Mason v. Lewis Contracting Services, LLC, No. 3:2018cv00095 - Document 20 (W.D. Va. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 6/6/19. (hnw)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
CLERK' S OFFiCE U. S.DISX rn lr AT> OV ,VA FILED JUN g6 2gjg IN TI'IE UN ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TH E W ESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGW IA CHA RLOU ESV ILLE D IV ISION JULIA C,DUDLR CLERK BY: ' L R AY M OND M ASON , CivilAction N o.3:18CV 00095 PlaintiF, M EM OR AND UM O PIN ION LEW IS CON TRACTW G SERV ICES, LLC, By:Hon.Glen E.Conrad SeniorU nited StatesD istrictJudge D efendant. Raymond Mason fsled this action againstLewis Contracting Services,LLC (Gtewis Contracting'),assertingclaimsunderTitleVIIoftheCivilRightsActof1964 (EçrfitleVII''),42 U.S.C.j2000e:1seq.,andtheAgeDiscrimination inEmploymentActof1967 (EW DEA''),29 U.S.C.j621x!seg. Thedefendanthasmovedtodismissthecomplaintforfailuretoeffecttimely serviceofprocessunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure4(m). Inresponse,theplaintiffhastsled am otiop to extend the tim eforservice. Theparties'm otionshavebeen fully briefed and are ripe fordisposition. Forthefollow ing reasons,thecourtw illexercise itsdiscretion to extend the tim e for service ofprocess. A ccordingly,the plaintiffs m otion w illbe granted and the defendant's m otion w illbe denied. Backeround Mason v. Lewis Contracting Services, LLC M ason is a residentofCharlottesville,V irginia. Lew is Contracting is a lim ited liability Doc. 20 com pany based in Atlanta,G eorgia. ln Septem berof2016,Lew is Contracting perform ed w ork asa subcontractoron adevelopmentprojectin Charlottesville. Thecompany hired M asonto Dockets.Justia.com workasalaborer. Mason allegesthathewassubjectedtounlawfulharassment,discrimination, and retaliationduringhisemployment,which culminated in histermination. Follow ing his term ination, M ason filed a charge of discrim ination w ith the Equal EmploymentOpportunityCommission(%EOC''). TheEEOC issuedaright-to-sueletteronJuly 10,2018. Ninety dayslater,on October8,2018,M ason commenced the instantaction. Before serving the defendant,M ason tiled an am ended com plainton D ecem ber7,2018. Atsom e pointthereafter,M ason retained aprofessionalprocess serverin Atlanta to serve the defendant. 'I'he plaintiffhassubm itted a sw orn declaration from the processserver,M argaret Ruddock. A ccording to the declaration,Ruddock attem pted to personally serve the defendant's registered agent, Jay W .Pakchar,Esq., on January 3, 2019. Pakchar's receptionist advised Rgdd .ock thatPakcharwas not.in the ofice and thatshe did notsee him every day. Ruddock inform ed the receptionist that she needed to serve Pakchar as the registered agent for Lew is Contracting. The receptionist gave Ruddock a business card containing Pakchar's telephone number. Ruddock called the num berand lefta messageadvising Pakcharthatshe wasattempting to effectservice on him . A ftershe did notreceive a response,Ruddock called Pakcharagain the following day and leftthe sam e m essage. Pakchar did notrespond to Ruddock's phone calls. 0n January 8,2019,Ruddock returned to Pakchar'soffce,where she served him w ith process. On January 15,1019,Mason flled aproofofservicesigned by Ruddock. Theproofof serviçe indicates thatPakcharw as served w ith process on January 8,2019 at 11:02 mm . The partieshavesinceGledtheinstantmotions. Discussion . ln 2015,the presumptive tim e for serving a defendantw asreduced from 120 days to 90 days. SeeFed.R.Civ.P.4(m),AdvisoryComm.Notes(2015Amendment), Thè.serviceclock 2 startson the datethecomplaintisfiled againstadefendant,Fed.R.Civ.P.4(m),and ççisnot restartedbythefilingofan amendedcompfaint'' Bolden v.Citv ofTooeka,441F.3d 1129,1148 (10thCir.2006). ln thisçase,itisundisputedthatthecomplaintwasGledonOctober8,2018, that the 90-day service period expired on M onday, January 7, 2019, and that