Graves v. Warner et al, No. 2:2016cv00175 - Document 24 (E.D. Wash. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment ECF No. 19 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)**14 PAGE(S), PRINT ALL**(Theodore Graves, Prisoner ID: 300361)
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Graves v. Warner et al Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 THEODORE F. GRAVES, NO. 2:16-CV-0175-TOR Plaintiff, 8 9 10 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. BERNARD WARNER, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 14 ECF No. 19. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. 15 The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, and is fully informed. For the 16 reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17 19) is GRANTED. 18 19 20 BACKGROUND On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff Theodore F. Graves, a Colorado inmate housed by the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC), filed pro se a 42 U.S.C. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 §1983 claim. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff alleges that Washington prison officials have 2 violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by levying 3 statutory deductions for the Cost of Incarceration (COI) and for Crime Victim 4 Compensation (CVC) without prior notice and a meaningful hearing. Id. at 3–4, 8. 5 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated the Contract Clause and Compact 6 Clause by impairing the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) and the Contract 7 between the states of Washington and Colorado (Contract). Id. at 3–4. 8 On September 12, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 9 including the required Rand notice.1 ECF Nos. 19; 21. Defendants seek dismissal 10 of all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. ECF No. 19 at 1. Plaintiff has not timely 11 responded to Defendants’ Motion. 12 DISCUSSION 13 A pro se litigant must file a response 30 days after the mailing of a 14 dispositive motion. Local Rule 7.1(b)(2)(A). Here, Plaintiff failed to respond to 15 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants properly filed a Rand 16 notice stating that “if you do not file your response opposing either of these 17 motions within the mandated timeframe, your failure to file a response may be 18 considered by the court as an admission that the motion has merit.” ECF No. 21 at 19 20 1 Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 2 (citing Local Rule 7.1(b)(2)). The Court will now consider the merits of 2 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 3 4 A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to 5 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 56(a). For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it 7 might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty 8 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is “genuine” where the 9 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. 10 Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any 11 genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 12 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific facts 13 showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 14 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts, as 15 well as all rational inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non- 16 moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court must only 17 consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 18 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for 19 the plaintiff and a “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the 20 plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 2 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action may be maintained “against any 3 person acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, privileges, or 4 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’ of the United States.” S. Cal. 5 Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983). The rights guaranteed by § 1983 are “liberally and beneficially 7 construed.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (quoting Monell v. N.Y. 8 City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978)). “A person deprives another 9 ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 10 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 11 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff 12 complains.’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (brackets and 13 emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 14 1. Due Process Violation 15 Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not demonstrate procedural 16 17 or substantive due process violations. ECF No. 19 at 5. a. Procedural Due Process 18 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person 19 of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 20 § 1. “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or 2 property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). “Due process ‘is a flexible 3 concept that varies with the particular situation.’” Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 4 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)). 5 Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps. First, the court 6 “asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered 7 with by the State.” Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the court finds a protected 9 interest, it proceeds to step two to determine what process is due. Quick v. Jones, 10 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). In this second step, the court “examines 11 whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 12 sufficient.” Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1042 (citation omitted). To guide the second 13 step of the analysis, courts consider the three-part balancing test announced in 14 Mathews v. Eldridge: 15 16 17 18 19 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 Here, Defendants argue that the DOC’s process for retaining deductions is 2 sufficient under Matthews v. Eldridge. ECF No. 19 at 8. Defendants concede that 3 Plaintiff has a protected property interest in the incoming funds, but argues that the 4 alleged deprivation was subject to adequate due process protections. Id. Under the 5 first Matthews factor, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s private interest is not 6 substantial. Id. Plaintiff states that the value of total deductions towards COI is 7 $590.34 and toward CVC is $1,908.20, as of the date of the Complaint. ECF No. 7 8 at 9–10. Defendants emphasize that for the past nine and a half years, DOC 9 deducted an average of just over $60 towards COI and $200 towards CVC, per 10 year. ECF No. 19 at 9. Defendants argue that the sums are closer to the $20 and 11 $110.27 expenses found insubstantial in Sickles v. Campbell, rather than the 12 $60,000 found substantial in Shinault v. Hawks. Id. at 8–9; Shinault v. Hawks, 782 13 at 1055–59 (citing Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., Ky., 501 F.3d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 14 2007)). 15 Second, Defendants contend that the risk of erroneous deprivations through 16 DOC’s procedure for making deductions is low because Washington’s deduction 17 scheme merely requires DOC to deduct a set percentage of certain deposits. ECF 18 NO. 19 at 9; RCW § 72.09.111(1); RCW § 72.09.480(2). Defendants emphasize 19 that the deductions are routine transactions involving no discretion and thus there 20 is very little risk of erroneous deprivation. ECF No. 19 at 9. Third, Defendants ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 argue DOC would be significantly burdened, administratively and financially, if it 2 were required to conduct a quasi-judicial, pre-deprivation hearing every time an 3 insubstantial statutory deduction is levied. Id. at 10. 4 Upon balancing of the Matthews factors, the Court finds that Defendants’ 5 argument has merit. The deductions are likely not substantial, risk of erroneous 6 deprivation is low, and Defendants would certainly be burdened by additional 7 procedural safeguards. 8 Additionally, there is evidence that the DOC’s orientation procedures 9 satisfied due process. Upon arrival at the Clallam Bay Correction Center, Plaintiff 10 received information on inmate life, including an introduction to offender banking 11 and offender trust accounts. ECF Nos. 19 at 5–6; 20 at ¶ 3. This information 12 included mandatory deductions that Washington levies on the funds of all inmates 13 in DOC custody. ECF Nos. 19 at 6; 20 at ¶¶ 3–4, 11. Therefore, Plaintiff had 14 notice that the statutory deductions would apply to him. 15 Plaintiff was also provided with adequate post-deprivation remedies. DOC 16 inmates are provided an accounting of their deductions and may challenge the 17 deductions through prison grievance procedures or by filing a tort claim with the 18 state. ECF No. 19 at 6; see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132 (“[I]n situations where a 19 predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at 20 stake ... postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process.”); see also Wright v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 918 (2000) (holding that Washington’s grievance process 2 and tort suit provide adequate post-deprivation remedies for unauthorized 3 deductions from a prisoner’s account). Here, Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting 4 the return of his funds. ECF Nos. 7 at 11–12; 20-1 at 19 (Ex. D). The grievance 5 was investigated, finding that Plaintiff’s account was correct and the deductions 6 would continue under RCW 72.09.111 and RCW 72.09.480. ECF No. 20-1 at 21 7 (Ex. E). On appeal, the investigation found that the DOC policy is applicable to 8 any person in the custody of the DOC, including persons from another state. ECF 9 No. 20-1 at 23 (Ex. F). Yet, Plaintiff is not protected from the deprivation of his 10 protected property interest, but the mistaken or unjustified deprivation thereof. 11 Carey, 435 U.S. at 259. There has been no showing of an unjustified deprivation 12 and Plaintiff’s alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies is not sufficient to 13 show that additional procedures are constitutionally required. 2 14 15 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim with prejudice. 16 17 2 The Court need not address Defendants’ argument that the Court can also 18 find Plaintiff was provided due process because the Washington State Legislature 19 lawfully enacted the statutes at issue. ECF No. 19 at 11. The Court has already 20 dismissed Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 2 b. Substantive Due Process The Fourteenth Amendment also protects individuals from the arbitrary 3 deprivation of their protected interests. “Legislative acts that do not impinge on 4 fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this 5 presumption is overcome only by a ‘clear showing of arbitrariness and 6 irrationality.’” Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 7 1994) (citation omitted). In conducting this inquiry, the Court looks to whether the 8 legislation “advances any legitimate public purpose” and “if it is at least fairly 9 debatable that the [legislative] decision ... was rationally related to legitimate 10 governmental interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff 11 bears the “extremely high” burden of showing that a statute is arbitrary and 12 irrational. Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 13 1997). 14 Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no substantive due process claim 15 because the deductions are not arbitrary. ECF No. 19 at 13. First, in regards to the 16 COI deductions, the state has a legitimate government interest in conserving 17 taxpayer resources by sharing the costs of incarceration. While Plaintiff is a 18 Colorado offender, Washington bears the costs of providing for his care and 19 custody while he is housed in Washington. The COI deductions are “used only for 20 the purpose of enhancing and maintaining correctional industries work programs,” ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 and are thus rationally related to Washington’s legitimate interest in preserving 2 taxpayer funds that would otherwise go to its prison systems. RCW 72.09.111(7); 3 see In re Pierce, 173 Wash.2d 372, 381 (2011) (en banc). The Court finds that 4 Plaintiff has not met the extremely high burden of demonstrating the COI 5 deductions do not advance any legitimate public purpose. 