Desper v. Clarke et al, No. 7:2017cv00549 - Document 42 (W.D. Va. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 1/29/2019. (slt)
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CLERKS OFFICE U.S.DIST.COURL AT ROANOC ,VA FILED IN TIIE UN ITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT FO R TIIE W ESTER N DISTRICT O F W R GINIA RO AN OK E DIW SIO N JAM ES PA UL D ESPER, JA1 2! 2210 JULI A .DUD ERK BY: D U CL K CASE NO .7:17CV 00549 Plaintiff, M EM OM ND UM O PIN IO N HAROLD CLARKENZI AL , By: G len E .Conrad Senior United StatesD istrictJudge Defendants. Jam es Paul Desper, a Virginia inm ate proceeding oro se. filed this civil rights action pursuantto 42 U.S.C.j1983,aflegingthatprison officialshavedeniedhim visitationwith his m inor daughter,in violation of his constitutionalrights. Upon review of the record,the court GndsthatDesperhasfailed to state a claim upon which reliefcan begranted. 1. BA CKGROU ND D esper has been in prison since Septem ber 2009 and is currently confned atA ugusta Correctional Center.1 H e is incarcerated for three convictions of'forcible rape through the m ental incapacity or helplessness of the victim , involving an l8-year-old w om an, who w as determ ined to have the overall m ental capacity of an eight-year-old child. See D esper v. Commonwealth,No.2116-10-3,2011W L 5346030 (Ct.App.Nov.8,2011). Hehasalsobeen V convicted for indecent liberties w ith a child, failing to register as a violent sex offender, probation violations,and creditcard larceny and forgery. Desper'smother,GlendaDesper(EçGlenda''),haslegalandphysicalcustodyofhisminor Desper v. Clarke et al Doc. 42 daughter,K .D .,who w as notthe victim of Desper's sexualoffenses. Between September 2009 and Decem ber2015,D esperw asallowed prison visitation w ith 11. 17. 1 The factssumm arized herein are based on online court.recordsand Desper'samended com plaintand otherdocumentation hehassubmitted andincorporatedby referenceintohisclaims. Dockets.Justia.com On M arch 1,2014,amendments to Virginia Departmentof Corrections (:iVDOC'') visitationregulationsinOperatingProcedure($$OP'')851.1tookeffect.SectionIV(C)(12)ofOP 851.1provided that (ojffenderswith any conviction requiring registration in the Sex Oyender and Crim es againstM inors Registry w illnotbe allow ed to visitw ith any m inor until grantedasex offendervisitationexemption.(Minorscurrentlyapprovedforsuch visitson the effective date ofthisoperating procedure m ay be allowed to continue visitingpendingreview foranexemption.) Com pl.Ex.2,ECF N o.1-2. The procedure only allow ed exem ptions for a sex offender inm ate to visit w ith his biological child, legally adopted child,or step-child, if that child w as not a victim of his crim es. To be eligible for an exem ption,a sex offender m usthave been free of disciplinary charges for six m onths, w ith no court order in effect prohibiting or restricting visitation. TheprocesstoapplyforanexemptionunderOP 851.1(1V)(C)(12),in2014andcurrently, requiresthe inm ate to com plete a questionnaire abouthis offenses and stepshe hastaken toward being accountable for his offense conduct, and about his child, their relationship, and how visitation willbe beneficialto the child. The parent or guardian of the m inor child m ust also com' plete and m ail a questionnaire to the inm ate's counselor,to provide, am ong other things, infonuation aboutthe adult's lcnow ledge ofthe offender's crim es,the child's relationship to the inm ate,theirpriorvisits,the child'sinterestin future visitation and potentialbeneitsfrom it,and the adult's concerns ifany. These subm issions are then reviewed by an evaluator,who conducts an assessmentofthe inmate,including ' a MentalStatus Evaluation (d(M SE''),review ofthe inm ate's personal,social,and sexualhistory,and an ç<actuarialassessm ent.'' ld. The evaluator then forwards the completed assessm ent of the inm ate's visitation exem ption request,and the questionnairescom pleted by the inm ate and the child's guardian forreview by the Sex Offender 2 Visitation Committee (tcommittee''). This Committee meetsquarterly to considervisitation exefnption requests and accom panying docum entation,and to decide whetherto recom m end the exemption. Final approval of these recom m endations com es from a designated prison adm inistrator. Ifthe inm ate'sapplication fora visitation exemption isdenied,there isno appeal. A fteroneyear,how ever,the inm atem ay reapply fora