B.E.S. et al v. Seattle School District No 1 et al, No. 2:2005cv02092 - Document 104 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
Court Description: ORDER granting defendants' 63 Motion for Summary Judgment; striking 80 Motion ; striking 85 Motion in Limine; striking 87 Motion in Limine; plaintiff's state law claims are remanded to King County Superior Court by Judge Ricardo S Martinez.(RS, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
B.E.S. et al v. Seattle School District No 1 et al Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Doc. 104 Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 1 of 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 11 B.E.S., et al., 12 Plaintiffs, 13 14 15 v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al., 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. 16 18 CASE NO. C05-2092RSM I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. #63). Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ federal claims should be dismissed because: (1) plaintiffs cannot establish their § 1983 claims, as neither defendant Terry Skjei nor defendant Seattle School District No. 1 (“School District”) violated any of their federal constitutional rights; (2) plaintiffs cannot establish Title IX liability, as they cannot demonstrate conscious disregard; and (3) plaintiffs’ claims against Terry Skjei in her individual capacity are an improper attempt to access punitive damages. Defendants further argue that plaintiffs’ state law claims should be dismissed because: (1) there is no private cause of action for failure to report child abuse; (2) no vicarious liability exists for 26 ORDER PAGE - 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 2 of 13 1 either defendant; (3) plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a prima facie negligence claim against either 2 defendant; (4) plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a prima facie case of outrage; (5) there is no applicable 3 cause of action for aiding and abetting in this case; and (6) all tort claims by plaintiff J.S. must be 4 dismissed for failure to comply with RCW 4.96. 5 Plaintiffs first respond that their state law claims should not be dismissed because: (1) they 6 have made a prima facie case of negligence under all of the negligence theories that they assert; (2) 7 the outrage claim requires a factual determination by the jury; (3) aiding and abetting is a recognized 8 tort claim; (4) plaintiffs substantially complied with RCW 4.96; and (5) plaintiffs have the right to 9 pursue a common law negligence action for failure to report. Plaintiffs further respond that their 10 federal claims should not be dismissed because: (1) defendants are liable under Title IX; (2) plaintiff 11 B.E.S. had a constitutional right to be secure in her person and that right was violated by 12 defendants; (3) plaintiff B.E.S.’s parents’ due process claim has merit; and (4) the jury should 13 decide whether punitive damages exist. Plaintiffs also ask for sanctions against defendants for their 14 failure to redact certain documents that were filed in support of their motion for summary judgment. 15 16 For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with plaintiffs, and GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment. II. DISCUSSION. 17 18 A. Background 19 This action arises from sexual abuse suffered by plaintiff B.E.S. at the hands of her former 20 teacher, Lawrence “Shayne” Hill, over a period of several years beginning during the 2001-02 21 school year. During the 2001-02 school year, plaintiff was a fifth grade student at Broadview- 22 Thompson Elementary school in Seattle, WA. Mr. Hill, a nonparty to this action, was plaintiff’s 23 teacher. At that time, he had been teaching fifth grade at Broadview for 20 years. In 2001-02, Dr. 24 Herb Packer, another nonparty, was Broadview’s principal, and defendant Terry Skjei was Assistant 25 Principal. 26 ORDER PAGE - 2 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC 1 Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 3 of 13 Plaintiffs allege that during B.E.S.’s fifth grade year, a time when she was particularly 2 vulnerable because of her father’s sudden death two years earlier, Mr. Hill made an effort to 3 befriend B.E.S. and groom her to gain her trust. Mr. Hill sent B.E.S. gifts, notes and letters, gave 4 her special chores and duties, ate lunch with her and spent time alone with her in his classroom. 5 Eventually, Mr. Hill began molesting B.E.S., including touching her buttocks, kissing her hands, 6 rubbing her hand, shoulder, armpits, waist and crotch, and occasionally digitally penetrating her 7 vagina. This abuse continued for approximately two years after B.E.S. entered middle school. 8 There is no dispute that B.E.S. never reported the abuse. Indeed, it was not until the parent of 9 another student1 saw Mr. Hill touch her own daughter’s buttocks, that an investigation was 10 conducted and B.E.S. admitted that she had been abused as well.2 Plaintiffs assert that defendants had notice of Mr. Hill’s actions for many years prior to 11 12 plaintiff’s abuse, but acted with deliberate indifference to the safety and protection of Broadview’s 13 students by ignoring teacher complaints and failing to take any remedial action against Mr. Hill. In 14 the instant action plaintiffs seek relief under 42. U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“Title 15 IX”), as well as several Washington state law theories. Defendants have moved to dismiss all of 16 plaintiffs’ claims. 