Close et al v. Pierce County Washington et al, No. 3:2009cv05023 - Document 72 (W.D. Wash. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER denying 41 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 31 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Re-Noting Date 12/18/2009, for remaining portion of 41 , signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Close et al v. Pierce County Washington et al Doc. 72 1 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 8 9 10 11 RALPH W. CLOSE and LAURA A. LARSON, individually and as the parents of decedent JAMES ROBERT CLOSE Case No. CV-09 - 05023RBL 12 14 15 16 17 18 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs, 13 v. PIERCE COUNTY, WASHINGTON; PIERCE COUNT SHERIFF PAUL PASTOR; EDWARD CORRELL; JOSEPH GORMAN; and TODD KLEMME, Defendants. 19 20 21 This matter is before the court on competing Motions for Summary Judgment on the Defendants’ 22 Qualified Immunity defense to the Plaintiffs’ claims. The case involves the suicide of Plaintiffs’ adult son, 23 James Close, in the Pierce County jail. 24 Gorman’s asserted Qualified Immunity defense is not valid [Dkt. #31]. The individual Defendants have 25 Plaintiffs seek a ruling that Defendant Correll and Defendant similarly moved for Summary Judgment, asking the court to determine as a matter of law that there was no 26 27 28 Constitutional violation, and that qualified immunity protects them from plaintiffs’ claims even if there was. Defendants Pierce County and its Sheriff, Paul Pastor, seek a ruling that they are not liable in any event, under ORDER Page - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). [Dkt. #41] 2 3 Plaintiffs argue that the Ninth Circuit recognizes the liberty interest which is the focus of their claim, and alternatively seek1 additional time for discovery, pursuant to Rule 56(f), on the County’s and the Sheriff’s 4 5 6 7 8 9 Monell defense. A. Factual Summary. Plaintiff Ralph Close (James’ father) informed the FBI that his son had likely committed a bank robbery. On June 16, 2006, acting on this information, Pierce County Violent Crimes Task Force members arrived at James Close’s residence in Sequim to serve and execute arrest and search warrants. 10 11 According to Detective Karr (one of the officers on the scene) James Close was cooperative, and said he 12 would confess, even before the officer had finished reading him his rights. After a taped interview at the 13 local Washington State Patrol office, James Close was permitted to return to his home to say goodbye to 14 his girlfriend, his father, and his dog. His girlfriend apparently told him at that time that his father had 15 turned him in, and James became very angry. While the team executed the search warrant, Officer Karr 16 17 18 19 20 21 sat in the car with James and made small talk. According to Karr, James did not seem suicidal, but was instead “pretty even keeled.” Nevertheless, Ralph Close had told the FBI that James had attempted suicide previously that year, that he was possibly bipolar and depressed, and was not taking any medication. Karr was aware of this information, and as a result made sure that the “booking form” for James included it. Karr also witnessed 22 and acknowledged James’ mood swings, and saw him smash a laptop. The Deputy who actually filled out 23 24 the booking form wrote “SUICIDE WATCH” on the top of the form. Detective Parr then drove James 25 Close to Pierce County. He observed Close as “up and down” and perhaps “a little loopy.” Like Karr, he 26 did not believe that James was then suicidal; he even had a meal with him prior to actually taking him to 27 28 1 Plaintiffs also seek to strike the declarations of Snow, Stewart, and Zimmerman, arguing that they were not timely disclosed prior to the Defendants’ Motion. The Motion to Strike is DENIED. ORDER Page - 2 1 the jail. 2 At the jail, Parr pointed out the “suicide watch” notation to the booking officers. Those officers, 3 Correll and Gorman, have submitted conflicting testimony about whether they saw the notation. Viewed 4 5 in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs (as it must be in connection with the Defendants’ Motion), the 6 evidence establishes that both officers saw and acknowledged the notation, and discussed it among 7 themselves. 8 9 In any event, Gorman and Correll both had received mental health evaluation training, and both claim they evaluated Close and determined that he was not a suicide risk. Neither recommended a mental 10 11 health evaluation by a doctor, and although they could have done so, neither placed James Close in a 12 “suicide smock” or a suicide watch cell. Both officers admit that the print officer, Defendant Officer 13 Klemme, also had mental health training, as well as the authority to put James Close in a smock. Officer 14 Klemme acknowledges this. None of the officers did so, and less than two hours after being admitted to a 15 regular cell, James Close hung himself. Despite the efforts of Officers on the scene, James Close died. 16 Plaintiffs’ §1983 claim against these three officers is that their deliberate indifference deprived 17 18 them of their 14th Amendment liberty interest in their relationship with their adult child. The viability of 19 this claim is discussed below. 20 21 The Plaintiffs also allege that the County and the Sheriff are liable for the actions of the Officers, arguing that the deliberate indifference is a policy or practice of the Sheriff’s Department. This claim is 22 based in part on an Order entered by this Court more than 10 years ago, in a case known as Herrera v 23 24 Pierce County, Cause No. 95-5025RJB-JKA. (See Ex. Z to Barone Dec; Dkt #61; see also Dkt. #89 in the 25 Herrera case). That Stipulated Order required the County to improve the mental health care at its jail, 26 and more than 13 years later the Order is still in effect. 27 28 B. Summary Judgment Standard. ORDER Page - 3 1 2 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary judgment as a 3 matter of law. Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the 4 5 non-moving party fails to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on 6 file, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 7 324 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position 8 is not sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual 9 disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a 10 11 motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other 12 words, “summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from 13 which a reasonable [fact finder] could return a [decision] in its favor.” Triton Energy, 68 F.3d at 1220. 14 C. 15 Qualified Immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields executive officers from civil suit for conduct that “does 16 17 not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 18 have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity applies when the 19 facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show either that the officer’s 20 conduct did not violate a constitutional right, or that a reasonable officer could think his conduct was 21 lawful in the situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 202 (2001). 22 Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from liability for conduct that in fact violates 23 24 a constitutional right, so long as a reasonable officer could think the conduct lawful: “qualified immunity 25 shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably 26 misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 27 28 198 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 206). “If the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer's conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or, ORDER Page - 4 1 2 indeed, even the burdens of litigation.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198. In determining whether a right is clearly established, the level of abstraction at which the right is stated must be particularized to the case, 3 and not as a broad proposition: “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 4 5 6 official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 7 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 8 of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 9 In analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the Court must determine first whether a constitutional 10 11 right would have been violated on the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting 12 the injury; and then whether the right was clearly established when viewed in the specific context of the 13 case. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether 14 a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 15 unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. The Supreme Court has recently held “that the Saucier 16 17 18 19 20 21 protocol [determining whether a violation is present in the first instance] should not be mandatory in all cases . . .[but] it is often beneficial.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). The Defendants’ Motion has two bases: the facts do not support a claim of deliberate indifference, and there is no clearly established Constitutionally protected right implicated by the suicide of an independent, adult child. The Court will therefore address the qualified immunity claim in the traditional, 22 two step fashion. 23 24 25 26 27 1. The viability of Plaintiffs’ Liberty Interest Deprivation Claim. The Plaintiffs’ sole substantive claim is that the actions of the officers and the County deprived them of their Constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the life of their independent, adult son. Defendants argue that there is no such claim as a matter of law. 28 This position is based on the assertion that some other Circuits have rejected such a claim, relying ORDER Page - 5 1 2 on Supreme Court precedent which expressly recognized that there is a parental liberty interest in the companionship of a minor child. See, e.g., Troxell v. Granville, 30 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) 3 (“the liberty interest at issue in this case--the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 4 5 children--is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”). 6 Defendants reluctantly recognize that the Ninth Circuit has extended this protection to the 7 companionship of an adult child. See Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985); see also 8 Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1264 (E.D. Wash. 2006)(“Based on current Ninth Circuit 9 authority, [plaintiff parents] are entitled to assert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process causes 10 11 of action seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights for loss of companionship with their adult son.”) 12 Nevertheless, because they claim that Ninth Circuit courts have recognized this claim “with 13 reservations,” this Court can and should rule that it does not exist as a matter of law. Defendants’ position 14 on this portion of their Motion is not well-founded. This Court cannot and will not overrule Ninth Circuit 15 precedent on this point. The Plaintiffs’ 14th Amendment claim will not be dismissed on the basis that this 16 17 Circuit should not recognize it. 18 2. 19 The Defendants seek Summary Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ §1983 claim on the basis that the 20 21 The evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ Deliberate Indifference Claim. undisputed evidence establishes that James Close, alone, took deliberate, private violence against himself, and there is no evidence that any state actor deliberately sought to deprive him or his parents of any right. 22 Plaintiffs respond that Defendants’ Motion is based on the wrong standard; specifically, that a 23 24 Plaintiff need not establish that an officer engaged in “deliberate action,” but instead must only prove 25 deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs cite a host of cases holding that corrections officers are prohibited 26 under the 14th Amendment from being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of pretrial 27 28 detainees. See, for example, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Perhaps not surprisingly, it is well established that jailers have a Constitutional duty to protect inmates from suicide. See, e.g., Snow ex ORDER Page - 6 1 rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005); Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 2 623 (7th Cir. 2003); Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534, 538 (8th Cir. 2003); Strandberg v. City of 3 Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1986); Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1265 4 5 (E.D.Wash. 2006). As the Plaintiffs argue, it is well established in a broader context that jailers have a 6 duty to protect inmates from a variety of “private action,” including violence at the hands of other 7 inmates. See Farmer, supra. 