Brink v. McDonald et al, No. 4:2014cv00024 - Document 52 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER granting 35 Motion in Limine; denying 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Mark S. Davis on 4/14/2015. (bgra)
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Brink v. McDonald et al Doc. 52 FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT EASTERN DISTRICT OF COURT VIRGINIA APR 1 4 2015 Newport News Division CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT MICHELE NORFOLK, VA BRINK, Plaintiff, Civil v. Robert a. Action No.: 4:14cv24 Mcdonald, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Defendant. OPINION This judgment, limine, Yvonne is ECF No. ECF McDonald seeks matter a No. before 24, and Def.'s Mot. on on ruling In his that motion 2015, 24, motion in the Ms. 1, supervisory 36. status a In GRANTS Defendant's motion in limine 43. and be Therefore, holds that Mem. response, . . . for all purposes related to this matter." ECF No. of coworker, co-worker in Limine at 1, should A. Defendant ("Plaintiff"). No. Solomon was in Robert has to Mot. "Yvonne ECF by limine, Solomon summary Plaintiff Resp. that at for and a motion 2015, of Michele Brink Limine conceded March regarding contends in a on March 2, rather than a supervisor, Supp. Court filed ("Defendant").1 Solomon the ORDER filed 35, pre-trial AND deemed a Pi.'s the Court Ms. Solomon 1 Also pending before the Court are two other motions in limine filed by Defendant. ECF Nos. 38, 40. The Court will resolve such motions by separate order. Dockets.Justia.com must be considered Plaintiff's coworker, rather than her Court need supervisor, for all purposes in this matter. Thus, only in light consider, of in Plaintiff's detail, concession, Defendant's the motion for summary judgment. After examining the briefs and the record, the Court determines that the oral argument is unnecessary because facts and legal contentions are adequately presented and oral argument would not aid in the decisional process. E.D. Va. Loc. R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 7(J). I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2 On September 5, a position Veterans Def.'s as a Affairs First Req. nurse Center for Admis. Plaintiff Unit ("Telecare") 2009, Plaintiff registered Medical 2008, medical 2006, was detailed as limitations. Plaintiff was at a to at at the Hampton, ("HVAMC"). 4, ECF No. HVAMCs temporary Id. accepted an appointment 5. Virginia, PL's 25-1. Telecare accommodation Thereafter, on to Resp. to In December Nurse for Group certain February 13, formally assigned to the Telecare position. Id. From the beginning of it was apparent to Plaintiff Plaintiff's substantive to Telecare, that her colleagues in Telecare did In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's assignment allegations of Defendant does not contest harassment. Thus, the Court only sets forth the facts relevant to the issues raised in Defendant's motion for summary judgment. not want Plaintiff Telecare informed and, Telecare long Id. unit, period of the local Telecare did union not want The Telecare workspace was kept did not colleagues time opening before have a key to the would the sometimes door to let wait a Plaintiff Id. Spring Plaintiff's race. or early Summer 2009, Dianne McQueen, began overtly harassing Plaintiff based on Id. *j 8. and Monica Brandon, Two other coworkers, then joined in harassing to a lesser degree. daily) f 3. in Michele Despite her knocks on the door to the Plaintiff's coworker, "'intense,' ladies position. "upon being placed in president Plaintiff's of late Telecare Moreover, Plaintiff t 5. into the workspace. By the Id. initially, workspace. the the "that there." in 28-1. position," Plaintiff [Plaintiff] locked work ^ 4, ECF No. Brink Decl. the to \ Id. 9. 'deeply offensive' and routinely." Yvonne Solomon Plaintiff, though The overt racial harassment was and occurred Def.'s Mem. Supp. frequently Mot. (if not for Summ. J. at 3 (quoting Compl. 1 12-14, 28, ECF No. 1); accord PL's Mem. Opp'n Mot. for Summ. harassment Plaintiff and to was talked J. which at (admitting McQueen, "so severe almost 3 that, every Solomon, from night such and assertion). Brandon subjected the beginning she went home with her husband, who recommended that she report the issues to a supervisor." Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 The often Def.'s (citing Kevin Brink Dep. at 30-31, for 35, 40, Summ. 43, J. Plaintiff at ECF No. 3 "sought Mem. Supp. 31-33, at 3 say ECF No. anything Mot. such to a harassment for Summ. 25-2); Program" 25-3); J. accord at such J. at through assertion). 3 In the addition, Hampton Opp'n Mot. However, or over Mem. Opp'n Mot. the harassment. manager VA's Def.'s two years." Opp'n Mot. "did the Def.'s to J. not purported Mem. Interrog. for at for Summ. Plaintiff about (citing PL's Resp. PL's Mem. 3 (citing Michele Brink Dep. accord PL's Mem. well PL's assertion) . because of supervisor for accord counselling for Summ. (admitting racial No. Mot. (admitting out Employee Assistance 25-4); Summ. Supp. 7, J. ECF at 3 (admitting such assertion). In October 2011, Plaintiff made the alleged harassment making various attempts her first to a supervisor, to meet with complaint about Pamela Orie.3 Ms. Orie in After early fall Defendant has presented evidence to contradict Plaintiff's that she complained to Ms. Orie in October 2011. For example, Defendant offers a declaration from Ms. Orie in which Ms. Orie denies meeting with Plaintiff about supposed racial issues in evidence October 2011 or any time prior to March 2, 2012. Orie Decl. f 14, ECF No. 25-8. Contrary to Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff has failed to "offer some hard evidence showing that [her] version of the events is not wholly fanciful," Def.'s Reply Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3, ECF No. 