Kovari v. Brevard Extraditions, LLC et al, No. 5:2018cv00070 - Document 151 (W.D. Va. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Michael F. Urbanski on 12/6/19. (kld)
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CV RK.SOFFjCE U,S.DIST.COt)R-f AT ROANOKE,VA FILED DE2 26 2219 IN T H E UN ITED STATE S D ISTRICT COU RT FO R TH E W E STERN D ISTRICT O F W R GIN IA s ULIAC. UDLG LERK l H ARW SON BU R G D IW SIO N c E DW ARD KO VARI, Plaintiffy Cid lAction N o.:5:18-cv-00070 By:H on.M ichaelF.U rbansld BREVARD EXTRADITION S,LLC, d/b/aU.S.PdsonerTransport,eta1., ChiefUnited StatesDistrictJudge b efendants. MEM ORANPUM OPINION Tlnis m atter com es before the court on defendants Brevatd Exttaditions, Prisoner Transportaéon Serdces of Am erica,LLC,and Prisoner Transportation Serdces, LLC'S rfdefendants'') second motion for bifurcadon,ECF No. 116,motion for partial slzmmaryjudgment,ECF No.118,andmotiontovacateUnitedStatesMagistrateJudgeJoel Hoppe's cliscovery order,ECF No. 134.Plaindff Edwatd Kovad (ffltovari'') has tesponded to allm otions,and the cotutheard atgum enton N ovem bet22,2019.ECF N o. 150.For the reasonsexplained below,the courtD EN IE S defendants'm otion to bifurcate, ECF No.116,and moéon foz pardalsummary judgment,ECF No.118.The coutt GRAN T S in pattand D EN IE S in partdefendant'sm oéon to vacate the discovery order. Kovari v. Brevard Extraditions, LLC et al Doc. 151 E CF N o.134. The cotut will fttst addtess defendants' second m odon to bifurcate, flled on Septem ber 6, 2019.The couttwitl then address defendants'm otion for patéal sum m ary Dockets.Justia.com judgment,ftledthesameday.Finally,thecourtwilladdressdefendant'smodon tovacatethe discoveryorder,ftled on O ctober2,2019. A. FederalRuleofCivilProcedure42$)statesthatcourtsmayorderseparatetrialson sepatateissuesotclgimsfo:avatietyofreasons,includingconvenience,avoidingprejudice, oz expediting proceeclings.The decision to biftucate is within the discteéon of the district cout't.Bowiev.Sorrell,209F.2d 29,51 (4t. h Cir.1953).ffW hen deciding whetherissues should be separately tzied,ttialcouzts m ustensuze thata lidgant's consétuéonalright to a jutyispzeserved.''Shum v.IntelCo .,499F.3d 1272,1276 Ted.Cir.2007). B. Though ttialhas already been bifurcated into a liability and com pensatory dam ages pordon,follow ed by a puniéve dam ages portion,ECF N o.88,defendants have m oved to bifsprcate again to separate evidence perénentto Kovari's 42 U.S.C.j 1983 clnims from evidence perdnentto his tortcllim s.D efendants requestthe cotutorder tdalbe conducted in threeseparatephases,duringwllich ajurywill,in order:(1)decideliabilityforKovati's cbimsitlCount1l,Count111,and CountIV;(2)decideliabilityforKovari'sclqim in Count 19and (3)addtesspuniévedamages,ifany.DefendantsarguethatKovad'sj1983 clqim fris entirely separate,itrelevant,and im pe= issiblewhen com pared to whatisreqlpited to prove'' lzis state law tort cbim s.> 1e the tlaeory of res ondeat su erio: r m ay be pernlissible to estabhsh a cause of action for neghgence,gtoss negligence, and intentional inflicdon of em odonaldistress,defendantsassertthatitcannotbe used to im pose liability on an inacéve defendant$keanemployet)pursuantto j1983.SeeJonesv.Chapman,No.ELH-14-2627, 2016 WL 4944978,at*4 @ .Md.Sept.15,2016)rfyjocalgovernmentalbodiesmay be liableunderj1983 based on tlaeunconstimtionalactionsofindividualdefendants,butonly ifthose defendantswere executing an offkialpolicy orcustom ofthe localgovernm entthat resulted in aviolation oftheplaintiff'srights.').To establish a clqim underj 1983,on the other hand,K ovarim ustdem onsttate thatthe defendants had a policy,custom ,or pzactice wllich caused theviolation ofltisciviltights,Shieldsv.PtinceGeotge'sC'nty,No.GJH-151736,2016 W L 4581327,*21-22 (13.Md.Sep.1,zol@- something notpermissible to establish ofbreach of a duty ofcare it' la negligence action.See Pullen v.Nickens,226 V a. 342,350,310S.E.2d 452,456 (1983)(cilingVir 'niaR.