Dillard v. Red Canoe Federal Credit Union, No. 2:2014cv01782 - Document 17 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for a Stay, by Judge James L. Robart.(MD, cc to pltf)
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Dillard v. Red Canoe Federal Credit Union Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 MERILAND DILLARD, Plaintiff, 11 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A STAY v. 12 13 CASE NO. C14-1782JLR RED CANOE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, 14 Defendant. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Meriland Dillard’s motion for a “continuance” 17 in the referenced action. (Mot. (Dkt. # 12).) The court liberally construes Ms. Dillard’s 18 motion as a motion seeking an approximately six-month long stay in these proceedings. 1 19 The court has reviewed Ms. Dillard’s motion, Defendant Red Canoe Federal Credit 20 21 22 1 See Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions . . . .”). ORDER- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Union’s (“Red Canoe”) response (Resp. (Dkt. # 15)), the balance of the record, and the 2 applicable law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES Ms. Dillard’s motion. 3 4 II. BACKGROUND Ms. Dillard commenced this litigation by filing a motion for leave to proceed in 5 forma pauperis on November 11, 2014. (IFP Mot. (Dkt. # 1).) The court granted Ms. 6 Dillard’s motion on December 11, 2014 (IFP Order (Dkt. # 7)), and her complaint was 7 filed that same day (see Compl. (Dkt. # 8)). In her complaint, Ms. Dillard alleges 8 “discriminatory lending practices” against Red Canoe. (See generally id.) 9 Approximately one month later, Ms. Dillard filed a motion seeking a stay in this litigation 10 for more than six months, until June 30, 2015. (See Mot. at 1 (“Plaintiff approaches the 11 Court for a Continuance in this case as the Plaintiff is out of the country on business until 12 June 30, 2015.”).) Ms. Dillard also specifically asks “to extend the Daedline [sic] for 13 FRCP [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(f) Conference until July 6, 2015.” (Id.) 14 Other than saying that she “is out of the country on business,” Ms. Dillard does not 15 explain why a stay is necessary. (See generally id.) 16 Red Canoe filed a response to Ms. Dillard’s motion stating that it did not object to 17 extending the deadline for the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference until July 6, 2015, “so long 18 as all other pretrial deadlines set forth in the Court’s Order Regarding Initial Disclosures, 19 Joint Status Report, and Early Settlement are similarly extended—including the deadlines 20 to make initial disclosures and to submit a joint status report and discovery plan.” (Resp. 21 (Dkt. # 15) at 1-2.) Red Canoe, however, objects to a continuance of its pending motion 22 to dismiss (see Dkt. # 13), which is presently noted for February 13, 2015. (Resp. at 2.) ORDER- 2 1 2 III. ANALYSIS A district court has the discretionary power to stay its proceedings. Lockyer v. 3 Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005). When considering a motion to stay, 4 the court weighs a series of competing interests: (1) the possible damage that may result 5 from the granting of the stay; (2) the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in 6 being required to go forward; and (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms of 7 the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be 8 expected to result from a stay. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) 9 (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55); see also Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110. 10 With respect to the first factor—possible damage if a stay is granted—Red Canoe 11 does not object to certain aspects of a stay, but it does object to any delay in the court’s 12 consideration of its presently pending motion to dismiss. (Resp. at 1-2.) The court has 13 not yet considered Red Canoe’s motion to dismiss, but if it is well-taken, a stay would 14 unnecessarily prolong the resolution of a pending motion and possibly resolution of the 15 entire case. The case is in such early stages, however, that the court does not find that 16 this factor weighs heavily against a stay. The same is not true, however, with respect to 17 the final two factors. The court finds that both of these factors weigh against granting 18 Ms. Dillard’s request for a more than six-month stay as discussed below. 19 Ms. Dillard has not explained why, under the second factor, she will suffer 20 inequity or hardship by being required to go forward with the prosecution of her suit 21 simply because she is out of the country on business travel for the first six months of the 22 year. Despite Ms. Dillard’s pro se status, she could opt to be tied into the court’s ORDER- 3 1 electronic filing system. The link providing instructions on how sign up for electronic 2 filing with the court is located in the upper, left-hand corner of the court’s main webpage 3 at http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov, in a link entitled “E-Filing (CM/ECF).” Thus, Ms. 4 Dillard could easily access the ability to file documents with the court electronically even 5 while she is abroad so long as she has access to an internet connection. Further, if Ms. 6 Dillard connected to the court’ electronic filing system, she also could opt to be 7 automatically electronically served with any documents filed by Red Canoe. In addition, 8 there is no reason that the parties could not conduct their Rule 26(f) conference via 9 telephone, video-link, or other remote means. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (simply requiring 10 that the parties “confer”). There is no requirement that such a conference must be held in 11 person. 2 Written discovery can certainly still be conducted even while Ms. Dillard is 12 aboard via electronic means, and there are even provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil 13 Procedure that allow for the possibility of taking depositions remotely. See Fed. R. Civ. 14 P. 30(b)(4). If some specific problem arises in the course of discovery or otherwise in the 15 litigation due to Ms. Dillard’s location abroad for the next several months, the parties can 16 bring that issue to the court’s attention at that time. 3 Accordingly, the court finds that the 17 second factor weighs against granting a stay. 18 19 2 Rule 26(f)(2) states that “[t]he court may order the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in person,” but there is no requirement for an in-person meeting. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 26(f)(2). The court expressly does not require an in-person conference under the circumstances 21 of this case. 3 The court can envision difficulties for the parties in completing their initial disclosure of 22 documents as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) while Ms. Dillard is ORDER- 4 1 The court also does not find that a stay will further the orderly course of justice 2 here. Ms. Dillard filed this action and then sought a six-month stay less than two months 3 later. She has premised her request for a stay on foreign business travel, but has provided 4 no explanation as to why such travel was necessary or why it necessitates a stay in this 5 litigation. Without a more compelling explanation, the court is disinclined to permit Ms. 6 Dillard to engage in “start and stop” litigation. The court presently has nearly 200 7 pending cases. In order to process all of those cases in a timely manner, the court must 8 issue and adhere to case schedules absent a demonstration of good cause for an 9 adjustment. Thus, the court cannot conclude that granting the stay Ms. Dillard requests 10 will further the orderly course of justice here. On balance, the court finds that the 11 competing interests it must weigh when considering the factors in Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 12 1110, weigh against granting a stay here. 13 IV. 14 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Ms. Dillard’s motion for a stay in this 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 21 22 out of the country. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), (iv). If so, the parties can seek an extension of this particular deadline from the court if appropriate. ORDER- 5 1 action or a continuance of the parties’ required Rule 26(f) conference until July 6, 2015 2 (Dkt. # 12). 4 3 Dated this 6th day of February, 2015. 4 6 A 7 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 4 If either party has good cause and would like a shorter extension of the deadlines set forth in the court’s order regarding initial disclosures, joint status report, and early settlement 22 (Dkt. # 10), they may seek such an extension from the court. ORDER- 6
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