Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 2:2018cv00017 - Document 20 (E.D. Wash. 2019)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ECF No. 18 ; denying ECF No. 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. FILE CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John T. Rodgers. (TR, Case Administrator)

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Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 20 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 1 Jan 23, 2019 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 DONNA F., No. 2:18-CV-0017-JTR Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF 15 No. 14, 18. Attorney Christopher H. Dellert represents Donna F. (Plaintiff); 16 Special Assistant United States Attorney Benjamin J. Groebner represents the 17 Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant). The parties have consented to 18 proceed before a magistrate judge. ECF No. 6. After reviewing the administrative 19 record and briefs filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for 20 Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 21 JURISDICTION 22 On January 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance 23 benefits, alleging disability since April 25, 2013, due to blindness in right eye, 24 anxiety, arthritis, pain in legs, pain in lower back, and insomnia. Tr. 216, 232. 25 Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. 26 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) R. J. Payne held a hearing on August 18, 27 2016, Tr. 59-116, and issued an unfavorable decision on October 7, 2016, Tr. 27- 28 37. The Appeals Council denied review on November 15, 2017. Tr. 1-6. The ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 ALJ’s October 2016 decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner, 2 which is appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff 3 filed this action for judicial review on January 16, 2018. ECF No. 1, 4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcript, the 5 6 ALJ’s decision, and the briefs of the parties. They are only briefly summarized 7 here. Plaintiff was born on January 31, 1958, and was 55 years old on the alleged 8 9 onset date, April 25, 2013. Tr. 216. She completed high school and two years of 10 college and has past relevant work as a book keeper and sales associate. Tr. 233- 11 234. 12 Plaintiff’s disability report indicates she stopped working on April 25, 2013, 13 because of her conditions. Tr. 233. Plaintiff testified at the August 18, 2016, 14 administrative hearing that she believed she could work the right type of job, a job 15 that was slow-paced. Tr. 103. However, she clarified she did not believe she 16 could work 40 hours a week, lift a 10-pound item a third of a day, or sit for six 17 hours a day. Tr. 103-104. She indicated it would take a special job, one well 18 designed for what she would be able to do. Tr. 105. 19 Plaintiff testified she is blind in her right eye and has vision issues with her 20 left eye as well. Tr. 75-78. Her vision issues were caused by diabetes, which were 21 fairly controlled at the time of the administrative hearing. Tr. 96. Because of her 22 vision problems, she experiences headaches and has difficulty with depth 23 perception. Tr. 78-80. She indicated she is able to read, but could not read for a 24 long period of time (no longer than 20 to 30 minutes a day). Tr. 80-81. She has 25 alleviated her vision difficulty by using magnifying glasses, placing Braille 26 identifiers on appliances, and having larger font on her phone. Tr. 81-82. Plaintiff 27 stated she has a driver’s license and drives, but indicated she no longer drives at 28 night. Tr. 84, 106-107. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 2 1 Plaintiff testified she also has arthritis in her lower back and pain that 2 radiates from her hip to the top of her calf. Tr. 89. She is not able to stand for 3 longer than 30 minutes at a time, can walk one block with the assistance of a 4 walking stick, and is able to sit for up to two hours. Tr. 90-91. She takes pain 5 medication for her constant pain. Tr. 93. 6 Plaintiff additionally stated she has neuropathy in her feet. Tr. 98. The 7 neuropathy was described as a feeling of numbness, burning and tingling in both 8 feet. Tr. 98. STANDARD OF REVIEW 9 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 10 11 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 12 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 13 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 14 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 15 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 16 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 17 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 18 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 19 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 20 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 21 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 22 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 23 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the 24 administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either 25 disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. 26 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision 27 supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards 28 /// ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 3 1 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 2 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 4 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 5 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a); see Bowen 6 v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 (1987). In steps one through four, the burden of 7 proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to 8 disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-1099. This burden is met once a 9 claimant establishes that physical or mental impairments prevent him from 10 engaging in his previous occupation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant 11 cannot do his past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden 12 shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other jobs 13 present in significant numbers in the national economy. Batson v. Commissioner 14 of Social Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193-1194 (2004). If a claimant cannot 15 make an adjustment to other work in the national economy, a finding of “disabled” 16 is made. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). 