& P.Co.v.Godse ,117 Va.167, 168-69,83 S.E.1072,1073 (1915)).For this reason,defendants contend thatpetvnitdng Kovatito presentevidenceofb0t.h hisj 1983clnim andVitgirtiastate1aw clnimsin asingle trialposesathreatofunfai. tprejudiceandhasthepotentialtoconfusethejury. Kovarirespondsthat,whileajurycould findin Kovari'sfavoron hisstate1aw tort cllims based upon an agency theory ofliability,he also plans to ask the jury to consider whetherdefendantsthemselves,ascomozations,atetesponsiblefotKovati'sinjutiesdueto their own com orate acts and omissions and to assess puniéve dam ages against defendants accordingly.To do this,Kovatiassertsthatthe jury mustbe able to consider defendants' conduct as com orate entities,including evidence of their policies and pracdces,that they directed or authorized their em ployees' treatm ent of Kovati, and that they knew at a com ozate levelthatharm would flow from the unlaw fulconductalleged.See,e.g.,Kal% an v.AllAm.Pest'Conttol,Inc.,281 Va.483,489,706 S.E.2d 864,868 (2011) (reèognizing clqim fot negligence against pesticide com pany based upon the com pany's actions in <f authozizing and allowing'' conduct at issue). The divide between what evidence is aHm issible foz which clnim is thus notas clear cut,Kovariassezts,as defendants contend, and bifhprcation isultimatelyunnecessaryandwould causean unjustifiablelevelofexpense and inconvenience. The cotztthasalready biftztcated this ttialonce and cannotsee the sense in doing so again.Such an acion,wlzich would itlpractice actasa trifurcaéon,w ould inconveniencethe pardes,the witnesses,the jurors,and the court.The courtcan see no effecdve way of handling such a trialand sees nothing requiting such a dzastic step.Should certain evidence be deem ed inadrnissible to provecertnin ofKovari'sclnim s,a determinadon thathasnotand cannotyetbemade,thecourttrustsin theabilityofthejutorsto follow insttuctionsfrom thecourtzegarding thepum osesforwhich they m ay considetcertain evidence. . D efendants'second m otion to bifurcate,ECF N o.116,isDEN IED . II. Thecourtwillnextaddressdefendants'motionforpartialsummaryjudgment. A. Pursuantto FederalRuleofCivilProcedure56(a),thecourtmustTfgrantsummary judgmentifthe movantshowsthatthereisno genuine clispute asto any materialfactand the movantis enétled to judgmentasa mattet oflaw.''Fed.R.Civ.P.56(a);see Celotex Co .v.Catrett,477 U.S.317,322 (1986)9Glnnv.EDO Cor .,710F.3d 209,213(4t. h Cir. 2013). W hen maldng this determinaéon, the court should consider ffthe pleaclings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, and admissions on ftle,together with ... gany) affidavits''f:tled by the pardes.Celotex,477 U.S.at322.W hether a factism aterialdepends on therelevantsubstantivelaw.Anderson v.LibertyLobbp Inc.,477U.S.242,248 (1986). Tfo nly disputesoverfactsthatm ightaffectthe outcom e ofthe stlitunder the governing law willproperlyprecludetheentryofsummaryjudgment.Factualdisputesthatazeirrelevantor unntcessarywillnotbe counted.''1d.