Maxfield v. Saul, No. 2:2020cv00103 - Document 17 (E.D. Wash. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING 15 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 16 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. File Closed. Signed by Judge Salvador Mendoza, Jr. (TR, Case Administrator)
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Maxfield v. Saul Doc. 17 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 1 Feb 09, 2021 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 3 5 6 7 PageID.1574 Page 1 of 15 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 2 4 filed 02/09/21 DAVID JOSEPH M., SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK No. 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ Plaintiff, v. 8 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 9 Defendant. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 11 Plaintiff David Joseph M. appeals the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) 12 denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental 13 Security Income (SSI). He alleges that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to identify that 14 he had severe mental impairments, (2) finding his substance abuse was a material 15 factor contributing to the disability, (3) failing to order a consultative psychological 16 examination, including cognitive testing, and (4) failing to assign his subjective 17 testimony about his functional limitations significant weight. ECF No. 15 at 10, 13. 18 The Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) disputes these contentions 19 and asks the Court to affirm the ALJ’s determination. ECF No. 16 at 14, 18. 20 Before the Court, without oral argument, are the parties’ cross-motions for ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1575 Page 2 of 15 1 summary judgment. ECF Nos. 15, 16. After reviewing the administrative record, 2 the parties’ briefs, and the relevant legal authority, the Court is fully informed. For 3 the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with the Commissioner and affirms. 4 PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 5 Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI benefits in April 2015 and filed another 6 claim for disability benefits in December 2017, alleging his disability began in 7 August 2011. AR 193–199, 200–207, 991 & 1149. The ALJ conducted a hearing, 8 finding Plaintiff not disabled and entered an unfavorable decision denying his 9 application for DIB and SSI benefits. AR 1083–103. Plaintiff appealed that 10 decision, but the Appeals Council found that the reasons submitted did not provide 11 a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision and denied his request for review. AR 1104– 12 10. Plaintiff thus sought relief and filed a complaint in this Court. AR 1111–13. On 13 review, this Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied 14 the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the 15 Commissioner for additional proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). AR 1118–46. 16 Pursuant to this Court’s remand order, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ 17 18 19 20 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcripts, the ALJ’s decisions, and the parties have also incorporated the relevant facts by reference in their respective cross-motions for summary judgment, see ECF No. 15 at 2 & ECF No. 16 at 4–5, and discussed any additional relevant facts in their briefing on those motions. See generally id. The Court thus provides only a short procedural summary here. 1 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 2 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1576 Page 3 of 15 1 to readdress step 2 of the sequential evaluation process and reevaluate whether 2 Plaintiff’s substance use is a material factor contributing to his disability. AR 991. 3 The ALJ thus conducted a second hearing, and Plaintiff appeared and testified. AR 4 1048–1082. Following the hearing, the ALJ again found Plaintiff not disabled 5 within the meaning of the Social Security Act due to his polysubstance use disorder 6 and entered an unfavorable decision denying his application for benefits. AR 988– 7 1011. 8 9 10 Plaintiff again sought review in this Court, leading to the instant crossmotions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 1, 15 & 16. DISABILITY DETERMINATION 11 A “disability” is defined, for the purposes of receiving SSI and DBI benefits, 12 as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 13 medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 14 result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 15 of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The 16 ALJ uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant 17 qualifies for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 18 At step one, the ALJ considers the claimant’s work activity, if any. 20 C.F.R. 19 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b), 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). If the claimant is doing any 20 substantial gainful activity, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled and deny ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 3 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1577 Page 4 of 15 1 their claim. Id. If the claimant is not doing any substantial gainful activity, the 2 evaluation proceeds to step two. 3 At step two, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant’s 4 impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). If they 5 do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that 6 meets the twelve month duration requirement in Section 404.1509, or a combination 7 of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, the ALJ will find 8 the claimant not disabled and deny their claim. Id. If the claimant does have a severe 9 physical or mental impairment, the evaluation proceeds to step three. 10 At step three, the ALJ also considers the medical severity of the claimant’s 11 impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If they 12 have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the Social Security 13 Administration’s listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration 14 requirement, the ALJ will find the claimant disabled. Id.; 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If 15 their impairment(s) does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the evaluation 16 proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity 17 18 and their past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), 19 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). If they can still do their past relevant work, the ALJ will find 20 the claimant not disabled and deny their claim. Id.; see also §§ 416.920(f), (h), ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 4 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ 1 ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1578 Page 5 of 15 416.960(b). If they cannot, the evaluation proceeds to step five. 2 At the fifth and final step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual 3 functional capacity and their age, education, and work experience to see if they can 4 adjust to other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (f), 416.920(a)(4)(v), (f). If 5 they can adjust to other work, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled and deny 6 their claim. Id. If they cannot, the ALJ will find the claimant disabled and grant 7 their claim. Id.; see also §§ 404.1520(g), (h), 404.1560(c). 