Disnute v. City of Puyallup, et al, No. 3:2010cv05295 - Document 23 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(JAB)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Disnute v. City of Puyallup, et al Doc. 23 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 9 CHRISTOPHER DISNUTE, PHILLIP CURRIE, and P.C., a minor, 10 11 12 13 Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PUYALLUP et al., No. 3:10-cv-05295-RBL ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. #13] Defendants. 14 15 16 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 17 18 [Dkt. #13]. The dispute arises from an encounter between two City of Puyallup police officers 19 and three African American individuals fishing on a public dock near Bradley Lake Park in 20 Puyallup, Washington. After review, the Court grants Defendants’ motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Christopher Disnute arrived at Bradley Lake on a late July morning in 2009 to 23 24 spend the day fishing from a public dock. Pls.’ Response at 2 [Dkt. #17]. He was soon joined by 25 Plaintiff Phillip Currie and his minor son, P.C., who had never before met Mr. Disnute. Id. The 26 three individuals engaged in polite conversation while Mr. Currie taught his son how to cast. Id. 27 The fishing expedition ended prematurely, however, when two uniformed police officers 28 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 mistakenly informed the anglers that only adults could fish in Bradley Lake. Defs.’ Mot. at 1 [Dkt. #1]. Officers Temple and Davis of the City of Puyallup Police Department engaged the 3 4 Plaintiffs in conversation after making a routine sweep of Bradley Lake Park, an area known to 5 conceal unregistered sex offenders, outstanding warrant subjects, and shoplifters fleeing nearby 6 7 retail establishments. Id. at 4. Officer Temple walked out on the dock and asked the two men 8 where they were from and if they had fishing licenses as a means to identify the individuals. Id. 9 at 5. Mr. Currie took issue with the way Officer Temple asked these initial questions because it 10 appeared Officer Temple assumed the three individuals traveled together or at least knew each 11 other. Pls.’ Response at 3 [Dkt. #17]. Mr. Currie stated, “sir, we’re not together; please don’t 12 13 assume we’re together just because we’re two African Americans fishing together on a dock.” 14 Id. at 4. The substance of the subsequent conversation is disputed, but in any event the officers 15 checked the police database for any outstanding warrants and both men came back clear. Decl. 16 of David Temple at 3 [Dkt. #15]. Officer Temple then erroneously informed the Plaintiffs that 17 18 19 20 21 Bradley Lake was a “youth only” fishing area, and they packed up their gear and left the lake. Id. Mr. Currie was particularly upset with the encounter because the officers did not appear to check any other fisherman’s license, and he had seen at least two white families fishing on the 22 other side of the lake. Pls.’ Response at 6 [Dkt. #17]. In addition, Mr. Currie was certain that 23 24 the “youth only” fishing restriction was no longer in effect. Id. at 5. He exchanged phone 25 numbers with Mr. Disnute. Id. at 6. When he got home, Mr. Currie called the City of Puyallup’s 26 parks and recreation officials and confirmed he could lawfully fish in Bradley Lake as long as he 27 28 ORDER - 2 1 2 3 4 had a valid license. Id. Mr. Currie then contacted the police department to discuss the way he had been treated, and he was directed to file a formal, written complaint. Id. Captain Dave McDonald met with both Mr. Currie and Mr. Disnute and conducted an investigation to determine whether Officer Temple’s conduct violated the city’s policy against 5 race-based policing. Defs.’ Mot. at 7 [Dkt. #13]. He concluded race did not play a role in the 6 7 incident after learning the officers contacted Plaintiffs because they were in close proximity to 8 the wooded area known to harbor criminals; the other white fishermen were in an area of the lake 9 separated from the woods, several hundred yards away; the heat in July had exhausted Officer 10 Temple, who was on bicycle patrol; and the officers did not conduct their patrol in order to 11 enforce fishing regulations. Id. at 7–8. 12 13 Plaintiffs subsequently filed this lawsuit. They allege civil rights violations pursuant to 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as harassment, invasion of privacy, unlawful detention, discrimination 15 in public accommodations, negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, negligent infliction of 16 emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pls.’ Compl. at 5 [Dkt. #1]. 17 18 19 Defendants move for summary judgment. [Dkt. #13]. II. ANALYSIS 20 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 21 the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary 22 judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to 23 24 summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to 25 interrogatories, or admissions on file, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 26 trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of 27 evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v. 28 ORDER - 3 1 Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual disputes whose resolution would not 2 affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary 3 judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words, 4 “summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from 5 which a reasonable [fact finder] could return a [decision] in its favor.” Triton Energy, 68 F.3d at 6 7 8 9 10 1220. A. Civil Rights Claim Under § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil action for persons that are deprived of their constitutional rights by another acting under color of state law. A municipality cannot be held 11 liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, “for an injury inflicted solely by its agents 12 13 or employees.