Carr v. Berryhill, No. 7:2017cv00420 - Document 20 (W.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 11/30/2018. (ck)
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CLERK'S OFFICE U.S.DIST.COURT ATO OKE,VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE W ESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION LINDA E.CARR, NûV 1 2gjg J IA BY; D ux CLER/ CivilA ction N o.7:17CV 00420 Plaintiff, M EM ORANDUM OPIM ON By:Hon.Glen E.Corlrad SeniorUnited StatesDistrictJudge N A N CY A .BERRY HILL,A cting Comm issionerofSocialSectlrity, Defendant. Plaintiffhasfiled thisaction challenging thefinaldecision oftheComm issionerofSocial Security denying plaintiff'sclaim foraperiod ofdisabilityarld disability instlrancebenefitslmder theSocialSecudtyAct,asnmended,42U.S.C.jj416(i)and423. Judsdiction ofthiscourtis establishedpursumltto42U.S.C.j405(g). Thiscotlrt'sreview islimitedtoadeterminationasto whetherthere is substantialevidence to supportthe Comm issioner's conclusion thatplaintiff failed to m eetthe requirem ents forentitlem entto benefits tmder the Act. lfsuch subsfantial evidence exists,the finaldecision ofthe Com missionermustbe affirmed. Lawsv.Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640 (4th Cir.1966). Stated briefly,substantialevidence hasbeen defined assuch relevantevidence,considering the record as a whole,asm ightbe fotmd adequate to supporta conclusionbyareasonablemind. Richardsonv.Perales,402U.S.389,401(1971). Theplaintiff,LindaE.Cam wasborn on M ay 3,1961,and evenm allycompletedthetenth Carr v. Berryhill Doc. 20 grade in school. M s.Carrhas been em ployed as a cashier and kitchen helper. She lastw orked on aregularand sustainedbasisin 2006. On October2,2013,M s.Carrfiled arlapplication fora period ofdisabilityand disability instzrancebenefits. In fling hercurrentclaim ,M s.Carralleged / thatshebecnm edisabled foral1form sofsubstantialgainfulemploymenton June30,2006,dueto Dockets.Justia.com pain in her back and right shoulder, numbness and wenkness in her toes and right hand, fibromyalgia,initablebowelsyndrome,memoryproblems,depression,andanxiety. (Tr.216). M s.Carrnow maintainsthatshehasrem ained disabled to thepresenttime. Therecord reveals thatM s.Carrm ettheinstlred statusrequirem entsoftheActtllroughthefourth quarterof2010,but notthereafter. Seegenerally42U.S.C.jj416(i)and423(a). Consequently,plaintiffisentitled to a period of disability and disability insurance benests only if she has established that she becam edisabled fora11form sofsubstantialgainfulemploym enton orbeforeherdatelastinsured, D ecem ber 31,2010. M s.Carr's application was derlied upon initialconsideration and reconsideration. She then requestedandreceivedaéqnovohearingand review beforeanAdministrativeLaw Judge. In an opinion dated August19,2016,theLaw Judge also determined,afterapplyingthefve-step sequentialevaluation process,thatM s.Cal' rwasnotdisabled on orbeforeherdate lastinsured.1 See 20 C.F.R.j404.1520. The Law Judge found thatM s.Carrsuffered f' rom severalsevere impairments through that date,including lumbar spine degenerative disc disease,degenerative jointdiseaseoftheshoulder,gallstones,initablebowelsyndrome,obesity,nnxiety disorder,and depressivedisorder,butthattheseimpainnentsdidnot,eitherindividuallyorin combination,m eet ormedicallyequaltherequirementsofalisted impainnent. (Tr.17-18). TheLaw Judgethen assessed M s.Carr'sresidualfunctionalcapacity asfollows: After careful consideration of the entire record,the undersigned finds that, through the date last instlred, the claim ant had the residualfunctionalcapacity to perform lightwork asdefined in 20 C.F.R.404.1567(b)exceptthe claimantcould occasionally kneel, 1The processrequiresthe Law Judge to consider, in sequence,whethera claimant:(1)hasengaged i n substantialgainfulactivity;(2)hasasevereimpairment;(3)hasanimpairmentthatmeetsorequalstherequirements ofalistedimpairment;(4)canreturntoherpastrelevantwork;and(5)ifnot,whethershecanperlbrm otherworkin thenationaleconomy. 