Wood v. Berryhill, No. 3:2018cv00004 - Document 25 (W.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen E. Conrad on 8/31/18. (hnw)
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CLERK' S OFFICE U.S.DIST . COURT AT ROANO KE,VA FILED IN THE UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT FO R THE W ESTERN DISTRICT OF W R GINIA CHARLOU ESVILLE D IVISION AIJC 3 j 2 jg B(UL RK LYLA GOFF W O OD, CivilA ction N o.3:18CV 00004 Plaintiff, M EM O RA NDU M OPIM O N N AN CY A .BERRYHILL,Acting Com m issionerofSocialSecurity, By:Hon.Glen E.Conrad SeniorU nited StatesD istrictJudge D efendant. Plaintiffhasfiled thisaction challenging the finaldecision ofthe Com m issionerofSocial Security denying plaintiff's claim s for disability insurance benefks and supplem ental security incomebenefksundertheSocialSecurityAct,asamended,42U.S.C.jj416(i)and423,and42 U.S.C.j 1381etseq.,respectively. Jurisdiction ofthiscourtispursuantto42 U.S.C.j405(g) and 42 U.S.C.j 1383(c)(3). Asreflected by the memoranda and argumentsubmitted by the parties,theissuesnow beforethe courtarewhethertheCom m issioner'sfinaldecision issupported by substantialevidence,orwhetherthere isGEgood cause''to necessitate rem anding the caseto the Commissionerforfurtherconsideration. See42U.S.U.j405(g). TheplaintiftlLylaGoffW ood,wasborn on July 19,1978. Shedid notgraduatefrom high school but eventually earned a GED . M s.W ood has been em ployed as a bank teller, custom er service representative,secretary,and auto parts clerk. She w orked in som e capacity until2012. (Tr.40). However,noneofthejobsperformedinthefifteen-yearperiodpreceding Wood v. Berryhill Doc. 25 theCommissioner'sSnaldecisionrosetothelevelofsubstantialgainfulactivity. (Tr.26). On M ay 22, 2014, M s. W ood Gled applications for disability insurance benefits and . supplem entalsecurity incom e benefits. In filing her currentclaim s,M s.W ood alleged that she becam e disabled for allform s of substantial gainfulem ploym ent on January 1,2010,due to Dockets.Justia.com sax Crohn's disease,depression,migraines,and high cholesterol. (Tr.215). M s.W ood now m aintainsthgtshe hasrem ained disabled to thepresenttim e. W ith respectto herapplication for disabilityinsurancebenetits,therecordrevealsthatM s.W oodmeitheinsuredstatusrequirements oftheActthroughthefirstquarterof2011,butnotthereafter. Seegenerallv,42U.S.C.jj416(i) and423(a). Consequently,plaintiffisentitledtoaperiod ofdisability anddisability insurance benefits only ifshe has established thatshe becam e disabled for al1form s of substantialgainful employm enton orbefore M arch 31,2011. M s.W ood'sapplicationsw ere denied upon initialconsideration and reconsideration. She then requested and received a de novo hearing and review before an A dm inistrative Law Judge. In an opinion dated April26,2017,the Law Judge also determ ined,after applying the five-step sequentialevaluationprocess,thatM s.W ood isnotdisabled. See20C.F.R.jj404.1520and 416.920.1 The Law Judge found that M s. W ood suffers from several severe impairm ents, including Crohn's disease,depression,and m igraines,butthatthese im pairm ents do not,either individually orin com bination,m eetorm edically equalthe requirem entsofa listed im pairm ent. (Tr.18). TheLaw JudgethenassessedMs.W ood'sresidualfunctionalcapacityasfollows: A fter careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned Gnds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.404.1567(b) and 416.9674b)excepttheclaimantcan occasionally climb stairsand ram ps, stoop, kneel, balance, crouch, and craw l; never clim b ladders, ropes,or scaffolds;needs ready access to a restroom at regularly scheduled breaks;and m ustavoid concentrated exposure tohazardsincludingdangerousmovingmachineryandungrotected heights. The claim antis lim ited to sim ple routine repetitlve tasks, 1The process requires the Law Judge to consider, in sequence,whethera cl aimant:(1)isengaged in substantialgainfulactivity;(2)hasasevereimpairment;(3)hasanimpairmentthatmeetsorequalstherequirements ofalistedimpairment;(4)canreturntoherpastrelevantwork;and(5)ifnot,whethershecanperlbrm otherworkin thenationaleconomy. 