8 In cases involving “drug addiction and alcoholism” (DAA), Social Security 9 Ruling (SSR) 13-2p, No. SSA-2012-0006, 2013 WL 621536 (Feb. 20, 2013), 10 provides guidance for evaluating whether a claimant’s substance use is material to 11 the disability determination. It instructs adjudicators to “apply the appropriate 12 sequential evaluation process twice. First, apply the sequential process to show how 13 the claimant is disabled. Then, apply the sequential evaluation process a sec FENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 7 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1581 Page 8 of 15 1 evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 2 (2019). The ALJ must base its determination on “more than a mere scintilla” of 3 evidence, id. at 1154, but need not support its decision by a preponderance of the 4 evidence. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. If the evidence supports more than one rational 5 interpretation, and the ALJ has supported its decision with inferences drawn 6 reasonably from the record, the Court must uphold its decision. Id.; Allen v. Heckler, 7 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the Court will not reverse an ALJ’s 8 decision if it committed harmless error. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. The burden to 9 show harmful error lies with the party challenging the ALJ’s determination. See 10 Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). ANALYSIS 11 13 Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Finding that Polysubstance Use Disorder Was Plaintiff’s Only Severe Impairment Within the Meaning of the Social Security Act 14 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by concluding he has no severe mental 15 impairments other than substance abuse. ECF No. 15 at 10–14. The Court disagrees. 16 “An individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this 17 subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing factor 18 material to the Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 19 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C), 1382c(a)(3)(J). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that 20 Congress aimed “‘to discourage alcohol and drug abuse, or at least not to encourage 12 A. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 8 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1582 Page 9 of 15 1 it with a permanent government subsidy.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747 (9th 2 Cir. 2007) (quoting Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Under 3 the implementing regulations, the ALJ must conduct a drug abuse and alcoholism 4 analysis (“DAA Analysis”) by determining which of the claimant’s disabling 5 limitations would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol.” Parra v. 6 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)); see also 7 SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536. 8 The key factor when evaluating whether DAA is material to the 9 determination of disability is whether the ALJ would still find the claimant disabled 10 if they stopped using drugs or alcohol. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1). In making this 11 determination, the ALJ evaluates which of the claimant’s current physical and 12 mental limitations would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol. Id. 13 § 404.1535(b)(2). The ALJ then determines whether any or all the claimant’s 14 remaining limitations would be disabling. Id. If the ALJ determines that the 15 claimant’s remaining limitations would not be disabling, they will find that the 16 claimant’s DAA material to the determination of disability. Id. § 404.1535(b)(3). If 17 the ALJ determines that the claimant’s remaining limitations are disabling, the 18 claimant is disabled independent of their DAA, and the ALJ will find their DAA 19 immaterial to the determination of disability. Id. § 404.1535(b)(4). “[T]he claimant 20 bears the burden of proving that drug or alcohol addiction is not a contributing factor ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 9 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ 1 ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1583 Page 10 of 15 material to his disability.” Parra, 481 F.3d at 748. 2 To begin with, the ALJ here “acknowledge[d] that the medical evidence the 3 claimant submitted includes diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, major 4 depressive disorder, unspecified mood disorder, unspecified anxiety disorder, post- 5 traumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, learning disorder, 6 anti-social personality disorder, panic disorder, and bipolar disorder by acceptable 7 medical sources.” AR 994. But the ALJ then emphasized the medical evidence also 8 documents a history of substance abuse. Id. For example, 14 Elizabeth Koenig, M.D., diagnosed the claimant with polysubstance use and dependence in addition to other mental impairments, and she stated that he “clearly has numerous challenges, not all of which can be explained by illicit drug use” (5F). John Arnold, Ph.D., also diagnosed the claimant with a severe opioid use disorder along with other mental impairments, and he opined that the substance use “probably had a significant impact on his mental health and ability to function” (9F). The psychological evaluators at the state agency level of disability determination likewise listed substance addiction disorders with other mental impairments as the claimant’s severe impairments. 15 AR 994–95. The ALJ concluded that while “[t]he evidence from Drs. Koenig, 16 Arnold, and the psychological evaluators at the state agency level suggest the 17 presence of a medically determinable impairment, . . . the statements of Glenn 18 Griffin, Ph.D., and Dana Harmon, Ph.D., indicate that the claimant’s substance use 19 precludes a finding that he has a medically determinable mental impairment at all.” 20 AR 995. 