20C.F.R.j404.1520. Ifadecisioncanbereachedatanystephzthesequentialevaluation process,furtherevaluation isunnecessary. Id. crawl,crouch,stoop,or climb rnmps and stairs. She could not clim b ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She should have avoided exposure to workplace hazards,such ashazardousm achinery and unprotectedheights. Shecouldperform simple,routinetasksofno m ore than four steps. She could occasionally interact with the public. (Tr.21). Given such a residualfllnctionalcapacity,and afterconsidering testimony f' rom a vocational expert,the Law Judge determ ined that M s.Carr was unable to perform any past relevantwork through thedatelastinsured. (Tr.23). However,theLaw Judgefoundthatshe retained the capacity to perform other work roles existing in siglzifcantnumberin the national economy. (Tr.27). Accordingly,theLaw Judgeconcluded thatM s.Carrwasnotdisabled at any tim efrom thealleged onsetdatethrough the datelastinsured,and thatshe isnotentitled toa period ofdisability ordisability insurance benefhs. See 20 C.F.R.j 404.1520(g). The Law Judge's opinion was adopted asthe finaldecision of the Commissionerby the SocialSecudty Administration'sAppealsCotmcil. Havingexhausted a11availableadm inistrativerem edies,M s. Carrhasnow appealed to thiscourt. W hile plaintiff may be disabled for certain forms of employm ent,the cnzcial facm al determ ination iswhetherplaintiffwasdisabled foral1formsofsubstantialgainfulemploym ent. See42U.S.C.j423(d)(2). Therearefourelementsofproofwhichmustbeconsideredinmaking such mlanalysis. These elementsare summarized asfollows:(1)objective medicalfactsand clinicalsndings;(2)theopinionsand conclusionsoftreatingphysicians;(3)subjectiveevidence ofphysicalmnnifestationsofimpairments,asdescribedtlzrough aclaimant'stestimony;and (4) the claim ant's education,vocationalhistory,residual skills,and age. V itek v.Finch,438 F.2d 1157,1159-60(4th Cir.1971);Underwoodv.Ribicoff,298F.2d 850,851(4thCir.1962). Aftera review of the record in this case,the courtis constrained to conclude thatthe Commissioner'sfinaldecision is supported by substantialevidence. The Law Judge'sopinion 3 reflects a throughout evaluation of M s.Can''s medicalproblem s and the extentto which they affected her ability to work. Although M s.Carrsuffered from a combination ofphysicaland emotionalimpainnents,substantialevidence supports the Law Judge's detennination that she retained theresidualfunctionalcapacity to perform alim ited range oflightwork tllrough herdate lastinslzred. Therecord reflectsthatM s.Cal'rpresentedto Carilion Clinicwith complaintsofback and hippaininNovemberof2005,priortoherallegedonsetdate. (Tr.295). Shewasexaminedby Dr.Dallas Crickenberger,an orthopedic specialist. Dtlring the exnm ination,plaintiffreported thatthe pain was worse after standing forherjob as a cashier,and thatcortisone injections provided by her prim ary care physician, Dr.David Cumm ings, provided pain relief for approximately two months. Plaintiffindicatedthatshehadbeen stressed because ofthepain and that she was taking Lortab and Xanax for û&her nerves.'' (Tr.295). Plaintiff advised Dr. Crickenbergerthatshewantedto be ableto çswork alittlebitm orein tennsofstanding time''and increase hertim e m owing the lawn from :$1-2 hoursto 2-4 hotlrsbecauseherlawn isabout 10 acres''in size. (Tr.295). On physicalexnmination,M s.Carr exhibited some tendemessto palpitation inthelefthip and paralumbararea,butherm otorstrength,sensation,andrellexeswere nonnal. X-raysofplaintiffslefthiprevealedStgoodjointspacey''Gtnospurs,''andtEnodestructive chmlges.'' (Tr.296). Lumbarspinex-raysshowedmilddegenerativechangesand spondylosis atL3-4. (Tr.310-11). TheremainderoftheltlmbarspineappearedGiessentiallytmremarkable.'' (Tr.311). M s.Carr saw Dr.Cum m ings on severaloccasions in 2006. W hile few treatm entnotes w ere compiled,itw asindicated thatplaintiffcomplained ofback and hip pain in October and December. Dr.CllmmingscontinuedplaintiffonLortabandXanax. (Tr.396). 