Barabin v. AstenJohnson Inc et al, No. 2:2014cv00557 - Document 51 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER granting 35 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand by Judge James L. Robart.(MD, cc to King County Superior Court)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 GERALDINE BARABIN, as personal representative for the Estate of HENRY BARABIN, 11 Plaintiff, 12 CASE NO. C14-0557JLR ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND v. 13 14 ASTENJOHNSON, INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Mot. (Dkt. 17 18 # 35)). Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // ORDER- 1 1 the relevant law, and deeming oral argument unnecessary,1 the court grants Plaintiff’s 2 motion to remand. 3 Henry Barabin was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2006. See Estate of Barabin 4 v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 2014). Mr. Barabin and his wife, 5 Plaintiff Geraldine Barabin, filed a personal injury lawsuit against 22 defendants in 6 December, 2006, alleging that Mr. Barabin developed mesothelioma as a result of 7 exposure to defendants’ asbestos-containing products. (1st Compl. (Dkt. # 34-4).) After 8 multiple settlement agreements, only two defendants remained: AstenJohnson, Inc. 9 (“Asten”) and Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (“Scapa”). (See generally C7-1454JLR Dkt.) 10 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, those two defendants are 11 diverse from the Barabins. (Not. of Rem. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 6.) 12 While the personal injury action was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Barabin 13 died. (See Death Certificate (Dkt. # 34-3).) Ms. Barabin filed this wrongful death action 14 in King County Superior Court on March 18, 2014. (See Compl. (Dkt. # 1-2) at 35.) The 15 allegations in that complaint—that Mr. Barabin developed mesothelioma as a result of 16 exposure to defendants’ asbestos-containing products—mirror the allegations in the 17 personal injury action. (Compare Compl. with 1st Compl.) In this second action, Ms. 18 Barabin joins as defendants not only Asten and Scapa, but also numerous other 19 defendants not included in the first lawsuit. (Compare Compl. with 1st Compl.) At least 20 Defendants did not request oral argument. (See Resp. (Dkt. # 43).) Even if they had, “[w]hen a party has had an adequate opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence and a memorandum of law, 21 there is no prejudice in refusing to grant oral argument.” Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. punctuation the issues parties and 22 1998) (internalwould not be omitted). Here, the court. have been thoroughly briefed by the oral argument. oral argument of assistance to Accordingly, the court will not hold 1 ORDER- 2 1 one of these defendants, namely, Wright Schuchart Harbor (“Wright”), is a citizen of 2 Washington State. (Mot. at 3.) 3 Scapa and Asten removed this action to federal court, asserting that the court has 4 diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the other defendants are 5 fraudulently joined. (See Not. of Rem. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff moves to remand the case on the 6 basis of the forum defendant rule and Wright’s Washington citizenship. (See 28 U.S.C. 7 1441(b)(2); Mot.) Defendants Scapa, Asten, and Wright respond that the court should 8 disregard the citizenship of all defendants—such as Wright—not joined in the first 9 personal injury action because the statute of limitations bars claims against them. (See 10 Resp. (Dkt. # 43) at 5-6; see also Asten Resp. (Dkt. # 46); Wright Resp. (Dkt. # 47).) 11 Similarly, Defendants Metalclad Insulation Corporation (“Metalclad”) and Gould Pumps, 12 Inc. (“Gould”) move to dismiss the claims against them based on the statute of limitations 13 defense. (See MTD (Dkt. # 34); Gould MTD (Dkt. # 36).) 14 II. ANALYSIS 15 A. Removal Jurisdiction 16 In general, a defendant may remove to federal court any state action over which a 17 district court would have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441; Ansley v. 18 Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the forum 19 defendant rule, however, an action may not be removed solely on diversity grounds if any 20 one of the defendants is a citizen of the forum state. Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. 21 Dist. of Ca., 393 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). To remove an 22 action, a defendant must file with the district court a “short and plain statement of the ORDER- 3 1 grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The “strong presumption against removal 2 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal 3 is proper, and that the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” 4 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition to 5 considering the notice of removal, “it is clearly appropriate for the district courts, in their 6 discretion, to accept certain post-removal evidence as determinative of the jurisdictional 7 requirements.” Janis v. Health Net, Inc., 472 F. App’x 533, 534 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal 8 punctuation omitted) (quoting Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690-91 9 (9th Cir.2006)); see also Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2002); Singer v. 10 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). 