17 B. Summary Judgment Standard 18 Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 19 and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 20 any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The Court must draw all 22 reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 23 1 24 25 26 That student, D.G.T., is the plaintiff in a related case before this Court. D.G.T. v. Seattle School District No. 1, et al., Case No. C06-0200RSM. 2 Mr. Hill was eventually arrested, whereafter he pleaded guilty to child molestation and other sex crimes against children, for which he is currently serving a sentence of five years to life. ORDER PAGE - 3 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 4 of 13 1 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). The moving party has 2 the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson, 3 477 U.S. at 257. Mere disagreement, or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact 4 exists, no longer precludes the use of summary judgment. See California Architectural Bldg. 5 Prods., Inc., v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). 6 Genuine factual issues are those for which the evidence is such that “a reasonable jury could 7 return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Material facts are those 8 which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See id. In ruling on summary 9 judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but “only 10 determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 11 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d at 747). Furthermore, conclusory or 12 speculative testimony is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact to defeat summary judgment. 13 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 60 F. 3d 337, 345 (9th Cir. 1995). 14 Similarly, hearsay evidence may not be considered in deciding whether material facts are at issue in 15 summary judgment motions. Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F. 2d 665, 667 (9th 16 Cir. 1980). 17 C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions 18 As an initial matter, the Court addresses plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. Plaintiffs accuse 19 defendants of deliberately misleading the Court on their motion for summary judgment and violating 20 the Court’s Protective Order by filing unredacted documents in support of their motion for 21 summary judgment. Defendants note that they immediately took steps to remedy their inadvertent 22 failure to seal certain documents, and note that plaintiffs themselves also failed to redact some of 23 their documents. Defendants also respond that they have not intimidated any of plaintiffs witnesses 24 and did not mislead the Court. In this instance, the Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs that 25 sanctions are appropriate. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ request. 26 ORDER PAGE - 4 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 5 of 13 1 D. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims 2 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, arguing that 3 plaintiffs cannot establish that either Ms. Skjei or the School District violated any of plaintiffs’ 4 federal rights, plaintiffs cannot establish deliberate indifference, plaintiffs cannot prove that either an 5 unconstitutional policy was the moving force behind their alleged injuries, and that, even if plaintiffs 6 could demonstrate a constitutional violation, Ms. Skjei is entitled to qualified immunity. In this 7 case, plaintiffs appear to allege § 1983 liability under several theories: (1) municipal liability on the 8 part of Seattle School District No. 1; (2) liability on the part of either defendant based on the 9 existence of a state-created danger and a special relationship between defendants and B.E.S.; and 10 (3) individual § 1983 liability on the part of Ms. Skjei. The Court will address each of these theories 11 accordingly. 1. Municipal Liability 12 13 Municipalities or political subdivisions are liable under § 1983 when the offending actions 14 are taken “pursuant to official municipal policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 15 (1978). A municipality may also be liable for a policy of inaction if such inaction amounts to a 16 failure to protect constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 17 Municipal liability does not arise, however, from respondeat superior or general liability theories. 18 Id. at 385. Rather, plaintiff must show that: (1) plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which 19 she was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy, custom or practice; (3) the policy amounts to 20 deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force 21 behind the constitutional violation. Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). 22 Deliberate indifference “occurs when the need for more or different action is so obvious, and 23 the inadequacy of the current procedure so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, 24 that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” 25 Id. at 1477-78 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The failure to adequately 26 ORDER PAGE - 5 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 6 of 13 1 implement a policy may form the basis of municipal liability if the failure in itself constitutes a policy 2 of deliberate indifference. Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2004). Whether a 3 municipality has pursued a policy of deliberate indifference is generally a question for the jury. 4 Pearce, 954 F.2d at 1478. A policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation if it caused 5 the violation. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). “Pointing to a municipal 6 policy action or inaction as a ‘but-for’ cause is not enough to prove a causal connection under 7 Monell. Rather, the policy must be the proximate cause of the section 1983 injury.” Van Ort v. 8 Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837, (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 9 Here, plaintiffs argue that municipal liability exists in this case because defendants deprived 10 B.E.S. of her constitutional right to be secure in her body by ignoring set district policy, and 11 dismissing signs of sexual abuse in order to protect its teacher’s reputation. Plaintiffs also argue 12 that the School District failed to adequately train its teachers and staff as to the appropriate action 13 under state law and District policy if any of them suspected abuse. In support of their argument, 14 plaintiffs point to the following specific examples: several deposed teachers testified that they 15 understood their duty was to report suspected child abuse to administrators; written policy at 16 Broadview confirmed that policy; the District supplied information that specifically told teachers 17 and other staff not to call parents or Child Protective Services, but instead tell an administrator who 18 would take appropriate action; when teachers actually reported inappropriate behavior to 19 administrators, they were told that the matter was already taken care of, to confront Mr. Hill 20 themselves, or were told that they didn’t want to hear the reports; testimony by Ms. Skjei made 21 clear that administrators weren’t even sure what the policies and procedures were to report 22 suspected abuse; and Mr. Packer simply never reported any suspected sexual abuse and instead 23 attempted to protect Mr. Hill’s professional reputation. 24 25 Defendants argue that these facts do not support a finding of municipal liability even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. First, defendants note that few reports were ever 26 ORDER PAGE - 6 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 7 of 13 1 made to the administration about Mr. Hill in any fashion. For example, Ron Langston, a Broadview 2 teacher, testified that he had only one conversation with Mr. Packer about Mr. Hill, and that he only 3 reported that Mr. Hill had girls sitting on his lap. Mr. Langston also reported that while Mr. Packer 4 was principal, he never reported anything directly to Ms. Skjei. Similarly, Frances Zavala, another 5 Broadview teacher, never reported any concern to Ms. Skjei about Mr. Hill at the time she was 6 assistant principal. She did make reports to Ms. Skjei when she became principal, after B.E.S. had 7 left the school. In her conversations with Mr. Packer, Ms. Zavala described Mr. Hill’s actions as 8 inappropriate touching. Finally, Ms. Zavala has testified that, prior to her deposition in this case, 9 she had never told anyone the extent of what she now asserts she saw, including Ms. Skjei. 10 Defendants also note that there is no dispute that the only inappropriate touching that Ms. Skjei 11 herself witnessed was Mr. Hill holding hands with students in the hallway. 12 Defendants next argue that there was no policy in effect at the time B.E.S. was a student 13 that required teachers only to report suspected abuse to administrators. Defendants point to 14 plaintiffs’ erroneous reliance on RCW 28A.400.317, which did not become effective until June 10, 15 2004. With respect to that statute, the language explicitly indicates that individual mandatory 16 reporting obligations remain unchanged. Defendants also point to plaintiffs’ erroneous reliance on a 17 Guide to Handling Employee Misconduct, which was not created until 2006 and has not been 18 formally adopted. Similarly, defendants assert that plaintiffs improperly rely on the Emergency 19 Procedures manual, which was not created until February 2005. 20 The Court agrees with defendants. Based on the record before this Court, and not on 21 plaintiff’s unsupported allegations, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 22 plaintiffs, the Court finds no widespread practice or policy of allowing abuse, or any practice or 23 policy to ignore suspected abuse. Further, the Court agrees that defendants actions do not amount 24 to deliberate indifference in this case. 25 As noted above, deliberate indifference occurs when the need for more or different action is 26 ORDER PAGE - 7 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 8 of 13 1 so obvious, and the inadequacy of the current procedure so likely to result in the violation of 2 constitutional rights, that the policymakers can reasonably be said to have been deliberately 3 indifferent to the need. Here, there is nothing to suggest that there was an obvious need for the 4 school to take different action to protect identifiable constitutional rights. Several of the teachers 5 testified that while they witnessed Mr. Hill with his female students sitting on his lap, they did not 6 directly report such behavior to the administration or did not become immediately concerned. For 7 example, Ms. Boswell testified that she was upset when she witnessed B.E.S. sitting on Mr. Hill’s 8 lap, but only informed another teacher, who subsequently informed Ms. Skjei. Ms. von Haartman 9 stated that she did not feel she had anything to report to CPS, so she informed Ms. Skjei that she 10 thought Mr. Hill’s actions were inappropriate, but also stated that she did not want to get involved. 