Dixon v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 2:2018cv00184 - Document 15 (E.D. Wash. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 13 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Robert H. Whaley. (PL, Case Administrator)
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Dixon v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 15 1 2 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 3 Sep 05, 2019 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 RYAN LEE D., 8 Plaintiff, No. 2:18-CV-00184-RHW v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 12, 13. Plaintiff brings this action seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision, which denied his application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381-1383F. See Administrative Record (AR) at 1, 15, 28. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the Court is now fully informed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for 2 Summary Judgment. 3 I. Jurisdiction 4 Plaintiff filed his application for Supplemental Security Income on March 5 31, 2015. See AR 15, 172-77. His alleged onset date of disability was his date of 6 birth—January 19, 1991.1 AR 172. Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on 7 July 6, 2015, see AR 99-102, and on reconsideration on October 29, 2015. See AR 8 109-113. Plaintiff then filed a request for a hearing on December 21, 2015. AR 9 114-16. 10 A hearing with Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Donna L. Walker 11 occurred on February 22, 2017. AR 34, 36. On April 27, 2017, the ALJ issued a 12 decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act and was 13 therefore ineligible for supplemental security income. AR 12-28. On April 11, 14 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, AR 1-6, thus 15 making the ALJ’s ruling the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 16 416.1481. On June 8, 2018, Plaintiff timely filed the present action challenging the 17 denial of benefits. ECF No. 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are properly before 18 this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 19 1 20 However, for claims under Title XVI, the application filing date (or protective filing date) is the earliest possible alleged onset date, which in this case was March 31, 2015. See DI 25501.370(A)(1). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 2 3 II. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 4 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 5 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 6 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 7 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant shall be determined to be 8 under a disability only if the claimant’s impairments are so severe that the claimant 9 is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering 10 claimant’s age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial 11 gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 12 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 13 for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 14 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 15 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). 16 Step one inquires whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial 17 gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Substantial gainful 18 activity is defined as significant physical or mental activities done or usually done 19 for profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. If the claimant is engaged in substantial 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 activity, he or she is not entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 2 416.920(b). If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two. 3 Step two asks whether the claimant has a severe impairment, or combination 4 of impairments, that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to 5 do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A severe 6 impairment is one that has lasted or is expected to last for at least twelve months, 7 and must be proven by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508-09, 8 416.908-09. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, or combination of 9 impairments, the disability claim is denied and no further evaluative steps are 10 required. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to the third step. 11 Step three involves a determination of whether one of the claimant’s severe 12 impairments “meets or equals” one of the listed impairments acknowledged by the 13 Commissioner to be sufficiently severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 14 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 & 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926; 15 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P. App. 1 (“the Listings”). If the impairment meets or 16 equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is per se disabled and qualifies 17 for benefits. Id. If the claimant is not per se disabled, the evaluation proceeds to the 18 fourth step. 19 20 Step four examines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity enables the claimant to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, the claimant is 2 not entitled to disability benefits and the inquiry ends. Id. 3 Step five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is 4 able to perform other work in the national economy, taking into account the 5 claimant’s age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 6 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c) & 416.912(f), 416.920(g), 416.960(c). To meet this 7 burden, the Commissioner must establish that (1) the claimant is capable of 8 performing other work; and (2) such work exists in “significant numbers in the 9 national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 10 11 12 676 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012). III. Standard of Review A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner is governed 13 by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under 14 these sections is limited, and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only 15 if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. 