDER - 16 1 H. Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Lochrie 2 The Plaintiffs allege that personal jurisdiction over Lochrie, a FAU employee, is 3 appropriate because of his extensive contact with Defendant Range and the FBI about Tavares. 4 [Dkt. #1, p. 14, 19, 21-23; Dkt. #29, p. 22]. 5 Lochrie denies any involvement in the DOC’s calculations of Tavares’ “good time” 6 7 8 9 10 deductions. Lochrie denies any contact with the FBI or Washington authorities regarding Tavares. Lochrie argues that he had no involvement in extradition decisions. [Dkt. #32]. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations regarding Defendant Lochrie’s conduct do not support this Court’s personal jurisdiction over him. Plaintiffs provide extensive detail of Lochrie and Range’s 11 conversations about Tavares. But, Plaintiffs do not provide any details about Lochrie’s alleged 12 13 14 15 contact with the FBI (or WSP) about Tavares. [Dkt. #1, p. 14, 19, 21-23; Dkt. #29, p. 22]. Plaintiffs do not make sufficient allegations to take Lochrie’s actions beyond that of a mere impersonal and nonspecific connection through the NCIC and Defendant Range. Though 16 the Plaintiffs allege that Lochrie acted in furtherance of the warrant in the NCIC to contact the 17 18 FBI, this is a blanket allegation without any specificity of a deliberate act aimed at Washington, 19 causing harm Lochrie knew was likely to occur. In Snyder, the District Court held that there was 20 not personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff only made a bare and generalized allegation of 21 contact with the forum state. U.S. Dist. WL 894415, at *4 (D. Minn. 2007). 22 Similar to Cook, there are no allegations that Lochrie had an ongoing relationship with 23 24 Washington authorities. 788 F.Supp. at 351. Lochrie’s contacts with Washington are tenuous and 25 do not demonstrate the “direct coordination” see in Maney or Lee. Maney, 399 F.Supp. at 769; 26 Lee, 250 F.3d at 693. 27 28 ORDER - 17 1 Because there is not a sufficient allegation of Lochrie’s directed behavior at Washington, 2 it is not necessary to examine whether the harm arose out of his behavior or whether personal 3 jurisdiction would be reasonable in this circumstance. Defendant Lochrie’s Motion to Dismiss 4 for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED. 5 V. CONCLUSION 6 7 The traditional rule is that the claim or cause of action arises where the injury occurs and 8 the harm of the Defendants’ actions has been felt in Washington. Maney, 399 F.Supp. at 767. 9 Washington’s personal jurisdiction over Defendants Range, Donnelly, and Burke is reasonable 10 because they purposefully interjected themselves into Washington State’s affairs by relying on 11 WSP, all the while ensuring that Tavares would not be returned to Massachusetts. Two 12 13 Washington residents were subjected to Tavares’ violence due to the Defendants’ actions. 14 Washington will be an efficient forum for adjudication of this dispute because of the location of 15 witnesses in Washington. The burden on the Defendants of defending in Washington is not 16 unreasonable, particularly in light of the great interest Washington has in adjudicating this 17 18 dispute. Defendants Range, Donnelly, and Burke’s Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 19 Jurisdiction are DENIED. Defendant Lochrie’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 20 Jurisdiction is GRANTED. 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated this 22nd day of July, 2011. 24 25 26 27 A RONALD B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 ORDER - 18
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