Socol v. Albemarle County School Board et al, No. 3:2018cv00090 - Document 21 (W.D. Va. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 6/25/19. (hnw)
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CLERIO OFFICE U . S.DIST.COURT AT ROANOKE,VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE W ESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION JUN 25 2219 JUL DUDLEM CLERK BY: K IM D .SOCO L, Plaintiff, CivilAction No.3:18CV00090 M EM OR ANDUM OW NION A LBEM A RLE COU N TY SCH OO L BOA RD , By:Hon.Glen E.Conrad SeniorUnited StatesDistrictJudge rd M ATTHEW S.HA AS,individually and as SuperintendentofAlbemarleCountyPublic Schools, D efendants. Ira D.Socol,a tormer employee ofthe Albemarle Cotmty Public Schools Cschool System'),filedthisactionagainsttheAlbemadeCotmtySchoolBoard(dlschoolBoard'')andthe Superintendentof Schools,M atthew S.Haas,asserting claims tmder42 U.S.C.j 1983 and Virginia law. The case ispresently before the courton the defendants'm otion to dismiss. For thereasonssetforth below,them otion willbe grantedinpartand denied in part. B ackeround The following facts are taken f' rom the am ended complaint and docum ents relied on therein. SeePhillipsv.LCIInt'l.Inc.,190F.3d609,618(4thCir.1999)(notingthatthecourtcan properly considerdocum entsthatare çiintegralto and explicitly relied on in the complaint''when Socol v. Albemarle County School Board et al Doc. 21 nzlingona' m otiontodismiss). InFebruat'yof2013,SocolwasMredtoworkastheDesignProjectManagerfortheSchool System's Desigli2015 project. Am .Compl.! 10. He becnme the AssislnntDirector of EducationalTechnologiesin March of2015. JZ ! 11. ln July of2017,Socolwasselected to Dockets.Justia.com direct the Departm entof Accountability,Research and Teclmology,which was subsequently reorganized into the Department of Leaming, Engineering, Access, and Design (<ILEAD Departmenf'). Id.!! 12-13. On or about M arch 5,2018,Haas,who was then Deputy Supelintendent of Schools, informed Socolthat he was Haas' choice to asslzm e the new role of Cllief Teclmology and InformationOflker(d$CTIO''). JIJ.S!14. Atthetimeoftheirdiscussion,Haashadbeenselected to replace Pnmela M oran as Superintendent. Haaswas aware thatSocolhad been considering otherprofessionalopportunitiesoutsidethe SchoolSystem. JZ !;17. In orderto convincethe plaintifftoforegootherjobopportlmities,Haasagreedtothesalaryrequestedbytheplaintiff. JZ ! 18. Hnnq also agreed thatSocolwould remain in the position ofCTIO throughoutHaas' forthcomingtenuieasSuperintendent. JIJ-.! 19. Haasindicated thatheGçexpectedtoservetwo . fotlr-yearterms.''l JZ BasedonHaas'representations,Socolagreedtoaccepttheposition. ltla - . !! 19-20. The SchoolSystem publicly nnnotmced thatSocolhad been nnm edthe CTIO on Apdl24, 2018. JZ !20. 0nJuly1,2018,HaasassllmedthetitleofSuperintendent. JZ !16. Inhisrole asCTIO,SocolwastheheadoftheLEAD Depnrtment. Ltla!27. Hereported directlytoHaas. Id.!16. Socolwasheavilyinvolved in thedevelopm entofanew pilothigh schoolcenterknown as Albemade Tech. Ld.u s!! 30-31. HnnA appointed Socol and several other School System employeesto a committee responsible foroverseeing the project(the ççsteering Committee'). HaasQGmade(AssistantSuperintendentDeborahlCollinstheseniormemberofthecommittee''and ttindsay Snoddy the ProjectM anager,''and he Rgave Rosalyn Schmitt then the Directorof 1UnderVirginialaw,ddltqhedivisionsuperintendentshallserveforaninitialterm ofnotlessthantwoyears normorethan fouryears.'' Va.Codej22.1-60. uAttheexpiration oftheinitialterm,thedivision superintendent shallbeeligibletohold om cefortheterm specitied bytheemployingschoolboard,nottoexceed folzryears.'' J. I. J . 2 FinanceandFacilities,financialoversight.'' Id.!33. TheSteering Committeewastaskedwith opening a new technical M gh scho6l, a new space for the LEAD Depnrtment, and a new professionallenrning center,a11ofwhich wouldbe located in thesnmeleased space. J. 11.! 34. The Steeling Committeehad approximately five monthsfrom itsformation to complete itswork andopenthenew spacetostudentsandadministrators. LII. The SchoolBoard gave the Steering Comm ittee a budget of $250,000 to be used for Grnishing the entire jroject. t11.! 38. Thebudgetincluded professionalservices,cabling, acousticalpaneling,carpeting,and furnittlre. JZ Theallotted famding hadto bespentbyJtme 30,2018. J. IJ-. Two ofthe Steering Comm ittee m em bers proposed hiring JenniferGreenhalgh,a local interiordesigner,to develop furnlsllirig plansfortheprojectata costof$150.00perhour. Id. !(39.'Socolopposed theproposal,believingthatitwould beawasteofmoneyandthatthe Steering Comm ittee,with theassistanceoftheBuilding ServicesDepartm ent,could do thework. JZ However, the other c'ommittee members disapeed w1111 Socol and elected to retain Greenhalgh tp work on the project. J.IJ. , Greenhalgh subsequently provided the Steering Comm ittee with alistofrecomm ended furnishingsthattotaled $488,000,excluding professional fees,appliance 's,cabling,carpeting;andfurnittlreforcertain areas. Id.!40. M terreceiving Greenhalgh's proposal,the Steedng Committee asked Elodie W olfe,.an offce assistantpartially assigned to theLEAD Depnrtment,to compile a listoffurnishingsthat wouldbemoreinlinewiththeSteeringCommittee'sbudget. Li !41. InlateApziloreadyM ay 2018,W olfe provided presentation to the Steering Comm ittee,which included Greenhalgh's recommendations,aswellasavarletyofaltelnlativefurnishingsfrom vendorssuchasW ayfairand IKEA. J.I. J Z.!42. çsW ithoutobjectionom anyofitsmembers,theSteelingCommitteeapproved 3 thepurchaseoftheitemsinM s.W olfe'salternaterecomm endationsand,asthem eetinglmfolded, those item swerea11placed in a Googlespreadsheetto which a11comm itteem embershad access.'' JZ Théspreadsheetincludedtheparticularprojectand room forwhichanitem waspm chased, theadkertisèdjrice,thefinalnegotiatedprice,thedateordered,andthepm chasecard(:T-Card'') usedtomakethepurchase. J. Z !43. Socolalleges thatthe Steering Comm ittee ap eed thatthe LEAD Department's P-cards wouldbeusedtomaketv furniturepurchasesapprovedbythecommittee. J#Z! 44. çGln some . cmses,multiple LEAD P-cardswere used to make fhrniture pm chasesbecause such pm chases would have exceeded the availablelimiton any one such P-card,which wasclearly noted in the (sjpreadsheet.'' J. 1 J-.! 