4 ln Aprilof2007,plaintiffpresented to Dr.Jolm Hagy with complaintsofabdom inalpain and intennittentrectal bleeding. (Tr.301). She was noted to be obese,buther physical exnmination wasotherwise normalwith no signsoftendernessin herback orlowerextrem ities. (Tr.302-03). An abdominalCT scan revealed thepresence ofgallstonesbutwasEGotherwise lmremarkable.'' (Tr.312). Dr.Hagy recommendedthatplaintifftmdergo acolonoscopy. (Tr. 301-02). HerefilledplaintiffsprescriptionsforLortabandXanax,andstartedheronPrevacid. (Tr.303). lnAprilof2008,M s.CarrwastakenbyambulancetoCarilionFranklinM em orialHospital from alocalfLmeralhome. (Tr.257). Plaintiffreportedthatherbrother-in-law hadjùstpassed away,and thatshe had experienced hyperventilation and dizziness. Shewasgiven Ativan and released a few hotlrs later. The attending physician's diagnostic impression included ççgrief reaction''andddpanicattack.''(Tr.257). ln Augustof2008,M s.Carrreturned to the em ergency room and reported thatshe had experiencedapnnicattackthepreviousdaywhileeating. (Tr.263). Sheindicatedthatitfeltlike food would notgo down hertilroat. (Tr.263). Plaintiffacknowledged thattllishad EGolzly happened twice''and thatshe was no longerhaving difficulty swallowing. (Tr.263). On physical exnm ination,there was no airway obstruction,back tendem ess,neck tendem ess,or edem ain herextrem ities. She wasdiagnosed with an çsalzxiety reaction''and prescribed Xanax andPrilosec. (Tr.263). In Decem ber of 2008,M s.Carr presented to the em ergency room with complaints of abdominalpain anddiarrhea. (Tr.270). Asidefrom exhibitingmildabdominaltendemess,her physicalexnmination was nonnal and she walked with a steady gait. (Tr.270-76). The 5 attending physician noted that she was probably experiencing biliary colic. (Tr.273). He referred herforan electivecholecystectomy. In Augustof2009,plaintiffpresented to Dr.Crickenbergerwith com plaintsofkneepain. Dr.Crickenberger ordered a three-view x-ray seriesofplaintiffs leftknee. The results ofthe serieswereifnegative...foranacuteosseousabnormality.'' (Tr.313). Plaintiffsaw Dr.Crickenbergeragain in Octoberof2010,atwhich time shecomplained of pain in herrightshoulderand lefthip. (Tr.314-15). A November2010 x-ray ofplaintiY s shoulderrevealed no evidence ofany abnormality. (Tr.314). An x-ray ofherhip revealed itearly osteoarthritic changes of the superior acetublar rim ,''but çino other abnormalities as imaged.'' (Tr.315). Dr.Crickenbergerrefen'ed plaintifftoDr.Jolm Fraserwith Cadlion ClinicNeurostzrgeryRoanoke. On November4,2010,Dr.Fraserordered x-rays ofplaintiffs lllmbarspine,which revealed interspacenarrowing and endplateosteophytesattheL3-L4 level. (Tr.316). A few days later,M s.Carrsaw Dr.Fraserfora consultative evaluation regarding herleft-sided low er backpain. (Tr.308). Plaintiffreportedthatherpainwasaccompanied by numbnessattimes, and thatherlegs feltheavy when she walked. Dr.Frasernoted thatplaintiffwasunder a fair nmountof stress,thatherhusband was disabled,and thatshe was in the process of obtaining custody ofhergrandchild. On physicalexam ination,plaintiffm oved slowly,butwascapableof w alking on her heels and toes without asym metry. She exhibited Gtsensory loss in an S1 distribution,''butthe straightleg raising testw as negative,herreflexesw ere sym m etrical,and Dr. Fraserdidççnotfindanywenknessoftheextensorhallicislonguson eitherside.'' (Tr.308). Dr. Fraserprescribed aM edrolDosepak and instnlctedplaintifftoperform lllm barexercises. Healso requested additional diagnostic im aging,including myelography. A