Vanderpol v. Swinger et al, No. 2:2012cv00773 - Document 71 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER denying 46 Deft Swinger's Motion for Leave; denying 51 Deft Swinger's Motion for Leave to File; denying 53 Deft Swinger's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 55 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Counsel is directed to e-file their Amended Complaint; granting 59 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 62 Deft Swinger's Motion for Summary Judgment, by Judge Marsha J. Pechman.(MD, mailed copy of order to Deft Swinger)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Vanderpol v. Swinger et al Doc. 71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 DOUGLAS J VANDERPOL, 11 12 13 14 15 Plaintiff, v. STEVE SWINGER, JANE DOE SWINGER, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GSA FUND, CASE NO. C12-773 MJP ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS Defendants. 16 17 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint and 18 answer to Defendant Steve Swinger’s counterclaims (Dkt. No. 55), and motion for partial 19 summary judgment based on collateral estoppels and res judicata (Dkt. No. 59). Also before the 20 Court is Defendant Steve Swinger’s motion to amend his answer (Dkt. No. 46), motion for an 21 extension of time (Dkt. No. 51), motion for partial summary judgment of Plaintiff’s adverse 22 possession claim (Dkt. No. 53), and motion for summary judgment based on the statute of 23 limitations (Dkt. No. 62). Having reviewed the motions, responses, and replies, the Court 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 GRANTS Plaintiff’s motions (Dkt. Nos. 55, 59) and DENIES Defendant Swinger’s motions. 2 (Dkt. Nos. 46, 51, 53, 62.) 3 Background 4 Douglas Vanderpol, the United States, and Steve Swinger all own property on the 5 Nooksack River. At some point, Swinger sought to place his property in the Conservation 6 Reserve Enhancement Program ( CREP ). CREP is a land retirement program in which 7 property owners are paid to commit agricultural lands for preservation; it is administered at the 8 national level by the USDA’s Farm Service Agency and at the local level by the Whatcom 9 Conservation District ( District ). When Vanderpol learned of Swinger’s plan to commit property on the left bank to the 10 11 CREP, he informed the District that a portion of the land ( Disputed Land ) was actually owned 12 by him or the United States. Vanderpol concedes the Disputed Land was once a part of 13 Swinger’s land on the right bank of the Nooksack River, but alleges that, through accretion, the 14 land is now part of the left bank. Alternatively, Vanderpol argues he has title due to adverse 15 possession given that he has used the land as a grass feeding area for dairy cows. 16 In response, Defendant Swinger claims that he owns the property, as evidenced by his 17 paying of property taxes. He also asserts a counterclaim for unjust enrichment and seeks to 18 recover the value of the Disputed Land. This is Defendant Swinger’s second case involving the Disputed Land. In 2011, in 19 20 Whatcom County Superior Court, he sued First American Title Insurance Company alleging 21 failure to disclose defects in the title, including an easement on the Disputed Land. (Dkt. No. 6022 1.) He also claimed First American Title failed to disclose that the Disputed Land was 23 inaccessible. The Nooksak River splits the rest of Swinger’s property from the Disputed Land. 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 2 1 On a motion for summary judgment, First American Title argued Swinger’s deed title establishes 2 his property as that area lying South of River Road and Northwesterly of the Nooksak River 3 and thus did not include the Disputed Land. First American Title further argued that the deed 4 boundary remains the location of the river bank, because the river had gradually changed course 5 through allusion. The Whatcom County court agreed with First American Title and concluded 6 that Swinger lacked any ownership in the Disputed Land and thus could not assert claims 7 relating to that property. (Dkt. No. 60-11). For purposes of this Order, the First American Title 8 litigation is referred to as the Whatcom County case. 9 10 11 Discussion 1. Plaintiff’s Motion To Amend Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a party may amend its pleadings only 12 with the opposing party's consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when 13 justice so requires. Id. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue 14 delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 15 by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 16 allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules 17 require, be freely given. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). But if amendment would 18 be futile, meaning any amendment would not save the complaint, a court should not grant leave 19 to amend. Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 Plaintiff moves to amend his complaint and answer to Defendant Swinger’s 21 counterclaims based the Whatcom County case. Plaintiff seeks to assert the defenses of 22 collateral estoppel, non-mutual collateral estoppel, and res judicata. Plaintiff argues amendment 23 is not based on undue delay, bad faith, it is not futile, nor will it result in prejudice to Defendant 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 3 1 Swinger. The Court agrees. If Swinger’s ownership of the Disputed Land was litigated, his 2 current claims of ownership in this case are precluded. Amendment is therefore not futile. 3 Further, Swinger does not show he would be prejudiced by amendment. The Court GRANTS 4 Plaintiff’s motion to amend. (Dkt. No. 55.) 