20C.F. R .jj404.1520and416.920. Ifadecisioncanbereachedatanystep inthesequential evaluationprocess,furtherevaluation isunnecessary. Ids 2 supertk ialcontactw ith thepubliù,and low stressw ork,m eaning no high production quotas orfastpaced assem bly. (Tr.20). Given herresidualfunctionalcapacity,and afterconsideringM s.W ood'spriorwork experience and the testimony ofavocationalexperq theLaw Judgedetermined thatM s.W ood retains suftk ient functional capacity to perform certain lightw ork roles existing in signifcant numberin the nationaleconomy. (Tr.26). Accordingly,theLaw Judgeconcluded thatM s. W ood is notdisabled,and that she isnotentitled to benefts under eitherfederalprogram . See generally 20C.F.R.jj404.15204g)and416.920(g). TheLaw Judge'sopinionwasadoptedas thefinaldecision ofthe Com m issionerby the SocialSecurity Adm inistration'sAppeals Council. H aving exhausted a1lavailableadm inistrativerem edies,M s.W ood hasnow appealedto thiscourt. W hile plaintiff m ay be disabled for certain form s of em ploym ent,the cnlcial factual determ ination is w hether plaintiff is disabled for al1 form s of substantialgainfulemploym ent. See 42 U.S.C.jj 423(d)(2)and 1382c(a). There arefourelementsofproofwhich mustbe consideredinmakingsuchananalybis. Theseelementsaresummarizedasfollows:(1)objective medicalfactsand clinicalfindings;(2)theopinionsandconclusionsoftreatingphysicians;(3) subjectiveevidenceofphysicalmanifestationsofimpairments,asdescribedthroughaclaimant's testimony;and(4)theclaimant'seducation,vocationalhistory,residualskills,andage. Vitekv. Finch,438F.2d 1157,1159-60(4thCir.1971);Underwoodv.Ribicoff,298F.2d 850,851(4th Cir.1962). On appeal,M s.W ood raises severalarguments,including thatthe Law Judge im properly assessed them edicalopinion evidence,erred in determ ining herresidualfunctionalcapacity,and presented a legally insuffkienthypotheticalto the vocationalexpert. Afterreview ing the record and considering the parties'argum ents,the courtfinds (Cgood cause''to rem and the case to the Commissionerforfurtherdevelopmentandconsideration. See42U.S.C.j405(g). The m edicalrecord confil' m s thatM s.W ood has a history of depression related to her physicalimpairm ents. In February of2014,oneofhertreating physicians,Dr.M argaretH obson, noted thatplaintiffwas Esnotdoing wellin terms ofCrohn'sdisqase,''and thatshe was Gçvery depressed and qverwhelmed by thisillness.'' (Tr.510). Dr.Hobson diagnosed plaintiffwith Ctlmlajordepressivedisorderrecurrentepisode,''forwhichsheprescribedEffexor. (Tr.510-11). Severalm onths later,in Octoberof2014,Dr.Hobson noted thatM s.W ood w as still''tvel. y m uch depressed''as a resultofherphysicallim itations,and thatthe previously prescribed m edication hadreportedlymadeherfeelworse. (Tr.709). Dr.Hobsonswitchedplaintiff'smedicationfrom Effexor to Celexa, and advised plaintiff that it was Eûimperative that she continue to take the medication every day.'' (Tr.709). Examination notesfrom afollow-up visitinNovemberof 2014 indicate thatoverhalfofthe appointm entwas(Cspentcounseling ptre depression,''and that herm edication w assw itched back to Effexorbecauseofthe side effectsshew asexperiencing with Celexa. (Tr.697-98). M orerecently,M s.WoodhasbeenprescribedXanaxforanxietyandshe hasreceivedindividualtherapyfrom Dr.LynneLunsford. (Tr.666,758). OnOctober26,2016, D r.' Lunsfprd noted thatplaintiffSscontinuesto have sym ptom s ofdepression and anxiety.' ' (Tr. 758). As the requesi of the sàte agency,Dr. Elizabeth Hrncir performed a consultative