subsequent myelogram 6 conducted on December7,2010dem onstrated moderatespinalcanalstenosisatL3-L4 and spinal stenosisto alesserdegree atL4-L5. (Tr.317). Theexnmination alsorevealed asmallcentral protnlsionatL5-S1andmoderatelyadvancedfacetarthropathyontheleftL5-S1. (Tr.317). M s.Carr returned to Dr.Fraser on January 28,2011,after her instlred status expired. Duringtheexnmination,plaintiffindicated thathersymptom sofpain and nllm bnesshad Eçgotten worse since them yelogram ,''and thatmostofherleg pain occurred when she slepton herside. (Tr.320). Dr.Fraserdiscussed thepossibility ofdecompressivesurgery,notingthatplaintiffs historywasGtlessthan aclear-cutpictureforneurogerlicclaudication orradiculopathyy''butthathe would notrefusetoperform surgeryifshewanted topursueit. (Tr.321). Atthattime,itwas GtnotclearthatEplaintiffwas)reallyinterestedinsurgery.'' (Tr.321). During a follow-up appointmenton M arch 24,2011,plaintiffreported thather left1eg numbnesshad increased andthatherentireleft1egwouldgo numb with sitting. (Tr.455). In light of her Gdpersistent and progressive symptom s,'' plaintiff decided to proceed with decompressive surgery. (Tr.455). On April6,2011,plaintiff underwentan 1,3-4 bilateral laminectom y,m edialfacetectom y,and fornm inotomy atCarilion Roanoke M em ozialHospiOl. Shetoleratedtheprocedurewellandwasreleasedthefollowing day. (Tr.458). Plaintiff returned to Dr. Fraser approximately five weeks later. In a letter to Dr. Crickenbergersllmm arizing the follow -up exnmination,Dr.Frasernoted thatM s.Carrwas still experiencingttsome1ow backpain.'' (Tr.322). However,shewasabletowalkonherheelsand toes,she could perform knee bends wellwith both legs,herreflexeswere symmetrical,and Dr. Fraser could tind ççno deficit.'' (Tr.322). Dr.Frasernoted thathe had prescribed physical therapy,Ultrnm ,and Lodine,andthathew ould seeplaintiffagain in six weeks. 7 On December 6,2011,plaintiffpresented to Dr.BrentJohnson,an orthopedic surgeon, with complaintsofrightshoulderpain. X-raysperform ed thatday revealed tT ype2 acromion.'' (Tr.328). Plaintiffelected to proceed with asteroid injection. Approximately seven months later,in Augustof2012,plaintiffcontinued to complain ofshoulderpain. (Tr.337). Atthat tim e,shewascaringforherdisabled husband andhadcustody ofhertwo-year-old grandson. She ultim ately undem entarthroscopicstlrgery on herrightshoulderon December26,2012. In September of 2013,M s.Carr returned to Dr.Fraser with com plaints ofback pain. However,on physicalexnmination,herback wasGtnontender,''hergaitwasonly m ildly antalgic, herstraight1eg raising testwasnegative,and shehad fullmotorstrength,intactsensation,and no edema. (Tr.421). Based on subsequentdiagnostic testing and evaluations,Dr.Fraseropined thatplaintiffs more recentsymptom s were Gsmostly osteom hritic rather than related to actual stenosis.'' (Tr.434). Dr.Fraseradvised plaintiffto increasethenmountoftimethatshewas walking in heryard and to continueperfonning exercises. Atthe administrative hearing held on July 12,2016,M s.Carrtestified thatsliè stopped workingasacashierbecause ofbackpain,andthatthesurgery perfonned by Dr.Fraserççactually made the pain worse.'' (Tr.44,46). Plaintiffalso claimed thatshe wastmable to do any household chores from the time she stopped working in 2006 tmtilthe end of2010,when her insuredstatusexpired. (Tr.51). Plaintiffestimatedthatshecouldonly standforapproximately twenty minutesbefore needing to lie down in a recliner,and thatshe could sitforno m orethan tm eenminutesatatime. (Tr.47-49). M s.Carrfurthertestifiedthatsheççgaveup''mowingthe law n w ith a riding m ow er%1a couple years ago,''and thatshehad previously used a push m ow erto cutçGa littlebitattheback door.'' (Tr.51-53). M s.Carrclaimed thatwhen sheused thepush mower,shehadtotakebreakseverytwentyminutes. (Tr.55). lnresponsetoquestionsfrom her attonwy,M s.Carralsotestified thatsheexperienceddifscultiesw ith anxiety,depression,stom ach crnmping,alzd diarrheaatthe timeshestopped working. (Tr.58.