(citauon onaitted).Themoving party bearstheinitial burden of dem onsttating the absence of a genuine issue ofm aterialfact.See Celotex,477 U .S.at323.lfthatburden hasbeen m et,tlae non-m oving partym ustthen com e forwatd and establish thespecihcmaterialfactsin disputeto survivesummaryjudgment.MatsushitaElec. Indus.Co.v.ZenithRadioCo .,475U.S.574,586-87(1986). In detetmining whether a genuine issue of m aterialfact exists,the courtview s the facts and draws allreasonable inferences in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party.. czlp1. m ,710F.3d at213 (citingBondsv.Leavitt,629 F.3d 369,380 (4th Cit.2011)). Indeed,tfgiltisanfaxiom thatinrulingonamoéon forsummaryjudgment,theevidenceof thenonmovantisto bebelieved,and alljustifiableinferencesateto be drawn in lnisfavor.i'' McAirlaids lnc.v.IGmberl-clark Co . No.13-2044,2014 WL 2871492,at*1 (4th Cir. June25,2014)(intetnalalteration onlitted)(citingTolanv.Cotton,134 S.Ct.1861,1863 (2014)(perculiaml).Moreover,ffgcjreclibilitydetetminations,theweighingoftheevidence, and the dtawing oflegitimate inferencesfrom the factsare jury functions,notthose ofa judge ....''Anderson,477 U.S.at255.However,the non-moving party ffmustsetfozth specific factsthatgo beyond the dm ereexistence ofa scintilla ofevidence.'''G 1nn,710 F.3d at213 (quoéng Anderson,477 U.S.at252).Instead,thenon-moying partymustshow that dfthereissufikientevidencefavoring the nonmoving pazty forajuryto retarn avetdictfor thatpartp''Res.BanksharesCo .v.St.PaulM erc 5 Ins.Co.,407 F.3d 631,635 (4t.h Cir. 2005)(quotingAnderson,477U.S.at249).dflnotherwozds,tograntsummaryjudgmentthe gcjourtmustdeterrninethatno reasonable jury could find fot the nonmoving party on the evidencebeforeit.''Mossv.ParksCo .,985 F.2d 736,738 (4th Cit.1993)(citingPerini Co .v.PeriniConst.Inc.,915F.2d 121,124(4thCit.1990)). B. D efendants contend thatthree ofK ovati'sfoku counts oughtto be disrnissed,asthe Virginia stattzte oflim itadons particularto tortclnim sreladng to conditionsofconfinem ent has nm .Cllim s 11 thtough, IV (negligence,grossnegligence,and intendonalinfliction of emotionaldistress,respecévely)arepersonalinjurycounts.Virginiahasatwo-yearstatuteof limitationsforgeneralpersonalinjuryacéons.Va.Code j8.01-243.However,clnimsarising from conditionsofconfinementatesùbjecttoadifferent,shorterstamteoflimitations: N o person confned in a state or localcorrecdonalfacility shall bring orhave broughton hisbehalfany personalaction relating to the condidons of his cono em ent until all available adtninisttadve zem edies aze exhausted. Such acdon shall be brought by or on behalf of such person within one year after cause of acdon accrues or within six m onths after all adrrlinistzativerem ediesare exhausted,whicheveroccurslater. Va.Codej8.01-243.2.Becausemorethan ayeazhad elapsed between theeventsgivingrise to Kovad'sclsimsandhisfslingofthisslzit,defendantsarguethatj8.01-243.2reqllitestheir motion forpnrtialsummaryjudgmentbegzanted. K ovari responds by pointing out that Virginia code defines Kçlocal correctional facilitf'asfTany ) *a11,jailflt'm orotherplaceused forthedetendon orincarceration ofadult offenders, excluding a lock-up,wlzich is owned, m nintnined or operated by any polidcal subdivision or com binadon of poliécal subdivisions of the Com m onwealtln''and ffstate 6 correctionalfacilitf'as Tfany correcéonalcentet or correcéonalfield unit used for the incarcezadon ofadultoffendersestablished and operated by theD epartm entofCorrections, ot opetated under contract pursuant to j 53.1-262.7'1 Va.Code 53.1-1.Defendants,in transporéng K ovari to Texas,were state actors but were under contractwith the H arris County Sherifps O ffice,notwith the D irector ofthe Virgirlia D epartm entof Correcéons. Kovariarguesthat,according to Vitginia'sstatutory dehniéons,j8.01-243.2 doesnotapply because,when he w as in defendants'custody,he was notincarcerated irz a localor state cortecdonal facility. ln support of his contendon, K ovati cites Llo d v. M or an, N o. 4:14cv107,2015W L 1288346,at*9 (E.D.Va.Match 20,2015),wlnich referred