Bunnell v. Saul, No. 1:2019cv03194 - Document 15 (E.D. Wash. 2020)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 12 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 13 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. FILE CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mary K. Dimke. (AN, Courtroom Deputy)

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88, 20 104. Defendant contends that by formulating an RFC limiting Plaintiff to work 2 ORDER - 14 1 that involves only simple, routine tasks, “the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff’s 2 impairments would, to some extent, interfere with her day-to-day work, but the 3 ALJ reasonably found that with accommodations, any interference would not be 4 disabling.” ECF No. 13 at 13 (citing Tr. 18, 21). However, the explanation 5 provided by Defendant was not offered by the ALJ. The ALJ’s conclusory 6 statement is insufficient because it provides no details to assess the basis for the 7 ALJ arriving at the conclusion to assign little weight to this part of Dr. Liddell’s 8 opinion. See Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We require 9 the ALJ to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her 10 conclusions so that we may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s 11 ultimate findings.”). On this record, the ALJ’s decision to afford little weight to 12 Dr. Liddell’s opinion that Plaintiff had a moderate limitation in the ability to 13 complete a normal workday or workweek is not supported by clear and convincing 14 reasons. 15 16 B. Other Challenges Plaintiff raises several other challenges to the ALJ’s evaluation of the 17 medical opinion evidence and Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, as well as the ALJ’s 18 analyses at steps one, two, and three. ECF No. 12 at 3-21. The Court declines to 19 address these challenges here. However, the Court briefly addresses the following. 20 First, Defendant does not dispute that the ALJ erred in her substantial gainful 2 ORDER - 15 1 activity calculations at step one. ECF No. 13 at 2-3. Instead, Defendant argues 2 that any error by the ALJ in evaluating whether Plaintiff engaged in substantial 3 gainful activity was harmless given that the ALJ proceeded through the sequential 4 evaluation after step one. ECF No. 13 at 2. On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate 5 whether Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity at step one. Second, the 6 ALJ evaluated whether Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was a medically determinable 7 impairment at step two under the 1990 American College of Rheumatology (ACR) 8 Criteria for the Classification of Fibromyalgia (“1990 Criteria”), but failed to 9 analyze Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia under the 2010 ACR Preliminary Diagnostic 10 Criteria (“2010 Criteria”) as directed by SSR 12-2p.4 See Rounds v. Comm’r of 11 Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2015) (instructing the ALJ, on 12 remand, to consider both the 1990 and 2010 diagnostic criteria when evaluating the 13 claimant’s fibromyalgia pursuant to the Commissioner’s binding ruling in SSR 1214 2p); Mahoney-Garcia v. Colvin, No. 3:14-cv-5599-RBL-KLS, 2015 WL 1965382, 15 at *2-4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2015). On remand, the ALJ is instructed to evaluate 16 and determine whether Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia is a medically determinable 17 18 4 Social Security Ruling (SSR) 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *2-3 (Jul. 25, 2012), 19 designates two separate sets of diagnostic criteria that can establish fibromyalgia as 20 a medically determinable impairment. 2 ORDER - 16 1 impairment under the 2010 diagnostic criteria. SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at 2 *2-3. Third, at step three, the ALJ shall address Plaintiff’s vision test from 3 February 27, 2017, which showed that Plaintiff’s corrected vision was 20/400, Tr. 4 538, and, if necessary, the ALJ shall obtain additional medical evidence related to 5 Plaintiff’s eyesight. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Part A § 2.02 (In 6 order to be considered disabled under Listing 2.02, a claimant must show that she 7 has a loss of central visual acuity and that the remaining vision in her better eye, 8 after best correction, is 20/200 or less.). Finally, the ALJ is directed to reconsider 9 the medical opinion evidence, both physical and mental, as well as Plaintiff’s 10 symptom claims, in light of the new analyses at steps one, two, and three. 11 12 C. Remedy Plaintiff urges this Court to remand for an immediate award of benefits. 13 ECF No. 12 at 13. “The decision whether to remand a case for additional 14 evidence, or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the court.” 15 Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232 (citing Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 16 1985)). When the Court reverses an ALJ’s decision for error, the Court “ordinarily 17 must remand to the agency for further proceedings.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 18 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 19 2004) (“[T]he proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the 20 agency for additional investigation or explanation”); Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. 2 ORDER - 17 1 Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). However, in a number of Social 2 Security cases, the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of 3 discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits” when three 4 conditions are met. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted). Under the 5 credit-as-true rule, where (1) the record has been fully developed and further 6 administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 7 to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant 8 testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were 9 credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on 10 remand, the Court will remand for an award of benefits. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 11 F.3d 648, 668 (9th Cir. 2017). Even where the three prongs have been satisfied, 12 the Court will not remand for immediate payment of benefits if “the record as a 13 whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 14 F.3d at 1021. 15 Here, further proceedings are necessary. As discussed supra, although Drs. 16 Liddell, Brown, and Clifford all opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in 17 her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek, Drs. Brown and Clifford 18 further opined that Plaintiff “may have days of symptoms when irritable and 19 symptoms may produce some absences from work; however nothing to show such 20 of the frequency to preclude work,” which is a qualification not offered by Dr. 2 ORDER - 18 1 Liddell. Tr. 88, 104-05. Further proceedings are necessary to properly evaluate 2 the medical opinion evidence. Furthermore, even if all three credit-as-true prongs 3 were met, remand for further proceedings would still be appropriate because 4 Plaintiff’s ability to work part-time for nearly the entire relevant period raises 5 serious doubt that Plaintiff is, in fact, disabled. Tr. 24. Therefore, this case is 6 remanded for further proceedings. The ALJ is instructed to conduct a new 7 sequential analysis, including analyzing whether Plaintiff engaged in substantial 8 gainful activity at step one, reevaluating Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia at step two, 9 addressing Plaintiff’s alleged vision impairment at step three, and reevaluating the 10 medical opinion evidence and Plaintiff’s symptom claims in light of the new 11 analyses at steps one, two, and three. 12 13 CONCLUSION Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court concludes the 14 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal 15 error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED. 17 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, is DENIED. 18 3. The Clerk’s Office shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff 19 REVERSING and REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner of Social 20 2 ORDER - 19 1 Security for further proceedings consistent with this recommendation pursuant to 2 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 3 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to 4 counsel, and CLOSE THE FILE. 5 DATED April 2, 2020. 6 s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 ORDER - 20

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