5 6 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light most 7 favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any 8 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see 9 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of 10 showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to prevail as a 11 matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets his or her burden, the non12 moving party must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact 13 regarding the existence of the essential elements of his case that he must prove at trial in order 14 to withstand summary judgment. Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The 15 court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 16 the [non-moving] party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). 17 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment arguing that the Whatcom County case has 18 already declared Swinger does not own the Disputed Land. Thus, his counterclaims are 19 precluded by collateral estoppels and res judicata. 20 Whether a prior state court judgment precludes relitigation of an identical claim in 21 federal court depends on the preclusion rules of the state. Gupta v. Thai Airways Int'l, LTD., 22 487 F.3d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 2007). Under Washington law, collateral estoppels applies when (1) 23 the issue decided in the prior case is identical with the one presented in the second; (2) the prior 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 4 1 case ended in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted 2 was a party or in privity with a party to the prior case; and (4) the doctrine does not work an 3 injustice. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.2d 552, 562 (1993). 4 The Court agrees that collateral estoppel precludes Defendant Swinger’s counterclaims 5 and defenses. Beginning with the first factor, the issues litigated in the Whatcom County case— 6 whether Swinger has any ownership in the Disputed Land and whether the river moved through 7 accretion or avulsion—are the exact claims Swinger asserts here. The Whatcom County court 8 unequivocally found Swinger lacks any ownership interest in the Disputed Land. Because this 9 decision was reached on a motion for summary judgment, it constitutes a final judgment. See 10 Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 865 (2004); Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn. 11 App. 891, 899 (2009) (summary judgment can be a final judgment on the merits). Additionally, 12 Swinger was the plaintiff in the prior case and is the party against whom the doctrine is asserted. 13 Finally, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not work an injustice. In the Whatcom 14 County case, the parties fully litigated the very ownership issues raised here. Although Swinger 15 was pro se, he vigorously contested ownership, including hiring an expert. Whether Swinger 16 owned the Disputed Land was raised, argued, and decided in a prior proceeding. Re-litigation of 17 ownership is unnecessary and would produce inconsistent judgments. Therefore, the Court 18 GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary and DISMISSES Defendant Swinger’s counterclaims. 19 20 3. Defendant Swinger’s Motions Defendant Steve Swinger moves: 1) to amend his answer (Dkt. No. 46), 2) for an 21 extension of time (Dkt. No. 51),1 3) for partial summary judgment of Plaintiff’s adverse 22 23 1 The Court construes the motion for an extension of time as a reply in support of Swinger’s motion to amend because it does not seek separate relief. 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 5 1 possession claim (Dkt. No. 53), and 4) for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations 2 (Dkt. No. 62). The Court DENIES Defendant Swinger’s motions. 3 Defendant Swinger seeks to amend his answer to assert a statute of limitations defense. 4 Plaintiff correctly claims amendment is futile because there is no statute of limitations for quiet 5 title or adverse possession claim like this one – where a person is claiming that a new title for 6 adverse possession has been acquired. (Dkt. No. 47 at 3). In El Cerrito, Inc. v, Ryndak, the 7 Washington Supreme Court articulated the distinction between a claim of dispossession and 8 acquisition through adverse possession: 9 10 11 Once a person has title (which was acquired by him or his predecessor by adverse possession), the ten-year statute of limitations does not require that the property be continuously held in an adverse manner up to the time his title is quieted in a lawsuit. He may bring his action at any time after possession has been held adversely for ten years. 12 El Cerrito, Inc. v. Ryndak, 60 Wn.2d 847, 854 (1963). Plaintiff is not required to bring 13 suit within ten years of acquiring ownership. Defendant Swinger’s motion to amend is 14 futile. Moreover, because Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, 15 Defendant Swinger’s motion for summary judgment on these same grounds is also 16 meritless. 17 Defendant also seeks to amend his answer to assert a right to an easement. He 18 fails to plead any facts that would support a claim for an easement. Consequently, the 19 amendment is deficient under Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a short and plain statement of 20 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . 21 Finally, Swinger moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s adverse possession 22 claim. Having already found that Swinger is precluded from asserting ownership in the 23 Disputed Land, the Court concludes Swinger’s motion is moot. 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 6 1 2 Conclusion Because a Whatcom County court has already found that Defendant Swinger does not 3 own the Disputed Land, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 4 55.) The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint and answer to the 5 counterclaims. (Dkt. No. 59.) The Court DENIES Defendant Swinger’s motions. (Dkt. Nos. 6 46, 51, 53, 62.) 7 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 8 Dated this 17th day of December, 2012. 9 A 10 11 Marsha J. Pechman Chief United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING DEFENDANT SWINGER’S MOTIONS- 7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
