Poffenberger v. Patel, No. 4:2018cv05105 - Document 83 (E.D. Wash. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 67 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF LIABILITY. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (CLP, Case Administrator)
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Poffenberger v. Patel Doc. 83 1 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 2 Jul 25, 2019 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 JENNIPHER POFFENBERGER, 7 4:18-cv-05105-EFS Plaintiff, 8 9 No. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF LIABILITY v. VRAJESH K. PATEL, 10 Defendant. 11 12 Before the Court, without oral argument, is Plaintiff Jennipher Poffenberger’s 13 Partial Motion for Summary Judgment of Liability, ECF No. 67. Plaintiff asks the 14 Court to grant judgment of liability against Defendant Vrajesh K. Patel as to three 15 specific assaults by strangulation included in her claims for battery and assault.1 16 Plaintiff argues that Defendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the 17 occurrences of the three strangulations for which he has been convicted and 18 sentenced in state court.2 Because the Court finds Defendant has had a full and fair 19 opportunity to litigate the occurrences of the three strangulations, the Court finds 20 21 22 1 2 ECF No. 67 at 1. Id. at 1–2. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 1 of 13 Dockets.Justia.com 1 good cause to grant Plaintiff’s Motion and find Defendant liable for battery and 2 assault. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiff and Defendant met while they were working for Providence St. Mary 5 Medical Center in Walla Walla, Washington.3 Plaintiff was a lab technician and 6 Defendant was a medical doctor and Director for Hospitalists.4 Plaintiff and 7 Defendant entered a romantic relationship in January 2017.5 Plaintiff alleges in her 8 Amended Complaint that although the romantic relationship began positively, 9 Defendant verbally and physically abused Plaintiff on multiple occasions.6 10 On October 3, 2017, the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of Walla Walla County 11 filed an Information charging Defendant with three counts of assault in the second 12 degree and two counts of harassment.7 The counts of assault were based on the 13 accusations that Defendant had strangled or suffocated Plaintiff on April 16, May 5, 14 and July 30, 2017, in violation of RCW 9A.36.021 and 10.99.020.8 15 On February 21, 2018, Defendant signed a “Stipulated Order of Continuance, 16 Waiver of Rights, and Statement of Defendant on Submittal or Stipulation to Facts” 17 (“SOC”).9 By signing the SOC, Defendant entered into a “deferral period” that would 18 terminate on February 21, 2019.10 On that date, the assault and harassment charges 19 20 3 4 5 21 6 7 22 8 9 10 ECF No. 28 at 2. Id. at 3. Id. See generally ECF No. 28. See ECF No. 69-1 at 2. Id. at 3. See id. at 6–12. ECF No. 69-1 at 7. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 2 of 13 1 against Defendant would be dismissed, provided he complied with several conditions 2 outlined in the SOC.11 If Defendant did not comply with the conditions, Defendant 3 agreed that the State of Washington’s case against him and the record would be 4 submitted to a judge to determine Defendant’s guilt or innocence.12 The record would 5 include “[a]ll police reports, witness statements, and photographs” attached to the 6 SOC at the time of signing, and Defendant stipulated to the admissibility of these 7 materials.13 Defendant waived his rights to present any evidence in his defense other 8 than those materials.14 He also waived his rights to a jury trial, refuse to testify 9 against himself, put forth and question witnesses, and be presumed innocent.15 10 Defendant signed the SOC “freely and voluntarily.”16 11 Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the present action on June 21, 2018 alleging 12 claims for battery, assault, and both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 13 distress.17 Plaintiff later amended her Complaint to remove the cause of action for 14 negligent infliction of emotional distress.18 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 15 realleged her claims for with a final judgment on the merits.55 3 4 Third, estoppel is sought against Defendant, who was the same defending party in the prior adjudication.56 The third element has accordingly been met.57 5 2. 6 Plaintiff argues that application of collateral estoppel would work no injustice 7 as Defendant had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether he 8 assaulted [Plaintiff] by strangulation on the three dates in question.”58 Defendant 9 argues he was not provided “a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of 10 Fourth Factor of Injustice assault at the order to show cause hearing.”59 11 Whether an application of collateral estoppel would create an injustice 12 depends “on whether the parties to the earlier adjudication were afforded a full and 13 fair opportunity to litigate” the issue.60 A criminal conviction in a prior adjudication 14 may “be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action” as it may provide a full 15 and fair opportunity to litigate.61 The prior