17 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 18 On October 7, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 19 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 20 21 activity since the alleged onset date, April 25, 2013. Tr. 29. 22 At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe 23 impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, diabetes mellitus with history of 24 diabetic retinopathy, right eye blindness, and obesity. Tr. 29. 25 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 26 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 27 the listed impairments. Tr. 32. 28 /// ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 4 1 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and 2 determined she could perform light exertion level work with the following 3 limitations: she can lift/carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 4 frequently; she has no limitations on sitting; she can stand and walk six hours total, 5 in any combination, in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks; she is limited to 6 occasional stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, balancing, and climbing of 7 ramps and stairs; she is not able to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; she must 8 avoid concentrated exposure to heavy industrial-type vibration; she must avoid all 9 exposure to commercial driving, unprotected heights and hazardous machinery; 10 she is not able to perform jobs requiring good depth perception or good bilateral 11 peripheral vision; and she is not able to perform fine detailed work. Tr. 32. 12 At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform her past relevant 13 work as a sales clerk and bookkeeper as actually performed and as generally 14 performed in the national economy. Tr. 36. 15 Alternatively, at step five, the ALJ determined that based on the testimony 16 of the vocational expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 17 experience and RFC, Plaintiff could perform other jobs present in significant 18 numbers in the national economy, including the jobs of file clerk, data entry clerk 19 and receptionist. Tr. 36-37. 20 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 21 meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from April 25, 2013, the alleged 22 onset date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision, October 7, 2016. Tr. 37. 23 24 ISSUES The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 25 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 26 standards. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in this case by (1) improperly weighing 27 the medical opinion evidence; and (2) failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s 28 subjective allegations. ECF No. 14 at 2. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 5 DISCUSSION1 1 2 3 4 5 A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for giving little credence to Plaintiff’s allegations. ECF No. 14 at 8-13. It is the province of the ALJ to make credibility determinations. Andrews, 6 53 F.3d at 1039. However, the ALJ’s findings must be supported by specific 7 cogent reasons. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Absent 8 affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s 9 testimony must be “specific, clear and convincing.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; 10 Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. “General findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must 11 identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 12 claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918. 13 In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 14 could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, Plaintiff’s 15 statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those 16 symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence of 17 record. Tr. 33. 18 The ALJ first indicated the objective medical evidence of record did not 19 fully support the level of limitation Plaintiff claimed in this case. Tr. 33. The ALJ 20 specifically held that that while Plaintiff has right eye blindness, diabetes mellitus, 21 22 1 In Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S.Ct. 2044 (June 21, 2018), the Supreme Court held 23 that ALJs of the Securities and Exchange Commission are “Officers of the United 24 States” and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. To the extent Lucia applies 25 to Social Security ALJs, the parties have forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in 26 their briefing. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 27 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (the Court will not consider matters on appeal that were not 28 specifically addressed in an appellant’s opening brief). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 6 1 lumbar degenerative disc disease and obesity, the record did not support a finding 2 that these impairments prohibited Plaintiff from performing all work. Tr. 33. A 3 lack of supporting objective medical evidence is a factor which may be considered 4 in evaluating an individual’s credibility, provided it is not the sole factor. Bunnell 5 v. Sullivan, 347 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (Once a claimant produces objective 6 medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject the 7 claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical 8 evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.); see also Robbins v. Soc. 9 Sec. Admin., 466 F3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (An ALJ may not make a negative 10 credibility finding “solely because” the claimant’s symptom testimony “is not 11 substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence.”). 12 As stated by the ALJ, no acceptable medical source of record has reported 13 any disabling limitations caused by Plaintiff’s physical impairments, nor has any 14 acceptable medical source stated that Plaintiff cannot work at the sedentary or light 15 exertional level. Tr. 34. With regard to Plaintiff’s lumbar degenerative disc 16 disease, there is no evidence of nerve root compression in the record, an 17 examination with Arild Lein, M.D., revealed no neurologic deficits and intact 18 motor function in the upper and lower extremities, Tr. 382-391 (Dr. Lein found 19 Plaintiff capable of performing light level work, with some postural limitations), 20 Plaintiff has presented with a normal gait and station and a musculoskeletal exam 21 showed no obvious deformities, Tr. 397, 610, 616, 694, and Plaintiff had negative 22 straight leg raises and only slightly diminished deep tendon reflexes on the left leg 23 in February 2015, Tr. 621. The ALJ further noted there is no evidence Plaintiff’s 24 obesity has had a significant or quantifiable impact on pulmonary, 25 musculoskeletal, endocrine, or cardiac functioning, and Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus 26 has generally been controlled with medication, Tr. 96, 320, 469, 523, 621. Tr. 33. 