45. The totalnmotmtofthe purchases exceeded $50,000. Ldsa! 46. However,tlnooneproject(AlbemarleTech,theLEAD space,ortheprofessionallenrningcenter) hadfurnishingsthatcostintheaggregateinexcessof$50,000.9' 1d. Additionally,tçlnloneofthe individualpieces offurniture (nor any group offumishings for any one space orpup ose) authozizedforptlrchaseby theSteering Committee exceeded $5,000 in cost.'' JZ !47. Socol furtherallegesthatnoneofthe committeemembersobjectedto thepm chases,Eleitherasto the itemspmchasedorastothemnnnerinwhich suchpm chasesweremade.'' Ll J.S!48. OnM ay28,2018,Socolreceivedan em ailfrom Thom asW inder,thePurchasing Agentfor ?' Albem arle Cotmty,questioning thefactthatmultiplefurnl .ttlrepurchaseshad been made from the samevendor. J. Z !50. Socoldiscussedthefurnittlrepm chasesw1111ReedaDeade,whohandled thebudgetfortheLEAD Department. Deadeadvised Socolthatttçthisiswhatwedo a11thetim e' (and)çnoone'seversaidanything.''' Id.!50. Afterreceiving W ihder'sem ail,Socolrequested am eetingw1t11W indertçsothathe could tmderstandwhat,ifanythinj,hadbeendonewrongandhow any issuescouldberesolved.'' J.Z 4 ! 51. 0n June 11,2018,Socolmetwith W inder and otherindividuals,including Assistant CotmtyM orneyAmandaFarley. Ld.a!53. Dudngthemeeting,Farleytlarguedthatthefnrniture purchasesforthethreeseparateprojectsshouldhavebeen aggregattd,andasaggregated,would haverequiredcompetitivebidding.'' 1d.!54. ' On Jtme 14,2018,theSchoolBoard heldaclosedmeeting dllring wllicilitultimately approvedthefllrniturepmchasesmadebytheSteeringCommittee. J. IJ.!f57. Socolsubsequently lesrned from Haasthatthree SchoolBoard m embershad voted againstapproval,and thatone of themembershadsuggestedthatSocolshouldbefred. J.t . k !59. On July 20,2018,Socolm etw1111Jolm Gray,AssistantDirectorofHllm an Resotlrces,and ClareKeiser,thenDirectorofEducationalQuality,todiscusstheptlrchasing. J. és!60. During themeeting,KeiseraccusedSocolofptlrchasingfzrnitureforhisownbeneft. JJ-, Socoladvised ' Gray andKeiserthatsuch accusationwasbothtmtnzeandtmfair. Jl1. Socolallegesthatneither . henoranyoneelsereceivedany improperbeneftasaresultoftheflzrniturepurchases,andthatthe SteeringCommittee'sonly goalwasto completetheprojectontimeandwithin budget. Socol ftzrtherallegesthatthefurnittlreinquestionremainsinusetoday. J#. On July 27,2018,Haas and Keiserm etwith Socoland advised him thathistim e w1t11 AlbemlleCounty had Sçscometo an end.''' JZ ! 66. When Socolobjected,Haasadvisedllim thathehad ççtno rights'here.' '' 1. #., Haasofferedtoallow Socoltoresignandreceiveaseverance packageifSocolwouldnotspeakpubliclyaboutHaas'actions. JZ However,Socolrefusedto . resign. J#. OnAugust'1,2018,zaassentSocolaletterterminatingSocol'semploymentasof thatdate. ld. Atsom epoint,the SchoolSystem prepared an investigation reportconcluding thatSocol hadviolatedAlbemazleCountyprocmementpoliciesClnvestigationRepolf). JZ !70;seealso 5 Investigation Report,Dkt.No.15-2. 'l'he Investlgation Reportwasnotshared with Socoluntil aAerhistermination. J. és!70. Socolallegesthathedidnotreceiveamenningfulopportunityto . coù testthesndingsinthereport. Id. : The SchoolSystem hasam itten policy applicableto thetennination ofemploym entasa resultofresignation,layoff,ordismissal(çTerminationPolicy'). Tenuination Policy,Dkt.N o. The policy defines tçdismissal''as çsan involtmtary separation 9om employm ent due to disciplinaryinfractionsorinabilitytoperform thework.'' Id.at1. Inthecaseofdism issal,Ritis expected thatthe principal/depnrtm enthead/designee has thoroughly investigated the incidents leading tothedismissal,hasdocllm ented any action taken,andhasapplied disciplinein afairand consistentfashion.'' Id. TheTermination Policy furtherprovidesasfollows: The Board shall m ake the fnal decision on a11 recomm endationsbythe Superintendentforthedism issalof licensedpersonnel. A voteofthemajorityofaquontm lofj theBoard isnecessary fordisnlissal. B. The Supedntendentm ay dismiss classified employees and non-licensed abministrative employees for good and just cause. A dism issed employee m ay appeal the decision tmderthe approved grievanceprocedure,exceptforclasses ofem ployeesasdefned inPolicy GBM A. Id.at2. Socolwas a non-licensed admirlistative employee atthe time ofhis termination. Am . Compl.!74. Hedidnotreceiveanyform ofpre-terminationhearing,andhewasGtnotwithinthe classofemployeeswhçhavepostrtennination grievancerights.'' J. l1.!!75-76. Theplaintiffwastheonly em ployeewhowasterminated forthefurniturepm chasesm ade bythesteeringcommiitee. J#z!79. Noneoftheothercommitteemembersweredisciplinedin . anymnnner,eventhoughtheentirekommitteeapprovedtheplzrchases. J.Z Theplaintiffalleges thatSnoddy,Collins,and Schmitt,çGwho werethem emberjoftheSteedng Comm itteebestableto 6 ensure com pliance ofthefum ittlrepurchaseswith theprocm em entregulations,havenotonly not beendisciplined,buthavebeenpromoted.'' Id.!(80. SocolallegesthatHaas made orpublished statem entsabouthistermination to itmultiple people''outsidetheSchoolSystem. JZ !137. 0nthesnmedaythatSocolwasgiventhechoice toresign orbeterminaied,HasscalledM oran,theformerSupedntendent,and advisedherofthe terminationdecisionandthealle' gedreasonsforit. Id.!90. SocolallegesthatheandMoranare co-authorsand businessassociatesy,and thatHaaswasaware oftheirprofessionalrelationship at thetimehecontacted M oran. J.Z !91. During thephonecall,Haasindicated thatSocolhad içtmisused P-cardsdeliberately and egregiously''iand thathehadiçiadm it'ted to the conductin the (Investigation)Report.''' Id.!!93,96. SocolallegesthatHaas'statementwascompletelyfalse and. thatitimpugnedhisreputation forhonesty,integrity,andmorality. JZ ! 94. Socolfurther . allegesthatHaassuggested thatthetermination would have a deleteriouseffecton thesalesand publicity ofthebook thàtSocolhad co-authored with M oran,and thatSocolcould have avoided theproblem byresigningandacceptingaseveranceagreement. J. i !!98-99. On August1,2018,the SchoolSystem issued apressrelease nnnotmcing thatSocolw as Ssno longer...employed by the schooldivision''and thatJnmieForemati,theDeputy Technology and Innovation Ufficçr,hadbeen chosentoheadtheLEAD Depnrtmenton mlinterim basis. Lda - ' ! 