Dalton v. Berryhill, No. 7:2017cv00519 - Document 18 (W.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 10/30/2018. (ck)
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CLERK' S OFFICE LJ.S.DiSq-. A7 ROAN CCIUFG OKE,VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TH E W ESTERN D ISTRICT O F V IRG INIA R OAN OICE D IVISION 0I 2 2 BKJ c, D usx cu ç. TRW ITY S.DA LTON , CivilActionN o.7:17CV00519 Plaintiff, M EM O M N DU M O PIN IO N NANCY A.BERRYHILL,Acting Com m issioner of SocialSectuity, By:Hon.Glen E.Cortrad SeniorUnited StatesDistrictJudge Defendant. Plaintiffhasliled thisaction challenging the finaldecision oftheComm issionerofSocial Security denying plaintiffs claim s for disabled cllild's instlrance benefks and supplemental sectlrityincomebenefitstmdertheSocialSecurityAct,asamended,42U.S.C.jj402(d)and423, and 42 U.S.C.j 1381 etseq.,respectively. Jurisdiction ofthiscourtisplzrsuantto 42 U.S.C. j405(g)and42U.S.C.j 1383(c)(3). Asreflectedbythememorandaandargumentsubmittedby the parties,the issues now before the courtare whether the Comm issioner's fnaldecision is supported by substantialevidence,orwhetherthereisEçgood cause''to necessitaterem andingthe casetotheCommissionerforfurtherconsideration. See42U.S.C.j405(g). The plaintiff,Trinity S.D alton,w as born on N ovem ber 7,1990, M r.D alton evenm ally graduated from high schoolwith a modified diplomaoattheageof 19. (Tr.820). He hasno historyofpastrelevantwork. (Tr.36,68). Dalton v. Berryhill Doc. 18 On Septem ber 13, 2013, M r. Dalton filed applications for disabled child's instlrance benefits and supplem ental sectuity incom e benefits. In filing his current claim s, M r. Dalton alleged thathe becnme disabled for a11forms of substantialgainfulem ploym enton M arch 18, Dockets.Justia.com 2012,due to a heartcondition and problemswith hisrightllip. (Tr.246). M.r.Dalton now maintainsthathehasremained disabled tothepresenttim e. M r.Dalton'sapplicationsweredenied upon initialconsideration and reconsideration. He then requested and received a denovo hearing and review before an Administrative Law Judge. In an opinion dated Novem ber 23,2016,the Law Judge also detennined,after applying the five-step sequentialevaluation process,thatMr.Dalton is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R.jj 404.1520 and 416.920.1 The Law Judge found thatM r. Dalton suffers from several severe im pairm ents, including tçstattls post aortic tear requiring stent placem ent, status post open reductioninternalfixationlofltherighthip,and(a)learningdisabilityy''butthattheseimpainnents do not,eitherindividually orin combination,m eetormedically equaltherequirementsofalisted impairment.(Tr.30-31). TheLaw JudgethenassessedM r.Dalton'sresidualfunctionalcapacity asfollow s' . After careful consideration of the entire record,the tmdersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perfonn a range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.15674a) and 416.967($, in that the claimant is able to frequently liftand carry 10 potmds,occasionally liftand cany 20 potmds,and sitfor six hotlrs and stand/walk forfotlr hotlrs in an eight-hour period. In addition, the claimant can never climb ladders,ropes,orscaffolds,can occasionally climb rnmpsorstairs, kneel,or crawl,can frequently stoop or crouch,and should avoid concentrated exposlzreto hazards. 1A claim fordisabled child's insurance benetitsdsisanalyzed tmderthe sam e tive-step sequentialprocess used to determinedisability forpurposesofdisability instlrance benetitsand supplementalsecurity income,and the claimantmustalsohaveadisabilitythatbegan before(he)reachedage22.1' Hicksv.Colvim No.7:12-cv-00618, 2014U.S.Dist.LEXIS22274,at*4n.2(W .D.Va.Feb.20,2014)(citationsomitted). TheprocessrequirestheLaw Judgeto consider,insequence,whetheraclaimant:(1)isengaged in substantialgainfulactivity;(2)hasasevere impairment;(3)hasanimpairmentthatmeetsorequalstherequirementsofalistedimpairment;(4)canrett u' ntöhis pastrelevantwork;and (5) ifnot,whether he can perform other work in the nationaleconomy. 20 C.F.R. jj 404.1520 and 416.920. Ifa decision can bereached atany step in thesequentialevaluationprocess,further evaluation isurm ecessary. 