service w as accom plished one day later. W hen a defendant is not served w ithin 90 days,ççthe court...m ust dism iss the action withoutprejudiceagainstthatdefendantororderthatservicebemadewithin aspeciGedtime.'' Fed.R.Civ.P.4(m). Rule4(m)makesclearthatdsiftheplaintiffshowsgoodcauseforthefailure, the courtmustextend theservicetimeforan appropriateperiod.'' Id. However,Eçleqven ifa plaintiffdoesnotestablish good cause,''the courtççm ay in itsdiscretion grantan extension oftim e forservice.'' SanGiacomo-Tanov.Levine,No.98-2060,1999W L 976481,at*1(4thCir.1999) (unpublishedtableopinion);seealsoHendersonv.UnitedStates,517U.S.654,658n.5(1996) (notingthatRule4(m)Stpermitsadistrictcourttoenlargethetimeforserviceçeven ifthereisno goodcauseshown''')(quotingAdvisoryCommitteeNotestoRule4(m)(1993Amendmentl). ln theirrespective Glings,the partiesdispute whether M ason has established good cause forfailingtoservethedefendantwithinthe90-dayperiod. çsGenerally,forpurposeofRule4(m), çgood cause'requiressome showing ofdiligence on thepartoftheplaintifqj.'' Attkisson v. Holder. F.3d ,2019W L2147243,at*16(4thCir.M ay17,2019). $$Putconversely,good cause generally existswhen the failure ofservice isdue to externalfactors,such asthe defendant's intentionalevasion ofservice.'' Id. On thepresentrecord,thecourtisnotconvinced thatM ason hasestblished good cause for failing to m aketim ely service. According to theplaintifrsown evidence,his processserverdid notattemptto serve the defendant'sregistered agentuntilJanuary 3,2019--only fourdaysbefore 3 the service deadline. A lthough the evidence also indicates that the registered agent failed to retunztwo subsequentphone calls,there isno indication thatthiswaspartofa concerted effortto evwde service ofprocess. Indeed,the record reflectsthatthe process server successfully served the registered agent on her second visitto his office. Thus,it appears likely that the current disputecouldhavebeen avoided hadtheplaintiffnotwaited untiltheend ofthe90-dayperiod to serve the defendant. N onetheless,asindièated above,the courtm ay exercise itsdiscretion to extepd the service period even in the absence ofgood cause. Underthe circum stancespresented,the courttinds it appropriate to do so ihl thiscase. There issim ply no basisforthe courtto conclude thatextending thçàerviceperiod by oneday would undulyprejudicethedefendant. SeeCellFilm Holdings. LLC v.Does,No.3:16-cv-00749,2016W L 7494319,at*5(E.D.Va.Dec.30,2016)CBecause thiscaseremainsinanearlystageçflitigation,inwhich(thedefendantqhasnotfiledjm answeror otherresponsivepleading,theCourtseesnoprejudicethatcouldresultfrom abriefextensionof time.''). Ontheotherhand,grahtingthedefendant'smotion to dismisswould likely resultin M ason'sclaim s being tim e-barred,since plaintiffsare required to file suitunderTitle V11and the A DEA w ithin ninety days afterthe issuance ofa right-to-sue letterby the EEOC. See 42 U .S.C. j2000e-5(9(1);29U.S.C.j626(e);seealsoMannv.Std.MotorProds..Inc-,532F.App'x417,. 418(4th Cir.2013)(explaining thata dismissalwithoutprejudice doesnottolltheninety-day statute of limitations period). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4(m) specifcally recognize thata discretionary extension m ay be warranted in such sim ation. See Fed.R .Civ.P. 4(m),Advisory Comm.Notes(1993 Amendment)CEReliefmaybejustised,forexample,ifthe applfcablestatuteoflimitationswouldbartherefiledaction ....''). Accordingly,thecourtwill exercise itsdiscretion to extend the service deadline and perm itthe case to proceed. 4 C onclusion Forthereasonsstakd,theplainiT smouontoextendthe:meforservicewlllbegrantet serviceofprocessonthedefendsntwillbedeemedtimely,nndthedefendant'smoGon to dismlns W IIbedenied. ' Fhe Clerk isdirectedto sendcopiesofthismemorandum opinion andtheaccompanying ordertoa1lcounselofrecord. DATED:w st, dayofJune,2019. SeniorUnitedStatesDie ctJudge 5
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
