Cantu v. Yakima County et al, No. 1:2016cv03206 - Document 20 (E.D. Wash. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS. Defendants Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint ECF No. 17 is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and DENIED as moot as to Plaintiffs remaining state law claims. Plaintiffs state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Cantu v. Yakima County et al Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 DAMIAN GARZA CANTU, CASE NO.: 1:16-CV-3206-TOR 8 Plaintiff, 9 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS v. 10 11 12 YAKIMA COUNTY, JOSEPH BRUSIC, PATRICIA POWERS, CARL MUNSON, & UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS, Defendants. 13 14 15 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Renewed FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to 16 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 17. This matter was 17 heard without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the briefing, the record, and 18 the files herein, and is fully informed. 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 BACKGROUND This action concerns the mistaken placement, for nearly two decades, of a 3 rape conviction on Plaintiff’s criminal record. See ECF No. 5. On October 21, 4 2016, Plaintiff sued Defendants in the Washington State Superior Court for 5 Yakima County styled, Damian Garza Cantu v. Yakima County, et al., case no. 16- 6 2-03007-39. ECF No. 2-2 at 9-18. Defendants timely removed that action to this 7 Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443. ECF No. 1. On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff 8 filed an Amended Complaint alleging various federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1983, in addition to an assortment of state law claims. ECF No. 5. This Court 10 has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims pursuant to the federal 11 question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and pendant jurisdiction of the 12 remaining state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1367(a). 14 On February 15, 2017, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss 15 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (hereinafter, the “Order”). See ECF Nos. 3, 16 14. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal causes of action as 17 time-barred and for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 14 at 13-16. The Court 18 declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims, but noted that absent amendment, 19 the statute of limitations would require the Court to dismiss the entire case. Id. at 20 19. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file another amended complaint. Id. at 18. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 2 1 On March 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint for 2 Relief and Damages and Jury Trial Demand. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff asserted new 3 claims for nuisance and violations of WAC 446-20-140, in addition to his existing 4 defamation, defamation per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 5 negligence and gross negligence, outrage, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations, negligent 6 hiring and supervision, and invasion of privacy by false light claims. ECF No. 15. 7 Plaintiff also added Defendants Joseph Brusic, Patricia Powers, and Carl Munson. 8 ECF No. 15. Plaintiff reasserted claims against the Yakima County Clerk’s Office 9 and Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office despite that the Court dismissed 10 them from this action with prejudice. ECF No. 14 at 6. 11 Defendants now move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 17. 12 FACTS 13 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, 14 see ECF No. 15, and are accepted as true for purposes of the instant motion. Bell 15 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 16 On September 6, 1996, Damian Eduardo Gutierrez Cantu (“Gutierrez”)) 17 pleaded guilty in Yakima County Superior Court to Third Degree Rape. See ECF 18 No. 15 at 2, 4-5, ¶¶ 3.1, 3.8-3.11; ECF No. 18 at 2. On January 23, 1997, a 19 Yakima County Deputy Clerk filed a document erroneously identifying the 20 convicted defendant as “Damian Garza Cantu,” and also erroneously using ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 3 1 Plaintiff’s date of birth. ECF No. 15 at 5, ¶ 3.11. Thereafter, Gutierrez’ conviction 2 was associated with Plaintiff’s criminal history record in the Judicial Information 3 Systems (“JIS”), on a case information sheet, and in the Washington State Patrol’s 4 Washington Access to Criminal History (“WATCH”) database. Id. at ¶ 3.12. 5 Between 1997 and 2002, Plaintiff was unable to obtain a job that could lead 6 to advancement and was routinely laid off without reason. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 3.14-3.15. 7 During the summer of 2002, Plaintiff was informed that he was being fired 8 “because he had raped someone” according to a failed background check. Id. at 9 ¶ 3.16. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff went to the Yakima County Clerk’s Office 10 (where he lived at the time) to inquire about the rape. Id. at ¶ 3.17. Plaintiff was 11 instructed by a Yakima County Clerk to obtain fingerprints at the Yakima County 12 Sheriff’s Department and was provided a number to call someone in Olympia, 13 Washington about “his incorrect criminal history.” Id. at 6-7, ¶¶ 3.17-3.19. 14 Plaintiff was told by the Yakima County Clerk’s Office that “the criminal history 15 problem would be fixed” and “not to worry.” Id. at 7, ¶ 3.20. Similarly, Plaintiff 16 was informed by someone in Olympia that “his record would be corrected” upon 17 payment of a $30 fee. Id. at 7-8, ¶ 3.21. A few days later, that same unidentified 18 individual told Plaintiff that “everything would be fine” and requested an 19 additional $30 fee; Plaintiff paid. Id. 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 4 1 Plaintiff had no further contact with anyone or any knowledge about 2 documents created or filed to correct his record. See id. 8-10, at ¶¶ 3.22-3.28, 3.30. 3 Plaintiff believed that the erroneous criminal conviction was removed from his 4 record. Id. at 11, 13, ¶¶ 3.39, 3.50. 