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978). 14 Because, as Plaintiffs concede, there is no evidence that the officers acted to execute the city’s 15 policy or custom, the § 1983 claims alleged against the City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police 16 Department must be dismissed. See Pls.’ Response at 13–14 [Dkt. #17]. 17 18 With respect to Officers Temple and Davis, personal liability may be established under § 19 1983 if the officers acted under color of state law and caused the deprivation of a federal right. 20 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). The officers do not dispute that they acted 21 under color of state law when they asked Plaintiffs for identifying information in police uniform; 22 thus, the question presented is whether the officers deprived Plaintiffs of a federal right, 23 24 specifically the right to be free from unlawful seizure. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 25 Defendants first argue that the remaining § 1983 claims against Officers Temple and 26 Davis should be dismissed because they are not named parties. Defs.’ Reply at 2 [Dkt. #20]. 27 This argument is a matter of semantics, however, because the officers are individually named in 28 ORDER - 4 1 paragraphs 1.5 and 1.6 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Damages. [Dkt. #1]. See 2 Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 303–04 (9th Cir. 1950) (“[T]he caption of an action is only the 3 handle to identify it and ordinarily the determination of whether or not a defendant is properly in 4 the case hinges upon the allegations in the body of the complaint and not upon his inclusion in 5 the caption.”), overruled on other grounds by Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962). 6 7 Defendants’ second and more persuasive argument is that the officers never seized the 8 Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that “mere police questioning does not 9 constitute a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 437 (1991) (noting a seizure occurs 10 when a law enforcement officer restricts a person’s liberty, either by physical force or a showing 11 of authority). Plaintiffs assert that the officers restricted their liberty by blocking their exit from 12 13 the public dock, by using a tone that suggested compliance would be compelled, and by failing to 14 inform Plaintiffs they were free to terminate the encounter. Pls.’ Response at 11–12 [Dkt. #17]. 15 A citizen’s encounter with police officers does not offend the principles of the Fourth 16 Amendment “unless [the encounter] loses its consensual nature.” United States v. Drayton, 536 17 18 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony reveals that this encounter remained 19 consensual. Both men complied with the officers requests for information and voluntarily 20 provided their names and dates of birth. Defs.’ Mot. at 10–12 [Dkt. #13]. The officers did not 21 touch, arrest, or detain Plaintiffs, nor did they threaten to use force if Plaintiffs refused to comply 22 with their requests. Defs.’ Mot. at 10–12 (citing deposition testimony from Mr. Currie and Mr. 23 24 Disnute) [Dkt. #13]. While the officers did mistakenly inform Plaintiffs about the fishing 25 regulations on Bradley Lake, and it is unfortunate that their fishing excursion ended abruptly, the 26 officers’ conduct did not constitute a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, 27 the officers are entitled to summary judgment as of matter of law. 28 ORDER - 5 1 B. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Fail as a Matter of Law 2 Plaintiffs have generally alleged a number of causes of action under Washington law. 3 First, Washington expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in 4 public accommodations. Wash. Rev. Code 49.60.030. A claimant must establish four elements 5 to present a prima facie case for discrimination: (1) that the claimant is a member of a protected 6 7 class; (2) that the establishment is a place of public accommodation; (3) that the government 8 discriminated against the claimant by treating him differently from persons outside the class; and 9 (4) that the claimant’s protected status was a substantial factor causing discrimination. Demelash 10 v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). The Court concludes the officers 11 did not target Plaintiffs for questioning on account of their race. The officers had just conducted 12 13 a routine sweep of an area known to harbor criminals, and the public dock was adjacent to this 14 area. Defs.’ Mot. at 3–4 [Dkt. #13]. Moreover, the officers were not engaged in a patrol to 15 enforce fishing regulations and had no reason to circumnavigate the lake to establish the identity 16 of each person fishing that day. Id. at 6. If other white fishermen had been on the public dock, 17 18 and the officers only questioned the African American fishermen, the evidence would suggest 19 the officers discriminated on account of race. But under the circumstances, Plaintiffs have failed 20 to show that their protected status was a substantial factor in causing disparate treatment between 21 themselves and other fishermen. 