16 Astrue, 698 F.3d 1144, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing § 405(g)). In reviewing a 17 denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 18 ALJ. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). When the ALJ 19 presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the evidence, it is not the 20 role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 Cir. 2001). Even if the evidence in the record is susceptible to more than one 2 rational interpretation, if inferences reasonably drawn from the record support the 3 ALJ’s decision, then the court must uphold that decision. Molina v. Astrue, 674 4 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 5 954-59 (9th Cir. 2002). 6 7 IV. Statement of Facts The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 8 and only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was 24 years old when he filed his 9 application for benefits, which the regulations define as a younger person. AR 27, 10 72; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.963. He graduated from high school and can communicate 11 in English. AR 27, 53, 189, 191. He has no past relevant work. AR 27. 12 13 V. The ALJ’s Findings The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 14 meaning of the Act at any time from March 31, 2015 (the date Plaintiff filed his 15 application for benefits) through April 27, 2017 (the date the ALJ issued her 16 decision). AR 16, 28. 17 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 18 gainful activity since the date he filed his application for benefits (citing 20 C.F.R. 19 § 416.971 et seq.). AR 17. 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 2 infantile cerebral palsy, syncope secondary to orthostatic hypotension, headaches, 3 other unspecified cardiac dysrhythmias, borderline intellectual functioning, 4 and math and reading disorder (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)). AR 17. 5 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 6 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of 7 the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (citing 20 C.F.R. 8 §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926). AR 17-19. 9 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional 10 capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c), including 11 the abilities to lift and carry up to 50 pounds occasionally (up to 1/3 of the 12 workday) and 25 pounds frequently (up to 2/3 of the workday). AR 20. The ALJ 13 also found that Plaintiff could see, hear, communicate, sit for up to six hours, stand 14 and walk for up to six hours, push, pull, balance, climb ramps and stairs, bend at 15 the waist, kneel, bend at the knees, and crawl. AR 20. With respect to the use of his 16 hands, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the unlimited ability to handle (gross 17 manipulation), finger (fine manipulation), feel (use of skin receptors), and reach in 18 all directions including overhead. AR 20. The ALJ limited his ability to reach with 19 his left upper and lower extremities to only occasionally. AR 20. However, the 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 ALJ found that Plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, or be exposed 2 to unprotected heights. AR 20. 3 With respect to environmental limitations, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 4 the unlimited ability to be exposed to extreme cold, extreme heat, wetness, 5 humidity, noise, odors, dust, gases, poor ventilation, and fumes, but that he should 6 avoid exposure to vibrations and hazards, such as machinery. AR 20. 7 With respect to Plaintiff’s mental abilities, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was 8 able to understand, remember, and apply information, and also able to interact with 9 other people such as coworkers, supervisors, and the public. AR 20. He could 10 concentrate, persist and maintain pace, adapt and manage, focus his attention and 11 stay on task at a sustained rate, sustain an orderly routine, regularly attend work, 12 and work a full day without needing more than the allotted number of rest periods. 13 AR 20. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff worked best in a stable, low- 14 pressure work setting with clear expectations of the work to be performed, and that 15 he learned best when tasks were either taught orally or by demonstration. AR 20. 16 Because Plaintiff did not have any past relevant work, transferability of job skills 17 was not an issue. AR 27. 18 At step five, the ALJ found that in light of Plaintiff’s age, education, work 19 experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in 20 significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. AR 27. These ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 included a grocery bagger, a car washer, and an advertising material distributor. 2 AR 27. 3 VI. 4 Issues for Review Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not free of legal error 5 and not supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 12 at 19. Specifically, he 6 argues the ALJ: (1) improperly discredited his subjective pain complaint 7 testimony; (2) improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence; and (3) did not 8 include all his mental limitations in the hypothetical to the vocational expert. Id. at 9 13-17. 