27 Although the ALJ found Plaintiff has right eye blindness, the record reflects 28 her left eye vision is 20/30 to 20/40 and her vision in both eyes is 20/40, Tr. 34, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 7 1 338, 401, Plaintiff indicated she watched television up to 12 hours a day and was 2 able to drive, Tr. 106-107, 383, 394, and Plaintiff was able to read a paragraph 3 from a magazine during a psychiatric consultative examination, Tr. 394. 4 Moreover, medical sources have opined that, despite visual difficulties, Plaintiff 5 would be able to perform work as long as it did not require depth perception or 6 good bilateral peripheral vision. Tr. 34, 70, 546. A review of the record 7 demonstrates Plaintiff had greater visual abilities than she alleged in this case. 8 9 10 11 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in determining the medical evidence is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling limitations. The ALJ also indicated Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were inconsistent 12 with her assertions of totally disabling symptoms. Tr. 34. It is well-established 13 that the nature of daily activities may be considered when evaluating credibility. 14 Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). While one does not need to be 15 “utterly incapacitated” to be disabled, id., it was proper for the ALJ to find 16 Plaintiff’s reports of activities such as doing yard work and laundry (consistent 17 with light level work), Tr. 251, 265, 415, cooking, cleaning and shopping, Tr. 394, 18 watching television up to 12 hours a day and driving a car, Tr. 106-107, 383, 394, 19 and being able to read a paragraph from a magazine during a psychiatric 20 consultative examination, Tr. 394, were inconsistent with the debilitating 21 limitations she alleged and thus detracted from her overall credibility. Tr. 34. See 22 Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the ALJ’s 23 adverse credibility determination and noting the claimant’s assertion of disability 24 was undermined by testimony about her daily activities, such as “attending to the 25 needs of her two young children,” cooking, and shopping); see also Molina v. 26 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even where [a claimant’s daily] 27 activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting 28 the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 8 1 debilitating impairment.”). The Court also finds it significant that Plaintiff testified 2 at the administrative hearing that she believed she would be able to work the right 3 type of job, one designed for her capabilities (i.e. not fast-paced). Tr. 103-105. 4 Her ability to perform the above activities is inconsistent with her claim of totally 5 disabling symptoms. 6 The ALJ also noted that some of Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent 7 with the evidence of record. Tr. 33-34. Inconsistencies in a disability claimant’s 8 testimony support a decision by the ALJ that a claimant lacks credibility with 9 respect to her claim of disabling pain. Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th 10 Cir. 1986); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (an ALJ may 11 engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering 12 claimant’s reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies in a claimant’s 13 testimony). When a claimant fails to be a reliable historian, “this lack of candor 14 carries over” to other portions of his or her testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 15 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Plaintiff alleged serious vision problems, even reporting the need for Braille 17 descriptions on her appliances. Tr. 81-82, 274. However, as indicated by the ALJ, 18 Plaintiff’s acknowledged ability to drive a car demonstrated she possessed a 19 considerable amount of depth perception, peripheral vision and general visual 20 ability. Tr. 34. Moreover, her ability to watch several hours of television each day 21 and read a paragraph from a magazine during a psychiatric consultative 22 examination also demonstrated greater visual abilities than alleged. The visual 23 facilities exhibited by Plaintiff’s continued ability to drive, watch television and 24 read conflict with her allegations of disabling vision loss. 25 The ALJ is responsible for reviewing the evidence and resolving conflicts or 26 ambiguities in testimony. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 27 1989). It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 28 evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971). The Court has a ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 9 1 limited role in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 2 evidence and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it 3 might justifiably have reached a different result upon de novo review. 42 U.S.C. § 4 405(g). After reviewing the record, the Court finds that the ALJ provided clear 5 and convincing reasons, which are fully supported by the record, for discounting 6 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by finding 7 Plaintiff’s symptom allegations were not entirely credible in this case. 8 B. 9 10 11 Medical Opinion Evidence Plaintiff asserts the ALJ also erred by discounting the treating opinion of Christopher Yang, M.D., in this case. ECF No. 14 at 5-8. Dr. Yang completed a medical source statement form on July 21, 2016. Tr. 12 623-626. Although Dr. Yang opined that Plaintiff’s visual impairment did not 13 meet the criteria of Listings 2.02, 2.03, 2.04, or 2.05, he found Plaintiff had 14 “severe” limitations on her ability to read, write, see detail, and perform assembly 15 or other work requiring eye-hand coordination. Id. 16 The ALJ assigned “little weight” to the portion of the medical source 17 statement of Dr. Yang that opined Plaintiff would have “severe” limitations on her 18 ability to read, write, see detail, and perform assembly or other work requiring eye- 19 hand coordination. Tr. 35. 