22 Second, Plaintiffs allege that the officers acted negligently, or that the city acted 23 24 negligently in hiring, training, and supervising the officers. Pls.’ Response at 18 [Dkt. #17]. The 25 city has admitted agency for this purpose; thus, the negligent training, hiring, and supervising 26 claims are “immaterial” because these causes of action apply only when an employee acts 27 outside the scope of employment. Shielle v. Hill, 287 P.2d 479, 480–81 (Wash. 1955). In order 28 ORDER - 6 1 to establish negligence, Plaintiffs must show the existence of a duty owed to individuals, rather 2 than the general public, a breach of that duty, and proximate causation. See Hartley v. State, 698 3 P.2d 77, 85 (Wash. 1985). Absent a “special relationship” between a police officer and an 4 individual, the police officer owes no duty to the individual under the public duty doctrine. 5 Coffel v. Clallam Cnty., 735 P.2d 686, 690 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (noting a special relationship 6 7 arises if there is some form of privity between the police department and the victim that sets the 8 victim apart from the general public, and there are explicit assurances of protection that give rise 9 to reliance on the part of the victim). There is no evidence that a special relationship exists 10 between Officers Temple and Davis and Mr. Currie or Mr. Disnute; therefore, traditional 11 negligence principles do not reach the officers under the public duty doctrine. 12 13 Third, Plaintiffs allege intentional infliction of emotional distress, or outrage, and 14 negligent infliction of emotional distress. Pls.’ Response at 21 [Dkt. #17]. The common law tort 15 of outrage has three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intentional or reckless 16 infliction of emotional distress; and (3) actual result to the plaintiff of severe emotional distress. 17 18 E.g., Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1012 (Wash. 1989). The defendant’s conduct must be “so 19 outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 20 decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in the civilized community.” 21 Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (Wash. 1971) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 22 42 cmt. d (1965)). The conduct of Officers Temple and Davis was not so outrageous as to 23 24 stretch the bounds of human decency and to be regarded as “utterly intolerable.” Because 25 reasonable minds could not differ on whether the officers’ conduct was “sufficiently extreme to 26 result in liability,” summary judgment is appropriate. See Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 27 619 (Wash. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 28 ORDER - 7 1 2 3 4 632 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]he tort of outrage ‘does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, and other trivialities.’” (quoting Grimsby, 530 P.2d at 295)). Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress also fails because Plaintiffs lack “objective symptomology” that is susceptible to medical diagnosis and proven by medical 5 evidence. E.g., Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424, 431 (Wash. 1998); Brower v. Ackerley, 943 6 7 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Kloepfel abandoned the objective symptomology 8 requirement for outrage cases but affirmed its application in negligent infliction of emotional 9 distress cases. 66 P.3d 633–34. Mr. Currie testified he has been treated by a psychotherapist 10 since the incident, Decl. of Richard Jolley at 11–12, but he provides no objective medical 11 diagnosis to prove he suffers from anxiety some “other disabling mental condition.” Hegel, 960 12 13 14 15 P.2d at 431. Fourth, Plaintiffs allege Officers Temple and Davis invaded their privacy by intrusion. Pls.’ Response at 22 [Dkt. #17]. This common law cause of action arises when a person 16 deliberately and unreasonably intrudes into another person’s private affairs. Fisher v. State ex 17 18 rel. Dept. of Health, 106 P.3d 836, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). Plaintiffs argue the officers 19 invaded their private solitude by authoritatively approaching Plaintiffs with the intent of 20 preventing them from fishing. Pls.’ Response at 23 [Dkt. #17]. There is no evidence the officers 21 intended to prevent Plaintiffs from fishing and unreasonably intrude into their private affairs; in 22 fact, the evidence shows the officers intended to identify the fishermen as part of their sweep of 23 24 25 26 27 the Bradley Lake woods. “Intent is . . . an essential element” of invasion of privacy by intrusion, and it is lacking here. Fisher, 106. P.3d at 840. Finally, Plaintiffs’ ancillary common law claims also lack merit and are unsupported in the pleadings and filings. 28 ORDER - 8 III. CONCLUSION 1 2 For the reasons stated above, the City of Puyallup, its police department, and individual 3 officers Temple and Davis have satisfied their initial burden for summary judgment. Plaintiffs 4 have failed to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admission on file, 5 “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. 6 Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #13] is GRANTED. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 DATED this 12th day of April, 2012 12 A 13 Ronald B. Leighton United States District Judge 11 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER - 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