11 B. Fraudulent Joinder 12 An “exception to the requirement for complete diversity is where a non-diverse 13 defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.’” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 14 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). It is “commonplace that fraudulently joined defendants do 15 not defeat removal on diversity grounds.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 16 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). A defendant is fraudulently joined “[i]f the plaintiff fails to state a 17 cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the 18 settled rules of the state.” Id. at 1318. The statute of limitations defense is a permissible 19 means by which to establish fraudulent joinder, and the defendant is entitled to present 20 facts showing that the statute of limitations has run. Id. at 1318-19. 21 Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Hamilton 22 Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). The party ORDER- 4 1 charging fraudulent joinder bears the “heavy burden” of showing that the complaint 2 “obviously fails” to state a claim. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044. Because the court must 3 construe the removal statute strictly against removal jurisdiction, jurisdiction will be 4 rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 5 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, “if there is a possibility that a state court would find 6 that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the 7 federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state 8 court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046. 9 C. 10 Statute of Limitations The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action in Washington is three years. 11 See Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 166 P.3d 662, 664 (Wash. 2007); see RCW 12 4.20.010; RCW 4.16.080(2). Under Washington law, statutes of limitations begin to run 13 once the cause of action has accrued. RCW 4.16.005. It is well-settled that wrongful 14 death actions ordinarily accrue at the time of death. Atchison, 166 P.3d at 664 (citing 15 Dodson v. Continental Can Co., 294 P. 265, 266 (Wash. 1930)). However, under the 16 discovery rule, if the facts of causation are unavailable at the time of death, a wrongful 17 death action will instead accrue at the time the decedent’s personal representative 18 discovered, or should have discovered, the cause of action. White v. Johns-Manville 19 Corp., 693 P.2d 687, 693 (Wash. 1985). 20 Defendants contend that, in addition to those rules, a wrongful death action is also 21 barred where the decedent failed to bring a personal injury suit on his own behalf within 22 ORDER- 5 1 the statute of limitations period. (See Resp. at 5-6.) Defendants’ contention is predicated 2 on the following three published cases. 3 In Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Company, which was decided in 1932, the court 4 held that an adminstratrix’s wrongful death claim, which was predicated on violations of 5 the then-existing “Factory Act,” accrued at the time of the negligence of the defendant— 6 not at the time of the decedent’s death. See 15 P.2d 943, 946 (Wash. 1932). Because the 7 suit was not filed until the statute of limitations for the Factory Act had passed, the 8 wrongful death claim was barred. Id. 9 Shortly thereafter, in 1935, the court in Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Company 10 reversed course and recognized the “great weight of authority” holding that a wrongful 11 death action accrues at the time of death—not the time of the injury. 44 P.2d 193, 195 12 (1935). To distinguish Calhoun, the court clarified that this rule was subject to the 13 limitation that “at the time of death there must be a subsisting cause of action in the 14 deceased.” Id. Because the decedent in Grant had brought a personal injury action 15 within the statute of limitations, the wrongful death claim added after his death was 16 viable. Id. at 196. 17 Finally, in Johnson v. Ottomeier, the court cited Grant in dicta as an example of a 18 “rule of exclusion” which applied to the wrongful death statute. 275 P.2d 723, 725 19 (Wash. 1954). 20 In addition to this published precedent, Defendants supply as exhibits two trial 21 court orders granting summary judgment on wrongful death claims based on the 22 ORDER- 6 1 expiration of the personal injury statute of limitations. (See Paal Decl. (Dkt. # 43-1) Exs. 2 A-D.) 3 D. Application to Plaintiff’s claims 4 The parties do not dispute that Mr. Barabin knew or should have known that he 5 possessed a personal injury claim against Defendants at least as of December 18, 2006, 6 when he filed his first action regarding his workplace exposure to asbestos. (See 7 generally 1st Compl.); Janis, 472 F. App’x at 534 (court may consider evidence outside 8 the pleadings when evaluating remand). The question, therefore, is whether it is “obvious 9 according to the settled rules of [Washington]” that the personal representative of Mr. 10 Barabin’s estate is precluded from bringing a wrongful death claim against any party not 11 sued by Mr. Barabin within three years of that date. See Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1319. If so, 12 those parties’ citizenships may be disregarded, the court has diversity jurisdiction over 13 the remaining parties, and the forum defendant rule does not bar removal. 