101;see also Press Release,Dkt.No. 15-1. The press release higlllighted Foreman's qualifcationsandtheservicesprovidedbytheLEAD Department. J-1J. S Socolalleges,upon inform ation and beliefkthatHaasalsoinform ed Kevin Castner,another former SuperinteridentofSchools,ofthe alleged reasons for Socol'stermination. J#= ! 103. . w tthintwoweeksoftheadverseemploymentdecision,CastnercalledSocoltodiscusspotential job prospects. J.Z ! 104. Dudngthephonecall,Ca 'stnersuggestedthatinformation publicized 7 regarding Socol'stermination could MnderSocol'sability to obtain ajob with anotherschool division. 1d. SocolallegesthattheSchoolSystem tEdidnotprovideEllimqwithapre-publicationhearing before itsagentspublicizedthealleged remsonsfor(hisqtermination,despitethefactthatthose reasonsimplicate hisjood nnme and reputation.'' Idk!! 112. Socolfurtherallegesthatthe publication ofthealleg'ed reasonsforhistermination hasprejudicedhim in llisprofession. Id. ! 113. For instance,an educationalfurnishings company withdrew a preliminary offerafter learning about Socol's termination. JZ ! 105. çtikewise,the mnmner of (the plaintiY s) tenninationcosthim aprofessionalopportunity*1111BCW H Architects.'' lê.! 106. ProceduralH istorv Socolfiledtheinstantaction againsttheSchoolBoard and HaasotlOctober1,2018. The defendantsmoved to dismissthe complaintunderRule 12(b)(6)ofthe FederalRulesofCivil Procedm e. 0n January 28,2019,the courtheld a hearing on the defendants'motion. Atthe k conclusion ofthe heàrllig,the courttook the m otion tmderadvisementand granted the plaintiff . leaveto flean amended complaint. 0n February 7,'2019, Socolfiled an amended complaintagainstthe defendants,in wllich heassertsthefolloWingclahns:denialofdueprocessinviolation oftheFoM eenthAmendment tmder42U.S.C.j 1983 (CotmtsIand 11);breach ofcontracttcount111);and defnmationperse . tcount1V). In response,thedefendantsrenewed theirmotion to dismiss.z 'rhematterisnow ripe forreview . 2Theplaintiffhasmoved to striketwo emailexhibitssubmittedin supportofthedefendants'supplemental brietl ' I'he court fmds it unnecessary to consider the challenged exhibits at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly,themotionto strikewillbedenied asmoot. 8 Standard ofReview Rule 120946)permitsaparty tomovefordismissalofacomplaintforfailureto state a claim upon wllich reliefcan be grmlted. Whendecidingamotiontodismissunderthisrule,the courtmustaccept.astruea11well-pleaded allegationsand clraw a11reasonablefactualinferencesin theplal kntiffsfavor. Ericksonv.Pardus,551U.S.89,94(2007). tçW hile a complaintattacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)motion to dismissdoes notneed detailed factualallegations,a plaintiY s obligation to provide the grotmds of his entitlem ent to relief requires m ore than labels and conclusions,and aformulaicrecitation oftheelementsofacauseofaction willnotdo.'' BellAtl. Corp.v.Twomblv,550U.S.544,555(2007)(intérnalcitationmldquotationmarksomitted). . To survivedismissal,$1acom plaintmustcontain sux cientfacm alm atter,acceptedastnle,to lstatea claim for relief that is plausible on its face.''' Ashcroftv.Iqbal,556 U.S.662,678 (2009) (quotingTwomblv,550U.S.at570). SçAlthoughamotionptlrsuanttoRule 12(b)(6)invitesaninquiryintothelegalsuo ciency ofthe complaint,notan analysis ofpotentialdefensesto the claim s setforth therein,dismissal nevertheless is appropHate when tlie face of the complaint cleady reveals the existence of a medtoriousafsrmativedefense.'' Brooksv.Citv ofW inston-salem,85F.3d 178,181(4thCir. 1996). Onesuch defenseisthestamteoffrauds. SeeALA.Inc.v.CCAIR.Inc,,29 F.3d 855, . 859 (3d Cir.1994)(Gç(A)complaintmay be subjectto dismissaltmderRule 12(b)(6)when an affirmativedefense'likethestatuteoffraudsappearson itsface.'');seealso GreenbeltVentures. ' . LLC v.W ajh.M etro.AreaTransitAuth.,481F.App.x 833,837-39(4' tl&èir.2012)(holdingthat acontractclaim wasbarred by the statm e offraudsand therefore properly dism issed underRule 12(b)(6)). D iscussion 1. Claim sunder1 1983 ThecourtwillsrstaddressSocol'sclaimstmder42U.S.C.j 1983,which imposescivil liability on any person acting tmder color of state 1aw to deprive another person of rightsand pdvilegessecm edbytheConstitutionand lawsoftheUnitedStates. See42U.S.C.j1983. In Cotmt 1, Socol claims that the defendants deprived him of a property interest in continued ' em ployment without providing due process. In Count II,Socol claim s that the defendants depdved M m ofa liberty interestin his reputation and good nnm e withoutnffording him due PrOCCSS. ThedueprocessclauseoftheFourteenth Amendm entprovidesthatçtno stateshalldeprive anypersonoflife,liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflam '' U.S.Const.nmend.XIV,j1. In order to establish a due process violation, çta plaintiff m ust srst show that he has a constimtionally protected Sliberty'or çproperty'interest,and thathehasbeen Sdeprived'ofthat protected interestby som e form ofçstate action.''' Stone v.Urliv.of M d.M ed.Svs.Com .,855 F.2d 167,'172(4th Cir.1988)(citationsomitted). Iftheplaintiffm akessuch showing,the court considers whatprocess wasrequired and whether any provided was adequate in the particular factualçontext. J#a. A. Pi-opertvInterest In movingto' dismissCotmt1, thedefendantscontend thatSocolhasfailedto dem onstrate that he had a constim tionally protected property interest in M s continued em ploym ent as CTIO . Forthe follow ing reasons,the courtagrees. In thepublic em ploym entcontext,ççitisnotenough foraplaintiffto dem onstrate thathe haslostMsjob.'' Herman v.Lackey,309 F.App'x 778,783 (4th Cir.2009). tslnstead,the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff possessed a protectable property interestin his .. . continued employment.'' JZ CETO have aproperty interestin abenefit,a person clearly must havem orethan an abstractneed ordesireforit. Hemusthavemorethan allnilateralexpectation ofit. Hem ust,instead,havealegitim atéclaim ofentitlem entto it.'' Bd.ofRezentsv.Roth,408 U.S.564,579(1972). Gt-fhus,onlywheretheemployeehasalegitimateentitlementtocontinued em ploymentdo the requirem entsofdue processattach.'' Roysterv.Bd.o 'fTrustees., 774 F.2d 618,621(4thCir.1985)(citationsomitted). Property interests are notestablished by the Constitution. Rather,they tçare created and theirbimensionsaredefined by existingrulesortmderstandingsthatstem 9om an independent source such as state law .'' Roth,408 U.S.at 577. çsln the contextof employment in public education,the independentsourcefortheproperty interesthasbeen said to be a contractwhich providesforcontinued employm ent,andwhich canbeterm inated only forgoodcause.'' Royster, . . 