-63). W hen asked aboutany hobbies thatshe had during the relevanttime period,M s.Carr testiûed thatshe would watch television and read home magazines. (Tr.79). She also indicated thatshe enjoyed going to churchwithhermother-in-law. (Tr.74). Afterconsidering a11ofthe evidenceofrecord,theLaw Judgedeterm ined thatM s.Carr's physicalimpairments were not so severe as to preventperform ance of lighter fonns ofwork activity through herdate lastinstlred. In m aking this determination,the Law Judge fotmd that M s.Carr'sallegationsoftotallydisablingphysicallim itationsdtlringtherelevanttim eperiodwere notentirely credible. TheLaw Judgenotedthatalthough plaintiffsoughttreatmentforbackpain, jointpain,andinitablebowelsyndromepriortotheexpirationofherinstlredstams,thetreatment she received wasçEessentially routine and/orconservative in nature''and plaintiffdid notsubm it evidence oftssignificanttreatmentf' rom specialists...beforethe date lastinsttred.'' (Tr,25). Although plaintiffultimately tmderwentdecom pressive stlrgery in Aprilof2011,the Law Judge noted thatplaintiffssymptom sappeared to worsen during the interveing time period,and that lumbarspineim agingshowedonly mild abnonnalitiestmtilthem onthbeforeherdatelastinsured. (Tr.25-26). TheLaw Judgefurtherobserved thatplaintiffhad normalphysicalexnminations duringtherelevanttimeperiod,thatsheoften m adenomention ofbackpain,and thatherabilityto m ow the lawn suggested thathersymptom swere notso severe asto precludea limited range of lightwork activity. (Tr.26). Additionally,theLaw Judgeemphasized thatnoneofplaintiffs treatingphysicianssuggestedthatshewastmabletowork duringtherelevanttimeperiod. (Tr. 27). 9 The Law Judge also folmd thatM s.Carr's symptoms ofnnxiety and depression did not renderherdisabled fora11form sofsubstantialgainflllemploym entorotherwise contribute to an overalldisability.2 In evaluating hermentalimpairm entsatstep three ofthe sequentialprocess, theLaw JudgedetenninedthatM s.Cal' rhadçlmoderatedifficulties''withsocialfunctioning. (Tr. 20). Althoughplaintifftestifedthatshedoesnotliketobearotmdpeople,theLaw Judgenoted thatshe Gçdid notcom plain ofdifficulty w1111socialinteraction to hertreating practitioners,''and that she Etlived with her fnmily m embers and went to chttrch with no problems in social f'unctioning.'' (Tr.20). The Law Judge also determined that M s. Carr had dtmoderate dio culties''in the area ofconcentration,persistence,orpace,based on hertestim ony indicating thatçtshedoesnotdealgwithqstresswellduetonnxiety.'' (Tr.20). However,theLaw Judge em phasizedthatplaintiffdidnotreportspecificproblemswith concentration,persistence,orpace during m edical examinations; that her t' reating practitioners never noted mental status abnonualities;andthatthefactthatsheenjoyedreadingmagazinessuggestedthatshedidnothave significantproblemswith attention orconcentration. (Tr.20,26). TheLaw Judge also noted thatnoneofM s.Carr'streating physicianssuggested thatshehad functionallim itationsresulting from hermentalhealth symptoms. (Tr.27). Onappealtothiscourt,M s.Carr,through cotmsel,makesthzeeargumentsin supportofher motion forsummaryjudgment. First,M s.CarrarguesthattheLaw Judge'sassessmentofher mentalimpairm entsisnotsupported by substantialevidence. Citingavariety ofdecisions,m ost notably thatoftheUnited StatesCourtofAppealsforthe Fourth Circuitin M ascio v.Colvin,780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir.2015),plaintiffarguesthatthe Law Judge'sfindingsregarding herresidual 2In determining thatplaintiffsuffered om anxiety and depression through the date lastinsured and that such disordersconstimted severe impairments,the Law Judge declined to adoptthe opinions ofthe