10 11 12 VII. Discussion A. The ALJ did not Improperly Reject Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by discounting the credibility of his testimony 13 regarding his subjective symptoms. ECF No. 12 at 14-16. Specifically, he argues 14 that the ALJ erred by doing so in part on the basis that he was able to hunt, fish, 15 cook, mow the lawn, wash dishes, do the laundry, and go to the store. Id. at 15. He 16 also argues that his fainting symptoms and cognitive deficits prevented him from 17 gainful employment. Id. at 15-16. 18 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 19 testimony regarding subjective symptoms is credible. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 20 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). First, the claimant must produce objective ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 medical evidence of an underlying impairment or impairments that could 2 reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged. Id. 3 Second, if the claimant meets this threshold, and there is no affirmative evidence 4 suggesting malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 5 severity of his symptoms only by offering “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” 6 for doing so. Id. 7 In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider many factors, 8 including, “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s 9 reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 10 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 11 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 12 treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 13 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). 14 Here, Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work due to his episodes of 15 orthostatic hypotension, which caused him to intermittently faint. AR 54. He 16 testified that this began when he was 22 years old. AR 57-58. He testified that the 17 frequency of these episodes varied—sometimes he would only faint once per 18 month, but other times he would faint twice per week—but that it occurred more 19 often with exertion. AR 55. Plaintiff acknowledged that his doctor prescribed him 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 medication for this condition, but stated that it made him sweat, “feel cruddy,” and 2 vomit. AR 54. After two weeks, he stopped taking it. AR 54. 3 The medical expert at the hearing—Gerald Seligman, M.D.—testified that 4 orthostatic hypotension is common in young adults, is preventable, and is not work 5 preclusive. AR 42-43. Dr. Seligman testified that Plaintiff could prevent these 6 episodes by taking his prescription medication, increasing his fluid intake, and 7 wearing compression stockings. AR 42. He noted Plaintiff’s non-compliance with 8 his medication. AR 42. However, Dr. Seligman opined that even without taking the 9 medication, Plaintiff could still prevent these episodes by just increasing his fluid 10 11 intake and wearing compression stockings. AR 43. The ALJ found that the medically determinable impairments could 12 reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms Plaintiff alleged. 13 AR 21. However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the 14 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely 15 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. AR 21. 16 The ALJ offered multiple clear and convincing reasons for discrediting 17 Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony. See AR 21-26. First, the ALJ 18 discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because they were belied by his daily 19 activities. AR 21. The ALJ noted an occasion in which Plaintiff went to the 20 emergency room for an ankle sprain because he had been running and stepped in a ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 hole. AR 21; see AR 651-52. The ALJ noted another occasion in which Plaintiff 2 went to the emergency room for a concussion because he had been “bucked off a 3 horse.” AR 21; see AR 537-38. While in the emergency room, Plaintiff indicated 4 that he regularly rode untrained, bucking horses. AR 537, 539; see also AR 598. 5 He also indicated that he rode bulls. See AR 578. He told another provider he 6 participated in rodeo team roping. AR 524. On another occasion, Plaintiff went to 7 the emergency room for shoulder pain because he had been “moving a bunch of 8 railroad ties earlier” and “also lifting a TV at home.” AR 560. On another 9 occasion, Plaintiff went to the emergency room for throat discomfort after he had 10 been bucking bales of hay. AR 567. The record contains other instances of Plaintiff 11 bucking bales of hay. See AR 543. On another occasion, Plaintiff went to the 12 emergency room after he had been shoveling snow off a mobile home roof. AR 13 659. On another occasion, Plaintiff went to the emergency room for chest pain and 14 told his doctor that he had been hunting recently but was able to tolerate exertion. 15 AR 667. Finally, Plaintiff’s mother submitted a report in which she indicated that 16 Plaintiff could hunt, fish, cook, mow the lawn, wash dishes, do laundry, and go to 17 the store. AR 198-200. Activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms are 18 proper grounds for questioning the credibility of subjective complaints. Molina, 19 674 F.3d at 1113; see also Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857; 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i). 