psychologicalevaluation on D ecem ber9,2014. Based on the clinicalinterview andm entalstatus examination,Dr.Hrncirdiagnosedplaintiffwithmajofdepressivedisorder,recurrent,moderateto severe. (Tr.555).'SheassessedM s.W ood'sfunctionalcapacityasfollows: M s.W ood can perfonu sim ple and repetitive tasks but m ay have diftk ulty w ith complex and detailedtasks....M s.W ood w illneed additional supervision to complete work activities on a consistent basis,m aintain regularattendance in the w orkplace,and com plete a norm al workday. M s. W ood is not expected to have difticulty acceptiùg instructions from supervisors. M s.W ood's symptom s willinfluence her interactionsw ith cow orkersand thepublic. M s. W ood m ay show a m oderate to severe exacerbation ofsym ptom sto the usualstressesencountered in com petitivew ork. (Tr.555). The Law Judge ultimately concluded thatM s.W ood'sm entalim pairmentdoesnotrender ' herdisabled foral1form sof substantialgainfulemploym entorotherwise conpibute to an overall disability. A tstep two ofthe sequentialprocess,the Law Judge found thatplaintiffsdepression istf:severe'within the meaning ofthe regulations because (itcauses)more than a minimal limittion intheclaimant'sabilityto perform basicwork activities-'' (Tr.18). lnmakingthis determ ination, the Law Judge accorded SElittle weight'' to the opinions of the state agency consultantswhofoundthatM s.W ood'smentalimpairmentisnotsevere. (Tr.26). TheLaw Judge emphasized that the çsevidence received at the hearing level, including D r. Lunsford's report,demonstratestheclaimanthasaseverementalimpairment.'' (Tr.26). ln evaluating M s.W ood'smenlalimpairmentunderstep three ofthe sequentialprocess, the Law Judge determ ined that she has Gm oderate lim itations''with respect to Gçconcentrating, persisting,ormaintainingpace.'' (Tr.19). Undertheregulations,thisareaofmentalfunctioning çdrefersto theabilitiesto focusattention on work activitiesand stay on task atasustained rate-'' 20 C.F.R.Pt.404Subpt.P,App'x1,section12.00(E). Examplesinclude:performingataskthatyou understand and know how to do;working atan appropriate and consistentpace;com pleting tasks in a tim ely m anner;and sustaining an ordinary routine and regularattendance atw ork. Id. In determiningthatM s.W oodismoderatelylim itedinthisareaofmentalfunctioning,theLaw Judge observed asfollow s: Consultative exam inerElizabeth H nw ir,Ph.D .,noted the claim ant recalledonetrialofthethreetrialsofthedigitforwardsejuences. She recalled two trials of the three trials of the digit backw a' rd sequences. She w asunable to explain fourproverbsusing logical, 5 abstractreasoning processes. However,sherecalled herbirth date, age, address, phone num ber, year obtained GED , and age of boyfriend,son,daughter,and brother. On other mentalstatus exam inations,the claim antwasnoted to have norm alattention span and concentration. (Tr.19). ln assessing plaintiffs residualfunctional capacity,the Law Judge gave Dr.Hrncir's opinionsdt partialweight'' (Tr.25). TheLaw Judgefoundthattheresultsofthementalstat'us exam ination conducted by Dr.Hrncirsupported Eslim iting theclaim antto sim ple routinerepetitive tasksand low stresswork.'' (Tr.25). However,becauseGithe claimantrecalled thefirstand currentpresidents ofthe United States,herbirth date,age,address,phone num ber,yearobtained GED,and age ofboyfriend,son,daughter,and brother,''the Law Judge determ ined thatdifurther limitations in the claimant's abilities are notwarranted.'' (Tr.25). The Law Judge also determ ined thata (tlim itation in the claim ant's interaction w ith qupervisorsand cow orkers is not . warranted,''sinceplaintifftEwascooperativeand shereportedstrong familyrelationships.'' (Tr. 25). ln the court's view ,the diftk ulty with the LaW Judge's evaluation of plaintiffs m ental impairm entistwo-fold. First,theLaw