6 Second, in relation to the CVC deductions, the state has a legitimate interest 7 in compensating crime victims. Although the victim is not from Washington, this 8 does not negate Washington’s legitimate interest in assisting crime victims in 9 general. See McCoy v. Clarke, No. CV-05-5036-AAM, 2005 WL 1979141, at *4 10 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2005). The CVC deductions are deposited in a special crime 11 victim’s compensation account and are thus rationally related to Washington’s 12 legitimate interest in providing for victims of crime. RCW 7.68.045. The Court 13 also finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the extremely high burden of 14 demonstrating the CVC deductions do not advance any legitimate public purpose. 15 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary 16 judgment on Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, as deductions under RCW 17 chapter 72.09 are “rationally related to the legitimate government interests of 18 curtailing the costs of incarceration and compensating victims of crime.” In re 19 Metcalf, 92 Wash. App. 165, 177 (1998). The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 20 substantive due process claim with prejudice. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 2. Contract Clause Violation 2 The Contract Clause states, “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing 3 the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. A Contract Clause 4 claim is analyzed under three factors: (1) whether there is a contractual 5 relationship, (2) whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and 6 (3) whether the impairment is substantial. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 7 181, 186 (1992). 8 Here, Plaintiff alleges that RCW §§ 72.09.111 and 72.09.480 violate the ICC 9 and the Contract, amounting to a violation of the Contract Clause. ECF No. 7 at 3– 10 4, 8–11. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish Defendants’ involvement 11 in any change of law that would create a violation or impairment of the ICC. ECF 12 No. 19 at 15. Additionally, Defendants contend that the statutes at issue do not 13 violate or impair the ICC because the statutes agree with both the ICC and the 14 Contract. Id. 15 Plaintiff cites that the receiving state of a transferred inmate is merely an 16 agent for the sending state, that inmates are at all times subject to the jurisdiction 17 of the sending state, and that a receiving state shall not deprive a transferred inmate 18 of any legal rights he or she would have had if confined in the sending state. ECF 19 No. 7 at 8; RCW 72.74.020(4)(a), (c), (e), (h). Yet, Defendants assert that Plaintiff 20 fails to quote the ICC provision fatal to his claim, “All inmates who may be ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 confined in an institution pursuant to the provisions of this compact … shall be 2 treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined 3 in the same institution.” ECF No. 19 at 15; RCW 72.74.020(4)(e). 4 Defendants also argue Plaintiff does not have a claim under the Contract, 5 which states, “Except where expressly otherwise provided in this contract or by 6 law, the laws and administrative rules and regulations of the sending state shall 7 govern in any matter relating to an inmate confined pursuant to this contract and 8 the [ICC].” ECF Nos. 19 at 16; 20-1 at 125 (Ex.2). Defendants emphasize that 9 Plaintiff omitted the italicized statement when quoting from the Contract and that 10 the Contract expressly allows for statutory provisions. ECF Nos. 7 at 6; 19 at 16. 11 The Contract also allows for the sharing of costs and reimbursements, “Except as 12 otherwise specifically provided in this contract, each state shall bear the cost of 13 providing care and custody of the inmate sent to it.” ECF Nos. 19 at 16; 20-1 at 14 132 (Ex. 2). Plaintiff again failed to quote the italicized language. ECF No. 7 at 7. 15 Lastly, the Contract declares that inmates in the custody of a receiving state “shall 16 be subject to all the provisions of law and regulations applicable to persons 17 committed for violations of law of the receiving state not inconsistent with 18 sentenced imposed.” ECF Nos. 19 at 16; 20-1 at 129 (Ex. 2). 19 20 The Court finds that Defendants’ argument has merit and there is no evidence that the statutes at issue impair the contractual relationship under the ICC ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 or the Contract. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Contract Clause 2 claim with prejudice. 3 Plaintiff has not shown standing to raise a Contract Clause violation. He is 4 not a signator, nor is he a third-party beneficiary of the ICC or the Contract. 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff has no standing to bring this claim and it is also dismissed 6 with prejudice for this reason. 7 3. Compact Clause Violation 8 Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated the Compact Clause. ECF No. 9 7 at 3. The Compact Clause states, “No State shall, without the Consent of 10 Congress, … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State ….” U.S. 11 Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Ninth Circuit has determined that violation of the 12 Compact Clause cannot be a basis for an action brought pursuant to § 1983, as the 13 ICC is not federal law nor does it create a liberty interest that is protected by the 14 due process clause. Ghana v. Pearce, 159 F.3d 1206, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 1998). 15 Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is unable to allege a viable claim 16 under the Compact Clause and the claim is dismissed with prejudice. 17 4. Qualified Immunity 18 The Court need not address Defendants’ qualified immunity claim, as the 19 Court has already dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. See ECF No. 20 19 at 18. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 2 3 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED. 4 2. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 5 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, enter judgment 6 for Defendants, furnish copies to the parties, and CLOSE the file. Each party to 7 bear its own costs and expenses. 8 DATED November 28, 2017. 9 10 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14
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