8 9 The issue is instead whether the evidence supports plaintiffs’ claim that the individual officer defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to the known risk that James Close would commit suicide. 10 11 Here, the gist of Defendants’ argument is that they “did not believe” that Plaintiff was a suicide risk, 12 based on their own independent analysis (in turn based on their own training and experience) that he was 13 not. 14 15 Against this subjective belief is the Plaintiffs’ rather substantial evidence that the officers knew or should have known that James was in fact a suicide risk. This evidence includes the prominent 16 17 “SUICIDE WATCH” notation on the booking form, the fact that James was likely bipolar and depressed, 18 had recently attempted suicide, was subject to wild mood swings and violence (each of which had been 19 observed by officers that very day), was not on medication, was “loopy” and “up and down,” and had a 20 “1000 yard stare.” The plaintiffs also claim that James Close’s mug shot depicts a look “of agony.” 21 Despite this evidence, Close was not referred to a Mental Health Professional, or even to a nurse. Officer 22 Gorman later stated that even if he had called one, they “do not answer the phone.” 23 24 As the Plaintiffs correctly argue, deliberate indifference is a finding that may be inferred from this 25 sort of evidence: “[I]f a person is aware of a substantial risk of serious harm, a person may be liable for 26 neglecting a prisoner's serious medical needs on the basis of either his action or his inaction.” Gibson v. 27 28 County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “When prison guards ignore without explanation a prisoner's serious medical condition that is known or obvious to them, the trier of fact may infer ORDER Page - 7 1 2 deliberate indifference.” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir.2005). “[D]eliberate indifference occurs when prison officials prevent an inmate from receiving treatment or deny him access 3 to medical personnel capable of evaluating the need for treatment.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 4 5 6 1211 (10th Cir. 2000). In light of the evidence and the clearly established law, the question is whether the officers’ own 7 version of their independent analysis of James Close’s mental state is sufficient to establish, as a matter of 8 law, that they were at most negligent, and not deliberately indifferent, to the risk of suicide. There is 9 substantial evidence that James Close was a suicide risk, and the undeniable inference from this evidence 10 11 is that each of the defendant officers was or should have been aware of that fact. For purposes of 12 summary judgment on the viability of the claim, and for purposes of qualified immunity, the Plaintiffs 13 have met their burden of establishing deliberate indifference to the risk of suicide, and to the deprivation 14 of the Plaintiffs’ 14th Amendment liberty interests. 15 The remaining question is whether the defendant officers were or should have been aware of this 16 17 clearly established Constitutional right. The defendants largely conflate this issue with their claim that 18 the Ninth Circuit does not or should not recognize a parent’s liberty interest in the companionship of an 19 adult child, discussed above. In this Circuit, that interest and that Constitutional right has been clearly 20 established since well before the incident in question. 21 For these reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ 22 Constitutional claims against each individual officer must be DENIED. 23 24 The Plaintiffs’ mirror image Motion, regarding the qualified immunity defense of Officers Correll 25 and Gorman, is effectively Granted. On the substantial record before the Court, the asserted qualified 26 immunity defense is factual and legally insufficient on summary judgment. The jury will, of course, 27 28 determine whether there was a Constitutional violation. If there was not, these Defendants will prevail. If there was, the individual Defendants will be liable. The jury will not determine whether the ORDER Page - 8 1 2 Constitutional right asserted was clearly established, such that a reasonable officer would have known of it. On a qualified immunity inquiry, that issue is one of law for the Court. For the reasons stated, the 3 asserted defense does not entitle the Defendants to summary dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. 4 5 6 C. Defendants’ state law based immunity claim. Defendants also claim that RCW 71.05.120 provides them with immunity for their decisions as to 7 whether or not to commit James Close for mental health reasons. 8 The statute provides: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 (1) No officer of a public or private agency, nor the superintendent, professional person in charge, his or her professional designee, or attending staff of any such agency, nor any public official performing functions necessary to the administration of this chapter, or peace officer responsible for detaining a person pursuant to this chapter, nor any county designated mental health professional, nor the state a unit of local government or an evaluation and treatment facility shall be civilly or criminally liable for performing duties pursuant to this chapter with regard to the decision of whether to admit, discharge, release, administer antipsychotic mediations, or detain a person for evaluation and treatment: PROVIDED, that such duties were performed in good faith and without gross negligence. RCW 71.05.120 16 17 This defense fails for several reasons. First, the statute relates to decisions regarding involuntary 18 commitment by mental health professionals. It does not relate to officers dealing with pre-trial detainees, 19 and it is questionable whether it applies to police officers in any event. Second, by its terms the statute 20 does not apply where the action (or inaction) in question rises above mere negligence; it specifically 21 excludes decisions based on gross negligence. 