Judgefailed to build an Siaccurate and logicalbridge''from the evidence she recounted to herconclusions regarding M s.W ood's m entalresidualfunctional cgpacity. M onroe v.Colvin,826 F.3d 176,189 (4th Cir.2016). In perfonning a residual functionalcapacity assessm ent,a Law Judge idm ustinclude anarrative discussion describing how theevidencesupportseachconclusion,citingspecitk medicalfacts(e.g.,laboratorytindings)and nonmedicalevidence(e.g.,daily activities,obselwationsl.'' Masciov.Colvin,780F.3d632,636 (4thCir.2015)(quoting SSR 96-8p,1996 SSR LEXIS 5,61Fed.Reg.34,474,34,475(Ju1y 2, 1996:. Additionally,iftheresidualfunctionalcapacity assessmentGtconflictswith anopinion from amedicalsource,the (Law Judgeqmustexplain whytheopinionwasnotadopted.'' SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEX IS 5, 61 Fed.Reg.at 34,478. U ltim ately,the Law Judge dsm ust both identify evidencethatsupports(her)conclusion and tbuild anaccurateand logicalbridgefrom (thatjevidenceto gher)conclusion.''' W oodsv.Berryhill,888F.3d 686,694 (4th Cir.2018) (emphasisinoriginal)(quotingMonroe,826F.3dat189). The courtisunableto concludethattheLaw Judgedid so intheinstantcase. In evaluating plaintiffs residual functional capacity, the Law Judge credited Dr. H nw ir's assessm ent in Stlimiting the claimantto simple routine repetitive tasks and 1ow stress work''but apparently rejected Dr.Hrncir's opinion thatplaintiffwould need additionalsupervision to finish work activities on a consistent basis,m aintain regular attendance,and com plete a norm alw orkday. (Tr.25). However,the only evidencetheLaw Judge cited to supportherdetermination that EGfurtherlim itationsin theclaimant'sabilitiesarenotw arranted''isthefactthatM s.W ood w asable to recallsuch basic infonuation as heraddress,phone num ber,the nam e ofthe president,herage, andtheagesofclosefamilymembers. (Tr.25). lmportantly,theLaw Judgeneverexplained how she concluded, based on this evidence, that M s. W ood can finish work activities on a consistentbasis,m aintain regularattendance,and com plete a norm alw orkday w ithoutadditional supervision. The Law Judge Eitherefore failed to build an çaccurate and logicalbridge'from the evidence (she)recounted to (her)conclusion aboutgplaintiffs)residualfunctionalcapacity.'' W oods.888 F.3d at694. M oreover,to the extentthe Law Judge's decision appearsto correlate theabilitytoperform simpletasksw ith the ability to m aintain concentration,persistence,andpace, the Unitsd States CourtofAppeals for the Fourth Circuithas made clear thatdtthe ability to perform sim pletasks differsfrom the ability to stay on task.'' M ascio,780 F.3d at638. For sim ilarreasons,the courtis also unable to conclude thatthe Law Judge presented a legally sufficient hypothetical to the vocational expert. lt is unclear w hether the Law Judge attem pted to account for her conclusion that M s.W ood experiences m oderate difficulties in concentration,persistence, or pace. The Law Judge asked the vocational expertto consider som eone w ith M s. W ood's age,education,and prior work experience who has the follow ing lim itations: gAlssume the individual is limited to light exertion. Can occasionally clim b stairs,ram ps,stoop,kneel,balance,crouch and craw l;and never clim b ladders,ropes,scaffolds;and needs ready accesstotherestroom atregularly schedutedbreaks. In addition mustavoid concentrated exposure to hazards including dangerous movingmachineryandunprotectedheights....