Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Company, No. 4:2017cv05096 - Document 14 (E.D. Wash. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS. Defendants Motion to Dismiss ECF No. 6 is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Company Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 LILLIAN FIGUEROA, an individual, NO. 4:17-CV-5096-TOR Plaintiff, 8 9 10 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a foreign corporation 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6). 14 This matter was submitted for consideration with oral argument on September 27, 15 2017. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, and is fully informed. 16 For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is 17 DENIED. 18 19 20 BACKGROUND This case concerns a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, by Plaintiff Lillian Figueroa against Defendant BNSF Railway ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Company, a foreign corporation incorporated in Delaware. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1–2. 2 On August 7, 2017, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6), arguing 3 that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred by the applicable three-year statute of 4 limitations (45 U.S.C. § 56) and that equitable tolling is not appropriate due to 5 Plaintiff’s alleged forum shopping. ECF No. 6 at 1–2. For the reasons discussed 6 below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion. FACTS 1 7 8 9 On May 29, 2012, Plaintiff was injured while performing work at Defendant’s Pasco Diesel Facility in Washington. ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 3; 6 at 3. On 10 May 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon. ECF 11 Nos. 1 at ¶ 9; 8-2 at 2. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 12 jurisdiction, which was denied. ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 14; 8-4 at 2; 8-6 at 2. On 13 February 26, 2016, Defendant filed a Writ of Mandamus with the Oregon Supreme 14 Court. The Court allowed the petition and heard oral argument on November 10, 15 2016. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16–17. On March 23, 2017, the Oregon Supreme Court 16 issued a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus and Appellate Judgment, instructing the 17 18 1 Defendant asserts that its Motion to Dismiss tests the sufficiency of 19 Plaintiff’s allegations, and so it states facts alleged by Plaintiff without admitting 20 those facts. ECF No. 6 at 3. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 2 1 Circuit Court judge to vacate his prior order denying the motion to dismiss and 2 conduct further proceedings consistent with the decision of the Oregon Supreme 3 Court. Id. at ¶ 19. On July 7, 2017, the Circuit Court judge signed an Order and a 4 Judgment document involuntarily dismissing the matter for lack of personal 5 jurisdiction, which was entered on July 11, 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. On July 12, 6 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court. Id. at ¶ 26. Defendant then filed 7 this Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 2017. ECF No. 6. 8 9 DISCUSSION Fed. R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss 10 the complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. 11 R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient 12 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requires the plaintiff to provide “more 15 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 16 550 U.S. at 555. When deciding, the Court may consider the plaintiff’s allegations 17 and any “materials incorporated into the complaint by reference.” Metzler Inv. 18 GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 19 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). A 20 plaintiff’s “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 3 1 most favorable to the plaintiff[,]” but “conclusory allegations of law and 2 unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 3 state a claim.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) 4 (citation and brackets omitted). 5 In addition, a motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of 6 limitations may be granted only “if the assertions of the complaint, read with the 7 required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was 8 tolled.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 9 1995) (quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)). 10 The Ninth Circuit has determined that a complaint cannot be dismissed “unless it 11 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 12 establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. at 1207 (citation omitted). 13 Here, Defendant alleges Plaintiff’s claim is time barred by the three-year 14 statute of limitations under 45 U.S.C. § 56. ECF No. 6 at 1. Plaintiff asserts that 15 the statute of limitations was tolled during the state court proceeding. ECF No. 1 16 at ¶ 7. This Court determines that Plaintiff could prove a set of facts to establish 17 that equitable tolling applies. See Supermail, 68 F.3d at 1206. 18 Reading the allegations in the complaint with the required liberality, the 19 Court cannot say that Plaintiff will be unable to establish that the matter was tolled 20 during the state court proceedings. The equitable tolling doctrine “enables courts ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 4 1 to meet new situations [that] demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the 2 relief necessary to correct… particular injustices.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 3 631, 650 (2010) (quotations and citation omitted). “Generally, a litigant seeking 4 equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has 5 been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances 6 stood in his way.” Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 556 U.S. 221, 227 7 (2012) (quotation and citation omitted). The first element requires the litigant to 8 show she undertook “the effort that a reasonable person might be expected to 9 deliver under his or her particular circumstances.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 10 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). This diligence does not require “an overzealous or extreme 11 pursuit of any and every avenue of relief.” Id. The second element requires the 12 litigant to show that “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 13 untimeliness … and … ma[de] it impossible to file [the document] on time.” 14 Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations 15 omitted). 16 Equitable tolling is appropriate when “plaintiff has not slept on his rights 17 but, rather, has been prevented from asserting them.” Burnett v. New York Cent. R. 18 Co., 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1985). Courts have “recognized the unfairness of barring 19 a plaintiff’s action solely because a prior timely action is dismissed for improper 20 venue after the applicable statute of limitations has run.” Id. at 430. When a ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 5 1 plaintiff files a timely FELA action in state court, serves the defendant with 2 process, and the case is then dismissed for improper venue, “the FELA limitation is 3 tolled during the pendency of the state suit.” Id. at 434–35. 4 Here, in light of the equitable tolling doctrine, the Court cannot say that 5 Plaintiff was not acting diligently in the pursuit of her claim. Before the three year 6 statute of limitations, Plaintiff filed in state court and upon the dismissal of the 7 state court claim, she immediately filed in federal court. Defendant argues that 8 Plaintiff was not prevented from filing her action in this court, but Plaintiff is not 9 required to pursue every avenue of relief to be considered diligent. ECF No. 6 at 10 6; see Doe, 661 F.3d at 1015. Secondly, her untimeliness was due to the state 11 court proceeding, which Burnett recognizes as a tolled time period. See Burnett, 12 380 U.S. at 434–35. It is possible that a set of facts could be proven to show that 13 Plaintiff was not sleeping on her rights, but was actively pursuing her claim in state 14 court. 15 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was merely seeking a jurisdiction with 16 preferable discovery rules and this forum shopping makes equitable tolling 17 inappropriate. ECF No. 6 at 6. Defendant cites Daimler AG v. Bauman to show 18 that Plaintiff knew the Oregon state court did not have jurisdiction, reflecting a 19 strategic decision and not a circumstance outside her control. ECF No. 6 at 6–7; 20 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). Yet, it is not clear that Daimler ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 6 1 concluded the issue of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Id. The 2 Court further clarified the precise issue of personal jurisdiction by state courts 3 under FELA in BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, where the Supreme Court held that 4 “FELA does not authorize state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 5 railroad solely on the ground that the railroad does some business in their States.” 6 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017). This case occurred two 7 years after Plaintiff filed her case in state court. Thus, Plaintiff may well be able to 8 prove that equitable tolling is appropriate given that the law may not have been 9 clear when she filed her case in 2015. 10 This Court finds that Plaintiff could prove a set of facts establishing that the 11 action was timely and the Court therefore denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 12 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is DENIED. 14 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish 15 16 copies to counsel. DATED September 27, 2017. 17 18 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 19 20 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 7
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