Little v. The State of Washington et al, No. 2:2011cv01387 - Document 79 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 66 67 68 72 Defendants Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE by Judge James L. Robart.(MD)
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Little v. The State of Washington et al Doc. 79 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 BRENDA JOYCE LITTLE, Plaintiff, 11 ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS v. 12 13 CASE NO. C11-1387JLR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the court on Defendants Washington State Bar 17 Association’s (“the WSBA”), Seattle School District No. 1’s (“the Seattle School 18 District”), Clover Park School District’s (“Clover Park”) and Kenneth Muscatel’s 19 motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Brenda Little’s first amended complaint (Dkt. ## 66, 20 67, 68, 72). Ms. Little filed a single response to the four motions to dismiss (Dkt. # 73). 21 Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and the 22 ORDER- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 governing law, and no party having requested oral argument, the court GRANTS the 2 motions to dismiss (Dkt. ## 66, 67, 68, 72) and DISMISSES this action WITH 3 PREJUDICE. 4 5 II. BACKGROUND In 2011, Ms. Little filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 6 Western District of Washington against the State of Washington, the WSBA, the Seattle 7 School District, Clover Park, and other defendants, alleging that the defendants violated 8 her rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. (See Cause No. 11-0091GMK Compl. (Dkt. 9 # 6).) The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 10 could be granted, and gave Ms. Little leave to file an amended complaint. (Cause No. 11 11-0091GMK Opinion and Order (Dkt. # 18).) Rather than amending her complaint, Ms. 12 Little voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit. (Cause No. 11-0091GMK Order of Dismissal 13 (Dkt. # 21).) 14 Ms. Little then filed a second lawsuit in this court against the State of Washington, 15 the WSBA, the Seattle School District, and Clover Park alleging 18 different causes of 16 action. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. # 16).) On Ms. Little’s motion, the court dismissed 17 the State with prejudice. (See Dkt. ## 32, 42.) The remaining defendants then moved to 18 dismiss Ms. Little’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See 19 Dkt. ## 20, 22, 24, 27.) The court granted the motions to dismiss because (1) many 20 counts were supported only by conclusory allegations that did not satisfy the pleading 21 requirements set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); and (2) other counts 22 were supported by allegations that were so confusing that they did not satisfy Federal ORDER- 2 1 Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a complaint contain a “short and plain 2 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). (Order (Dkt. # 48) at 5.) The court, nevertheless, granted Ms. 4 Little leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.) 5 Ms. Little timely filed her amended complaint, which adds Dr. Muscatel as a 6 defendant and alleges the following causes of action: (1) civil conspiracy against all 7 Defendants; (2) tortious interference and interference with a business relationship against 8 all Defendants; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants; (4) 9 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against all Defendants; (5) “defamation stigma plus” 10 against all Defendants; and (6) three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the WSBA 11 for violations of equal protection, disability discrimination, due process, First 12 Amendment freedom of speech, and Seventh Amendment due process. (See generally 13 Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 51).) 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 A. Motions to Dismiss 16 Defendants move to dismiss all of Ms. Little’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See 18 Dkt. ## 66, 67, 68, 72.) When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the 19 court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Livid 20 Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005). The 21 court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and draw all 22 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. ORDER- 3 1 Sys., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). The court, however, need not accept as true a 2 legal conclusion presented as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. 3 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal 4 theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. 5 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). “To survive a 6 motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 7 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting 8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. 9 Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 10 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 11 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “A 12 pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of 13 a cause of action will not do.’ . . . Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 14 assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 15 555). 16 As with Ms. Little’s original complaint, the court has carefully reviewed Ms. 17 Little’s amended complaint to determine whether it cures the previous deficiencies. The 18 court concludes that it does not. First, the amended complaint fails to contain the 19 required “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 20 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Most counts of the amended complaint incorporate by 21 reference the preceeding 90 paragraphs of allegations and then baldly recite the elements 22 of the cause of action. Ms. Little fails to indicate which of the numerous facts previously ORDER- 4 1 alleged give rise to the particular cause of action listed in each count. (See, e.g., Am. 2 Compl. ¶¶ 93-94.) The court does not consider this style of pleading to comply with Rule 3 8(a)’s requirement of a “short and plain statement.” Nevertheless, the court has 4 endeavored to match the allegations in the amended complaint with the alleged causes of 5 action. Even assuming that the amended complaint complies with Rule 8(a), however, 6 the court finds that the amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that 7 Defendants are liable for the alleged violations. A brief discussion of the shortcomings 8 of each count of the amended complaint follows. 