sex offendervisitation exemption. A fterthese visitation procedures firsttook effect in M arch 2014,Desperfailed to file a visitation exemption requestas the policy required. N evertheless,foralm osttwo years,ofGcials allowed him discretionary visitation w ith K .D . to give him an opportunity to apply for an exem ption. Desperfrstlearned in February 2016 that officials had rem oved K .D .from his list ofapproved visitors.lnM arch 2016,Desperand Glenda submittedtherequiredpaperwork fora sex offendervisitation exemption application. A m entalhealth professionalevaluated D esper a few weeks later. D esper subm its evidence indicating thathe has had extensive m entalhealth issues. Ultim ately, in February 2017,G lenda learned that the visitation exemption request had been denied m ore than six m onths earlier. D esper and G lenda com pleted the paperwork for a secönd visitation exem ption application in June 2017. A differçnt m entalhealth professional evaluated Desperin A ugust. The visitation exem ption w as denied in Septem ber 2017. N either Desper nor G lenda as K.D .'S legal guardian was notifed of the denial or was provided any specific reason that D esper's visitation exem ption requests were denied. A letter from K .D . indicatesthatin M arch 2018,shew astwelve years old. Desperthen Gled this j1983 action,naming as defendants VDOC Director Harold Clarke,ChiefofOperationsA .D avid Robinson,and severalJane/lohn D oe defendants. Plaintiff alsofiledamotionforsummaryjudgmentandamotion forpreliminaryinjunctiverelief,andthe 3 defendants responded to these m otions. Defendants Clarke and Robinson have also filed a m otion to dism iss. D esper has responded by filing two motions for leave to file an am ended com plaint,which the courtw illgrant. Desper'samendedcomplaintsuesClarkeandRobinson (çtdefendants');MariaStransky, Sex Offender Program Director; M arie Vargo, Corrections Operations Adm inistrator; and Jane/lohn Does- unnamed membersoftheComm ittee. Despercontendsihatthese individuals' actions, depriving him of visià tion w ith K .D . since D ecem ber 2015, have violated his constitutionalrights underthe A ssociation Clause ofthe FirstAm endm entand the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Am endm ent.2 A s relief, D esper seeks declaratoryandinjunctiverelief,andpunitivedamages. 11. D ISCUSSION A . The M otion to D ism iss A districtcourtshoulddismissacomplaintunderRule 12(b)(6)oftheFederalRulesof CivilProcedure if,accepting al1w ell-pleaded allegations in the com plaintastrue and draw ing all reasonable factualinferencesin the plaintifrsfavor,the com plaintdoesnotallege çEenough facts to state a claim to reliefthatisplausible on itsface.''3 BellAtl. Corp.v.Tw ombly,550 U .S.544, 570(2007).CCII AIIplaintiffsobligaiiontoprovidethegroundsofhisentitlementtoreliefrequires m ore than labels and conclusions,and a formulaic recitation ofthe elem ents ofa cause of action 2 The initialcom plaintalso raised an ex postfacto claim , butDesperdoes notpursuethisclaim in his am endedcomplaint. 3 Thedefendants'responsesin opposition toDesper'smotion forsummaryjudgmentand motion for interlocutory injunctive reliefinclude sworn affdavitsand otherdocumentation. ln considering themotion to dism issfiledby defendantsClarkeandRobinson,however,thecourthasnotconsideredanyofthesem attersoutside thepleadings.Onthatbasis,thecourthasalsodeniedDesper'smotiontocom peldiscovery. 4 willnotdo.''ld.at555.4 Tostateaclaim underj 1983,aplaintiffmustallege(Ctheviolationof a rightsecured by the Constitution and law s ofthe United States,and m ustshow thatthe alleged deprivation w as com m itted by a person acting under color of state law .'' W estv.Atkins.487 U.S.42,48(1988). 1. FirstAm endm ent N eitherthe Supreme Courtnorthe United States CourtofAppealsforthe Fourth Circuit hasrecognized a clearly established constitutionalrightto visitation w hile in prison. W illiam sv. Ozmint,716 F.3d 801,806 (4th Cir.2013) (citing Overton v.Bazzetta,539 U.S.126,131 (2003:.Infact,controllingcaselaw intheFourthCircuitholdsthatEEthereisnoconstitutional right to prison visitation, either for prisoners or visitors''under the Frçedom of A ssociation Clause of the FirstAm endm ent. W hite v.Keller,438 F.Supp.110,115(D.Md.1977),aff'd, 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir.1978);Oxendine v.Williams,509 F.2d 1405,1407 (4th Cir.1975) holding that ttlprisoner) has no constitutionalright to physical