adjudication need not end in a trial;62 16 54 17 18 55 56 57 19 58 59 20 60 21 22 61 62 ECF No. 69-2 at 53. The Court notes that collateral estoppel may be defeated by later rulings on appeal. See City of Des Moines, 87 Wn. App. at 702. However, a judgment becomes final for collateral estoppel purposes “at the beginning, not the end, of the appellate process.” Id. See generally ECF Nos. 1 & 28 (civil matter); see also ECF No. 69-1 at 2 (criminal matter). Thompson, 138 Wn.2d at 790. ECF No. 67 at 9 (internal quotations omitted). ECF No. 79 at 1. Nielson v. Spanaway General Med. Clinic, Inc., 135 Wn.2d 255, 265 (1998). See also Clark, 150 Wn.2d at 913 (“The determination of whether application of collateral estoppel will work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is asserted—the fourth element—depends primarily on whether the parties to the earlier proceeding received a full and fair hearing on the issue in question.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Clark, 150 Wn.2d at 913. See, e.g., Billings v. Town of Steilacoom, 2 Wn. App.2d 1, 19 (2017) (an administrative hearing may have preclusive effect on a subsequent civil action). Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 8 of 13 1 even a guilty plea in a criminal proceeding may be used as a basis for collateral 2 estoppel in a subsequent civil action where it was made knowingly, intelligently, and 3 voluntarily.63 4 The Court finds that Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 5 issue of whether he assaulted Plaintiff through strangulation or suffocation. To 6 resolve his case, Defendant “freely and voluntarily” signed the SOC, which set out 7 conditions Defendant agreed to meet in order to receive dismissal of his charges.64 8 By signing the SOC, Defendant acknowledged that any violations of the SOC’s 9 conditions would result in the state’s case being “submitted on the record” to the 10 Superior Court judge to determine his guilt or innocence of the charges.65 He signed 11 that he had discussed the terms of this agreement with counsel and understood his 12 rights and how his guilt would be determined.66 His resolution of his case by signing 13 the SOC is not unlike the resolution of a case through a guilty plea; he made the 14 fully informed decision that the Superior Court judge would determine his guilt or 15 innocence based on the record to which Defendant stipulated. Defendant accordingly 16 had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether he assaulted Plaintiff and chose 17 to litigate the issue by signing the SOC knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.67 18 63 19 20 21 64 22 65 66 67 See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against King, 170 Wn.2d 738, 745 (2011) (a defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether he committed a crime wherein his decision to plead guilty rather than go to trial was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily); see also State v. Schimmelpfennig, 92 Wn.2d 95, 104 (1979) (“A plea of guilty to a criminal offense is a confession of guilt whose result is equivalent to conviction. The defendant pleading guilty acknowledges full responsibility for the legal consequences of his guilt. A plea of guilty should thus be treated no differently than a jury verdict[.]”) (citations omitted). ECF No. 69-1 at 10. See id. at 8. Id. at 10. See King, 170 Wn.2d at 745. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 9 of 13 1 Defendant argues that he was not given a full and fair opportunity to litigate 2 whether he assaulted Plaintiff because he “was not given a full and fair hearing as 3 to whether he was in breach of the SOC itself” at the show-cause hearing.68 He 4 argues that the prosecutor and Superior Court judge “relied on unreliable hearsay 5 to decide that the SOC conditions were violated.”69 6 This argument is irrelevant to whether Defendant had a full and fair 7 opportunity to litigate the issue of assaulting Plaintiff. As Plaintiff correctly points 8 out, Defendant is disputing the methods by which the Superior Court determined 9 whether Defendant violated the terms of his SOC, not whether he assaulted 10 Plaintiff.70 The purpose of the show-cause hearing was to determine whether 11 Defendant had violated his SOC by being untruthful to his substance abuse 12 counselor.71 13 determination of his guilt of assault would be based on the record—not a show-cause 14 hearing—and he stipulated to the admissibility of all documents in the record to Indeed, Defendant signed the SOC acknowledging that the 15 16 68 17 18 19 20 21 22 69 70 71 ECF No. 79 at 4. Id. See ECF No. 81 at 2–3. ECF No. 69-2 at 29. The Court notes that the Order to Show Cause also instructed Defendant to show cause as to “why the Court should not find him guilty” of assault and harassment. Id. at 29– 30. However, the SOC states that “the State’s case [against Defendant] will be submitted on the record if [Defendant] fail[s] to comply with any of the conditions set forth” in the document. ECF No. 69-1 at 8. Accordingly, the Court interprets the Superior Court’s directions as allowing Defendant an opportunity to present a defense prior to the submission of the case if the Superior Court found Defendant guilty of violating the SOC. The SOC did not require this opportunity. The Court therefore finds the core purpose of the hearing was to determine whether Defendant violated his SOC, not to determine Defendant’s guilt of assault, which the Superior Court judge would later determine on the record in accordance with the SOC. See id. at 8. This conclusion is further supported by the Superior Court judge’s letter in response to Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider, which only discusses the findings that Defendant violated his SOC. See ECF No. 692 at 50–51. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 10 of 13 1 determine his guilt.72 As such, any procedural defects in the hearing to show cause 2 for whether he violated the SOC do not affect the issue of whether he had a full and 3 fair opportunity to litigate the assaults.73 4 In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of proving the four 5 elements required to apply collateral estoppel. Defendant had a full and fair 6 opportunity to litigate the issue of whether he strangled or suffocated Plaintiff on 7 April 16, May 5, and July 30, 2017, and was found guilty of these acts by the state 8 Superior Court judge. Accordingly, the Court estops Defendant from relitigating the 9 issue of whether he strangled or suffocated Plaintiff on these dates. 10 C. 11 Plaintiff argues that because Defendant’s strangulation or suffocation of 12 Plaintiff is conclusively established, “the issue of whether [Defendant] battered or 13 assaulted [Plaintiff] is conclusively established.”74 Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the 14 Court to find Defendant liable for her claims of battery and assault.75 Defendant is liable for common law battery and assault. 15 Plaintiff filed claims for common law battery and assault.76 Common law 16 battery is defined as a “harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an 17 act intended to cause the plaintiff . . . to suffer such a contact[.]”77 Similarly, “[u]nder 18 72 19 73 20 74 21 22 75 76 77 See ECF No. 69-1 at 8–9. Defendant sets forth an alternative, contractually based argument. See ECF No. 79 at 6–9. The issues Defendant alleges are with the state prosecutor’s alleged violation of the terms of the SOC. See id. Whether the state prosecutor violated the terms of the SOC is not relevant to the issues presented to this Court. Accordingly, the Court declines to address this argument. ECF No. 67 at 10. Id. at 10–12. Because Defendant’s argument centered on procedural defects with the SOC hearing, Defendant did not address the issue of liability. See generally ECF No. 79. ECF No. 28 at 12–13. McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 103 Wn. App. 391, 408 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 11 of 13 1 the common law, a person assaults another . . . by unlawfully touching another with 2 criminal intent (actual battery)[.]”78 Defendant was convicted of assaulting Plaintiff 3 “by strangulation or suffocation.”79 Thus, he is liable for common law battery because 4 he intentionally caused a harmful or offensive contact with Plaintiff.80 Because 5 common law assault encompasses actual battery, the Court finds Defendant to be 6 liable for Plaintiff’s claims of common law battery and assault arising from three 7 incidents of strangulation. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 Having found that Plaintiff has met all elements required for collateral 10 estoppel, the Court hereby estops Defendant from relitigating the issue of whether 11 he strangled or suffocated Plaintiff on April 16, May 5, and July 30, 2017. Because 12 the Court finds Defendant strangled or suffocated Plaintiff on those three occasions, 13 the Court finds Defendant liable for common law battery and assault. As such, the 14 Court finds good cause to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of 15 Liability against Defendant, ECF No. 67. 16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 17 18 19 78 20 21 22 79 80 State v. Hahn, 174 Wn.2d 126, 129 (2012) (listing definitions of common law assault). ECF No. 69-1 at 2–3; ECF No. 69-2 at 33. See State v. Cardenas–Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 267–68 (2017) (“[Second degree] assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person that is harmful or offensive . . . A touching or striking . . . is offensive if the touching or striking would offend an ordinary person who is not unduly sensitive.”); State v. Esters, 84 Wn. App. 180, 185 (1996) (a battery or “consummated assault” requires only an intentional touching “that recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm,” not “specific intent to inflict substantial bodily harm”) (emphasis added). See also Esters, 84 Wn. App. at 184 (distinguishing an actual “consummated assault” from an attempted assault). Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 12 of 13 1 2 3 4 5 1. Plaintiff Jennipher Poffenberger’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Liability, ECF No. 67, is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and to provide copies to all counsel. DATED this 25th day of July 2019. 6 7 s/Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — Page 13 of 13
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