state agency consultants,who found thattherewasinsufficientevidenceto substantiatethepresence ofamedically determinable m entalim painnent. functionalcapacity(t&R. FC''),andthecorrespondinghypotheticalquestionposedtothevocational expert,did notsuftk ientlyaccomm odateherm oderatedifficultieswith concentration,persistence, pace,and socialfunctioning. Forthefollowing reasons,however,thecourtisunableto agree. InMascio,theLaw JudgecreditedMascio'sdiagnosisofanadjustmentdisorderandalso fotmd thatshehad moderate difscultieswith m aintaining concentration,persistence,orpaceasa sideeffectofherpain m edication. Id.at638. Althoughthehypotheticalposed to thevocational expertçtsaid nothing about M ascio's m ental lim itationsy''the vocational expertincluded an çltmsolicitedadditionofStmsldlledwork'''wilichçsmatchedtheALJ'SfindingsregardingM ascio's residualfunctionalcapacity.'' Id. The Fourth Circuitultimately Etagreegdjwith othercircuits thatthe A LJ doesnotaccotm tSfora claim ant'slim itations in concentration,persistence,and pace byrestrictingthehypotheticalquestiontosimple,routinetasksorunslcilledwork.''' ld.(quoting W inschelv.Comm'rofSoc.Sec.,631F.3d 1176,1180 (11thCir.2011)). TheCourtreasoned thatEttheabilityto perform sim pletasksdiffersfrom theability to stay ontask.'' 1d. Becausethe Law Judgefailed to explain çtwhy M ascio'smoderate lim itation in concentration,persistence and paceatsteptlu-ee(did)nottranslateintoalimitationinM ascio'sresidualfunctionalcapacity,''the Fourth Circuitconcluded thatarem and wasrequired. Id. Upon review ofthe record,the courtconcludesthatthe Law Judge's assessmentofM s. Carr'sm entalimpairments is supported by substantialevidence and thatremand isnotrequired tmderM ascio. Asindicated above,theLaw Judgepartially creditedtheplaintiff'stestim ony that she som etim es avoids being arotmd people in determining thatheranxiety resulted in moderate diftkulties with socialftmctioning. (Tr.20). Likewise,in determining that M s.Carr.had m oderate difficulties w ith concentration,persistence,or pace,the Law Judge took into accotmt plaintiffs testimony that she did nothandle stress very well. (Tr.20). After considedng plaintiff'sparticulardifficulties in these areasoffundioning,the Law Judge found thatplaintiff waslim itedtoperformingGtsimple,routinetasksofnom orethan fotlrsteps,''with only occasional interaction with the public. (Tr.21). The Law Judge found thatsuch restrictionsadequately accom modated herissueswith stressandanxiety,andthattherecord asawholeindicated thatshe didnotrequireadditionalwork-related limitations. (Tr.20,25-26). Asnoted above,theLaw Judge emphasized that plaintiffs medical records did not docum ent any mental sta' tus abnormalities orsuggestthatfunctionalrestrictionswere necessary asa resultofherem otional impairments. Thus,tmlike M ascio,the Law Judgedid notsllmm arily lim itM s.Cal' rto unslcilled work withoutexplanation. Instead,theLaw Judgeformulated speciticlim itationsthathefoundwould sufficiently accomm odate plaintiffs particular diffkulties with social interaction and with concentration,persistence, or pace. The court is satissed that the Law Judge provided an adequate explanation of how his IIFC findings fully accotmted for M s. Carr's stress or anxiety-related limitations,and thathis assessm entis supported by substantialevidence. The simple fact is thatM s.Can'received routine and/or conservative treatm entfordepression and nnxiety,bothbeforeand afterherdatelastinsured,andthatnopractitionerhaseversuggestedthat shehasan emotionalimpairmentthatresultsin moresignificantfunctionallim itationsthan those identified by the Law Judge. For a11ofthese reasons,the courtconcludesthatrem and is not requiredunderM ascio. M s. Can''s second argum ent is that the Law Judge failed to conduct a proper fllnction-by-function analysis assessing her