contactwith his family''). CT reedom of physical association is inconsistent w ith an incarcerative penal system . A ccordingly,this courtbelieves that prisoners have no associationalright to receive visitors. Thigrightislostinaccordancewith dueprocessatthetimeofcriminaljudgment-'' White,438 F.Supp.at117. Flourfactors are relevantin deciding whetheraprison regulation affecting a constitutionalrightthatsulwives incarceration w ithstands constitutionalchallenge: whether the regulation has a çGivalid, rational connection''' to a legitim ate governm entalinterest;whether alternative m eans are open to inm ates to exercise the asserted right;w hat impact an accom m odation of the right would have on guards and inm ates and prison resources; and whether there are GGready alternatives''to the regulation. 4 The courthas omitted internalquotation marks, alterations,and citations here and throughoutthis opinion,unlessotherwisenoted. 5 Overton,539U.S.at132 (quoting Turnerv.Saflev,482 U.S.78,89-91(1987)). Applyingthe Turnerfactors,the Courtupheld the visitation restrictions atissue in Overton and expressly held thatthey furthered legitim atepenologicalinterests in m aintaining internalsecurity and protecting child visitorsfrom sexualm isconduct. Even if Desper retains som e constitutionalrightto visit w ith his daughter,the VD OC visitation regulation similarly withstandshisj1983 challengeundertheTurnerfactors. First, the regulation and its requirem entsbeara clear and reasonable relationship to the state's interest in protecting children from sexualm isconduct and in prom oting sex offendertreatm entsuccess. SeeOverton,539U.S.at133(çGprotectingchildrenfrom harm isalso alegitimategoal.'');Alex v.Beard,No.CIV.1:CV-09-1711,2010 WL 1416837,at*4 (M.D.Pa.Apr.6,2010)(d1g1qtis logicalthatw here prison officials believe a sex offender'scontactwith any particular individual w ould not prom ote treatm ent or rehabilitation efforts, visitation w ith particular individuals should beprohibited.''). To continuevisitation afterthe regulation took èffect,Desperhad to apply foran exem ption and undergo an assessm entto ensure thatvisitation w ith K .D .w as safe forher. Only afterhe failed to do so afterm any m onths did offcialsdisapprove continued visits unless he obh ined an exem ption. The assessm entdid notreach the resultD esperand hism other desired. Nevertheless,that assessm ent requirem ent w as reasonably related to K .D .'S safety, given D esper's adm itted history of m ental health problem s and sex offenses w ith teenagers. Furthermore,the denials ofvisitation were notperm anent. D esper m ay reapply for a visitation exem ption every year. Overtim e in histreatmentprogram ,the safety assessm entm ay change. Second,D esper retains other means of com m unicating w ith K .D .and maintaining his relationship w ith her. He m ay speak w ith her on the telephone,correspond with her through letters,and convey m essagesto herthrough Glenda orotherfam ily mem berswho visithim . See 6 Overton,539U.S.at135(noting thatsex offenderstccancommunicatewiththosewhomay not visit by sending messages through those who ' are allowed to visit,''and Etltlhey .may com m unicate with persons outside the prison by letterand telephoner''in satisfaction ofsecond Turnerfactor).G'll-jhefactthat(Desperqmaymaintaincontactwith (K.D.)throughmeansother than'visitation supportsthe reasonableness ofthe (prison visitationlpolicy.'' W irsching v. Colorado,360F.3d1191,1201(10thCir.2004). Third, allow ing D esper to resum e visitation w ith K.D .w ithout the safety assessm ent process the visitation procedure requires would dEimpairthe ability of corrections officers to protectallwho are inside a prison'sw alls.'' Overton 539 U .S.at131..ln such circum stances,the courtiGmustaccord substantialdeferenceto theprofessionaljudgmentofprison administrators, w ho beara signifk antresponsibility for defining the legitim ate goalsofa corrections system and fordeterm ining the m ostappropriate m eansto accom plish them .'' ld.at132. Fourth, Desper has not proposed any ready alternative to the existing regulation that w ould furtherthe sam e interests to the sam e extent. H e simply insists thathe should be granted an exem ption,based on hispastvisitation w ith K.D .and his desire to resum e it. A s discussed, the am ended visitation regulation does notend Desper's ability to m aintain a relationship w ith K .D . Itm erely lim its sex offenders'physicalvisitation with their m inor children to those who obtain the exem ption- after a personalized assessm entdeterm ines thatsuch visits do notpose a safet 'y risk to the child orunderm ine the offender'streatm entprogram . 