't. 774 F.2dat620-21(citationsomitted);seealsoLoganv.Zimmerman BrushCo.,455U.S.422, 430 (1982)C' Fhehallmark ofproperty,theCourthasemphasized,isan individualentitlement poundedih statelaw,which cnnnotberemoved exceptçforcause.''')(citationsomitted). Ifan employee is terminablè at will under state law ,then he has no m otected property interest in continuedemployment. SeeHerman,309F.App'x at783(tçAn at-willemploymentrelationsMp doeshotcreate aprotectableproperty interestin continuedemploymentforj 1983purposes.'') (citingRoth,408U.S.at577-78);seealsoCominelliv.Rector& VisitorsoftheUniv.ofVa.,589 F.Supp.2d 706,713 (W .D.Va.2008)Cln Virginia,an at-willgovernmentemployee Ghasno legitimateexpectancy ofcontinuedemploymentand thushasnoprotectibleproperty interest-''') (quotingJenkinsv.W eatherholtz,909F.2d 105,107(4thCir.1990:. inthiscase,itistmdisputedthatSocolhadnowrittencontractforcontinuedemployment with the, SchoolBoard.3 Socolnonetheless arguesthattwo sotlrcesgave rise to an enforceable expectation ofcontinued employm ent. Hefirstpointsto hisconversation with Haasin M arch of 2418,duringwhichtheyallegedly agreedthatSocolwouldremaininthepositionofCTIO forthe duration ofHaas'tenmeasSuperintendent. SeeAm.Compl.! 18;seealsoP1.'sBr.Opp'n 12, Dkt No.9(assertingthattheplaintiffapdHaashadamutually explicittmderstandingthatKhis timeasCTIO would span manv years'')(emphasisadded). Socolalso citestotheTermination PolicythatpermitstheSuperintendenttodism issnon-licensedadm inistrativeemployeesforgood and' justcause. Theplaintic sreliance on the alleged oralagreem entin M arch of2018,when Haaswas DeputySujerintendenksuffersfrom twofataltlaws. First,Socoldoesnotcite,and the èourthas notlocated,any authority indicating thutan assistantordeputy supedntendenthasthe powerto bind a public schoolboard to an employm entcontract. To the contTary,<tvirgirlia authorities suggestthatasuperintendentisnotanagentforamemberoftheschoolboard,landcnnnotqenter into orterm inatecontractsin areasnormally reserved to theschoolboard.'' Dennisv.Ctv.Sch. Bd.,582 F.Supp.536,542 (W .D.Va.1984)(emphasisadded)(citingLeggv.Cty.Sch.Bd.,160 S.E.60 (1931)). Sucllareasplainly includeemploymentcontracts. See Va.Code j22.1-313 (GTheschoolboardshallretain itsexclusivefsnalauthority overlattersconcemingemployment andsupervisionofitspersonnel.'');Id.j22.1-293(GW schoolboard,uponrecommendationofthe division superintendent,may employ principalsand assistantprincipalsz');ld.j 22.1-302 (ç1A writtencontract...shallbemadebytheschoolboardwitheachteacheremployedbyit....'');8 3In Virginia,Stlsqchoolsare required by state 1aw to issue conkactsto teachers,principals,assistant principals,andtsupervisors.''' Sullivanv.W arrenCty.Sch.Bd.,49Va.Cir.226,229(Va.Cir.Ct.1999)(citingVa. Codejj22.1-302,22.1-294). Es-f' heterm 'supervisor'asstamtorilydefmedislimitedtoafew positionsforwhicha license isrrquired bytheBoard ofEducation.'' Id. Because SocolwasafEnon-licensed administrativeemployeey'' Am.Compl.!(74,awrittenconkactwasnotrequiredtmderstatelaw. 12 V.a.Admin.Code j 20-490-20 (sûcontracts wi th teachers shallbe executed on behalfofthe (schooljboardbythechairmanandtheclerk.''). Second,as discussed m ore fully below,itisclear from the nm ended complaintthatthe alleged oralar eementcontemplated em ploym entforaterm ofm orethan oneyear. Becausethe ap eem entwasnotreduced to m iting,itdoesnotcomply with Virginia's stamte ofgaudsand cnnùotbe enforced..See Va.Code j 11-2 (providing thatçtany agreementthatisnotto be performedwithinayear''mustbeSçinwritingandsignedbythepartytobechargedorllisagentn); seealsoW altonv.GreenbrierFord.Inc.,370F.3d446,454(4thCir.2004)(holdingthatthestatute oft' raudsbarredtheplaintic stsattemptstorelyonallegedoralpromise'sthat(thedefendantjmade regardingathree-yearemploymentcontracf). Forboth ofthese reasons,Socolcannotplausibly allege thathehad aprotected property interestin continued employmentbased on thepurported oralapeem entwith Haas. See,e.g., ' , . . Haclinv.CityofAlcona,42F.App'x55,57(9thCir.2002)(holdingthatplaintiffhadnoproperty ' a intetest in ctmthmed bmploym ent with the city because the m ayor did nothave authority to contractforathree-yearterm ofemployment);M illerv.CrystalLakeParkDist,47F.3d 865(7th Cir.1995)(observing fhat$çapromisenotenforceablebecause ofthe statuteoffraudsdoesnot createa çproperty'interesf');M ahon v.GreenvilleM em'lAuditorillm,No.90-2438,1991U.S. . ' App.LEXIS 7881,at*6 (4th Cir.Apr.30,1991) (holding thatan alleged oralemployment agreementviolated South Carolina'sstatuteoffraudsandthereforedid nbtgiveriseto aprotected . ' projeriyinterest). Sobol's reliance on the Termination Policy fares no better. As indicated above,the provisiononwhichSocolreliesstatesthatçsltqheSuperintendentmaydismissclassifedemployees andnon-licehsedadministrativeemployeesforgoodandjustcause.'' TerminationPolicyat2. It doesnotstatethatnon-licensedadministrativeemployeesshallonlybedismissedforgoodandjust cause. Nordoesitstatethatnon-licensedadm inistrativeem ployeeswillnotbedism issedwithout justcause. W ithoutsuchlanguage,itisclearfrom existingprecedentthatthepolicyprovisionis insuflki:ntto rebutthe strong preslzm ption ofat-willemploymentin Virgirlia. See County of Gilesv.W ines,546S.E.2d 721,723 (Va.2001)(holdingthatsimilarpolicylanguageindicating thatanGççemployeemaybedischargedforineftkiency,insubordination,misconduct,orotherjust cause'''was insufficiehtto rebut the ' prejllmpiion of at-will employment). Therefore,the Termination Policy provides Stno property z'ightwhich isprotected by the federalconstitution.'' J. I. J.Sat725;seealsoForemanv.Griffth,81F.App'x432,437-39(4thCir.2003)(applyingCotmty ofGilesinaffinningthedismissalofapropertyinterestclaim). Forthese reasons,the courtconcludesthatSocolhas failed to allege suffk ientfactsto establish that he had a protected property interest in llis continued employm ent as CTIO. Accordingly,he cnnnot sustain his property