11 Mr. Langston stated that he witnessed Mr. Hill inappropriately touching female students on several 12 occasions, but did not think much of it at the time, and finally reported it to Mr. Packer during a 13 conversation pertaining to his own inappropriate behavior. These teachers also characterized Mr. 14 Hill’s actions as subtle, and all believed the appropriate step was to inform the administration rather 15 than make a CPS report themselves. 16 In addition, both Ms. Skjei and Dr. Packer spoke to Mr. Hill about appropriate boundaries 17 with his students, and encouraged him to change his behavior. The school also arranged a teacher 18 presentation about appropriate interactions with students. The Court acknowledges that neither 19 administrator took any disciplinary action against Mr. Hill, and that, arguably, such practice is 20 negligent in creating the risk of further inappropriate touching by Mr. Hill. However, in order for 21 municipal liability to exist, a policy of inaction must be more than mere negligence. See Daniels v. 22 Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1986). Accordingly, and for the additional reasons above, the 23 Court finds that summary judgment in favor of defendants is appropriate on the municipal liability 24 claim. 25 26 ORDER PAGE - 8 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC 1 2 Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 9 of 13 2. State-Created Danger A municipality or political subdivision may also be found liable under § 1983 where a 3 plaintiff is deprived of constitutional rights by a private actor as a result of a state-created danger. 4 Huffman v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998). The “state-created danger” 5 theory is a potential source of both individual and municipal liability, and is viewed as an exception 6 to the rule that municipal liability may not be based on the acts of private individuals. Id. at 1058- 7 59; L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996). In order to succeed on a claim based under this 8 theory, a plaintiff must show “that the state official participated in creating a dangerous condition, 9 and acted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious danger in subjecting the plaintiff to 10 it.” Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 900. The “deliberate indifference” standard requires the plaintiff to show: 11 12 (1) an unusually serious risk of harm . . . , (2) defendant’s actual knowledge of (or at least, willful blindness to) that elevated risk, and (3) defendant’s failure to take obvious steps to address that known, serious risk. 13 Id. A defendant will not be liable under the state-created danger theory unless the defendant’s 14 actions in creating the dangerous condition are the proximate cause of the constitutional injury. Van 15 Ort, 92 F.3d at 837. Proximate cause requires that the private actor’s actions be a foreseeable 16 result of the state official’s participation in the creation of a dangerous condition. Id. Thus, the 17 unforeseeable acts of private actors break the chain of causation between the actions of a state 18 official and the alleged constitutional violation. Id. 19 Plaintiffs allege that defendants created a dangerous situation by putting B.E.S. in Mr. Hill’s 20 class, and keeping her in that class, despite warnings that B.E.S. was in distress, and despite 21 warnings that Mr. Hill was sexually abusing her and other students. To succeed on that claim, 22 plaintiffs must show that a state official participated in creating a dangerous condition, and acted 23 with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious danger in subjecting the plaintiffs to it. The 24 Court finds that there was not a known, serious risk that Mr. Hill would molest B.E.S. As 25 discussed above, the evidence produced by plaintiffs shows that there were few reports to 26 ORDER PAGE - 9 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 10 of 13 1 administrators about Mr. Hill’s behavior, and those reports were only that Mr. Hill had been seen 2 with girls sitting on his lap. B.E.S. never reported the abuse, and Ms. Skjei only witnessed Mr. Hill 3 holding students’ hands in the hallway. Further, for the reasons already discussed, defendants’ 4 actions do not rise to a level of deliberate indifference, and there is no evidence that either the 5 School District or Ms. Skjei purposefully intended to cause plaintiffs harm. Accordingly, the Court 6 finds that summary judgment in favor of defendants is appropriate on the state-created danger claim. 3. Individual Liability Under § 1983 7 Plaintiffs further argue that Ms. Skjei violated B.E.S.’s constitutional right to personal 8 9 security and to bodily integrity by failing to investigate the allegations and reports of inappropriate 10 behavior by Mr. Hill. To prevail on such a claim, plaintiff must show “(1) that the conduct 11 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct 12 deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 13 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, to be liable under § 1983, plaintiff must show that the deliberate or 14 affirmative act or omission of the defendant caused the deprivation of constitutional rights. 15 Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1989). As already discussed, the Court finds 16 that Ms. Skjei’s actions do not amount to deliberate indifference in this case. Harry A. v. Duncan, 17 351 F. Supp.2d 1060, 1074-76 (D. Mont. 2005). Accordingly, 18 summary judgment in Ms. Skjei’s favor is appropriate.3 4. Loss of Consortium 19 20 Plaintiffs have also raised a due process violation on the basis of parental loss of consortium. 