residualfunctionalcapacity. In particular,M s.Carr contendsthatthe Law Judgefailed to m ake sufficientûndingsregarding heralleged Eiinabilityto 12 stand form orethan twenty m inutesatatim eand sitformore than 15 minutesatatim e and her need to reclinein herreclinermultipletim esperday.'' P1.'sBr.22,Dkt.No.18. Upon review of the record and applicable caselaw, the court finds this argllment tmpersuasive. Although guidelines f' rom the Social Security Admizzistration instructthe Law Judgeto take a Gsfunction-by-function''approach to determining a claim ant's residualfunctional capacity,SSR 96-8p,1996 SSR LEXIS 5(Ju1y2,1996),theFourthCircuithasGGrejectedaperse rulerequiring remand when theALJdoesnotperform an explicitft m ction-by-function analysis.'' M ascio,780F.3d at635. Instead,theCourtagreed withtheSecondCircuitthatSslrqemand may beappropriate...whereanALJfailsto assessaclaimant'scapacitytoperform relevantfunctions, despite contradictory evidence in the record,or where otherinadequacies irlthe ALJ'S analysis frustrate meaningfulreviem ''' J. ês(quoting Cichockiv.Astnle,729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)). Upon review oftherecord,the courtconcludesthatsuch deficienciesarenotpresentin the instantcase. Itisclearfrom theLaw Judge'sdecision thatheconsidered a11ofM s.Carr'sclaimed limitations,including those described dming the adm irlistrative hearing, but fotmd that such limitationswereinconsistentw iththefindingson physicalexnmination,theconservativenatureof thetreatm entprovided priorto herdatelastinsured,and herown statementsto practitionersduring therelevanttimeperiod. (Tr.25-26). Although plaintifftmderwentdecompressivestlrgery a few m onths after her insured status expired,the record indicates that plaintifps symptoms w orsened duzing the intervening tim e pedod. Prior to the conduct of the sm gicalprocedm e in A prilof2011,D r.Frasernoted thatplaintiff s sym ptom shad Gigotten w orse sincethem yelogram '' conducted in Decem berof2010 and thatshe had elected to proceed with surgery in lightofher progressivesymptoms. (Tr.320,455). Totheextentplaintiffnow suggeststhatshewantedto 13 tmdergo slzrgery soonerbutwastmableto schedule ituntilafterherdate lastinsured,the record simplyfailstosupportsuch argument. AfterseeingM s.Carron January28,2011,nearlyamonth afterherinsured statusexpired,Dr.Fraseradvised Dr.Crickenbergerthatitwas Gtnotclearthat (M s.Carrwaslreallyinterestedinstlrgery.'' (Tr.320). Therecordindicatesthatitwasnotuntil a subsequentevaluation on M arch 24,2011,when plaintiffiireported thatherleftleg numbness ( had increased,'' that plaintiff çtrequested that gtheyl proceed'' with surgery.3 (Tr.455). M oreover,five weeksafterthe surgery was perfonned,plaintiffwasable to walk and bend her kneeswell,and Dr.Fraserwasunable to 5nd mly deficiton physicalexnmination. (Tr.322). Fora1lofthesereasons,the courtbelievesthattheLaw Judge'sevaluation ofM s.Carr'sclaim ed limitationsisconsistentwith the protocolestablished in M ascio and M onroe v.Colvin,826 F.3d 176 (4th Cir.2016),and that substantialevidence supports the Law Judge's evaluation of plaintic sresidualfunctionalcapacitythrough the datelastinsuzed. Finally,relyingon theFourth Circuit'sdecision in Brown v.Com m issioner,873 F.3d251 (4th Cir.2017),M s.Carr contends that the Law Judge's assessment of her testimony and subjectivecomplaintsisnotsupportedbysubstantialevidence. AlthoughM s.Carrtestifiedatthe adm inistrativehearing thatsheexperienced totally disablingpain and discomfortpriorto herdate last insured,the Law Judge found that the plaintiY s statem ents regarding the intensity and limiting effectsofhersymptom swerenotentirely consistentwith them edicalevidence and other evidence ofrecord. The Law Judgeprovided specific reasonsforhisdecision to notfully credit the plaintiffs statements regarding the severity of her symptom