interest claim tmder the Fourteenth Amendm ent. Thus,thedefendants'm otion willbegranted asto Cotmt1. B. Libertv Interest In Cotmt11,Socolclaim sthathe was depdved ofa liberty interestwithoutdueprocess. M orespecifcally,Socol:ssertsthatthedefendantsviolatedtheFourteenth Am endm entbyfailing to affordhim adequateprocessbeforepublicly disclosing the reasonsforltisterm ination. Sçpublicemployees,evenwhen lawfully discharged,enjoytheSfreedom totakeadvantage of other em ploym entopportunities.''' Cnnnon v.V ill.of Bald H ead Island,891 F.3d 489,501 (4thCk.2t18)(quotingRoth,408U.S.at573). CTMSincludesthedghttobeçfreefrom arbikary restrictions upon the opporttmity for other gainful em plom ent stemm ing f' rom the reasons voltmtarilygiven bygovemmentforlawfully term 'inating ...at-willpublicemployment''' L/a . (quoting Johnson v.M onis,903 F.2d 996,999 (4th Cir.1990:. Consequently,RaFourteenth Amendmentçliberty interestisimplicatedbypublicnnnolmcementofreasonsforanemplofee's . . ' discharge.''' Sciolino v.Citv ofNewnortNews,480 F.3d 642,645-46(4th Cir.2007)(quoting Johnson,903F.2dat999). ' Thisparticulartypeofdueprocessclaim hascometo beknown asaEtstigna-plus''clahn. See Evansv.Chalmers,703 F.3d 636,654 (4th Cir.2012).'The claim hastwo components. Cnnnon,891F.3d at501. First,theplaintiffmustestablish thathehasbeen deprived ofa liberty interest. Ld.. a Todoso,<$aplaintiffmustallegethatthechargesagainstMm :(1)placedastigrùa on hisreputation;(2)weremadepublicbytheemployer;(3)weremadein conjunction with his tennination ordemotion;and(4)werefalse.'' Sciolino.480F.3d at646. Second,theplaintiff m u'stdemonstratethathewasdeprived ofsuch interestwithoutduepröcess,which in thiscontext involvesnoticeand an opporitmityto cleartheplaintiY snnm e. Cnnnon,891F.2d at501-02. In !hesm ended complaint,Socolspecifically allegesthathewasnotafforded any form of hearing orother opportunity tb contestthe pttrported reasonsforM stermination and attemptto clearltisname. SeeAm.Compl.!! 76,112. Consequently,thecourtmustdeterminewhether Socolhasallegedfactsimplicatingaprotectçdlibertyinterestforwhich dueprocesswasrequired. In llià nmended complaint,Socolpoints prim arily to two statements in supportof his liberty interestclaim . First,SocolallegesthatHaasinformed M oran and qthersofthealleged basisfor his termination,nnm ely that Socolhad Sçtm isused P-cards deliberately and egregiously.''' Id. !! 93,103. Second,jocolcitestothepressreleasepublished on August1,2018,in which the SchoolSystem nnnounced thatSocolwasçsno longer...employed bytheschooldivision.'' Press Relçaseat1$seealsoAm.Compl.! 101. Forthefollowingreasons,thecourtconclubesthat Socol has stated a plausible claim for relief based on Haas'statem ent to M oran and others regardingthe alleged basisforSocpl'stermination. In order to implicate a protected liberty interest,a plaintiff m ust demonstrate that a statem entwasmade aboutllim thatplaced astigm aonhisreputation. Sciolino,480F.3d at648. GlF' orovertllirtyyears,EtheUited StatesCourtofAppealsfortheFottrth Circuit)hasheldthata governmentaldisclosureplacesa stigma on a formerùmployee sttfficientto give riseto a liberty interest claim if it implies the existence of serious character defects such as dishonesty or immorality.'' Cannon,891F.3dat502 (citationsomitted). In mssessing liberty interestclaims, theCourthasStdistinguished statem entsthatim ply such seriouscharacterdefects9om statem ents thatsimply allege incom petence.'' Ridpath v.Bd.ofGovernorsM arshallUzliv.?447 F.3d 292, j08(4thCir.2006)(citationsomitted). Viewingtheallegationsinthelightmostfavorabletothe plaintiff,the court concludes that Haas' statement regarding the alleged basis for Socol's term ination did m ore tha11suggestthatSocolwasihcompetentasCTIO. Instead,by indicating that Socol deliberately and egregiously m isused purchase cards,Haas insinuated that Socol engaged in dishonestconductand therefore im plied the existence ofa serious characterdefect. See Cox v.N.Va.Transp.Comm'n,551F.2d 555,557-58(4th Cir.1976)(affirmingthet' I'iaI court'sdetermination thattheplaintic slibertyinterestwasinfringedwhen heremployerpublicly linkedherdischarge. toaninvestigationoffinancialirregulnrities,thusçsinsinuatingdishonestyn); M cNeillv.Butz,480F.2d314,319-20(4thCir.1973)(concludingthatfederalemployees'liberty . interestswereimplicatedbychargesthatG&smackled)ofdeliberatefraud''andGlineffectallegeld) dishonçst/). Accordingly,atthis stage of the proceedings,the courtconcludes thatHnnR' accusationplaced a constimtionally cognizablestigm aon theplaintiffsreputation. Socolhasalso sufficiently allegedthatHnnq'statem entwastEmadepublic.'' Sciolino,480 F.3d at647;seealso Ridpath,447 F.3d at342 ($11n orderto invoke dueprocessprotections,a chargeofaseriouscharacterdefectmustbepublicly disclosed.''). TheFourth Circuithasheld that the element of public disclosure is met if a statem ent was actually dissem inated to a prospectiveemployerorthepublicatlarge,orifthereisalikelihood ofacm aldisclosure. Id.at 648 n.4,650. In thiscase,SocqlallegesthatHaasinform ed m ultiplepeople outside the School System ofthe alleged basis for Socol'sterm ination,including M oran and CasGer. The court concludesthattheplaintiffsallegationsaresufficientto satisfy thesecond elem ent. To satisfythetiirdelement,theplaintiffmustallegethatthestigmatizing statementwas lçmade in conjtmction with Mstermination ordemotion.'' Id.at647. Thiselementisemsily satisfied here. SocolallegesthatHaas'conversation with M oran took placeonthesnm edaythat Socolwasadvisedofhisterm ination,andthatthealleged basisfortheterm ination wassharedwith Castner lhortly thereaAer. Accepting the plaintic s allegations as true, Haas disclosed the infonnation atissueconcurrently with,orin closeproxim ityto,theplaintic stennination. To satisfy the fourth and final elem ent,the plaintiff must allege that the stigm atizing statem ent was false. Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 647. Ir1 the nm ended com plaint,the plaintiff expressly disputesthç yeracity ofthe accusation madeby Haas. SocolallegesthatHaasfalsely . indicated that Socol had m isused purchase cards, and that the assertion that Socol <çdid so deliberatelyandegregiouslyisalsofalse.'' Am.Compl.!94. SocolemphasizesthatheSçwasbut ohem emberofthe Steering Comm itteey''thatlçallofthe members approved the purchases,''and that he remsonably relied on Snoddy, Schm itt, and other m em bers to çGenstlre procm em ent compliance.'' Id.!! 79,86. Socol further alleges thatno one on the Steering Committee received ariy improperbenefitasa resultofthefllrnittlrepurchasesand thatthecom mittee'sonly goalwastocompletetheprojectontimeandwithinbudget. J-I. L!62. Suchallegations,accepted astrue anb taken collectively,are suxcientto satisfy the fourth element. Thus,the court concludes that Socolhas stated a plausible liberty interest claim based on Haas'statem entto M oran and othersm gardingtheallégedbasisforSocol'sterm ination. The same cnnnotbe said,however,ofthe pressrelease. As indicated above,the press release simply reported that Socolwas no longerem ployed by the SchoolSystem . The press 2 ' t release did notindicate thatSocolhad been term inated,m uch lessprovide any reasonsforhis termination. Becausethepressreleaseaccurately reflected theplaintiY sem ploym entstatusmld included no additionalstatem entsthatwould imply the existence ofseriouscharacterdefects,the courtconcludesthatthepressreleasedoesnotgiveriseto aviablelibertyinterestclaim . See.e.a., M artink.CitvofGlascow,882F.Supp.2d903,914(W .D.Ky.2012)(holdingthatapressrelease nnn luncingthatapublicemployeehadbeen dismissedforviolationsofdepnrtmentalpolicy did notsûpportalibertyinterestclaim sinceitdidnotSdbearl)uponthe(theplaintic sqimmoralityor dishonesty');V illerv.Hamm,No.1:10-cv-00243,2011WL 9185,2011U.S.Dist.LEXIS 141,at *38(D.M d.Jan.3,2011)(emphasizingthatStlmlereimmendo,wheretheunderlyingstatementis true,isnotsufficienttogiverisetoaconstitutionalcln1 'm''). C. D efendants'Liabilitv Having concluded thatthe nm ended com plaintstates a plausible liberty intemstclaim basedonHaas'statement,thecourtmustdeterminewhetherthedefendantsaresubjecttoliability underj1983. ThecotlrtconsidersinturnthepotentialliabilityoftheSchoolBoardandHaas,the latterofwhom issued'in both hisoffkialandindividualcapacities. T he SchoolBoard TheSchoolBoardisamlmicipalentityforpurposesofj1983. SeeLove-Eanev.M artin, 355 F.3d 766,782 (4th Cir.2004). M tmicipalentitiesma8notbeheld liabletmderthe stamte m erely becaujethey employed atortfeasor. M onellv.Dep'tofSocialServs.,436U .S.658,691 (1978). Instèad,theplaintiffmustplausiblyallegethattheexecutionofapolicyorcustom ofthe mllnicipalentity caused theviolation oftheplaintiœ sconstitutionalrights. Seeid.(explaining that$Gitiswhen execution ofa governm ent'spolicy orcustom ,whetherm adeby itslawm akersor bythosewhoseedictsoractsmayfairlybesaidtorepresentofficialpolicy,inflictstheinjurythat thegövennmentasan entil isresponsibleunderj 1983''). In attempting to establish mllnicipalliability,SocolallegesthatHaas'actionsKrepresent theoo cialpolicy ofiheBoard and Ethe SchoolSystemq.'' Am.Compl.! 115. The Supreme CourthasrecognizedthatS'mlmicipatliabilitymaybeimposedforasipgledecisionbymllnicipal polichniktrstmderappropriatecirc'lmstances.'' Pembam v.CitvofCincimvati,475U.S.469, 480(1986:. çç' l-o qualify asa $fma1policymaking offkial,'amllnicipaloffkialmusthavethe respbnsibility and iuthoritytoimplem entfm almunicipalpolicy with respectto aparticularcourse ofactiom'' ltiddick v.Sch.Bd.oftheCitv ofPortsmouth,238 F.3d 518,523 (4th Cir.2000) (emphasisin odginal);see also Davison v.Randall,912 F.3d 666,689 (4th Cir.2019)(Gllqn assesjing whether a municipality m ay be held liable forconstitutionalor statutory violations of their decisionmakers, the touchstone inquiry is whether dthe decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish'mlmicipalpolicy with respectto the action ordered.'') (emphasis and alterationinoriginal)(citationsomitted). R'rhe question of who ppssesses inal policym nking authority is one of state lam '' lkiddick,238F.3d at523 (citingPembatm 475 U.S.at483). In answeringthisquestion,courts lGmustlook totherelevantlegalm aterials,including stateand localpositivelaw,aswellascustom orusage having the force of lam '' Id.(internalquotation marks and citations omitted). As relevanthere,Virgiia 1aw provides thatçGltjhe schoolboard shallretain its exclusive final authority over m atters concem ing employment and supervision of its persormel, including dismisszsandsuspensions.'' Va.Codej22.1-313(emphasisadded). ' ., Although Socolcorrectly pointsoutthatGGtsnalpolicym aking authority m ay bedelegated,'' Riddick,238 F.3d at523,theam ended com plaintdoesnotplausibly allegethattheSchoolBord delegated any such authority in this case. Jnstead,Socol makes only vague and conclusory allegations in this regard,which are insuo cientunder Twombly and Iqbal. See Am .Compl. ! 115(Gsupon irlformation andbelief,theBoard delegatedauthorityto itsagentsandemployees, including Dr.Haas,to formulate,develop and adm inisteremploymentand personnelpoliciesand practicefortheBom'dand EtheSchoolSystemq,includingthosepoliciesandpracticesthatcaused M r.Socolthednmàgeshehasalleged.n). Moreover,the mere factthatHaaswaspermittedto dismissnon-licensed admizlistrativeemployeesforgoodandjustcausetEsimplycannotestablish thathe had the broaderailthodty to craftmlmicipalpolicy.'' Robinson v.Baloz,160 F.3d 183, 190(4thCir.1998). ççln otherwords,thereisamarkeddifferencebetweençtheauthoritytomake finalpolicy (and)the authority to make snalimplementing decisions.'' Htmterv.Town of M ocksville,897 F.3d 538,555 (4$h Cir.2018)(quoting Greensboro Prof'lFire FichtersAss'm Local3157v.CityofGreensboro,64F.3d962,966(4thCir.1995:. Thus,whileHaasmayhave had the discretion to dl Lsm iss certain em ployees, u: . (tlhe discretion to ja1 re an(jjse does noj necessadly include responsibility for establishing related policy.'' W eensboro Profl Fire tiahtirs,64F.3dat966. Intheabsenceofsufscientfactualallegationsf' rom whichthecourtcan reasonably inferthatHaashadfinalpolicymakingauthoritywith respecttotheactionsatissue,the 20 courtconcludes thatthe plaintic s attemptto establish mllnicipalliability on tllisbasismustbe rejected. Robipson,160F.3dat190. The sam e istrue for Socol'sconclusory assertion thatthe SchoolBoard ratified Haas' actions. SeeAm.Cömpl.! 