9 Count One – Civil Conspiracy: Like the original complaint, the amended 10 complaint does not contain specific factual allegations from which the court could 11 conclude that Defendants entered into a civil conspiracy. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 12 Counts Two and Three – Tortious Interference and Interference with a 13 Business Relationship: The amended complaint fails to allege specific acts by 14 Defendants that interfered with Ms. Little’s business relationships. For example, the 15 conclusory allegation that “Clover Park School District and the Washington State Bar 16 Association began ex parte discussions to interfere with Brenda’s contractual relationship 17 with Mack Litton” (Am. Compl. ¶ 50), without further factual enhancement, does not 18 comply with the pleading standard set forth in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. See also 19 Cornish Coll. of the Arts v. 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’ship, 242 P.3d 1, 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 20 2010) (“Exercising one’s legal interests in good faith is not improper interference,” as 21 required to establish tortuous interference.). The amended complaint, moreover, does not 22 ORDER- 5 1 allege that any intentional or negligent interference caused a breach or termination of Ms. 2 Little’s relationship with Mr. Litton. 3 Count Three 1 – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The amended 4 complaint does not contain allegations of conduct that was “so outrageous in character, 5 and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 6 regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Robel v. 7 Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 619 (Wash. 2002) (internal citation omitted and emphasis 8 in original). Here, the court finds that Ms. Little’s amended complaint fails to allege any 9 fact that even if true are so outrageous as to amount to intentional infliction of emotional 10 distress. 11 Count Four – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981: The amended complaint fails to 12 allege facts giving rise to any Defendant’s liability under this provision. See Iqbal, 129 13 S. Ct. at 1949. 14 Count Five – Defamation Stigma Plus: The amended complaint does not state a 15 claim for “defamation stigma plus” (id. ¶¶ 102-03) because it does not allege that 16 Defendants disclosed a stigmatizing statement or that any such disclosure denied Ms. 17 Little some more tangible interest, such as employment. See Wenger v. Monroe, 282 18 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the elements of a “stigma plus” due process 19 claim). 20 21 1 22 Two counts in the amended complaint are labeled “Count Three.” ORDER- 6 1 Counts Six, Six, 2 and Seven – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims: The amended 2 complaint alleges three counts against the WSBA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations 3 of equal protection, disability discrimination, due process, First Amendment freedom of 4 speech, and Seventh Amendment due process. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104-12.) In support of 5 the first “Count Six,” the amended complaint alleges: “Washington Bar Association 6 intentionally hired primarily white males [sic] triers of fact, tried Little in abstentia, 7 refused to allow her to hire a lawyer, did not appoint a lawyer for disability petition.” (Id. 8 ¶ 107.) Neither these specific allegations nor any other allegation in the amended 9 complaint is sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, as noted in the 10 court’s order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss Ms. Little’s original complaint, the 11 allegation that the WSBA has only white triers of fact is not sufficient to state a claim for 12 the denial of equal protection. Second, the allegation that the WSBA “tried Little in 13 abstentia” does not state a claim because the Washington State Court Rules for 14 Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (“ELC”) do not prohibit the WSBA from holding a 15 disciplinary hearing when a respondent fails to appear after being properly notified. See 16 ELC 10.13 (requiring respondents to attend disciplinary hearings and setting forth 17 inferences that hearing officers may draw from a respondent’s absence). Moreover, the 18 allegations that the WSBA refused to allow Ms. Little to hire a lawyer and that it would 19 not appoint a lawyer for Ms. Little’s disability petition are inconsistent with more specific 20 21 22 2 Two counts in the amended complaint are labeled “Count Six.” ORDER- 7 1 allegations in the complaint that Ms. Little had a pro bono attorney and that the WSBA 2 also appointed an attorney for her disability petition. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76-84.) 3 B. Leave to Amend 4 Defendants argue that the court should deny any request for leave to amend and 5 dismiss Ms. Little’s amended complaint with prejudice. Under Federal Rule of Civil 6 Procedure 15(a)(2), courts are instructed to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 7 requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The court, however, may exercise its discretion to 8 deny leave to amend “due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 9 movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 10 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of 11 amendment.’” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 12 2008) (quoting Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 13 2008)). “[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 14 subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, ‘[t]he district court’s 15 discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.’” Id. (quoting Read-Rite Corp. 16 Sec. Litig., 335 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, Ms. Little has been granted 17 numerous attempts to amend her complaint, and yet the most recent version does not 18 correct the previously noted deficiencies. Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to 19 deny Ms. Little leave to amend and dismiss this action with prejudice. See Zucco 20 Partners, 552 F.3d at 1007. 21 22 ORDER- 8 1 2 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss 3 (Dkt. ## 66, 67, 68, 72), and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE. 4 Dated this 3rd day of April, 2012. 5 7 A 8 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ORDER- 9
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