1d. (Tr.32). Given this residualfunctionalcapacity,and after considering the testimony ofa vocationalexpert,theLaw JudgedetenninedthatM r.Dalton retainssufficientfunctionalcapacity to perform certain tmskilled,sedentary work roles existing in signiscantnumberin the national economy. (Tr.36). Accordingly,theLaw JudgeconcludedthatM r.Daltonisnotdisabled,and that he is not entitled to benefits under either federal progrnm . See generally 20 C.F.R. jj404.350(a)(5),404.1520(g),and 416.920(g). The Law Judge'sopinion wasadopted asthe finaldecision of the Comm issionerby the SocialSectlrity Administration's Appeals Cotmcil. Having exhausted a11 available adm inistrative rem edies,M r.Dalton has now appealed to this court. W hile plaintiff may be disabled for certain forms of employm ent,the crucial facm al determination is whether plaintiff is disabled for a11forms of substantialgainfillemployment. See 42 U.S.C.jj 423(d)(2)and 1382c(a). There are fottrelements of proofwhich mustbe consideredinmakingsuch ananalysis. Theseelementsaresummarizedasfollows:(1)objective medicalfactsand clinicalfindings;(2)the opinionsand conclusionsoftreatingphysicians;(3) subjectiveevidenceofphysicalmanifestationsofimpairments,asdescribedthroughaclaimant's testimony;and(4)theclaimant'seducation,vocationalhistory,residualskills,andage. Vitek v. Finch,438F.2d 1157,1159-60(4th Cir.1971);Undem oodv.Ribicoff,298 F.2d 850,851(4th Cir.1962). On appeal,M r.Dalton raises severalargum ents,including thatthe Law Judge erred in detennininghisresidualftmctionalcapacityandpresented alegally insufficienthypotheticaltothe vocationalexpert. A fter review ing the record and considering the parties'argum ents,the court finds çsgood cause'' to rem and the case to the Com m issioner for further developm ent and consideration. See42U.S.C.j405(g). The adm inistrative record reveals that M r.Dalton has a specific lenrning disability for whichhereceivedspecialeducation servicesinschool. (Tr.820,821,827,865). Atsteptwoof thesequentialevaluationprocess,theLaw Judgefotmdthatplaintiffslearningdisabilityççcausegsj significantfunctionallimitations''and therefore qualifiesasa ûçsevere''mentalimpairmenttmder theapplicableregulations. (Tr.30). Additionally,atstep three ofthe sequentialprocess,the Law Judge detennined thatplaintiffs mentalim pairmentresultsin Gtmoderate diflkulties''with çsconcentration,persistence orpace.'' (Tr.31). Although the Law Judge did notinclude any restrictionsrelated to plaintiffslenrning disability in hisresidualfllnctionalcapacity assessm ent ortheinitialhypotheticalpresentedto thevocationalexpert(Tr.32,68),thevocationalexpert voltmtarilyaddedalimitationtoSGunskilled''work. (Tr.68)(t(Ithinkthehypotheticalbestfrnmes the sedentary work,obviously,unskilled. Further,I suggest we look atproduction-odented work.''). Thevocationalexpertthen identified severalunskilled,sedentaryjobsthatcould be performed by an individualwith the limitations described by the Law Judge. (Tr.68). In particular,thevocationalexperttestified thatthedtresidualoccupationalbase''would includethe jobsofassembler,bagger/smffer,andinspector/tester. (Tr.68--69). TheLaw Judgeultimately reliedonthetestimony ofthevocationalexpertin determiningthatççtherearejobsin signifcant numbersinthenationaleconomythattheclaimantcanperform.'' (Tr.36). In the court'sview,the difficulty with the Law Judge's evaluation ofplaintiffsm ental impairmentistwo-fold. First,theLaw Judge'sopinion appearsto correlate an abilitytoperform sim ple tasks w ith the ability to m aintain concentration,persistence,and pace. On page 8 ofhis decision,theLaw Judgesllmmarily statesasfollows: Asthere isno allegation orevidence ofany problem swith social interaction,thetmdersigned findsthattheclaimanthasno difficulty m aintaining social functioning. However,the undersigned finds that the m ental impainnent causes moderate difficulties in 4 m aintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. Thus, the tmdersigned finds that restrictions imposed by Ethe) learning disability are lim ited to inability to perform work that is not unskilled in nature. (Tr.35). Thecourtagreeswith theplaintiffthattheLaw Judge'sconclusory analysisconflicts with thedecision oftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFotu'th Circuitin M asciov.Colvin, 780F.3d632(4th Cir.2015). InM