117 (alleging,inthealternative,thatçitheBoard'sdecision to ratify M r.Haas'sactionsconstituteafinaldecisionoftheBoard'' ). Socoldoesnotallegethatmembers . oftheSchoolBoardknew thatHaasintendedtopublicizethebasisforSocof'sterminationwithout : , providing a nnme-cleanng hearing,much less plausibly dem onstrate thatthey ratifed Haas decision. In short,theplaintiY sbareallegation ofratifcation isinsuY cientto withstandreview tmderRule 12(b)(6). See Barret' tv.Bd.ofEduc.,13 F.Supp.3d 502,512 (E.D.N.C.2014) (holding thattheplaintiffsSifailed to sum ciently allegefactssupporting atheory ofmtmicipal liabilitytmdeij1983thatsatisfesthe12(b)(6)pleadingstandard''wheretheplaintiffs'complaint offeredtsnohèn-conclusoryfactualallegations''insupportofsuchclaim);Leev.O'M a11ey,533F. Supp.2d $48,553 (D.M d.2007)(emphasizing thatconclùsory statementsare insufficientto supportm lmicipalliability tm derM onell). For these reasons,the courtconcludes that Socolhas failed to plead sufficient factual allegationstosupportaclaim ofmunicipalliabilityunderj1983. Aqcordingly,Count11willbe . ' dismisse' d w1t11respecttothe SchoolBoard. 2. H aas Thecourtturnsnextto Socol'sliberty interestclaim againstHaas,wllichisbroughtagainst him in both hisofficialand individualcapàcities. UnderFout'th Circuitprecedent,the j 1983 claim againstHaàs in his oo cialcapacity as Supedntendentis Eleséentially a claim againstthe Board and thus (mustl be dismissed as duplièative.'' Love-Lane,355 F.3d at 783 (citing Kentuckyv.Grahnm,473U.S.159,165--66(1985:. Totheextentthatthelibertyinterestclaim isassertedagainstHaasin hisindividualcapacity,Haasassehsthedefenseofqualisedim munity. . ' Qualified immtmity protecis govemmentofficials f' rom civilliability çlinsofar as their conductdoesnotviolate cleady established statutoryorconstitutionall'ightsofwhich areasonable person would haveknown.'' Harlow v.Fitzgerald,457 U.j.800,818 (1982). Thebm den of provingthedefensettiestsontheparty seekingtoinvokeit'' W ilson v.PrinceGeorge'sCty.,893 F.3d213,219 (4th Cir.2018). Toprevailunderthisdefense,thedefendanthasto Sçshow either thatthere wasno constitutionalviolation orthatthedghtviolated wasnotclearly established.'' Greggv.Hnm,678F.3d333,347n.7 (4thCir.2012)(citingHem'yv.Purnell,652F.3d524,531 (4thCir.2011)(enbancll. ln this, case,thecourthasalready determinedthatthenm ended complaintplausibly alleges thatHaasviblatid theFourteenth Amendm entby failingto afford Socoladequateprocessbefore publicly disclosing thereason forhistermination. Consequently,the courtmustdecidewhether the constitutionalright'atissue wasclearly established. ççFor a rightto be clearly established, thereneed notbetacasedirectly onpoint,butexistingprecedentm usthaveplacedthestatutory or constitutionalquestion'beyonbdebate.''' Cnnnon,891F.3d at497 (quotingAshcroftv.al-r dd, 563U.S.731,741(2011( 9. Stateddifferently,1çaconstimtionalrightiscleadyestablishedwhen Gitscontoms (arejsufficiently clearthatareasonableoflicialwould tmderstnnd thatwhatheis doingviolatesthatright-''' Ridpath,447 F.3d at313. At the tim e of Socol's termination in Augustof 2018,itw as cleady established that tGmnoticeand an opportunityto beheard areessential'when apublic employee'sliberty interestis infringed by a charge implying such serious characterdefectsas tdishonestyl)orimmorality' lodgedinthecourseofan injury such asfailtlretorehire.''' Id.(quotingRoth,408U.S.at573). 22 çilnthewakeofRoth anditsprogeny,(theFourthCircuit)hasreiteratedandexpotmdedonthe requirem ents of such a liberty interestclaim on mlmerous occasions.'' Id. For instance,the Fourth Circuithasprovided çGconcrete exnmples ofthe typesofpublic statem ents implying the existence of serious characterdefects such àsdishonesty and immorality.'' J;.sat314. The exnmplesinclude a statem entlinking an employee's discharge to the investigation of financial irreguladties. J.I . J.(citing Cox,551F.2d at557-58). Atthisstageoftheproceedings,thecourt can discem no m eaningfuldistinction between such statem entand Haas'statementtying Socol's terniination to thedeliberateandegregiousm isuseofpm chasecards. tçln each ofthesescenazios, thecharge atissuecan betmderstood to insinuatedishonesty and otherseriouscharacterdefects.'' Id. Consequently,existing precedentgave Haasççfairwarning''thatthe accusation atissuewas Gjustthetypeifc'hargethatimplicatesaprotectedlibertyinterest.'' Id. Existingprecedentalso establishedthatSocolwasentitledtoannm e-cleadnghearingprior tothepublicdisclosm eoffalse information regarding thebasisforhistermination. Cnnnon,891 F.3d at506 (citing Sciolino,'480F.3d at653). BecauseSocolallegesthathewasnotprovided witùanyproqeduralsafeguardsbeforeHaaspubliclydisclosedthestigmatizingandallegedlyfalse inform ation atissue,tlp nm ended complaintstatesaviolation oftheplaintiffsclearlyestablished l'ighttodueprocess. SeeRidpath,k47F.3dat315. Accordingly,acceptingtheallegationsofthe am ended complaintastnze,Hasscontravened a clearly established Fotirteenth Am endmentright of which a reasonable person would have known. Hass therefore is notentitled to qualised im m llnity atthis stage oftheproceedings with respectto CountII. 23 lI. Claim sunder state law Inadditiontohisclaimstmderj1983,Socolassertstwoclaimstmderstatelaw. InCount 111,Socolmssertsa claim forbreach ofcontractagainstthe SchoolBoard. In CotmtlV,Socol assertsactaim fordefnmationperseagainstHaas. 'rhecourtwilladdresseachclaim intum. A. Breach of contract In supportoftkeclaim forbreachofcontract,SocolallegesthattheSchoolBoard,through itsagent,Haas,orally agreed forSocolto remain asCTIO forthedm ation ofHaas'employm entas Supedntendent. Socolfurtherallegesthatthe Board breached the oralcontractby term inating Socol'semployment. Thecourtagreeswiththedefendantsthatthisclaim issubjecttodismissal. Asindicated above, the nmended com plaint does not plausibly allege that Haas,who was then Deputy Superintendent,had authority to bind the SchoolBoard to an oralemploym entagreem ent. See Va.Codej22.1-313;Dennis,582F.Supp.at542. Additionally,Virgila'sstatmeoffraudsbars enforcem entofan oralpromiseofem ploym entforaterm ofm orethan oneyear. SeeW alton,379 F3dat454(citink'Va.Code.j11-2);seealsoFallsv.Va.StateBar,397S.E.2d671,672-73(Va. 1990)(holdingthatthestatuteoffraudsbarredenforcementofanemploymentcontractthatwasto continueaslongastheemployee'sjobperformancewassatisfactory). UnderVirginialaw,Haas wasrequiredtoserveGianinitialterm ofnotlessthantwoyears,''Va.Code j22.1-60,andHaas advisedSocolthatheplnnnedtoservetwofour-yearterms. SeeAm.Compl.! 