22 Finally, as the Plaintiffs argue, a state statute cannot, as a matter of law, take away a right granted 23 24 by the United States Constitution. State law immunities cannot bar federal civil rights claims. “Conduct 25 by persons ... which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law.” Pardi v. 26 Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 389 F.3d 840, 851 (9th Cir. 2004)(citations omitted). A Constitutional claim 27 28 otherwise made out by a plaintiff cannot be “trumped” by an allegedly exculpatory state statute. RCW 71.05.120 does not apply. ORDER Page - 9 1 2 D. The County’s and the Sheriff’s Monell Liability. The County and its Sheriff, Paul Pastor, seek judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s 3 Constitutional claim against them. They argue that the Plaintiffs must, and cannot, establish that any 4 5 Constitutional violation was the result of the County’s (or the Sheriff’s) policy or practice. 6 A plaintiff alleging liability of a municipality for civil rights violations must prove three 7 elements: (1) a violation of his/her constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a municipal policy or custom 8 of the municipality, and (3) a causal nexus between the policy or custom and the constitutional violation. 9 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The first element is 10 11 12 discussed above, and is established for purposes of this analysis. There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by showing “a 13 longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local 14 government entity;” (2) “by showing that the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a 15 final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area 16 17 of decision;” or (3) “by showing that an official with final policymaking authority either delegated that 18 authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 19 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 20 21 Plaintiffs argue that the Pierce County jail has for years been under an Order of this Court regarding the Constitutional sufficiency of its health care, including mental health. Based on this, they 22 argue that the policies advanced by the Defendants as adequate, are in fact inadequate as a matter of law. 23 24 They also submit opinion testimony from Lindsey Hayes, an expert on jail suicides. She has 25 reviewed all of the information about James Close’s booking (including the “SUICIDE WATCH” 26 notation and numerous acknowledgment that he had mental health issues) as well as the Interim Reports 27 28 issued over time in the Herrera litigation. [Dkt.. #60] She opines that through inadequate intake screening policies and the failure to conduct regular suicide prevention training to correctional staff, the ORDER Page - 10 1 County allowed its correctional officers to inconsistently react to information regarding potentially 2 suicidal inmates. It is her expert opinion that these failures led to James Close’s suicide. 3 This evidence of the inadequacy of the County’s training is further supported by evidence from 4 the officers themselves. Officer Gorman admitted that he did not in fact have formal training in how to 5 6 probe for suicide dangers, and described his training in mental health issues as “half-assed” and “not 7 much.” [See Dkt. #61, Ex. V at 58:15-23; Dkt. #32, Ex. O at 6.] 8 On this record, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the County’s “policies” did not lead to the 9 Constitutional violation discussed above. For this reason, the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 its Monell liability is DENIED. Plaintiffs request for a continuance of the Motion under Rule 56(f) so that 11 discovery into the County’s policies may be conducted prior to a ruling is therefore DENIED as moot. 12 13 This Order should not be construed as a limitation on further discovery into those policies. 14 Plaintiffs also seek a delay in the ruling on the claims against Sheriff Pastor individually, at least 15 until his deposition is complete. The evidence (and therefore the briefing) on the Sheriff’s potential 16 liability is incomplete. This Request is therefore GRANTED. The Plaintiffs shall be permitted to conduct 17 18 the Sheriff’s deposition prior to a ruling. Following that deposition, the parties may each file one five page 19 Memorandum related specifically to the issue of the Sheriff’s potential liability. Those Briefs shall be 20 exchanged simultaneously, on December 18, 2009. 21 22 CONCLUSION. 23 Viewed in the light most favorable to them, the evidence does support the Plaintiffs’ claim of a 24 25 clearly established Constitutional violation, and one which reasonable officers in the Defendants’ position 26 would have known. The Individual Defendants’ Motion [Dkt. #40] on the basis that there was no 27 Constitutional violation as a matter of law, or that the officers are nevertheless entitled to qualified 28 immunity because they could not have known their conduct was a violation, is DENIED. ORDER Page - 11 1 Plaintiffs’ Motion [Dkt. #31] seeking dismissal of the qualified immunity defense as applied to 2 Officers Gorman and Correll is effectively GRANTED. The County’s Motion for Summary Judgment 3 under Monell [Dkt. # 41] is DENIED. Finally, the evidence is insufficiently developed to rule as a matter 4 of law whether Sheriff Pastor may be liable under Monell. For this reason, the Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) 5 6 Motion to delay the ruling on that portion of the case until further discovery is completed is GRANTED, 7 and that limited portion of the Defendants’ Motion will be re-noted for December 18, 2009. Any briefs on 8 this topic shall not exceed five pages and shall be filed and served on the noting date. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 Dated this 17th day of November, 2009. 12 14 A 15 RONALD B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER Page - 12
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