to Va.Code 53.1-1'sdefniéons to preventthe applicaéon ofj 8.01-243.2 tocbims arising from time spentin ajuveniledetention center.Kovad argtzesthiscaseprovesthatj53.1-1'sdefsnidons apply here and lim itthe applicability of the one-year stattzte oflim itations to confinem ent operated by Vitginia.Thus,the standard two-year stam te oflim itations applies to llis tort claim s. The coklttagrees.The Viq inia G eneralA ssem bly established 170th a one-year stam te oflim itaéons forcbim s arising ftom conditionsofconfinem entand the exactcondidonsof d.colzrt confinem ent to which this shorter statute of lim itaéons would apply.A s the L.1 .9:- held, fY irginia Code j 8.01-243.2 does not contain a catch-all term such as, Kothet correcdonalfacility,'';butinstead,incorporatesTflanguage lim iting the scope ofthesewords. 1Va.Codej53.1-262governshow theCommonwealthmayenterintoprivatecontractswithprison contractorsand reads,irlpertinentparqfr' l' heDizector,subjecttoanyapplicablereguladonswhichmaybepzomukatedbytheBoard puzsuantto j53.1c266and subjectto thepzovisionsoftheVirgml ''aPublicProcmementAct(j2.2-4300etseq.),is hèreby autlzorized to enter into contzacts with prison contractors for the fmancing, site selecdon, acquisidon, construcdon,maintenance,leasing,m anagem entoroperadon ofprison facilides,orany combination ofthose sewices.. '''I'he ffundez contzact'' aspect of this definidon refers only to contracts entered into by the Dizector of Virgt 'm'a Deparfmentof Correcdons.See Va.Code j 53.1-262 (governing state correcdonalfaciv es nm tluough private contracts). . . ',L-l . p-y-d,2015 R 1288346,at *10.Defendants reply that j 8.01-243.2 does not reference,adopt,otincom orate dehnidons from j 53.1-1,butthe Code ofVirginia isone body oflaw.Newton v.Commonwea1th,21 Va.App.86,90,462 S.E.2d 117,119 (1995). Courts have clearly already referred to the definidons provided by Va.Code j 53.1-1 in intemzetingj8.01-243.2.Thezeisnozeason notto do soheze. In thei. t teply,defendants aqued tlaatKovariffwould have this gcjouttapply gthe statutejtcidiscrirninate againstVitgirtia'ssisterjurisdictions,theemployeesand agentsof such juzisdicdons,and out-of-state entiéessuch as Defendant.''ECF No.135,at5.This, argues defendants, would violate the D orm ant Com m erce Clause of the Consétudon. D efendants argtze that,although the affit-mative defense of a stattzte of lim itationsis nota fundam entalright,such stam tesate Tfan integralpattofthe legalsystem and are relied upon to protect the liabilities of pezsons and corporadons acdve in the com m ercial sphere.'' D efendants clnim that K ovari's reading of this statute of lim itations would provide a differentand m ore favorable statute oflim itationsto the Com m onwea1th ofVirginia and its local political subdivisions while achieving no legitim ate state interest, as a clistincdon between in-state and out-of-state prisons and transport com panies has no readily apparent governm ent intetest except to place an addiéonal fm ancial burden on out-of-state com panies. In deternlining whether a state law violates the D orm antCom m erce Clause,courts follow a two-step analysis.Brown v.Hovater,561 F.3d 357,363 (4th Cir.2009).First,a couztm ustask whethetthe state1aw discrim inatesap instintetstate com m etce.Id.Iftheteis no discrimination,a courtmustask whetherthe state1aw ffunjustifiably ...burdengsjthe 8 interstateflow ofarticlesofcommerce.''Id.In addressingwhethezastate1aw unjuséfiably buzdens interstate com m erce,the couttgenerally applies the testfttst atéculated in Pike v. Bnace Chutch,lnc.,397 U.S.137,142 (1970),underwhich the challenged law fTwi. llbe upheld urllesstheburden imposed on