19;seealsoP1.'s Br.Opp'n 12(assertingthattheplaintiffandHaasmumallytmderstoodthattheplaintiY sEçtimeas CTIO would span many years'l. Because Socoland Haas allegedly apeed thatSocolwould rem ain in theposition ofCTIO fortheentiredm ation ofHaas'tentlre,thepurported employm ent agreementwasnotcapable ofbeing fully performed witllin one year. Consequently,itis clear 24 f' rom the am ended complaintthatthe contractclaim based on such agreem entis ban' ed by the statttteoff' rauds.4 Accordingly, thedefendants'm otion todismisswillbegranted asto Cotmt111. B. D efam ation per se ln CountW ofthe am ended complaint,SocolclaimsthatHaasdefamed him by m aking statements to M oran and others regarding the purported basis for Socol's term ination. Socol contendsthatsuch statem entsaredefnmatory perse. Tostateaclaim forY famationtmderVirginialaw,aplaintiffmustplausiblyshow thatthe defendant(1)published (2)an actionablestatementwith (3)therequisiteintent. SeeChapin v. Knight-m dder.Inc.,993 F.2d 1087,1092 (4th Cir.1993)(citing Gazette.Inc.v.Harris,325 S.E.2d 713 @ a.1985:. G$To be Gactionabley'the statementmustbe notonly false,butalso defnmakozy 'thatis,itmustGtendl)so to harm thereputation ofanotherasto lowerhim in the estimation ofthecomm llnityortodeterthirdpersonsfrom associatingordealingwithhim .''' Id. (quotingRestatement(Second)ofTortsj559). Certain statementsaredefnmatoryperseunderVirginialaw,including(1)S4ltlhosewhich imputeto apersonunfimesstoperform thedutiesofan offceoremploymentofprotk,orwantof integrityin thedischargeoftheduiiesofsuch an offkeoremploymenf';and (2)Stgtqhosewhich Prejudicesuch person in hisorherprofession ortrade.'' Tronfeld v.NationwideV ut.Ins.Co., 636S.E.2d447,449-50(Va.2006)(quotingFlemincv.M oore,275S.E.2d632,635(Va.1981:. 4 Although a contractthat does not satisfy the stamte of frauds may stillbe enforced tmder certain circllmstances,CotmtI1Idoesnotstatea claim forwhich reliefcould bep anted,even in theabsenceofawriting. Thepartialperformancedoctrinecitedby theplaintiffisan equitableremedythat'çdoesnotoperatein actionsatlaw fordamagesforbreach ofcontractto takethe contractoutofthe statute offrauds.'' Lance J.M archiafava.Inc.v. Hafk777F.2d942,946(4thCir.1985);seealsoMianv.ArmenianAssemblyofAm.ReliefFund-No.93-2385,1994 U.S.App.LEXIS30511,at*6-7(4thCir.1994)(rejectingtheplaintiffsargumentthathispartialperformanceofthe allegedemploymentcontractremovedthecontract9om thestamteofgauds);Falls,397S.E.2dat672(holdinjthat stamteoffraudsbarredenforcementofanemploymentcontractdespitethefactthattheemployeeleftanotherlobin relianceupon the employer'soralassurancesand satisfactorily performedhisjob responsibllitiesfornearly two years). ' 25 For such statements,Virginia law presllmes that the plaintiff stzffered actual damage to his reputation and;therefore,noproofofdnm age isrequired. Flem ing,275 S.E.2d at636. A defa'm atory statem entm ay be m ade in direct terms or by ie erence,insinuation,or implication. Perk v.Vector Res.Grp.,485 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va. 1997). Although EEptu' e expressions of opizlion'' cannot ordinarily form the basis of a defnmation claim , EEfacm al statementsmadeto supportorjustifyanopinioncan.'' W JLA-TV v.Levin,564S.E.2d383,392 (Va.2002)(internalquotationmarksomitted). Accordingly,statementsthatareverifably false orcontain tçprovably false facm alcozmotations''m ay bedefnmatory. Id.;see also M ilkovich v. Loral JollrnalCo.,497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990)(holding thata statementthatimpliesa false assertion offactmaybeactionableevenifitiscouchedasastatementofopinion). Theissueof whetùerastatçmentisopinionorfactisdeterminedbythecourtasamatteroflaw,asistheissue ofwhetherastatementisdefnmatory. SeeYeaclev.ColleaiateTimes,497 S.E.2d 136,138(Va. . 1998);Chavesv.Johnson,335S.E.2d97,102(Va.1985). In moving td dismiss Socol's defnm ation claim,the defendants argue thatthe alleged statement that Socoldeliberately and egregiously misused ptlrchase cards is a non-actionable opinion. Atthis stage ofthe proceedings,however,the courtistmpersuaded. In determining whethera statementis one offactor opinion,the courtmustconsiderthe statementas a whole ratherthan isolating oneportion ofthestatem entfrom another. Hyland v.Raytheon Tech.Servs. Co.,670S.E.2d746,750 (Va.2009). W henconsideredin tllismnnner,thecourtconcludesthat the statem entatissue is not a pure expression of opinion. The assertion that Socoldeliberately m isused purchase cards(Yontainsprovably false factualcozmotations.'' Raytheon Tech.Servs. Co.v.Hyland,V 1S.E.2d84,91(Va.200*7);seeLi (holdingthatastatementsuggestingthatan employee was responsible for certnin losses that adversely affected the company was not a 26 . statementofopinionandcouldbethebasisforaclaim ofdefnmation). Additionally,Haas'ççuse qfthetel' m <egregiousglyl'mayhaveimpliedanassertionoffactasto (theplaintiffs)stateofmind orintentiom'' Galarpev.United AirlinessInc.,N o.3:17-cv-06514,2018W L 1586202,2018U.S. Dist.LEXIS56165,.at*13(N.D.Cal.Apr.2,2018);seealsoHyland,641S.E.2dat91(notingthat theuseofthewordçssignificantly''lndescribingtheplaintiY sjobperformancedidnotmakethe challengedstatementanopirlion). Accordingly,thecourtisunableto concludethatthestatem ent atissueisa non-actionableopinion. To the extentthatthe defendantsalqo arguethatHaas'statementisnotdefam atory perse, thqcouitdisagrees. Liberallyconstrued,theaccusationthatSocoldeliberately and egregiously misused pm chase cardswhileserving asCTIO implied thatSocolwasunfitto perlbrm theduties oftheposition andthafhelacked honesty and integrity. Accordingly,thecourtconcludesthatthe . ' . ' . i' iatementsupportsaplausible claim fordefnmation perse. Thus,CotmtIV isnotsubjectto dismissàlunderRule 12(b)(6). Conclusion Forthereasonjstated,thedefendants'm otionto dismisswillbegranted in pat'tanddenied in part. TheClerk isdirected to send copiesofthism em orandllm opinion and the accom panying orderto al1cotmselofrecord. DATED:This QS dayofJtme,2019. SeniorUrlited StatesD istrictJudge
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