s. The Law Judge noted that plaintiffreportedperforming yard work and otheractivitiesthatwereinconsistentwith complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. (Tr.26). Although plaintiff testified dudng the 3Plaintiffdoesnotappeartoarguethattheneed forshouldersurgery existed priortoherdatelastinstlred. Shedid notundergo arthroscopicsurgery on herrightshoulderuntilDecember26,2012,nearly two yearsaherher instlredstatusexpired. X-raysperformedinNovemberof2010revealednoevidenceofanyabnormality. (Tr.314). adm inistrativehearing thatherlawn wasvez' y sm all,she advised Dr.Crickenbergerthatshe was responsibleformowingçsabout10 acres,''which required severalhotlrs. (Tr.295). TheLaw ': Judge reasoned that,regardlessofthesizeheryard,the factthatshewasableto engage in such activity during the relevanttime period suggested thather symptom swere notso severe as to preclude performance of a limited range of lightwork. The Law Judge also noted that the objective medicalevidence,including diagnostic imaging,testing,and physicalexnmination results,repeatedly revealed no orm ild abnormalities tmtilthe m onth before plaintiffsdate last insured. Additionally,the Law Judge em phasized thatin light of the ççallegations of totally disabling symptoms, onç w ould expect to see some indication in the treatment records of restrictions placed on the claimant, yet a review of the record in this case reveals no such restrictionsrecommendedbyanytreatingphysicians.'' (Tr.27). Upon review ofthe record,the courtisunable to discem any errorin the Law Judge's crgdibility findings. Unlike Brown,the Law Judge considered plaintiff smedicalhistory along with herown allegationsregarding thesymptom sofherphysicaland mentalim pairments. The courtagreesthatplaintiff'sallegationsoftotally disabling symptom sare som ewhatinconsistent withthecomplaintsdocumentedin thetreatmentrecords,theobjectivefindingsonexnmination, and the relatively conservative treatm entm easuresprovided beforeherdate lastinstlred. Thus, thecourtissatisfied thatsubstantialevidencesupportstheLaw Judge'sdecision notto fully credit M s.Carr's testim ony. In aftirm ing the Com m issioner's snaldecision,the courtdoes not suggestthatM s.Carr wasfreeofallpain anddiscom fortdtlring therelevanttim eperiod. Indeed,them edicalevidence confinnsthatplaintiffsufferedfrom impairmentsthatcould be expected to resultin subjective limitations. However,no physician suggested thatM s.Carrwastotally disabled fora1lformsof work ornecessitatedgreaterwork-related lim itationsthanthoseidentifedbytheLaw Judge. The record simply does not include medical evidence that is consistent with totally disabling symptom atologypriortotheexpiration ofplaintiffsinstlredstatus. Itmustberecognized thatthe inabilitytoworkwithoutany subjectivecomplaintsdoesnotofitselfrenderaclaimantdisabled. See Craic,76 F.3d at592. Itappearsto thecourtthattheLaw Judgeconsidered allofthemedical evidence,as well as all of the subjective factors reasonably supported by the record,in adjudicating M s.Carr's claim forbenetks. Thus,the courtconcludes thata11facets ofthe Com missioner'sfinaldecision aresupported by substantialevidence. Asageneralrule,theresolution ofconflictsintheevidenceisam atterwithin theprovince of the Com missioner,even if the courtm ightresolve the conflicts differently. Richardson v. Perales,supra;Oppenheim v.Finch,495 F.2d 396 (4th Cir.1974). Forthereasonsstated,the courtfindstheComm issioner'sresolution ofthepertinentcontlictsin therecord in thiscasetobe supportedby substantialevidence. Accordingly,thefinaldecision ofthe Com missionerm ustbe affinned. Law sv.Celebrezze,supra. TheClerk isdirectedto sendcertified copiesofthism em orandllm opinion to al1cotmselof record. DATED :ThisY day ofN ovember,2018. SeniorUnited StatesDistrictJudge 16
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