5 Despite steps taken in 2002 by the Yakima County Sherriff’s Office, 6 Prosecuting Attorney, and Superior Court, the incorrect information was not 7 removed from Plaintiff’s criminal record. See id. at 10, ¶ 3.32. Since 2002, 8 Plaintiff still could not obtain a decent job. Id. at ¶ 3.33. Plaintiff thought his 9 subsequent failed background checks were due to his 1993 DUI conviction. Id. at 10 13-14, ¶ 3.51. 11 In 2016, Plaintiff was told he was not getting good jobs because he was a 12 rapist. Id. at 14, ¶ 3.52. On November 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion in 13 Guierrez’ underlying rape case to remove Plaintiff’s personal identifiers and to 14 correct Plaintiff’s criminal record. See id. at 14-15, ¶ 3.56, Ex. 14. The Yakima 15 County Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s motion. Id. at 15-16, ¶ 3.57. While now 16 apparently corrected, Plaintiff complains that from 1997 until sometime after 17 November 4, 2016, the rape conviction remained on his criminal history. See id. at 18 14, ¶¶ 3.54-3.55. 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 5 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Standard of Review 3 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of 4 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims. Navarro 5 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint must contain a “short 6 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 8 claim, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief 9 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In 10 assessing whether Rule 8(a)(2) has been satisfied, a court must first identify the 11 elements of the plaintiff’s claim and then determine whether those elements could 12 be proven on the facts pled. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. 13 In this evaluation, the court should draw all reasonable inferences in the 14 plaintiff’s favor, see Sheppard v. David Evans & Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th 15 Cir. 2012), but it need not accept “naked assertions devoid of further factual 16 enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations, brackets and citation 17 omitted). 18 “A district court may dismiss a claim if the running of the statute is apparent 19 on the face of the complaint.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 20 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 6 1 “However, a district court may do so only if the assertions of the complaint, read 2 with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute 3 was tolled.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Accordingly, Plaintiff may not defeat a motion to dismiss on statute of 5 limitations grounds without properly pleading “sufficient factual matter . . . to state 6 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff 7 must set forth sufficient factual matter (not legal conclusions) to establish either 8 the delayed accrual of the statute of limitations or the equitable tolling thereof, 9 because the Court need not accept “naked assertions devoid of further factual 10 enhancement.” Id.; see also Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 11 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff “must plead with particularity the 12 circumstances surrounding the concealment and state facts showing his due 13 diligence in trying to uncover the facts.”). 14 Here, Defendants renewed their dismissal motion on the grounds that 15 Plaintiff’s claims are time barred and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 16 which relief may be granted. See ECF No. 17. 17 18 19 20 B. Statutes of Limitations i. Defendants’ Initial 12(b)(6) Motion Upon examination of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, this Court previously decided that Plaintiff’s claims accrued in the summer of 2002, when ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 7 1 Plaintiff discovered the mistaken rape conviction on his record. ECF No. 14 at 12- 2 13. This Court declined to apply Washington’s “discovery rule” despite Plaintiff’s 3 counsel’s insistence during oral argument that Plaintiff did not discover until 2016 4 that the rape conviction originated in the Yakima Superior Court. Id. at 10. This 5 Court also determined that Defendant’s assurances that his criminal record would 6 be fixed do not provide a basis under the equitable tolling doctrine to extend the 7 statute of limitations for fourteen years because Plaintiff did not assert Defendants 8 intended to mislead Plaintiff to thwart him from seeking legal redress. In addition, 9 Plaintiff could not articulate any efforts he undertook from 2002 through July 25, 10 2016, to pursue his legal remedy or to confirm the corrections were made. Id. 11 Notwithstanding, the Court permitted leave to amend to “set forth sufficient factual 12 matter (not legal conclusions) to establish either the delayed accrual of the statute 13 of limitations or the equitable tolling thereof . . . .” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 14 15 ii. Defendants’ Renewed 12(b)(6) Motion Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, and 16 liberally construing all facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds 17 that Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims accrued in the summer of 2002 when 18 Plaintiff discovered the mistaken rape conviction on his record. See Olsen v. Idaho 19 State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (federal civil rights claims 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 8 1 accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the 2 basis of the action.”) (citation omitted). 3 After Plaintiff’s discovery in 2002, he had three years to assert his 42 U.S.C. 4 § 1983 claims. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 5 1991) (citations omitted) (stating that because Section 1983 does not contain its 6 own statute of limitations, Washington courts apply the three-year statute of 7 limitations codified in RCW § 4.16.080(2)); Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of 8 California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (the federal courts “apply the 9 forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum 10 state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of 11 these laws is inconsistent with federal law.”