14 The court concludes that, although Defendants may well ultimately prove to have 15 a viable statute of limitations defense, this defense is by no means obvious according to 16 the settled rules of Washington State. See Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1319. The few published 17 cases Defendants have marshaled to support their theory are outdated: they were decided 18 85, 82, and 60 years ago. See Calhoun, 15 P.2d at 946; Grant, 44 P.2d at 195; Johnson, 19 275 P.2d at 725. Of the three, only Grant addresses the issue squarely. The language in 20 Johnson is dicta, and therefore not controlling. 275 P.2d at 725. Both Calhoun and 21 Grant were decided in the context of now-repealed employment laws such as the 22 ORDER- 7 1 “Factory Act” and without the benefit of the current wrongful death statute, RCW 2 4.20.010. See Calhoun, 15 P.2d at 946; Grant, 44 P.2d at 195. 3 Most importantly, rather than following Grant, the Washington Supreme Court 4 has since stated that the time at which a wrongful death claim accrues to a decedent who 5 was aware of his personal injury claim is an open question. Specifically, in evaluating 6 the application of the discovery rule to wrongful death claims, the Washington Supreme 7 Court clarified: 8 9 10 11 [W]e are not faced with, nor do we decide, a case in which the deceased is alleged by the defendant to have known the cause of the disease which subsequently caused his death. In that case there is a question as to whether the wrongful death action of the deceased’s representative “accrued” at the time of the decedent’s death, when the decedent first discovered or should have discovered the injury, or when the claimant first discovered or should have discovered the cause of death. 12 White, 693 P.2d at 690. Inasmuch as Defendants have failed to identify a single 13 published opinion since White concerning this issue, it appears that the issue remains 14 unresolved.2 15 Indeed, when faced with a similar dearth of case law addressing the question of 16 when a claim under the Montana State wrongful death statute accrued, the Ninth Circuit 17 certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court. See Carroll v. W.R. Grace & Co., 18 830 P.2d 1253, 1253 (Mont. 1992) (accepting certification and holding that a wrongful 19 death action does not accrue until the death of the injured person). In originally 20 considering the question, the Ninth Circuit applied the rule that a federal court 21 2 The motion are unhelpful in that they are 22 form orders oftwo trial court decisions that Defendants attach to their Decl. Exs. B, D.) dismissal that discuss neither law nor facts. (See Paal ORDER- 8 1 confronting a state-law question not yet decided by the state’s highest court must “seek 2 the rule [it] believe[s] that Court would adhere to were it confronted with a similar 3 situation.” Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 4 1981) Yet, in the fraudulent joinder context, the bar is much higher: the court asks not 5 how the state’s highest court would probably rule, but rather whether defendant’s 6 proposed ruling “is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” See Ritchey, 139 7 F.3d at 1319. The Ninth Circuit’s decision to certify a similar question of law under the 8 lower standard weighs heavily against finding defendant’s proposed construction to be 9 “obvious” here. 10 Moreover, several considerations suggest that a Washington court addressing the 11 issue would find that a wrongful death claim is not barred merely because the personal 12 injury statute of limitations runs prior to decedent’s death. To begin, in Washington 13 State, “actions can only be commenced . . . after the cause of action has accrued.” RCW 14 4.16.005. A cause of action accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or in the reasonable 15 exercise of diligence should discover, the elements of the cause of action.” 1000 Virginia 16 Ltd. P’ship v. Vertecs Corp., 146 P.3d 423, 428 (2006). Plainly, the death of the decedent 17 is an element of a wrongful death cause of action. See RCW 4.20.010. Consequently, 18 Washington courts have consistently held that a wrongful death claim accrues, at the 19 earliest, as of the death of the decedent. See Atchison, 166 P.3d at 664. 