20 If the opinion of a treating or examining physician is not contradicted, it can 21 only be rejected with clear and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 22 830 (9th Cir. 1995). If contradicted, the opinion can only be rejected for “specific” 23 and “legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 24 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Historically, the courts 25 have recognized conflicting medical evidence, the absence of regular medical 26 treatment during the alleged period of disability, and the lack of medical support 27 for doctors’ reports based substantially on a claimant’s subjective complaints of 28 pain as specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding a treating or examining ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 10 1 physician’s opinion. Flaten v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 2 1453, 1463-1464 (9th Cir. 1995); Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. 3 Here, the “severe” vision limitations opined by Dr. Yang were contradicted 4 by other medical sources and evidence, including the medical expert, Minh D. Vu, 5 M.D., Tr. 62-75,2 state agency reviewing physicians, Tr. 139-143, and examining 6 physician Lein, Tr. 382-391,3 reports that her left eye vision is 20/30 to 20/40 and 7 her vision in both eyes is 20/40, Tr. 34, 338, 401, and Plaintiff’s activities of 8 watching television up to 12 hours a day and driving, Tr. 106-107, 383, 394. 9 Therefore, the ALJ needed to only provide specific and legitimate reasons for 10 rejecting Dr. Yang’s opinions. 11 The ALJ first noted Dr. Yang’s opinion that Plaintiff would have “severe” 12 visual limitations, Tr. 625, was vague. The undersigned agrees. It is undisputed 13 that Plaintiff has a severe vision impairment; namely, right eye blindness, Tr. 29. 14 However, the form Dr. Yang filled out does not specifically define “severe” or 15 provide greater or lesser limitation options with respect to the assessed limitations. 16 /// 17 2 18 19 20 21 22 23 hearing, Tr. 62-75, and was accorded great weight by the ALJ, Tr. 34. Dr. Vu specifically stated that Plaintiff’s right eye blindness did not meet or equal a listings impairment because Plaintiff’s remaining vision in her left eye was 20/30 to 20/40. Tr. 64, 68. Dr. Vu restricted Plaintiff from working jobs requiring good depth perception, good bilateral peripheral vision, and fine detailed work. Tr. 70. 3 24 25 26 27 28 Dr. Vu testified as a medical expert at the August 18, 2016 administrative The ALJ accorded “significant weight” to the March 17, 2014, opinions of medical examiner Dr. Lein. Tr. 35, 382-391. Dr. Lein opined that Plaintiff would be limited to light exertion level work with some postural and manipulative limitations. Tr. 390. Dr. Lein also noted Plaintiff’s poor depth perception. Tr. 30, 390. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 11 1 Moreover, the form does not provide an explanation for the “severe” findings or 2 describe how Plaintiff’s abilities to perform the particular tasks were restricted. 3 The ALJ next noted that the opinion was on a check-box form with no 4 explanation to support the expressed limitation. Tr. 35. An ALJ’s rejection of a 5 check-box report that does not contain an explanation of the bases for the 6 conclusions made is permissible. Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 7 1996). As discussed above, Dr. Yang’s medical source statement provides no 8 explanation to support the “severe” limitations assessed on the form. Finally, the ALJ determined that Dr. Yang’s opinion was inconsistent with 9 10 other evidence. Tr. 35. As indicated throughout the ALJ’s decision and this order, 11 Plaintiff’s ability to drive, watch several hours of television each day, and read a 12 paragraph from a magazine during a psychiatric consultative examination 13 demonstrated greater visual capabilities than Plaintiff alleged and Dr. Yang 14 assessed. Based on the foregoing, as concluded by the ALJ, the evidence of record 15 16 does not support the “severe” limitations assessed by Dr. Yang on the medical 17 source statement form. The Court finds that the ALJ provided specific and 18 legitimate reasons, supported by substantial record evidence, for discounting that 19 portion of Dr. Yang’s report. 20 C. Vocational Expert Testimony 21 Plaintiff next contends the ALJ erred by relying on a vocational expert’s 22 response to an incomplete hypothetical; a hypothetical that did not reflect all of 23 Plaintiff’s limitations. ECF No. 14 at 14-15. Plaintiff specifically asserts the ALJ 24 should have included a limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to read for extended periods 25 in the hypothetical provided to the vocational expert. ECF No. 14 at 14; ECF No. 26 19 at 4. 27 As determined above, the ALJ did not err by rejecting the assessed “severe” 28 limitations on Dr. Yang’s medical source statement form and by finding Plaintiff’s ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 12 1 symptom allegations were not entirely credible. As such, the ALJ’s ultimate RFC 2 determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of error. 3 The ALJ’s RFC determination held that Plaintiff could perform light 4 exertion level work with certain postural, environmental, and vision (no job 5 requiring good depth perception or good bilateral peripheral vision and no fine 6 detailed work) restrictions. Tr. 32. At the administrative hearing held on August 7 18, 2016, the vocational expert testified that with the restrictions assessed by the 8 ALJ, Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform her past relevant work (sales clerk 9 and bookkeeper) as well as a significant number of jobs existing in the national 10 economy, including the positions of file clerk, data entry clerk and receptionist. 11 Tr. 109-113. Since the vocational expert’s testimony was based on a proper RFC 12 determination by the ALJ, the ALJ did not err at steps four and five of the 13 sequential evaluation process in this case. 14 CONCLUSION 15 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 16 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 17 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 18 19 1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 20 2. 21 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy 22 to counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant 23 and the file shall be CLOSED. 24 DATED January 23, 2019. 25 26 27 _____________________________________ JOHN T. RODGERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 13

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