ascio,theFourthCircuitexplainedthatCctheabilitytoperlbrm simpletasksdiffersfrom theabilitytostay ontask''and thatGtgoqrlly thelatterlimitation would accountfora claimant'slimitation in concentration,persistence,orpace.'' M ascio,780 F.3d at 638. Thus,m erely lim iting a claim antto tmskilled work,withoutany further explanation,is insufûcientunder M ascio. See ila (Giperhaps the ALJ can explain Nvhy h4ascio's rnoderate limitation in concentration,persistence,orpace atstep three doesnottranslateinto alim itation in M ascio'sresidualftmctionalcapacity ....Butbecause the ALJ here gave no explanation,a remandisin order.''). Forsimilarreasons,the courtis also unable to conclude thatthe Law Judge presented a legally sufficient hypothetical to the vocational expelt W hile the Law Judge adopted the vocationalexpert'sopinion thatplaintiffcan perfonn production-oriented w ork asan assembler, smffer,orinspector,the vocationalexpertwasnotasked to considerthesignitk anceofm oderate limitationsin concentration,persistence,orpace in theperformanceofsuchjobs,a11ofwhich would seem inglyrequire attendancetotask. Nevertheless,theLaw Judgerelied onthetestimony ofthevocationalexpertin detenniningthattherearejobsexisting in significantnumbersin the nationaleconom y which M r.Dalton can perform . In W alkerv.Bowen,889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1989),the Fourth Circuitcommented as follow s: Thepurposeofbringing in avocationalexpertistoassisttheALJin determining whether there is work available in the national econom ywhichthisparticularclaimantcan perform. In orderfora vocationalexpert's opinion to be relevant or helpful,itm ust be basedupon aconsideration ofa11otherevidenceintherecord,andit m ustbe in responseto properhypotheticalquestionsw hich fairly set outallofclaimant'sim painnents. Id.at50(citationsomitted). ln his opinion,the Law Judge did notoffer any specitk rationale foromitting m oderate lim itations in concentration,persistence,or pace from the hypotheticalquestion on which the vocationalexpert'sopinionwasbased. Thecourtissimplyunabletoconcludethatthisparticular hypotheticalquestion,which was devoid of any m entalrestrictions,was suffcientto alertthe vocational expertto the existence of m oderate lim itations in plaintiffs concentration,work persistence,and attendance to task. The courtbelieves thatconsideration of such lim iGtions would be importantin assessing a claimant's capacity to perform the jobs identitied by the vocationalexpert. Indeed,in responsetoadditionalquestions,thevocationalexperttestifiedthat thosevery snmejobswould no longerbeavailableifthehypotheticalindividualwasdistracted f' rom worldngforatleast20percentoftheworkday. (Tr.70). M oreover,the Fourth Circuithas specifkally held thatççan ALJdoesnotacc' otmt Gfora claimant's limitations in concentration,persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical questiontosimple,routinetasksortmskilledwork.''' M ascio,780F.3dat638(quotingW inschel v.Comm 'rofSoc.Sec.,631F.3d 1776,1180(11thCir.2011:. ThecourtrecognizesthatM ascio does notstand forthe proposition thatm oderate lim itations in concentration,persistence,orpace alwaystranslateintoalimitationinaclaimant'sresidualflmctionalcapality. Rather,asindicated above,the decision tmderscores the Law Judge's duty to explain how his residualftmctional capacity findingsadequately accotmtfora claimaqt'swork-related lirnitations. In thiscase,the Law Judgedidnotprovidesuch explanaion. Consequently,:(arem and isin order-'' Id. For the reasons stated, the court fmds GGgood cause'' to rem and this case to the Commissionerforflldherdevelopm entand consideration.2 If the Commissioner is = able to decidethe case in plnin tiY sfavoron the basis ofthe existing recordjthe Commissionerwill $ conducta supplementaladministrative hearing atwhich both sideswillbe allowed to present additionalevidenceand argllment. An appropriate orderofremandwillbeenteredthisday. TheClerk isdirectedtosend certifedcopiesoftbismemorandl'm opiniontoal1counselof record. DATED;Tlus-:4* dayofoctober, 2018. - SeniorUnited StatesDistrictJudge 2ln lightcfthecourt'sdecision to remandthecasetotheComm issioner,thecourtdeolinestoaddressM r. Daltonjsremqiningc' laimgoferror. ' 7
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