ginterstateqcommerceisclearlyexcessiveinrelation to theputative localbenefits.'' Turning thisanalysisto Va.Codej 8.01-243.2,thecourtfindstheanswerto the flrst ofthe above questionsto be,<<N o.?7N othing in the language ofthe stattzte refers to out-of- state actors oz,indeed,to com m erce ofany ldnd.The statm e does nottteatpersons from different states differently, but applies to any torts com m itted in Vitginia correctional instittztions,by anyone.The answer to the second question is,again,<<N o.''Tlaisstam te has nothing to do with com m erce,travel,ozfavoring Vitginiaresidents;asK ovatipointed outat ' p . the hearing on this m atter,the statute would have the sam e effect on K ovati's cllim s if defendantswere domiciled in Virginia.The crux ofthe m atterisw hose custody K ovariwas in when his cloim arose.As defendants contracted with the sheriff of H arris County in Texas,he was clearly notin the custody ofthe Comm onw ealth ofVirginia.N othing in the G eneralA ssem bly ofVitgl 'nl 'a lim iting the applicaéon ofthis stam te oflim itadonsto clnim s arising ftom a state or local correcdonal facility offends the Com m erce Clause of the Constittztion. Finally,defendants argue thattllis reading would violate theirrightsunder the Equal Ptotecéon Clause,which lim its a state's power to condition the right of an out-of-state com oration to do businesswithin its borders.M etro.Life Ins.Co.v.W ard,470 U .S.869, 875 (1985).W hen dete= ining ifthe state legislanxte violated the EqualProtection Clause, 9 the courtm ustflrstdetetm ine theclassificadon used fozthe discrim inatorypurpose and then decide whatlevelofscrutiny mustbe applied based on such a classifkadon.Clark v.Jetez, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988).At a bare rninimum,when a stamtory classihcation neither em ploysa suspectdisG ction norburdensthe exercise ofa fundam entalconsdtuéonalright, that classiûcation m ust be rationally zelated to a legitim ate state interest a level of exatninaton refetted to asfftationalbasissctutiny.''Palm etv.CityN at'lBank,498 F.3d 236, 247 (4th Cir.2007).Defendantsdo notcontestthattheapplicablescrudnyleveliszational basis.The courtfinds nothing in Vizginia lim iéng the applicaéon ofa stattzte oflim itadons to its own concliéons of confnem ent that does not m eet the nlinim um standards setby radonalbasisscrtztiny.Again,the statute does notdiscrim inate againstout-of-state transport com panies;itsim ply applies only to lim itcllim sofpersons conhned in state facilities.The citizenship ofthe defendantisofno m attez. Defendants'moéonforpartialsummaryjudgmentisDENIED. C. Thecourtnow turnsto theOrdertowllichdefendantsobject.Defendantsftledtheir objectionsto theSeptember19,2019Orderissued bythemagistratejudgein thiscase.After reviewing the appropriate pleadings and reading the transcript of the Septem ber 4, 2019 discovery hearing, the court generally agrees wit.h the approach taken by the m agistzate judge,subjectto certain refinements.The courtbelievesthatthese certain refinementsate necessary to thediscovery orderbased on concernsofrelevanceand propordonalitp W ith zegatd to the hve categoziesofdocum entsidentfied in the Septem bez18,2019 Order,defendantsarerequiredto producethefollowingdocumentswithin tlnirty (30)days: 1. Inveségations and Auclits.The Septem ber 12,2019 O rder flrstdirects defendants to Produce ffall investipaùve reports and docum ents related to the investigation of deaths and serious physical injtzties (defmed those itjtzries reqlliring hospitalizadon) alleged by inm ates that have occurred during tzansportaéon by defendants as a result of illness, disease,or the conclitions of confinem ent