7 Forthe stated reasons,the courtconcludesthatDesper'sallegations failto state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly,the courtw illgrantthe m otion to dism iss,and denyDesper'smotionforsummaryjudgment,sastohisclaimsundertheFirstAmendment. 2. Due Process The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am endmentprohibits a shte from depriving ffany person of life,liberty,orproperty w ithoutdue process oflaw .'' U .S.Const.am end.X IV, j1. To state a claim thatofficialshave deprived him ofaconstimtionally protected liberty interestwithoutdueprocess,C1aplaintiffmust(1)identifyaprotectedlibertyorproperty interest and (2)demonstratedeprivation ofthatinterestwithoutdueprocessoflaw.'' Prietov.Clarke, 780 F.3d 245,248 (4th Cir.2015). The Supreme Courthas rejected the argument that dEunfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause.'' Kv.D ep't of Corr.v. Thompson,490U.S.454,460(1989).çç-l-hedenialofprison accesstoaparticularvisitoriswell w ithin the term s of confinem entordinarily contem plated by a prison sentence,and therefore is not.independently protected by the Due Process Clause.'' 1d.at461. Therefore,to prove thathe hasaprotected libertyinterestatstakehere,Despermust(a)pointtot(abasisforaninterestor expectation instateregulations''invisitation,Prieto,780F.3dat250;and(b)show thatdenialof thatinterestim posed on him an %tatypicaland significanthardship ...in relation to the ordinary incidentsofprisonlife.''6 Sandinv Connor,515U.S.472,484(1995). . First,the VD O C'S decision to change its visitation policies did not im plicate Desper's constitutionalrights. Itisw ellestablished thatstate ofticial'sfailure to abide by proceduralrules 5A courtcangrantsummaryjudgmentonlyçdifthemovantshowsthatthereisnogenuinedisputeastoany materialfactandthemovantisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.''Fed.R.Civ.P.56(a).Becausethecourt . hereindeterminesthatDesperfailsto stateanyclaim upon whichreliefcanbegranted,thecourtalso concludesthat hecannotbeentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw,anddenieshismotionaccordingly. 6 Only ifDesperm akesboth oftheseshow ingsdoestheDueProcessClauserequireaparticularm e% ure ofproceduralprotectionbeforehisvisitationstatuschanges.Sandin.515U .S.at487. 8 and regulations does not,in and of itself, state a federaldue process issue. Riccio v.Cty.of FairfaxeVa.,907F.2d 1459,1469(4thCir.1990). Second,D esper cannot m ake either of the required show ings to establish a protected liberty interestarising from the VDOC'Sprocedure asamended in 2014. Certainly,the policy doej notcreate an expectation thatD esper,as a sex offender,can continue visitation w ith K .D . w hile she isa m inor. Rather,the policy orohibits sex offenders from visitation w ith theirm inor children until they undergo the safety assessm ent and obtain an exem ption. The lack of any policy-created expectation thatDesperand K .D .can continue visitation isfatalto hisprocedural due process claim . See,e.2.,Kv.D ep'tofCon'.,490 U .S.at462-63.M oreover,the courtcannot find thatthe visitation policy changes imposed an atypicaland signifcanthardship on Desper compared to ordin'ary prison circumstances. ld.at461 (finding tûdenialofprison accessto a particular visitor'' to be GGwellw ithin the term s of confinem ent ordinarily contem plated by a prispn sentence'').Asdiscussed,Despercan maintain hisrelationship withK.D.whilesheisa m inor through other available m eans of com m unication and can reapply every year for an exemption. Forthe stated reasons,the courtconcludes thatD esperfailsto state a due process claim upon which reliefcan be granted. Therefore,the courtw illgrantthe m otion to dism iss,and deny Desper'smotionforsummaryjudgment,astothisclaim. 