Hurst v. Berryhill, No. 7:2017cv00473 - Document 17 (W.D. Va. 2018)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 11/20/2018. (aab)

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CLERK' S OFFICE U.S.DISX COURT ATROANOKE,VA IN TH E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU RT FILED FOR THEWESTERN DISTRICT OFVIRGINIA Ngy 2g 2gjj ROAN OU DIV ISION W ILLIAM DA VID H URST, J LI A BY: CivilA ction N o. 7:17CV 00473 () CL ERK Plaintiff, M EM O R AND UM O PG ION NAN CY A .BERRYH ILL,A cting Com m issionerofSocialSecurity, By:H on.G len E.Conrad SeniorUnited States DistrictJudge Defendant. Plaintiffhasfiled this action challenging the finaldecision ofthe Com m issionerofSocial Securitydenying plaintifrsclaim foraperiodofdisability anddisability insurancebeneitsunder theSocialSecurityAct,asamended,42U.S.C.jj416(i)and423. Jurisdiction ofthiscourtis established pursuantto 42 U.S.C.j 405(g). Asreflected by the memoranda and argument subm itted by the parties,the issues now before the courtare whetherthe Com m issioner's final decision is supported by substantialevidence,or whether there is tGgood cause''to necessitate remandingthecasetotheCommissionerforfurtherconsideration. See42U.S.C.j405(g). The plaintiff,W illiam D avid H urst,w asborn on February 26, 1974. He com pleted his high schooleducation and eventually graduated from college. (Tr.39). M r.Hursthasbeen em ployed asa hospitalcleaner,security guard,and custodian. He worked fora contractcleaning service for partof2015 and 2016 with the assistance ofajob coach. (Tr.17,200,278). H owever,theA dm inistrative Law Judge determ ined thatsuch em ploym entdid notreach the level Hurst v. Berryhill Doc. 17 ofsubstantialgainfulactivity. (Tr.17). On Septem ber 26,2013,M r.Hurst filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. In fling his current claim , M r.H urst alleged that he becam e disabled forallfol' m sofsubstantialgainfulem ploym enton Septem ber19,2013,dueto Asperger's Dockets.Justia.com cuE syndrome,attentiondeficithyperactivitydisorder(ADHD),andinsomnia. (Tr.205). Mr.Hurst now m aintains thathe has rem ained disabled to the presenttim e. The record reveals that M r. H urstm etthe insured status requirem ents of the A ct at allrelevanttim es covered by the tinal decisionoftheCommissioner. Seegenerally42U.S.C.jj416(i)and423(a). M r.H urst's application was denied upon initial consideration and reconsideration. He then requested and received a de novo hearing and review before an Adm inistrative Law Judge. In an opinion dated N ovem ber2,2016,the Law Judgealso determ ined,afterapplying the tive-step 1 sequentialevaluationprocess,thatMr.Hurstisnotdisabled. See20C.F.R.j404.1520. The Law Judge found thatM r.H urst suffers from severalsevere impairm ents,including A sperger's syndrom e,AD HD,hearing loss,depression,and anxiety,butthatthese im pairm entsdo not,either individually orin com bination,meetorm edically equalthe requirem ents of a listed impairm ent. (Tr.17-18). TheLaw JudgethenassessedM r.Hurst'sresidualfunctionalcapacityasfollows: After careful consideration of the entire record,the undersigned finds that the claim ant has the residual functional capacity to perform a fullrange of work at a1l exertionallevels but w ith the follow ing nonexertional lim itations: the claim ant is able to undersànd,rem em berand carry outsimpleinstructionsin repetitive unskilled work. He should have no interaction w ith the general public and no m ore than occasionalinteraction with co-w orkersand supervisors. H e w ould be able to respond appropriately to supervision, co-w orkers, and usual work situations. H e should avoid fast-paced environm ents like those on an assem bly line. He shouldhavestaticjobdutiesthatremainfairly constantandavoid exposureto excessively loud background noise such asheavy traffc andjackhammers/construction equipmentin the immediatework environm ent. 1The processrequiresthe Law Judge to consider, i n sequence,whethera claimant:(1)isengaged in substantialgainfulactivity;(2)hasasevereimpairment;(3)hasanimpairmentthatmeetsorequalstherequirements ofalistedimpairment;(4)canreturntohispastrelevantwork;and(5)ifnot,whetherhecanperform otherworkinthe nationaleconomy. 