. . . “borrow[ing] no more than 12 necessary.”) (citations omitted). 13 The newly asserted facts in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint do not 14 change the 2002 accrual date. See ECF Nos. 15 at 9, ¶ 3.31 (stating that Plaintiff 15 “believed” he took steps in 2002 to “learn what, and whom” caused the false rape 16 conviction and that he took care of it). 17 Turning to the statute of limitations exceptions, the Court also finds that 18 Plaintiff has not shown that the discovery rule, equitable tolling doctrine, or the 19 newly-asserted continuing tort doctrine apply to permit this untimely action to 20 proceed. The Court addresses each in turn. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 9 1 First, as to the discovery rule, Plaintiff continues to assert that he discovered 2 his wrongful conviction in 2002, but now alleges that he previously lived in Skagit 3 County in 1997 through 1999. ECF No. 15 at 6-7, ¶ 3.17. Plaintiff re-alleges his 4 counsel’s prior representations that he only coincidentally went to the Yakima 5 County Clerk’s Office because he lived in Yakima County at the time. Id. 6 Plaintiff hypothesizes that had he lived in a different county, he would have gone 7 to that county’s clerk’s office. Id. Plaintiff’s speculative reasoning to support his 8 argument that he did not know, “and it was not reasonable to expect Plaintiff to 9 know,” that Yakima County caused the incorrect rape conviction is belied by his 10 interactions with Yakima County. ECF Nos. 15 at 13, ¶ 3.46; 18 at 25. That is, 11 Plaintiff claims that he communicated with a Yakima County Deputy Clerk, 12 followed the Clerk’s instruction to go to the Yakima County Sheriff’s Office, and 13 called a number provided by the Clerk to fix his record. ECF No. 15 at 6-7, ¶¶ 14 3.17-3.19. Plaintiff was never told that he was in the wrong court or denied 15 assistance by anyone employed by Yakima County. The assertion in his Second 16 Amended Complaint that it was unreasonable for him to know that the case was a 17 Yakima County action is nothing more than a legal conclusion that does not 18 change the fact that Plaintiff knew the elements of his claims in 2002, yet simply 19 chose not to pursue an action with diligence within the applicable statutory 20 limitation periods. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 10 1 Federal civil rights claims accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to 2 know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Olsen, 363 F.3d at 926 3 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). That is, “discovery of the injury, not 4 discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” Rotella v. 5 Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). A federal civil rights claim can accrue before a 6 plaintiff knows the identity of the defendant. See Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 7 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1984). Diligence, or a lack thereof, play no part in the 8 analysis as the burden is on the plaintiff to determine the existence and source of 9 fault within the statute of limitation period. Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 642 10 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1981)). 11 Second, and for similar reasons, Plaintiff has not met the requirements for 12 equitable tolling, which requires “bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the 13 defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.” See In re Bonds, 165 14 Wash. 2d 135, 141 (2008) (plurality opinion). Importantly, “[c]ourts typically 15 permit equitable tolling to occur only sparingly, and should not extend it to a 16 ‘garden variety claim of excusable neglect.’” State v. Duvall, 86 Wash. App. 871, 17 875 (1997) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 18 (1990)). 19 20 Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions between 1996 and 2002 were in bad faith and “with actual malice,” Plaintiff does not allege any facts to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 11 1 support that he exercised due diligence after his 2002 discovery to pursue his 2 claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely re-alleges that he had “taken every step possible . 3 . . to learn what, and whom, had caused the issues with his incorrect criminal 4 history and had done everything he knew of to take care of his false criminal 5 history.” ECF No. 15 at 11, ¶ 3.39. In plain terms, Plaintiff elected to rely on 6 others to fix the erroneous record instead of bringing a cause of action, and 7 assumed—over the next fourteen years—that his record was correctly fixed. See 8 id. Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing he was prevented from timely pursuing 9 his claims or diligently seeking confirmation that his record was fixed. 10 Washington courts are “reluctant to apply exceptions to legislative time limits” 11 because doing so “would undercut finality of judgments, encourage untimely filing 12 and amendments to collateral attacks, and unjustifiably expand the narrow 13 equitable tolling exception.” In Re Bonds, 165 Wash.2d at 143-44 (high burden). 14 The Court declines to apply equitable tolling to Plaintiff’s federal causes of action 15 because, read with the required liberality, despite the opportunity to add new facts 16 to establish equitable tolling, Plaintiff’s factual assertions do not permit him to 17 prove that that statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. See Jablon v. Dean 18 Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff could have commenced 19 an action in 2002, but failed to do so until 2016. Equitable tolling simply does not 20 apply to the facts asserted in this case. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 12 1 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the continuing tort doctrine should apply to save 2 his untimely claims. ECF Nos. 15, 18 at 27. Even assuming arguendo that the 3 continuing tort doctrine could apply to some or all of Plaintiff’s state law claims, 4 Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are the claims for which this Court’s pendant 5 jurisdiction rests, and the continuing tort doctrine does not apply to those claims. 