(Tlhisindividualis galso)limitedtosimple,routine,repetitivetasks;superficialcontact w ith the public,and 1ow stressm eaning no high production quotas orfast-paced assem bly. (Tr.55-56). W hile the Law Judge adopted the vocationalexpert'sopinion thatplaintiffcan perfol'm work as a non-postalm ailclerk,laundry w orker,orm aid,the vocationalexpertw asnot asked to considerthe signifcance ofm oderate lim itationsin concentration,persistence,orpace in the performance of such jobs, all of which would seemingly require attendance to task. N evertheless,the Law Judge relied on the testim ony ofthe vocationalexpertin determ ining that M s. W ood retains sufficient functional capacity for several specific work roles existing in significantnum berin the nationaleconomy. In W alkerv.Bowen,889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1989),the Fourth Circuitcommented as follow s: Thepurposeofbringing in a vocationalexpertisto assistthe ALJ in determ ining w hether there is w ork available in the national econom y w hich thisparticularclaim antcan perform . In orderfora vocational expert's opinion to be relevant or helpful, it m ust be based upon a consideration ofa1lotherevidence in the record,and it m ustbe in responsetoproperhypotheticalquestionsw hich fairly set outal1ofclaim ant'sim pairm ents. Id.at50(citationsomitted). In her opinion,the Law Judge did notoffer any specific rationale for om itting m oderate lim itations in concentration,persistence,orpace in her hypotheticalquestion propounded to the vocationalexpert. The courtissim ply unableto concludethatthe hypotheticalquestion posedby the Law Judge, which assum qd that plaintiff can perform low stress w ork involving sim ple, routine,repetitive tasks,wassufficientto alertthe vocationalexpertto the existence ofm oderate lim itations in plaintiff's concentration, work persistence, and attendance to task. The court believes that consideration of such lim itations w ould be im portant in assessing a claim ant's capacitytoperform thejobsenvisionedbytheLaw JudgeforM s.W ood. M oreover,the Fourth Circuithas specifcally held that Gsan A LJ does notaccount Kfor a claim ant's lim itations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical questiontosimple,routinetasksorunskilledwork-''' M ascio,780F.3dat638(quotingW inschel v.Comm'rofSoc.Sec.,631F.3d 1776,1180 (11thCir.2011)). Thisisbecause<stheabilityto perfol'm sim ple tasks differs from the ability to stay on àsk. Only the latter lim itation w ould accountfora claim ant'slim itation in concentration,persistence,orpace.'' 1d. The court recognizes that M ascio does not stand for the proposition that m oderate lim itationsin concentration,persistence,orpace alwaystranslate into a lim iGtion in a claim ant's residualfunltionalcapacity. Rather,thedecision underscorestheLaw Judge'sdutytoexplain how her residualfunctionalcapacity findings adequately accountfor a claim ant's w ork-related lim itations. For instance,the Law Judge Gtm ay find thatthe concentration,persistence,orpace limitationdoesnotaffectEaclaimant's)abilitytowork,inwhichcaseitwouldEbe)appropriateto exclude itfrom the hypotheticaltendered to the vocationalexpert.'' 1d. In this case,how ever, 9 theLaw Judgedidnotprövldesuchexplanafoh or.bulldaloglcalbridge'betweenherG dlngsand ' . J ' . .. ieevldenceofxcord. Consequentl#çaremsndlslnorder.. '.K For ie - qons stated, tlle court fmds dçgood cause'' to remand the case to tlle , , # ' #. Comml 'sslonerfor ilrtber developmeàt.nn' d consldemtiomz Ifthe Comm lqsbnerisnnsble to . * . I ,. ' decide'tlïlKîe- e in plaintic s av .o ., r.o. n.théb.aslsoftheexistingmcord,the Commlssionerw111 . f conducta supplementaladmlnlstratlve henn-ng atwMch both sides * 1be allowed to preseét . . . j . .;(. addiuonalevldenceandargument Anappropriateorderofremqnd* 1. 1beenteredthl 'Kdéy. TheClerk isdirectedtosendcertm edcoplesof1Mqmemorandum opiniontoG coùnKelof recori DATED:'I4u'G /* dayoj. s ou<r . .. .x lg. I:!. . '' SenlorUnitH .statesDkstrld Judée ' . . . **. ê . . . * ' . * '' ' 2h nglltoftlx coM 'sdecislon toremnnd thecasetotheCommlsgoner,tlze COUh declinesto address M s.W ood'sremslnlng clnlmnoferor. 10
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