since January 1,2011.:' The Ozdetthen directsdefendants'producdon to Tffocuson the toughly twelve investigations that defendants'counselnoted duting the conference Caj. l.:> The courtagreesthatdefendants should produceinternalinvesdgative reports ofdeathsorseriousinjuyies(reqlxidnghospitalization)asaresultofthedeprivadons alleged by K ovat' iin his Com plaint,nam ely thathis shacldes were too éght,he was czamm ed in the back ofa van,he waszegularly deprived ofadequate food and water, he was deprived ofregularstopsto use theresttoom ,showerorsleep,he was forced to sitin human waste and filth,wassubjected to verbalthreatsand abuse,and was deprived of m edication and m edical tteatm ent for his hypertension. lnternal investigaéve reports on issues unrelated to K ovari's allegaéons are itrelevant and need not be produced. In this regard, the cotut can discern no relevance to invesdgadons or audits relating to issues not clqim ed by K ovat'i, such as van accidents, assaults urlrelated violations of D epartm ent of 'Transportation regulaéons,such as those concerning excessive holzts logged by drivers. This case doesnotconcetn allegaéons ofphysicalassault,m otorveilicle accident,orany other 11 harm sustained by K ovarias a result ofviolation ofD epartm entofTransportaéon driving regulations. To the extent that a D epartm ent of Transpottation or othez externalaudit bearson K ovari's clnim s,auditsreladng to 2016 are to be produced.Should any such 2016 auditprovide a basis foz additionaldiscovety on relevant topics,K ovarim ay m ake a furtherrequest. 2. DocumentsRe ardin Mana edalTrainin .Themagistratejudge'srulingasto this cliscovery topicisaffitvned. 3. Documents Re ardin Media Covera e.The magistrate judge's tnzling as to this discovery topic appropriately cabined discovery to com'm unicationsfrom orbetween individualswho havetheauthority to m akepolicy-leveldecisionsfordefendants. The court believes that two Flltther lim itations are necessary. Fitst, commurlicaéonsdealing with aspectsofthe MarshallProjectReportunrelated to K ovati's com plaints are notrelevantand need notbe produced.Second,a lim itation isnecessaryasto thetimingofsuch communications,given thattheMarshallProject Reportcam e outa few m onthsbeforeK ovari'stransport.In thisregard,discovery is limited to:(1)communicationsregatding therepottand related letteroccurdng prior to Kovari'sttansport;and (2)latercommunicaéonsregal/ingthereportand related letterconcerning policiesin placeatthe tim e ofKovari'sttansport. 4. D ocum ents Re ardin O ther Passen ers. K ovari seeks discovery on five or six personswho heclnim swerettansported by defendantsbuthasm ade no showing that any of these persons experienced sim ila. r issues as did K ovari or are likely to have 12 discoverable inform ation.D efendants aptly note that these persons have notbeen idenéfied in Kovari'sinitialdisclosutes.K ovati'sassertionsregatcling thesepersons at the healing w as rather am orphous. Absent som e asserdon that these persons expedenced circum stancesin thei. ttzansportation bearing on K ovari's case,the court willnotindulge this fislling expedition.Defendagts'objecdon to this requestis sustdned. 111. Fot dae reasons p'ven above, the court D EN IE S 170th defendants' m oéon to bifarcate,ECF No.116,and defendants'motion forpaldalsl'mmaryjudgment,ECF No. 118.The colzttGRAN T S in partand DE N IE S in partdefendant's m odon to vacate the discovery order,according to the specificadonsgiven above.ECF N o.134. A n appropriate Orderwillbe entered. snt eted, gg-( os(z. 0y) . /w/ * a ;' ' aelF.U rbanski CbiefUnitedStatesDisttictludge 13 '
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