Briggman v. Burton et al, No. 5:2015cv00076 - Document 55 (W.D. Va. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Glen E. Conrad on 09/27/2016. (ssm)
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Briggman v. Burton et al Doc. 55 CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DIST. COURT lb.T ROANOKE, VA FILED EP 2 7 2016 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA HARRISONBURG DIVISION DAVID B. BRIGGMAN, ) ) Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 5:15CV00076 ) ) v. MEMORANDUM OPINION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) By: Hon. Glen E. Conrad Chief United States District Judge ) ELIZABETH KELLAS BURTON, Chief Judge, 26th Judidal District, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in her official capacity, et al., Defendants. David B. Briggman, proceeding prose, filed this action against Elizabeth Kellas Burton, Kevin C. Black, and Hugh David O'Donnell in their official capacities as Judges ofthl Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts ("JDR Courts") of the Commonwealth ofVirgiLa's 26th Judicial District, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Virginia law. By ordlr entered November 3, 2015, all motions in the case were referred to United States Judge Joel C. Hoppe, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B). The defendants subsequenhy moved to dismiss the plaintiffs amended complaint. The magistrate judge has since issued a feport and recommendation, in which he recommends that the court (1) deny without prejudice the defendants' motion; (2) abstain from moving forward with Briggman's claims; and(,) stay the case until all potentially dispositive issues of state law have been resolved by the of the Commonwealth of Virginia. For the following reasons, the court declines to adopt the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The court will dismiss Briggman's claims for rellfunder § 1983 and decline to exercise jurisdiction over his claims under state law. Dockets.Justia.com Background The following factual allegations, taken from Briggman's amended complaint an his brief 1 in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, are accepted as true for purposrs of the defendants' motion. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (emphasizing thal "a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" when ruling on a motion to dismiss); Davis v. Bacigalupi, 711 F. Supp. 2d 609, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("In tLting the sufficiency of the pro se Plaintiffs Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will also coLider the dismiss .... ") (citing cases). Briggman, a resident of Rockingham County, alleges that the defendants have i properly . barred him from entering the JDR Courts' courtrooms in Harrisonburg, Virginia to obsete certain proceedings conducted in cases in which he was not a party. Briggman specifically complains of being excluded from proceedings in child support enforcement actions brought by th1 Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement against other individuals. On October 16, r015 and October 26, 2015, respectively, Briggman was denied access to a "bond hearing" and a '[contempt review proceeding" in an enforcement action brought against Scott Alan Gill. Am. Cojpl. 17, 19. On October 19, 2015, Briggman was denied access to a "sentence review heari g" in an written findings were made as to why he was not allowed to observe these proceedings. Briggman also alleges that, on one occasion in November of 2015, he was told that a I courtroom in Harrisonburg was closed during the JDR Courts' "adult criminal docket.I Id. 20. ·On another day, however, Briggman "was allowed access to [a] criminal hearing" , onducted in Harrisonburg. Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Judges' M. to Dismiss 6. 2 .----------------- Briggman commenced the instant action on November 3, 2015. He then filed an amended complaint on November 23, 2015. In Count One of the amended complaint, Briggmj claims that the judges violated his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constttution by refusing to allow him to observe child support enforcement and criminal proceedings coJducted in the JDR Courts' courtrooms in Harrisonburg. In Count Two of the amended cbmplaint, Briggman claims that the judges violated his rights under Article I, Section 8 of the ConsLution of Virginia by denying access to court proceedings. In his brief in opposition to the judg,' motion, Briggman also claims that the judges violated Virginia Code § 16.1-302(c), which governs the closure of courtrooms in JDR courts, and provides that "[i]f the proceedings are closed, the court shall state in writing its reasons .... " Va. Code§ 16.1-302(c). 1 In addition to seeking injunctive relief, Briggman requests that the court issue the following "declaration": a. Defendants have violated the First Amendment rights of plaintiff to attend hearings in the Harrisonburg-Rockingham County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court courtrooms; b. Defendants have failed to make any findings justifying the closure of the Harrisonburg-Rockingham County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Coilirt courtrooms; c. The denial of constitutional access to hearings in t e Harrisonburg-Rockingham County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Co rt courtrooms has caused plaintiff to suffer irreparable harm; and 1 Section § 16.1-302(c) provides in full as follows: The general public shall be excluded from all juvenile court hearings and only such pers ns admitted as the judge shall deem proper. However, proceedings in cases involving an ad6It charged with a crime and hearings held on a petition or warrant alleging that a juvenile years of age or older committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adrlt shall be open. Subject to the provisions of subsection D for good cause shown, the court may, sua sponte or on motion of the accused or the attorney for the Commonwealth close 'he proceedings. If the proceedings are closed, the court shall state in writing its reasons and the statement shall be made a part of the public record. 3 d. To comply with [federal constitutional] mandates, defendants must allow members of the public to attend hearings in the Harrisonburg-Rockingh , Juvenile and Domestic Relations courtrooms. ' Am. Compl. at 11-12. Standard of Review The judges have moved to dismiss Briggman's amended complaint pursuanf to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint, which must contain "a short and plain statement of the claij showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Presley vl City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). When deciding a motion to dismiss Lder this rule, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and draw all reasonJle factual inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; see also Vital, S.A. v. Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013). "While a complaint attacked by a Rull12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation top ovide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires .more than labels and conclusions, and a ormulaic · recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, L'state a I claim for relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 6' 8 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Discussion I. Claims for relief under § 1983 Briggman asserts claims for relief under § 1983 against Burton, Black, and O'IDonnell in their official capacities as state court judges. Section 1983 provides a private right of ahtion for a violation of constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of state law. A I set forth 4 above, Briggman seeks both injunctive and declaratory relief for the alleged violations fhis First Amendment rights. A. Injunctive Relief Briggman's claim for injunctive relief is barred by the plain language of § II. 83. The statute restricts "action[s] brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission tak n in such officer's judicial capacity," and expressly preciudes injunctive relief "unless a declara+y decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, rhe plain language of § 1983 allows suits for injunctions only after a litigant has sought a declaratory judgment." Ward v. City ofNorwalk, 640 F. App'x 462,467 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Jepelletier v. Tran, 633 F. App'x 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the appellant's "claijs seeking injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions taken in his judicial capacitt ... were barred by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983"). Because Briggman does not alllge that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and since the requested injunctive relief arises from actions taken in the judges' official capacities, Briggman's claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed. B. Declaratory Relief Although§ 1983 "does not expressly authorize suits for declaratory relief again tjudges," it "implicitly recognizes that declaratory relief is available in some circumstances." B andon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2000). Howe1er, those circumstances are limited by the Eleventh Amendment, which "protects the states from suit in federal court, as well as 'arm[s] ofthe State and State officials."' Lawson v. Gault, 8281F.3d 239, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12518, at *19 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3, 368,390 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) (.J[Eleventh 5 Amendment] immunity applies to ... state employees acting in their official capacity ") (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized an ex eption to Eleventh Amendment immunity that allows individuals to seek prospective relief against state officials who violate federal laws or the Constitution. To full within this exception, a tlaintiff's complaint must allege an "ongoing violation of federal law," and seek relief that is ["properly characterized as prospective." Verizon Md., Inc. v. PSC, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The pivotal question is whether the requested relilf "serves directly to bring an end to a present of federal law." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). Relief that is "tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation offeClerallaw, even though styled as something else," is barred? Id. at 278; see also Int'l Coalition foriReligious Freedom v. Maryland, 3 F. App'x 46,49 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the "limited elception" created by Ex parte Young provides only for prospective relief from a continuing v1hition of federal law, and "not for declaratory relief for a past violation of federal law") (citin Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1982)). Applying these principles, the court is unable to conclude that Briggman seeks the type of relief authorized by Ex parte Young. First, Briggman has not alleged an ongoing violJion of his rights under federal law. He instead alleges that he was access to JDR couJrooms in Harrisonburg on four occasions, while he was admittedly granted access to a proceed"ng in the Harrisonburg-Rockingham County JDR Court on another occasion. Moreover, his amended complaint seeks declaratory relief that cannot be characterized as prospective, spe, ifically a 2 Likewise, in order to have standing to seek prospective declaratory relief, a plaintiff"must establish an ongoing or future injury that is 'certainly impending'; he may not rest on past injury." Arpaio v. d>bama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013))1. 6 declaration that the defendants "have violated the First Amendment rights of plaintiff to attend hearings in ihe Harrisonburg-Rockingham County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Crurt," and that the denial of access "has caused plaintiff to suffer irreparable harm." Am. Coipl. at. 11 (emphasis added). Ex parte Young and its progeny make clear that this exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity "may not be used to obtain a declaration that a state officer has rotated a plaintiffs federal rights in the past." Buchwald v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 159 F.3d 487, 495 (lOth Cir. 1998) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewel Auth. v. Accordingly, such relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Briggman also seeks, as part of his claim for declaratory relief, a declar tion that County Juvenile and Domestic Relations courtrooms" in order to comply with the First Amendment. Am. Compl. at 12. Even assuming that this particular request for relief£ lis within the Ex parte Young exception, and that Briggman has standing to pursue such claim, the court nonetheless concludes that such relief is unavailable under existing precedent. "The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits governments from 'abridging the freedom of speech .... '" Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). This protection of speech includes a right of access to criminal trials, which was first recognized by the Supreme Court in .Lchmond Newspapers. Id. at 580. The Court has since found that the public has a right of acclss to voir dire proceedings during criminal trials, Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.I501, 511 (1984), and to certain preliminary criminal hearings. See El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto bco, 508 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1993) (preliminary criminal hearings as conducted in PueJo Rico); Press-Enters. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (preliminary criminal h larings as 7 conducted in California). While "the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the First Amendment's right of access extends to civil trials or other aspects of civil cases, . . . ost circuit courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have recognized that the First Amendment right of access extends to civil trials and some civil filings." ACLU v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). It is however, that this right of access is "not absolute 1, and that 1 "a state may deny access to a portion of a criminal [or civil] trial if it demonstrates tha denial of access is necessitated by a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. To determine whether the First Amendment provides a qualified right of access, courts "employ the 'experience and logic' test, asking: '(1) whether the place and praless have historically been open to the press and general public,' and (2) 'whether public accels plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. " In re Application ofU.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balt. Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989)). Foufh Circuit "precedent makes clear that both the experience and logic prongs are required." Id. femphasis added); see also Del. Coalition for Open Gov't, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013) ("In order to qualify for public access, both experience and logic must counsel in favor [f opening the proceeding to the public."). Thus, in order to state a claim for denial of access, Briggman must plausibly liege that both prongs of the experience and logic test mandate that the presumption of openness applies to the proceedings at issue. Briggman's amended complaint fails in this regard. The[amended complaint does not allege that juvenile court proceedings have been historically open to ti e public. To the contrary, such proceedings "have been historically closed to the public." Ky. Pjess Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (E.D. Ky. 2005); see also Natural Parents! of J.B. v. 8 1 ' - - - - Fla. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 780 So.2d 6, 9 (Fla. 2001) (observing that 'juvenile proceedings have historically been closed to the public in furtherance of the overriding i terest in, among other things, protecting the child from stigma, publicity, and embarrassfent, and promoting rehabilitation," and that "[a]ll fifty states have some form of shield law to lirit public access to proceedings involving juveniles"); San Bernardino County Dep't ofPublic Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. App. 3d 188, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)("[I]t is clear and there can be no dispute that the history of the juvenile system has been one of private hearings, not public."); In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Unlike criminal trials, juvenile prreedings have not been historically open."); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Vt. 1981) ("Far from a tradition of openness, juvenile proceedings are almost invariably closed."). Consequertly, with respect to the child support enforcement proceedings in which Briggman is "most interested," Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Judges' Mot. to Dismiss 5, Briggman has not stated a claim for denial Jthe right of access under the First Amendment. See Holder, 673 F .3d at 252 (emphasizing that biith prongs of the experience and logic test must be met); see also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Ch ster, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming the dismissal of an amended complaint that "failed to allege that a tradition of public access exists"). Moreover, even if Briggman could meet both prongs of the experience and ogic test, "access is still not guaranteed." ACLU, 673 F.3d at 252. Instead, as explained abov{ the state may deny access to a proceeding "if it demonstrates that denial of access is by a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." !d. al252; see also N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 652 F.3d 247, 264 (2d Cir. 2011) ("The First Amendment right of access is always qualified. 'Just as a government mly impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest lof such 9 objectives as the free flow of traffic, so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair admini tration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial."') (quoting Richmond Newsp pers, 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18). Because the necessity and propriety of closure must be determited "on a case-by-case basis," Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,609 (1982), kriggman is not entitled to the declaratory relief requested in the amended complaint, namely a dlclaration that "defendants must allow members of the public to attend hearings m the Harrisonburg-Rockingham County Juvenile and Domestic Relations courtrooms." Am. Compl. For all of these reasons, the court concludes that Briggman's claims for inj,ctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 must be dismissed. Accordingly, the judges' motion will be granted with respect to these claims. II. Claims under state law Having dismissed the federal claims forming the basis of the court's exercise of jurisdiction over this dispute, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction o er the remaining claims asserted under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice. Conclusion For the reasons stated, the court declines to adopt the report and recommendation issued by the magistrate judge. The defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted with respect tl the 3 In passing, the court notes that the plaintiff is not without a remedy in the event that he is denied access to a future proceeding iri JDR Court. As the magistrate judge observed in his report and members of the public may move to intervene in a case for the limited purpose of asserting an objedtion to the JDR Court's ruling barring them from the courtroom. See Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 528 S.E.2 · 458, 609 (Va. 2000). Should the plaintiff again be denied redress, he may appeal an adverse ruling to the Ci cuit Court for the County of Rockingham. 10 plaintiff's claims under federal law. The remaining claims under state law will be ismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this order and the accompanying me orandum opinion to the plaintiff and all counsel of record. DATED: This j.(/ A1day of September, 2016. 11
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