21 In this context, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to harm the parent-child 22 relationship, not just the child. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 827-28 (3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs 23 fail to point to any evidence in the record that defendants intended to harm B.E.S.’s relationship 24 25 26 3 Because the Court finds that no constitutional violation occurred, it need not address defendants’ qualified immunity argument. ORDER PAGE - 10 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 11 of 13 1 with her parents. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendants on this claim is 2 appropriate. 3 E. Title IX 4 Title IX provides that no person “shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be denied the benefits of, or 5 be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 6 assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). It is undisputed that Seattle School District No. 1 receives 7 federal financial assistance. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 8 (1998), the United States Supreme Court held that damages are available under Title IX only if “an 9 official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute 10 corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the 11 recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 280. The court 12 expressly declined to impose liability on “principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice,” 13 instead demanding actual notice to an official of the defendant. Id. at 285; see also Davis v. 14 Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999) (reinforcing the holding of Gebser); Oden 15 v. N. Marianas College, 440 F.3d 1085, 1088-1089 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 Defendants first argue that Ms. Skjei, an assistant principal at the time, is not a “funding 17 recipient” for purposes of Title IX, and therefore cannot be held liable in her individual capacity 18 under the statute. See Sherz v. Hawaii Dept. Of Ed., 396 F. Supp.2d 1138, 1145 (D. Hawaii 2005) 19 (explaining that “Title IX does not subject school officials to liability in their individual capacities.”). 20 Plaintiffs have produced no authority to the contrary. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs 21 assert their Title IX claims against Ms. Skjei in her individual capacity, the Court agrees that such 22 claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. 23 As for the claim against defendants in their official capacities, Gebser made clear that 24 liability under Title IX will not lie unless an official who has authority to address the alleged 25 discrimination fails to adequately respond, and such response must amount to deliberate 26 ORDER PAGE - 11 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 12 of 13 1 indifference. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. This Court has already determined that defendants’ actions 2 do not amount to deliberate indifference. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Title IX claims must be dismissed. 3 F. State Law Claims 4 Because the Court will dismiss all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, it now declines supplemental 5 jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3); Acri v. Varian 6 Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a district court has 7 discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over nonfederal claims if it has dismissed 8 all claims over which it had original jurisdiction). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ state law claims will be 9 remanded to state court. 10 III. CONCLUSION 11 Having reviewed defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #663), plaintiffs’ 12 response (Dkt. #72), defendants’ reply (Dkt. #75), the declarations and evidence in support of those 13 briefs, and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby ORDERS: 14 15 (1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #63) is GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ federal claims are DISMISSED. 16 (2) Plaintiffs’ state law claims are hereby REMANDED to King County Superior Court. 17 The Clerk SHALL close this file and send a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of Court for 18 the King County Superior Court. 19 (3) Plaintiffs’ pending Motion In Limine (Dkt. #87) is STRICKEN AS MOOT. 20 (4) Defendants’ pending Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert (Dkt. #80), Motion to Prevent 21 Plaintiffs from Concealing Their Identity (Dkt. #95), and Motion In Limine (Dkt. #85) are 22 STRICKEN AS MOOT. 23 (5) The Court had previously informed counsel that a new trial date for related case D.G.T. 24 v. Seattle School District No. 1, C06-0200RSM, would be addressed during the pre-trial conference 25 in this matter. Because this action is now dismissed, the Court will address a new trial date for the 26 ORDER PAGE - 12 Case 2:05-cv-02092-JCC Document 104 Filed 03/06/2007 Page 13 of 13 1 related case in its Order on defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment in that action, which 2 shall be issued shortly. 3 (6) The Clerk shall forward a copy of this Memorandum Order to all counsel of record. 4 DATED this _6_ day of March, 2006. 5 6 A RICARDO S. MARTINEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ORDER PAGE - 13
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