9 10 11 12 13 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 10 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1584 Page 11 of 15 1 “Dr. Harmon concluded in October 2015 that there was ‘no reliable evidence 2 of a mental disorder distinct from the impacts of [the claimant’s] chemical 3 dependency.’” Id. (record citation omitted). And Dr. Griffin testified at Plaintiff’s 4 “first hearing that the diagnoses from the acceptable medical sources listed above 5 could not be accurately made without excluding the effects of substance use. He 6 stated that the claimant’s ongoing substance use precluded exclusion of substance 7 use as the cause of symptoms, thereby rendering the diagnoses unsupportable.” Id. 8 At the second hearing on remand, the ALJ questioned Dr. Griffin again. Id. 9 “[Dr. Griffin] noted that the claimant continued to abuse substances, as his drug 10 screens from November 2018, June 2019, and September 2019, among others, were 11 positive for amphetamines and benzodiazepine.” AR 995. The ALJ thoroughly 12 analyzed Dr. Griffin’s reasoning about why Plaintiff’s substance abuse precluded 13 definitive diagnoses of the several documented mental disorders and asked him 14 pointed questions clarifying the apparent discrepancy between his medical opinion 15 and that of several other doctors. See id. Among other things, the ALJ thoroughly 16 addressed why the opinions of Drs. Griffin and Harmon deserve great weight and, 17 on the other hand, why the opinions of Drs. Koenig, Arnold, Arrienda, and Metoyer 18 deserve little weight. See generally AR 994–1003. The ALJ likewise notes and cites 19 medical evidence in the record establishing 20 [t]he claimant had positive drug screens in October, November, and ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 11 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ 1 2 3 4 ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1585 Page 12 of 15 December 2016 (9A/12). He also asserted at the most recent hearing in January 2020 that he had not used amphetamines or opiates since the February 2017 hearing, but his toxicology screens are positive for amphetamines and/or opiates each month from December 2017 through September 2018, January 2019 through March 2019, and May 2019 through July 2019 (34F/26-28, 30, 32, 33, 37-39, 41-45, 47). 5 AR 997–98. The ALJ thus determined Plaintiff’s “reports of sobriety are unreliable 6 unless confirmed by testing.” AR 998. He also concluded “that portions of SSR 13- 7 2p relating to evaluation of psychiatric disorders that co-occur with a substance use 8 disorder are inapplicable.” AR 996. The ALJ ultimately found Plaintiff’s “only 9 medically determinable impairment is his polysubstance use disorder.” AR 998. 10 “[W]hen DAA is the only impairment adjudicators can go directly to step 11 three and deny the claim because DAA is material.” SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, 12 at *5. This Court agrees with the ALJ that the record offers no evidence supporting 13 the notion that Plaintiff’s mental disabilities would remain if he stopped abusing 14 methamphetamine, opioids, and other drugs. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 15 404.1535(b); AR 994–1003. Moreover, this Court respects that “the ALJ is the final 16 arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.” Tommasetti 17 v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 18 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir.1995) (“The ALJ is responsible for determining 19 credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving 20 ambiguities.”)). ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 12 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1586 Page 13 of 15 1 In sum, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that his polysubstance 2 use disorder was not a contributing factor material to his mental health-related 3 disabilities. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 750. The ALJ applied the proper legal standards 4 and supported his decision with substantial evidence in the record. See Molina, 674 5 F.3d at 1110. He made reasonable inferences supported by the record and relied on 6 substantial evidence to support his conclusion on DAA materiality. Just because 7 “the ALJ could have come to a different conclusion,” does not mean the ALJ erred. 8 Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). For 9 these reasons, this Court finds no error and Plaintiff’s argument fails. 10 11 12 13 B. The ALJ Properly Denied Plaintiff’s Request for an Additional Consultative Exam Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred by failing to order an additional psychological evaluation. ECF No. 15 at 13. This Court disagrees. 14 “An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is 15 ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation 16 of the evidence.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mayes 17 v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 18 Plaintiff underwent three consultative psychological evaluations (performed 19 by Dr. Arnold, AR 436–41; Dr. Koenig, AR 351–61; and Dr. Metoyer, AR 1366– 20 70) before the ALJ found Plaintiff’s “only medically determinable impairment is ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 13 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1587 Page 14 of 15 1 his polysubstance use disorder.” AR 998. Moreover, Dr. Harmon reviewed the 2 medical records for the State, highlighting there was “no reliable evidence of mental 3 disorder distinct from the impacts of [Plaintiff’s] chemical dependency.” AR 982. 4 This Court finds the record was neither ambiguous nor inadequate for the 5 ALJ to properly evaluate of the evidence. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1156. Given that 6 the ALJ had years of Plaintiff’s mental health records and multiple opinions from 7 several doctors to inform his decision, he had no duty to develop the record further. 8 See id. 9 C. 10 Because the ALJ Properly Denied Plaintiff’s Claim Based on DAA Materiality, This Court Need Not Address Plaintiff’s Arguments Concerning Later Steps in the Sequential Analysis 11 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have afforded significant weight to his 12 subjective testimony when addressing his functional limitations. ECF No. 15 at 13. 13 But because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding (that Plaintiff’s only 14 medically determinable impairment is his polysubstance use disorder) at step two 15 of the sequential analysis, this Court need not proceed to address whether the ALJ 16 erred later in the sequential analysis. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th 17 Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If [the Commissioner] can find that 18 you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we make our determination or decision 19 and we do not go on to the next step.”)). 20 // ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 14 Case 2:20-cv-00103-SMJ ECF No. 17 filed 02/09/21 PageID.1588 Page 15 of 15 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 15, is DENIED. 3 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 3. The Clerk’s Office shall ENTER JUDGMENT for DEFENDANT and CLOSE the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office shall enter this Order and provide copies to all counsel. DATED this 9th day of February 2021. __________________________ SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR. United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 15
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