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting his credibility based on his 2 ability to hunt and do household chores. ECF No. 12 at 15. Plaintiff cites several 3 Ninth Circuit cases holding that a claimant’s ability to perform some daily 4 activities, such as grocery shopping, cooking, watching television, driving, etc., 5 does not necessarily detract from his or her credibility. Id. (citing Vertigan v. 6 Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2001); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 7 722-24 (9th Cir. 1998); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). Even 8 assuming it is error to discount symptom testimony based on the claimant’s ability 9 to perform household tasks (which, in many situations, it is not),2 Plaintiff fails to 10 explain how the ALJ erred in discounting his symptom testimony based on his 11 ability to hunt, fish, run, ride bucking horses, ride bulls, team rope in the rodeo, 12 move numerous railroad ties, lift a television, buck bales of hay, and shovel snow 13 off a roof. Because this level of activity was inconsistent with the limitations 14 Plaintiff claimed to have, see AR 55, this was a proper basis for discounting his 15 credibility. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014); accord 16 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 18 The ALJ also gave another clear and convincing reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony—his complaints were inconsistent with 19 2 20 It is only error, for instance, to discount a claimant’s symptom testimony when the activities do not consume a substantial part of the claimant’s day or are not transferable to a work setting. See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049-50; Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 the medical evidence. See AR 21, 23. The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff had 2 orthostatic hypotension and cognitive deficits, which imposed some limitations. 3 AR 21. With respect to Plaintiff’s physical impairments, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s 4 mild examination findings and generally normal medical tests, including normal 5 blood tests, electrocardiograms, computerized tomography (CT) scans, cervical x- 6 rays, cerebral angiograms, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies. AR 21- 7 22; see AR 398-400, 418, 537, 542, 578-80, 589-91, 661, 670. Plaintiff also told a 8 provider that he had not experienced any fainting episodes for six months. AR 524. 9 Finally, the ALJ noted Dr. Seligman’s testimony that Plaintiff’s fainting symptoms 10 could be controlled with treatment compliance—working with his doctor to titrate 11 medications, actually taking the medications, wearing compression socks, eating 12 and hydrating properly, and living a healthy lifestyle. AR 24-25. 13 With respect to Plaintiff’s cognitive deficits, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was 14 able to graduate high school and tested within average ranges in several areas, 15 including communication, daily living skills, socialization, and reading vocabulary. 16 AR 23; see AR 360, 365-67. The ALJ also discussed two psychological 17 examinations. AR 23-24. The first was done by Renee Thompson, Psy.D., who 18 acknowledged Plaintiff’s cognitive deficits but nevertheless opined that he was 19 “capable of understanding, remembering and carrying out simple work-related 20 instructions,” although she also believed he could need “additional support to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 understand and complete tasks.”3 AR 461. The second was done by John Arnold, 2 Ph.D., who opined that Plaintiff had a “fair” psychological prognosis. AR 528. Dr. 3 Arnold opined that Plaintiff could graduate from a vocational program with some 4 accommodations and he did not limit Plaintiff’s employment ambitions from a 5 psychological standpoint. AR 528-29. An ALJ may discount a claimant’s 6 subjective symptom testimony when it is inconsistent with the medical evidence. 7 Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008); 8 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in discounting his claim that he could not 10 work due to his fainting symptoms. ECF No. 12 at 15. However, as discussed 11 above, these were not work preclusive and could be effectively controlled with 12 treatment. See infra at 11, 14. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in 13 discounting his claim that he could not work due to his cognitive deficits, pointing 14 to his “school records and the findings of the psychologists, Renee Thompson, 15 PhD [sic] and John Arnold, PhD.” ECF No. 12 at 15-16. However, as also 16 discussed above, none of these sources precluded Plaintiff from working. See infra 17 at 14-15. 18 19 3 20 Dr. Thompson actually conducted two psychological examinations. See AR 392-97, 455-61. In the first, which she performed two years prior, she opined that Plaintiff was “capable of and would benefit from gainful employment.” AR 396. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by 2 substantial evidence, it is not the Court’s role to second-guess it. For the reasons 3 discussed above, the ALJ did not err when discounting Plaintiff’s subjective 4 complaint testimony because the ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing 5 reasons for doing so. 6 /// 7 B. 8 9 The ALJ did not Err in Weighing the Medical Opinion Evidence Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating and weighing the medical opinion evidence. ECF No. 12 at 16-17. Specifically, he argues that the ALJ gave 10 too much weight to the non-examining doctors’ opinions, that the ALJ failed to 11 satisfy the “specific and legitimate” standard, and that several treating and 12 examining doctors’ opinions were uncontradicted. Id. 13 Title XVI’s implementing regulations distinguish among the opinions of 14 three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 15 those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) 16 those who neither examine nor treat the claimant but who review the claimant’s 17 file (non-examining physicians). Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 18 (9th Cir. 2001); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1)-(2). Generally, a treating 19 physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s, and an 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a non-examining 2 physician’s. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202. 3 If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another 4 doctor’s opinion—as is the case here—an ALJ may only reject it by providing 5 “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. An 6 ALJ satisfies the “specific and legitimate” standard by “setting out a detailed and 7 thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his [or her] 8 interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. In 9 contrast, an ALJ fails to satisfy the standard when he or she “rejects a medical 10 opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, 11 asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or 12 criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his 13 [or her] conclusion.” Id. at 1012-13. 14 Plaintiff baldly asserts that adherence to the “specific and legitimate” 15 standard “was not done” here. ECF No. 12 at 17. However, the ALJ, over seven 16 single-spaced pages, summarized Plaintiff’s voluminous treatment records and the 17 findings and opinions of his many medical providers. See AR 20-26. The ALJ 18 explained which medical opinions she found persuasive, which ones she did not, 19 and why she found each one either persuasive or unpersuasive. See AR 24-26. 20 Contrary to Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion, the ALJ set out a detailed and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17 1 thorough summary of the facts and conflicting evidence, stated her interpretation 2 thereof, and made findings. The ALJ therefore satisfied the “specific and 3 legitimate” standard. 4 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ gave too much weight to the non- 5 examining physicians’ opinions, particularly the two that testified at the hearing. 6 ECF No. 12 at 16. However, ALJs are required to consider—and also entitled to 7 rely on—non-examining physicians’ opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1). 8 The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of the two doctors who testified at the 9 hearing because their opinions were the most consistent with the totality of the 10 11 medical evidence and Plaintiff’s test results. AR 24-25. Plaintiff also makes much of the fact that “there was an abnormal tilt test,” 12 which is used to evaluate the cause of unexplained fainting. ECF No. 12 at 17; AR 13 512. Plaintiff emphasizes the tilt test result “is objective and is not contradicted.” 14 ECF No. 12 at 17. Plaintiff also emphasizes that the diagnosis “of orthostatic 15 hypertension [sic] is not rebutted in this case.”4 Id. Plaintiff is correct that he 16 indisputably has orthostatic hypotension, which the ALJ found to be one of his 17 severe impairments. See AR 17, 21-25. However, as the ALJ explained and as is 18 discussed above, Plaintiff’s fainting symptoms were not work preclusive and could 19 20 4 Plaintiff cites the medical records from Gerhard Muelheims, M.D. and Romeo Pavlic, M.D., who conducted the testing, diagnosed Plaintiff, and prescribed him medication. AR 22-23, 477-79, 481-503. Neither of these physicians provided any opinions regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations. Id. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 18 1 be effectively controlled with treatment, which Plaintiff did not comply with. See 2 infra at 11, 14. 3 Plaintiff finally argues that “the opinions expressed by Renee Thompson, 4 PhD [sic] and John Arnold, PhD are also uncontradicted.” ECF No. 12 at 17. 5 However, as also discussed above, neither of these psychologists opined that 6 Plaintiff was incapable of working. See infra at 14-15. For these reasons, the ALJ 7 did not error in evaluating and weighing the medical opinion evidence. 8 C. The ALJ did not Err in Framing the Hypothetical Question for the Vocational Expert 9 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in framing the hypothetical question 10 for the vocational expert because the question did not include all of Plaintiff’s 11 limitations. ECF No. 12 at 17. However, the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the 12 vocational expert was consistent with the ALJ’s findings relating to Plaintiff’s 13 residual functional capacity. Compare AR 20 with AR 65-66, 68. The ALJ 14 included all of Plaintiff’s limitations, and the only omitted limitations were those 15 that the ALJ found did not exist. Plaintiff’s argument here essentially just restates 16 his prior arguments that the residual functional capacity did not account for all his 17 limitations. Courts routinely reject this argument. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 18 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008); Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 19 VIII. Order 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 19 1 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 2 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. 3 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 4 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is DENIED. 5 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, is 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 GRANTED. 3. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and the file shall be CLOSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, forward copies to counsel, and close the file. DATED this 5th day of September, 2019. s/Robert H. Whaley ROBERT H. WHALEY Senior United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 20
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