Westbrook v. Hammond et al, No. 3:2010cv05392 - Document 6 (W.D. Wash. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER denying 5 Motion for leave to Amend as proposed, and GRANTING leave to file amended complaint. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint by 7/16/10, or the Court will recommend dismissal of the deficient portions of his complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen L Strombom.(CMG; cc to Plaintiff)
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Westbrook v. Hammond et al Doc. 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 9 SHANNON WESTBROOK, 10 11 12 Plaintiff, v. DR. STEVE HAMMOND, et al., 13 14 15 NO. C10-5392 BHS/KLS ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AS PROPOSED, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT Defendants. This civil rights action has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Karen L. Strombom pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local MJR 3 and 4. On June 3, 2010, 16 17 18 Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a proposed prisoner civil rights complaint. Dkt. 1. On June 4, 2010, the Clerk of Court directed Plaintiff to provide service 19 copies and marshal forms for the service of his complaint. Dkt. 2. On June 14, 2010, Plaintiff 20 was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and his Complaint was docketed. Dkts. 3 and 21 4, respectively. On June 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint, with a 22 proposed amendment, service copies and summonses. Dkt. 5. As proposed, portions of the 23 amended complaint contain deficiencies preventing service. Accordingly, the court shall not 24 25 26 direct service of the amended complaint, but shall give Plaintiff an opportunity to submit an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. ORDER 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 3 4 DISCUSSION Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, A[a] party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.@ Otherwise, the party Amay amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by 5 6 written consent of the adverse party.@ Id. Leave to amend Ashall be freely given when justice 7 so requires,@ and Athis policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.@ Id.; Morongo Band of 8 Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). However, under the Prison 9 Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners 10 11 seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 12 has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which 13 14 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 15 relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) (1), (2) and 1915(e) (2); See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 16 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 18 19 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and that the conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the 20 21 22 United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy 23 an alleged wrong only if both of these elements are present. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 24 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). 25 26 ORDER 2 1 2 3 Plaintiff also must allege facts showing how individually named defendants caused or personally participated in causing the harm alleged in the complaint. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A defendant cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely 4 on the basis of supervisory responsibility or position. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 5 6 Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978). A theory of respondeat superior is not sufficient to 7 state a section 1983 claim. Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982). To be liable 8 for causing the deprivation of a constitutional right, the particular defendant must commit an 9 affirmative act, or omit to perform an act, that he or she is legally required to do, and which 10 causes the plaintiff’s deprivation. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). The 11 inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of 12 each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional 13 14 15 deprivation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77 (1976). 16 In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff adds factual allegations regarding his 17 claim that he was denied medical care at the Stafford Creek Corrections Center (SCCC) in 18 violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. He adds several new defendants; among these, 19 Plaintiff purports to sue (1) Governor Christine Gregoire because she is in charge of the 20 supervision and discipline of all state employees; (2) Eldon Vail, Secretary of the Department 21 22 of Corrections (DOC), because he is in charge of the supervision and discipline of all 23 correctional and medical staff at SCCC; and (3) Pat Glebe, Superintendent of SCCC, because 24 he is in charge of the supervision and discipline of all SCCC correctional and medical staff. 25 Dkt. 5-2, pp. 1-2. 26 ORDER 3 1 2 3 With regard to Governor Christine Gregoire, Secretary Vail and Superintendent Glebe, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because he has named these individuals in their supervisory capacity only and has included no 4 factual allegations to support a claim that these individuals personally participated in the 5 6 alleged deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must include factual allegations 7 8 that a state actor acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Deliberate 9 indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 10 11 proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference includes denial, delay or intentional interference with a 12 prisoner’s medical treatment. Id. at 104-5; see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 13 14 459-60 (9th Cir. 1980). To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must 15 demonstrate that the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. 16 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A determination of deliberate indifference involves an 17 examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of 18 the defendant’s response to that need. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 19 1992). 20 First, the alleged deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 21 22 U.S. at 834. A “serious medical need” exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition would 23 result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to 24 contemporary standards of decency. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-35 (1993); 25 26 ORDER 4 1 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Second, the prison official must be deliberately indifferent to the 2 risk of harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 3 An official is deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need if the official “knows of 4 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. Deliberate 5 6 indifference requires more culpability than ordinary lack of due care for a prisoner’s health. 7 Id. at 835. In assessing whether the official acted with deliberate indifference, a court’s inquiry 8 must focus on what the prison official actually perceived, not what the official should have 9 known. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words an official 10 11 must (1) be actually aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, (2) actually draw the inference, but (3) nevertheless disregard the risk to 12 the inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-8. 13 14 Plaintiff must identify the individuals who have allegedly caused him harm, but he has 15 failed to do so as to Governor Gregoire, Secretary Vail and Superintendent Glebe. 16 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees 17 under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 18 supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation 19 must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.1979); Mosher 20 v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a 21 22 claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must 23 allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally 24 participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed 25 to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 26 ORDER 5 1 ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional 2 violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted); 3 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). 4 Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support 5 6 claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163 7 (1993). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Governor Gregoire, Secretary Vail 8 and Superintendent Glebe personally participated in the alleged violations, knew of the 9 violations and failed to prevent them, or implemented a deficient policy. Therefore, Plaintiff 10 11 has failed to state any valid claims against Governor Gregoire, Secretary Vail and Superintendent Glebe and dismissal of his claims against these individuals is appropriate. 12 Before dismissing these parties, however, the court shall grant Plaintiff leave to file an 13 14 amended complaint to either plead facts sufficient to support the conclusion that Governor 15 Gregoire, Secretary Vail and/or Superintendent Glebe participated in the deprivation of his 16 Constitutional rights or to file an amended complaint that does not include these individuals. 17 18 19 Plaintiff shall set forth his factual allegations in separately numbered paragraphs. The amended complaint shall operate as a complete substitute for (rather than a mere supplement to) the present complaint. The amended complaint must be legibly rewritten or retyped in its 20 entirety, it should be an original and not a copy, it may not incorporate any part of the original 21 22 complaint by reference, and it must be clearly labeled the “First Amended Complaint” and 23 must contain the same cause number as this case. Plaintiff is further directed to provide copies 24 of his First Amended Complaint and completed summonses containing the current address for 25 26 ORDER 6 1 each named defendant. Plaintiff shall do so on or before July 16, 2010, or the Court will 2 recommend dismissal of the deficient portions of his complaint. 3 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint as 4 proposed (Dkt. 5-2) is DENIED. The Clerk shall send a copy of this Order and a copy of the 5 6 7 General Order to Plaintiff. Dated this 29th day of June, 2010. A 8 9 Karen L. Strombom United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ORDER 7
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