20 C. F.R.j404.1520. Ifadecision can bereached atany stepinthesequentialevaluation process,furtherevaluation isunnecessary. Id. 2 (Tr.20). Given such aresidualfunctionalcapacity,and afterconsidering thetestimony ofa vocationalexpert,the Law Judge determ ined thatM r.H urst isunable to perfotm any of hispast relevantwork. (Tr.24). However,the Law Judge found thatMr.Hurstretainssuffcient functional capacity to perform other w ork roles existing in signitk ant num ber in the national economy. (Tr.25). Accordingly,theLaw JudgeconcludedthatMr.Hurstisnotdisabled,and that he is not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. j404.1520(g). TheLaw Judge'sopinionwasadoptedastheGnaldecisionoftheCommissioner by the Social Security A dm inistration's Appeals Council. H aving exhausted all available adm inistrative rem edies,M r.Hursthasnow appealed to thiscourt. W hile plaintiff m ay be disabled for certain form s of em ploym ent, the crucial factual determ ination is whether plaintiff is disabled for a1lfonns of substantial gainfulem ploym ent. See42U.S.C.j423(d)(2). Therearefourelementsofproofwhichmustbecopsideredinmaking such an analysis. Theseelementsare summarized asfollows:(1)objective medicalfactsand clinicalfindings;(2)theopinionsandconclusionsoftreatingphysicians;(3)subjectiveevidence ofphysicalmanifestationsofimpairments,asdescribedthroughaclaimant'stestimony;and(4) the claimant's education,vocationalhistory,residualskills,and age. Vitek v.Finch,438 F.2d 1157,1159-60(4thCir.1971);Underwoodv.Ribicoff,298F.2d850,851(4thCir.1962). On appeal,M r.H urstraises severalargum ents,including thatthe Law Judge im properly assessed the opinion evidence and erred in determ ining his residualfunctionalcapacity. After reviewing the record and considering the parties'arguments,the courtfnds f<good cause''to rem and the case to the Com m issionerforfurtherdevelopm entand consideration. See 42 U .S.C. j405(g). The m edical record establishes that M r. H urst suffers from a com bination of severe nonexertionalimpairm ents. In Septem berof 2012,D r.George W agner,a physician w ith N ew HorizonsHealthcare,diagnosed plaintiffwith ADHD and insomnia. (Tr.311). Heprescribed trazodone,an antidepressant,w hich plaintiffcontinued to take atthe tim e ofthe adm inistrative hearing. (Tr.46,311). OnNovember12,2013,M r.HurstpresentedtoDr.AlanKatz,aclinical psychologist,fora neuropsychologicalevaluation. (Tr.321). Dr.Katz,who had previously evaluated plaintiffin 2001,noted thatplaintiffhas ::a longstanding history ofsocialanxiety that has been com plicated by interm ittent episodes of poorly m odulated anger and reduced social judgment'' (Tr.321). Dr.Katz also noted thatplaintiffexhibits Kçclassic manifestations''of autism spectrum disorderorA sperger'ssyndrom e,such asçtsocialaw kw ardness,decreased insight and a non-verbal learning disability,''and that other Elcom plicating factors''include Ellifelong depression,reduced stresstolerance and fears about his ability to mainu in independentliving.'' (Tr.321). Basedonclinicalinterviews,hisreview ofexistingrecords,andtheresultsofaseries ofquestionnairesand tests,Dr.Katzdiagnosed plaintiffw ith autism spectrum disorder,A sperger's syndrome,a visualimpairment,and right fronto-parietaldeficits. (Tr.327). More recent treatm entrecordsfrom N ew HorizonsH ealthcare also retlectdiagnosesofA sperger's syndrom e anddepression,aswellasmoderatehearinglossinbothears. (Tr.389,400,404,405,407). The record containsseveralopinions regarding the im pactofM r.H urst's impairm ents on hisability to w ork. Atthe conclusion ofthe initialneuropsychologicalevaluation,D r.Katznoted thatM r.HurstEGwould be w ellserved by an application for SocialSecurity benefits,''butthathe remained hopefulthatplaintiffsEçacquisition ofbenefits ofthis type (would)prove to be a temporary arrangement,''sinceemploymentwould beEtthehealthiestofallpossibilities-'' (Tr. 326). Dr.KatzrecommendedthatplaintiffCsinitiate contactwiththeDepartmentofAgingand RehabilittiveServicesfor...assistancewithjobexploration,interviewingskillsandapossible position ofsupported employm ent.'' (Tr.326). 