3. EqualProtection TheEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentdeclaresthatttlnqoStateshall . . . denytoanyperdon...theequalprotectionofthelaws.''U.S.Const.,amend.XIV,j1.This provision does not altogether forbid states from classifying individuals; rather it dskeeps 9 governm entaldecisionm akers from treating differently persons who are in a11relevantrespects alike.''NordlinRerv.Hahn,505U.S.1,10(1992). To succeed on an equalprotection claim ,a plaintiffm ustfirstdem onstratethathe has been treated differently from others with whom he is sim ilarly situated and that the unequal treatm ent w as the result of intentional or purposeful discrim ination. Once this show ing is m ade, the court proceeds to determ ine whetherthe disparity in treatmentcan bejustiûed underthe requisite levelof scnltiny. Kerrv.MarshallUniv.Bd.ofGovernors,824F.3d 62,82 (4th Cir.2016)(quotingMorrisonv. GarraRhtv,239 F.3d 648,654 (4th Cir.2001:. W hen an inmate brings an equalprotection claim ,his allegations of unequal treatm ent m ust be analyzed in light of the prison's special Seçurity and m anagem entConcerns. M orrison,239 F.3d at655. S'The burden,m oreover,is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.'' Overton,539 U .S.at 132. The courtcannotGnd thatD esperhas m et,or could m eet,his burden to statean equalprotection claim here. First, Desper has not shown that he w as treated differently than other sex offenders confned in VD OC prisons. Under the 2014 am endments to the visitation policy, a11 sex offendersw ere required to apply foran exemption and undergo the sam e type ofassessm entthat D esperunderwent. Second,he cannotshow thathe issim ilarly situated in allrelevantrespectsto other sex offenders who have been granted exem ptionsto visitwith their m inor children. A s a prerequisite forthis exem ption,evaluators m usthave determ ined thatthe inmate's crim inaland m entalhealth history and otherfactors did notcreate risksofpotentialharm to children'ssafety. Evaluators did notreach this conclusion aboutD esper,however,during the assessm entofthese samç factors. 10 The courtconcludesthatD esper fails to state any equalprotection claim on which relief could be granted. A ccordingly,the courtw illgrant the m otion to dism iss,and deny D esper's motionforsummaryjudgment,onthisclaim. B. O therM atters TheM otionforInterlocutoryInjunctiveRelief Becausepreliminary injunctivereliefisan extraordinaryremedy,theparty seeking such relief must m ake a clearshow ing (tthathe is likely to succeed on the m erits,thathe is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence ofprelim inary relief,thatthe balance ofequitiestips in his favor,andthatan injunction isin thepublicinterest-'' W interv.Nat.Res.Def.Council.Inc., 555U.S.7,20(2008).Giventhecourt'sfndingthatDesperstatesnoconstitutionalclaim upon which reliefcan begranted underj1983,hehasnotmadeaclearshowing ofalikelihood of success on the m erits ofhisunderlying claim s in this law suit. A ccordingly,he cannotm eetall fourW interrequirem entsforinterlocutory relief. The courtwilldeny hism otion accordingly. 2. Unserved and Unnam ed D efendants In his am ended complaint,D esper adds tw o additionalV DO C offcials- stransky and V argo. These defendants are not yet parties to this action, because the court has not accom plished service upon them . Before doing so,how ever,the courtisrequired to dism iss any action orclaim ûled by a prisoneragainsta governm entalentity oroffcerifthe courtdeterm ines the action or claim is frivolous,m alicious, or fails to state a claim on w hich relief m ay be granted.28U.S.C.j1915A(b)(1).Giventhecourt'sGndinghereinthatDesperfailstostateany j'1983claims,forthatreason,thecourtmustalsosummarilydismisshisclaimsagainstStransky andVargo,pursuanttoj1915A(b)(1). Desper's am ended com ple t also names Jane and John Doe defendants. The court noM ed hlm by orderentered M arch 8,2018,thatifhe falled t)provlde the nsmesofthe Doe defehdnnts,hisclàlmqagnlnntèem wouldbedlsmlssedwlthoutprebdice.Hehasfailedtodo so. Accordingly,a11clslmqagslnqttheDoedefendnntswillbe digmlssed withoutpreludice, pursnnnttoRule 4(m). ln any event forreasonsalready explained,Desperfailsto stateany acGonable91983clslm agm'nKtanyone.Thus,anyamendmenttonnmetheDoedefendantsnow would bedenied asfutlle. 111. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, the court will grant Desper's mo:ons to flle an amended complaint;grantthem otion to dismissSled by defendantsClckeand Roblnsonideny Desper's motionsforKnmmo Judgmentand interlooutory injundlvereliet and slxmmsrily dismissal1 clm'mnàgalns'totherdefendnnts,purmmntto j1915A(b)(1)orRule4(m).Anappropriateordér wlllentertbisday. ! The Clerk is directed to send copies ofthis memorandum opinion and accompO ying ordertothepndles. ENT ER 4 :Thiskg dayofJanuary,2019. SeniorUnlted StatesDisi ctJudge 12
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