20 For instance, in Wills v. Kirkpatrick, a Washington appellate court considered 21 whether the medical malpractice or wrongful death statute of limitations applied to a 22 claim for wrongful death due to medical malpractice. See 785 P.2d 834, 837 (Wash. Ct. ORDER- 9 1 App. 1990). The medical malpractice statute of limitations accrues one year from the 2 date of discovering the alleged malpractice or three years after the actual act of 3 malpractice. Id. (citing Bixler v. Bowman, 614 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Wash. 1980).) The 4 court reasoned that the wrongful death statute of limitations must applied because 5 otherwise “we would have the situation where such a claim could be barred even before 6 death triggers accrual of the right to bring the action.” Wills, 785 P.2d at 837. The court 7 concluded: “Such a result seems to us illogical and unjust.” Id. 8 Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has made clear that wrongful death 9 claims are separate and distinct causes of action from survival claims (the continuance of 10 the personal injury claims of a now-deceased party). Bowers v. Fibreboard Corp., 832 11 P.2d 523, 526 (Wash. 1992); see also Upchurch v. Hubbard, 188 P.2d 82, 85 (Wash. 12 1947). The two types of claims are authorized by discrete provisions of the Revised 13 Code of Washington. Compare RCW 4.20.010 with RCW 4.20.046 (survival of actions). 14 More importantly, the two types of claims advance different goals and result in different 15 damages. The “purpose of the wrongful death statute is to compensate certain relatives 16 of the deceased for injuries to their pecuniary interest . . . [which includes], in addition to 17 monetary contributions, compensation for the loss of other services such as the love, 18 affection, care, companionship, society and consortium of the deceased spouse.” Bowers, 19 832 P.2d at 526 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). On the other hand, the 20 survival action allows the personal representative, acting on behalf of certain specified 21 surviving relatives, to recover for the decedent’s damages, including any pain and 22 suffering between the time of the injury and the time of death.” Id. In other words, “the ORDER- 10 1 survival statute continues the cause of action of the decedent for the damages which the 2 decedent could have claimed had the death not occurred.” Id. The fact that survival 3 actions exist to perpetuate personal injury claims on behalf of a decedent militates against 4 linking the accrual of a wrongful death claim for the benefit of third parties to the accrual 5 of the underlying personal injury claim. 6 Looking outside the state of Washington for guidance, Defendants provide 7 examples of other jurisdictions that have held that a wrongful death claim is barred where 8 the personal injury statute of limitations runs prior to the decedent’s death. (See MTD at 9 7, n. 25.) However, states are by no means unanimous in adopting this rule; many states 10 have held that a wrongful death claim is not precluded by the running of the personal 11 injury statute of limitations. See, e.g. Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 238 P.3d 209, 220 (Idaho 12 2010) (finding that the fact the statute of limitations had run against decedent’s personal 13 injury claim did not bar a wrongful death suit because “the action created by Idaho’s 14 Wrongful Death Act is more than a mere survival action; it provides compensation for the 15 harm that the heirs experience due to the decedent’s death. . . . As the actionable wrong 16 for a wrongful death action is not complete until the death of the decedent, the statute of 17 limitations does not begin running until that time.”)3 Additionally, Defendants’ 18 19 3 See also Carroll, 830 P.2d at 1255; Saul ex rel. Heirs of Cook v. S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 25 So. 3d 1037, 1040 (Miss. 2010) (“The statute of limitations for wrongful-death claims, however, 20 cannot begin to run until, at the earliest, the date of death.”) (internal punctuation omitted); James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 P.2d 695, 705 (Ariz. 1987) (“The wrongful death cause of action can 21 accrue only at the death of the party injured.”); Farmers Bank & Trust Co. of Bardstown v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky. 1984) (“[T]he statute of limitations for wrongful death actions runs from the death for personal injury or medical negligence or 22 of the decedent, even though there was no viable action Inc., 687 P.2d 80, 82 (Nev. 1984) (“The death of malpractice at the time of death.”); Gilloon v. Humana, ORDER- 11 1 contention that the United States applies this rule to federal statutes is incorrect. (See 2 MTD at 7, n. 25.) In fact, in the context of suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 3 federal appellate courts have concluded that when a state statute creates an independent 4 wrongful death claim, such wrongful death claims do not accrue under federal law prior 5 to death. See, e.g., Miller v. Phil. Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2006) 6 (“[W]rongful death claims, for FTCA purposes, cannot accrue prior to death.”); Warrum 7 v. United States, 427 F.3d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 2005). 8 In light of these considerations, the court concludes that Defendants have not 9 carried their “heavy burden” of showing that the complaint “obviously fails” to state a 10 claim against the new Defendants. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046. Indeed, “the inability to 11 make the requisite decision in a summary manner itself points to an inability of the 12 removing party to carry its burden.” Id. at 1044. Here, the lack of recent relevant case 13 law, the equivocation of the Washington Supreme Court on the issue, the overarching 14 purpose of the wrongful death statute, the hesitation of the Ninth Circuit to decide the 15 matter a similar situation, and multiple decisions by other jurisdictions taking the 16 opposite position, all raise the possibility that a Washington State court would find that 17 18 the decedent being an essential element of the cause of action for wrongful death, there can be no legal 19 20 21 22 injury until the death has occurred.”); Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (Ga. 1983) (“No . . . cause of action for wrongful death in Georgia is barred by the statute of limitations before death.”); Larcher v. Wanless, 557 P.2d 507, 512-13 (Cal. 1976) (“[T]he cause of action for wrongful death . . . is not merely a continuation or survival of the decedent’s claim for personal injuries, but is an entirely new cause of action created in the heirs and based on the death of the decedent as that death inflicted injury upon them. Until that death, the heirs have suffered no “injury” . . . and hence have no basis for filing suit.”); W. Page Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127 (5th ed. 1984) (“As to the defense of the statute of limitations, . . . the considerable majority of the courts have held that the statute runs against the death action only from the date of death, even though at that time the decedent’s own action would have been barred while he was living.”). ORDER- 12 1 the statute of limitations has not run. But, “if there is a possibility that a state court would 2 find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the 3 federal court must find that the joinder was proper.” Id. at 1046. 4 This court must construe the removal statute strictly against removal jurisdiction. 5 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Because Defendants raise a legitimate doubt as to the right of 6 removal, the case must be remanded to state court. Id.; see also Blake v. Unumprovident 7 Corp., C 07-04366 MHP, 2007 WL 4168235, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007) 8 (remanding case and holding that because state courts had not yet decided the statute of 9 limitations issue, “defendants cannot establish that it is obvious under settled rules of 10 existing state law that [the action] is time-barred”); Brazina v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 11 271 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (remanding case because “defendants have 12 not persuaded the court that the statutory language clearly bars” plaintiff’s challenge); 13 Sue Tsang v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. EDCV 12-00127 VAP, 2012 WL 14 10423187, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012) (remanding case because “Defendants have not 15 persuaded the Court, by clear and convincing evidence, that Plaintiff’s trespass claim 16 obviously fails to establish the possibility of recover[y]”). 17 E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 18 Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Mot. at 4-5); see 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1447(c). Plaintiffs advance the erroneous notion that “an award of attorneys’ fees and 20 costs may be made upon a simple finding that the removal was improper.” (See Mot. at 21 5.) To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, 22 courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked ORDER- 13 1 an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Gardner v. UICI, 508 F.3d 559, 2 561 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 138 3 (2005)). “[W]hen an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Id. 4 (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 138). 5 Here, Defendants’ rationale for removal was supported by case law and presented 6 a close question in a complex and unresolved area of state law. As such, the court cannot 7 say that Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal. See Gardner, 8 508 F.3d at 562 (upholding denial of attorneys’ fees when defendants’ removal was 9 supported by case law and raised a “close question” of state law). Plaintiff’s request for 10 attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED. 11 12 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. 13 # 35). The court ORDERS that: 14 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and 1447(d), all further proceedings in this 15 case are REMANDED to the Superior Court for King County in the state of 16 Washington, 17 18 2. The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of this order to all counsel of record for all parties, 19 3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Clerk of the Court shall mail a certified 20 copy of the order of remand to the Clerk of the Court for the Superior Court 21 for King County, Washington, 22 ORDER- 14 1 2 4. The Clerk of the Court shall also transmit the record herein to the Clerk of the Court for the Superior Court for King County, Washington, 3 5. The parties shall file nothing further in this matter, and instead are instructed 4 to seek any further relief to which they believe they are entitled from the 5 courts of the state of Washington, as may be appropriate in due course, and 6 6. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this case. 7 Dated this 30th day of June, 2014. 8 10 A 11 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ORDER- 15
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