6 See Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 828 7 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the statute of limitations has expired on Plaintiff’s 8 alleged § 1983 constitutional claims, the Court declines to exercise its 9 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims for the reasons explained 10 11 below. Construing all facts in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint liberally and 12 as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims accrued in the 13 summer of 2002, when Plaintiff discovered the mistaken rape conviction. Tolling 14 the statute of limitations period is not appropriate under the facts as pled. Thus, 15 Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are time-barred. 16 C. Leave to Amend 17 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts to “grant leave to 18 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless . . . the pleading 19 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 20 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Even when a complaint fails to state a ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 13 1 claim for relief, “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear 2 that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 3 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotations omitted). The standard 4 for granting leave to amend is generous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court 5 should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). In determining whether leave 6 to amend is appropriate, a court must consider the following five factors: bad faith, 7 undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether 8 the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. United States v. Corinthian 9 Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 The Court previously forewarned Plaintiff that he must allege facts which 11 would support tolling the statute of limitations. ECF No. 14 at 17. The Court also 12 cautioned Plaintiff that he “must plead with particularity the circumstances 13 surrounding the concealment and state facts showing his due diligence in trying to 14 uncover the facts.” Rutledge, 576 F.2d at 250. However, Plaintiff offered no facts 15 showing that he diligently attempted to pursue a legal remedy until 2016, or that he 16 was prevented from doing so. 17 Against this backdrop, the Court finds that granting further leave to amend is 18 no longer appropriate. First, although the Court finds no indication of bad faith or 19 undue delay at this early stage in the proceedings, the Court finds amendment 20 would be futile and, thus, prejudicial to Defendants. Although Plaintiff has alleged ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 14 1 detailed facts in his lengthy Second Amended Complaint, none cure the lapsed 2 statute of limitations problem nor provide a tolling basis. The Court can no longer 3 conceive of any additional facts that could provide support for Plaintiff’s untimely 4 claims. Further leave to amend Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is no 5 longer warranted. 6 D. Supplemental Jurisdiction 7 A federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims 8 to the extent they are “so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original 9 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1367(a). “A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy when it 11 shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims and the state 12 and federal claims would normally be tried together.” Bahrampour v. Lampert, 13 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Once the court acquires 14 supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, § 1367(c) provides that the court 15 may decline to exercise jurisdiction if 16 17 18 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 15 1 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Indeed, “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims 2 are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to 3 exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. 4 v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988), superseded on other grounds by statute as 5 stated in Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010); see 6 also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 7 Here, the Court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction for several 8 reasons. First, the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s federal claims over which 9 the Court had original jurisdiction are time barred. This triggers the Court’s 10 discretion to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 11 Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a district court did 12 not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 13 remaining state law claims when federal claims were dismissed). 14 15 16 Second, because this case is still at the early stages of litigation the parties will not be greatly inconvenienced by the Court’s decision to decline jurisdiction. Third, state court is a particularly appropriate forum in which to address 17 Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims because those claims are governed by state 18 law. The values of judicial economy, convenience to the parties, fairness, and 19 comity would be no more advanced by retaining the case in this Court than by the 20 parties resolving the state law claims in state court. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 16 1 For all of these reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 2 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 3 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 4 1. Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 5 Complaint (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on 6 Plaintiff’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and DENIED as moot 7 as to Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims; and 8 2. Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 9 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, enter Judgment 10 11 accordingly, provide copies to counsel, and close the file. DATED: July 28, 2017. 12 13 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 17
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