0nDecember5,2013,plaintiffreturnedtoDr. Katz for a follow-up appointment,during which plaintiff expressed frustration çGdue to his 4 unemploymentstatus.'' (Tr.328). Atthatpoint,Dr.Katzopinedthatplaintiffççwould bebest served by at least shortterm disability support from Social Security given the host of social, emotionalandneurocognitivedefkitshecontinuestodisplay.'' (Tr.328). However,heurged M r. Hurst GGto continue to pursue a position of highly structured, repetitive and supervised em ploym entwhere he can work ata reduced pace and w ithoutsocialand interpersonaldem ands beingplaceduponhim.'' (Tr.328). The state agency psychologists,D r.Joseph Leizer and D r.Linda D ougherty,com pleted two form sregarding plaintifpsm entalhea1th:a Psychiatric Review Technique form and a M ental ResidualFunctionalCapacity Assessm entform . On thelatterfonu,both psychologistsnoted that M r.Hursthas m arked orm oderate lim itations in the categories ofGEsustained concentration and persistence,''çdsocial interaction,''and EEadaptation,''but thathe 4sshould be able to perform the basicmentaldemandsofsimpleand low stresscompetitivework on a sustained basis.'' (Tr. 75-77,88-90). Like Dr.Katz,howeversthe state agency psychologistsalso indicated that plaintiff would require a heightened levelof supervision as a result of his im pairm ents. W hen asked to explain,in narrative form ,the resulting lim itations in the area ofsustained concentration and persistence,they stated asfollow s: Theclaimantcan concentrateandpersistatsimplejob instructions and duties,m ake sim ple decisions,sustain ordinary routines w ith occasional extra suoervisorv helo, m aintain usual attendance requirem ents,work around others withoutbeing unduly distracted by them and m eetsim ple production requirem ents. (Tr.76,89)(emphasisadded). The record also containsa reportfrom Dennis Stephenson,a vocationalevaluatorwith the state'sDivisionofRehabilitativeServices. (Tr.329-330). BasedonM r.Hurst'sGsoverallwork performance,in conjunction with hislimited socialskillsand impairedjudgment''Stephenson expressedthebeliefthatM r.Hurstwouldhavedifficultymaintainingfull-timeemployment. (Tr. 330). HefurtheropinedthatplaintiffwouldneedEûsupportedemploymentservices''inorderto obtainpart-timework. (Tr.330). The Law Judge ultim ately concluded thatM r.H urst'snon-exertionalim pairm entsdo not renderhim disabled forallform s ofsubstantialgainfulem ploymentorotherw ise contribute to an overall disability. ln assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the Law Judge gave EGsignificantweight''totheopinionsofthestateagency psychologists. (Tr.22-23). TheLaw Judge also gave Rsom e weight''to Dr.K atz's opinion,noting thatitEEappears consistentwith the claimant'sresidualfunctionalcapacity.'' (Tr.23). Likewise,theLaw Judgegaveçlsomeweight'' toM r.Stephrnson'sopinion. (Tr.24). AlthoughMr.Stephenson didnotbelievethatplaintiff could successfully m aintain full-tim eemploym ent,the Law Judgenoted thatshe G<believesthatthe restrictions in the claim ant's residualfunctionalcapacity w ould enable him to sustain fulltim e work-'' (Tr.24). Upon review ofthe record,thecourtisunableto concludethattheLaw Judge'sassessm ent ofMr.Hurst'sresidualfunctionalcapacity ($RFC'')is supported by substantialevidence. In assessing a claim ant's RFC,the Law Judge considers G'allthe relevant evidence,''m edical or otherwise,to determ ine a claim ant's çEability to m eet the physical,m ental, sensory, and other requirementsofwork.'' 20 C.F.R.j 404.1545. The Law Judge Ctmust include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supportseach conclusion,citing specific medicalfacts (e.g.,laboratoryGndings)andnonmedicalevidence(e.g-,dailyactivities,observationsl-'' M ascio v.Colvin,780F.3d632,636(4thCir.2015)(quoting SSR 96-8p,1996SSR LEXIS 5,61Fed. Reg.34,474,34,475 (Ju1y 2,1996:. Additionally,ifthe RFC asseàsmentGçcontlictswith an opinionfrom amedicalsource,the(Law Judgelmustexplainwhytheopinionwasnotadopted.'' SSR 96-8p,1996 SSR LEXIS 5,61 Fed.Reg.at34,478. U ltim ately,the Law Judge 6<m ustb0th identifyevidencethatsupports(herlconclusionand <buildan accurateand logicalbridgefrom (thatlevidence to (her)conclusion-''' Woodsv.Berryhill,888F.3d 686,694 (4th Cir.2018) (emphasisinoriginal)(quotingM onroev.Colvin,826F.3d176,189(4thCir.2016:. IftheLaw Judge fails to adequately explain how she reached conclusions regarding the claim ant's RFC, remandisappropriate. SeeMascio.780F.3d at636;seealso Monroe,826F.3dat188(ç:(W )e hàve held thatrem and m ay be appropriate where an ALJ failsto assess a claim ant's capacity to perlbrm relevantfunctions,despite contrary evidence intherecord,orwhereotherinadequaciesin theALJ'Sanalysisfrustratemeaningfulreview.'')(internalquotationmarksomitted). In the court'sview ,the diffculty w ith the Law Judge'sassessm entofplaintiffs RFC is thatshe failed to adequately addressthe evidence indicating thatM r.Hurstwould need special supervision orassistanceto sustain em ploym ent. The record reveals thatM r.H urstrequired the assistanceofajobcoachtoobtainandperform hismostrecentpositionwithacontractcleaning service,anda1loftheopinionevidenceindicatesthatadditionalsupervisionorassistancewouldbe necessary,either in the form oftcoccasionalextra supervisory help''or <csupported em ploym ent'' services. (Tr.76,89,300,326). AlthôughtheLaw JudgeaffordedSlsignitkantweight''tothe opinions ofthe sàte agency physicians,she failed to explain w hy the RFC assessm entdid not includeanylimitationreflectingtheneedforextrasupervision. (Tr.22-23). Nordidsheexplain how the RFC assessm entwas(dconsistent''w ith Dr.K atz'srecom m endation thatplaintiffpursue a Gçposition ofsupported em ployment''ora EEposition ofhighly strucm red,repetitive and supervised em ploym entwhere he can w ork ata reduced pace and withoutsocialand interpersonaldem ands beingplaceduponhim.'' (Tr.328). Intheabsenceofsuchexplanations,thecourtisconstrained to conclude that remand is w arranted under the particular circum stances of this case. See Saundersv.Colvin,No.7:14-cv-00096,2015U.S.Dist.LEXIS 128902,at*29 (W .D.Va.Sept. 25, 2015) (EEGiven Saunders's interconnected challenges of hearing loss and intellectual deficiencies,theA LJ shallprovide furtherexplanation on rem and asto w hy he did notacceptthe medicalrecommendafonsoftemporA yreqnlrlng aJob coach orwhy such arecommendafon does not need to be included in the RFC.''); see also.e.a.. Goodman v.Berryhill.No. 2:16-cv-00285,2017U.S.DlstLEM S93188,at*29(W .D.W ash.June16,2017)(remandlngfor fne erproce lngswheretheLaw Judgefailed to addressaphysician'sopinion 1attheclaimant may need Rexka superdsipn and encomagementto sty on œ k'');Rabb v.Colvm. * No. 1:12-cv-02666,2014U.S.Dist.LEM S38695,at*59tfmdingthattheLaw Judgeerredlnfnlllng to KaccountforDr,Telford-Tyler's opinlo'ns thnt. , . Plalntiffm ay require some inlfalextra supervislon''orRexplainwhyloseopM onswerenotcredited''). For the reasons stated, the court snds Rgood caqse'' to remand the case to the . Comml ssloner for fi- her developmentand cons *ideraion.2 If the Comml .ssioneris'mnble to declde tblx case in plaintim sfavoron the basis ofthe existing record,the Commlssionerw111 conducta supplemenM admlnlma tive henring atwhlch b0t11sides w1llbe allowed to present addiGonalevidenceandargument. An appropdateorderofremand'wlllbeenteredtblsday. TheClerk isdirededto sendcee'ledcopiesofthismemorandum opiniontoa11counselof x cord. oATBo:n iszzM dayofxovember, 2018. SeniorUlted StatesDisd ctJudge 2h liltofthecourt'sdecisiontommsndt:ecasetotboCommissioner,thecourtdeolinestoaddress M r Hurspsre#mlnlngclm-mqofeaor. 8

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