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), Plaintiff's sworn declaration directly disputes Defendant's evidence about the first report of alleged harassment, and therefore creates a genuine dispuce as to when Plaintiff first met with Ms. Orie regarding her allegations of racial harassment. In resolving the instant motion, the Court cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. F.3d 2015). Jacobs , No. Thus, v. 13-2212, N.C. Administrative 2015 WL 1062673, Office of the at *4 (4th Cir. Courts, Mar. 12, the Court has described any genuinely disputed facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, 4 the non-moving party. Id. 2011, Ms. Orie and Plaintiff met what Plaintiff believes Decl. *;*i 17-18, Plaintiff "lynchings, the conversations her KKK, the end of October to have been October 28, ECF No. informed at about regarding M. Brink Orie, workplace oppression black men 2011. discussions of blacks, dating respectively, 2011 and November 3, to Dr. Anthony 2011, Bradford white women" Brink Decl. ^ 22. relayed the same the email r\ 18. and Dr. Sheila Elliott See ECF Nos. 28-9. Plaintiff next complained to Ms. in Id. and Plaintiff sent emails, that referenced Plaintiff's meeting with Ms. Orie. 28-8, involving inappropriate "complained to her about being called 'white girl.'" On October 31, on In her meeting with Ms. 28-1. the 2011, October from M. During her meeting with Ms. Orie, Plaintiff information that 2011 meeting. Plaintiff second-level Orie on March 2, 2012. to Id. Ms. supervisor-and she had provided to Ms. Orie Orie, Dr. Also, in Lewis Elliott, a March 2, 2012 Frazier—Plaintiff's Plaintiff indicated that "tension and hostility has been present for a long time" Plaintiff's motivated workplace, by factors that that she are believed protected that by "it EEOC is in partially regulations," and that she was "making a final attempt to resolve this tension by requesting mediation 11. blank In response "report of to through your assistance." Plaintiff's contact" forms complaint, to Plaintiff Ms. ECF No. Orie sent 28- out and her coworkers in an attempt allegations. 5, 2012 to Orie Dep. email indicating document conduct from that any Thereafter, fact-finding 15, Ms. ECF No. Orie "attached concerns to is regarding 28-15; ECF No. Plaintiff the or (past Report and of present) Plaintiff's 28-16 her coworkers Contact you (March may form to have."). Plaintiff's supervisors had additional meetings with Plaintiff and engaged in additional email correspondence.4 On April of 20, 2012, discrimination. Plaintiff ECF No. filed 28-27. a formal In August 2012, charge Plaintiff reassigned to a position as a Nurse Navigator at HVAMC, her current position at HVAMC. On February 28, 2014, asserted harassment based race; on and (III) February prejudice her 6, causes Plaintiff on of race; retaliation. 2015, disparate which is See Brink Decl. fl 29. employment discrimination action. initially was Compl., action (II) this ECF No. 1. under disparate See id. Plaintiff filed Title VII treatment HH 27, 31, 34. voluntarily Title VII Plaintiff for: (I) based on However, dismissed with treatment and retaliation claims. ECF * Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of following her March 2, 2012 complaint to Ms. Orie. the investigation Both parties have submitted substantial evidence regarding events following Plaintiff's March 2, 2012 complaint. However, the Court does not set forth any further details of such investigation because they are not relevant to Defendant's laches defense—the only remaining defense asserted in See Notice, ECF No. 48. For the Defendant's summary judgment motion. same reason, the Court does not set forth any facts relating to harassment that occurred subsequent to Plaintiff's March 2, 2012 complaint. No. 21. Thus, only Plaintiff's harassment claim remains at issue in this matter. On February deposition. deposition, the allegations of her recall at ECF No. took Plaintiff's 25-3. During racial harassment conversations allegations, what 98, 176, 185, prompted 185. the about including O.J. Simpson, African-American men dating Caucasian women, Id. at 98, Id. Defendant counsel questioned Plaintiff concerning concerning lynchings, not Dep., Defendant's specifics KKK. 2015, Brink M. 17, 195. the Similarly, In response, conversation Plaintiff Plaintiff about could number of times in which conversations about and the O.J. not could Simpson. quantify the lynchings occurred, but could "say when it was worse" and that "it was persistent." Id. at 176. frequency Caucasian ago,-" Id. In of women 195. because about "that was could not establish African-American two and a half, men the dating three years Plaintiff stated that "it occurred throughout." Regarding could not provide conversations and a half years ago," in about the KKK, Plaintiff a quantitative number as to the frequency of such conversations because "consistent Plaintiff conversations however, at addition, terms "that was almost three years ago, two but stated that such conversations were of their constantly talking about and barraging me with these things ... at times it was worse than others, but it was always there." Id. at 199. Finally, although Plaintiff has alleged that her coworkers left "stories about racial occurrences" at her work station, Compl. her deposition, H 13, in Plaintiff could only identify one article that a coworker left on her desk and that she considered to be racially hostile or harassing, M. Brink Dep. at 214. On March 2, 2015, summary judgment. Defendant ECF No. regardless of environment allegations, based by on two Faragher the Therein, validity he affirmative v. 24. City of is Boca Inc. v. for Summ. response 2015, in summary defense. at 13. opposition Defendant Summ. J., J. (1) Raton, filed his ECF No. 33. Defendant's with ECF No. hostile defense U.S. 775 524 U.S. for 742 work judgment established (1998) (1998) Def.'s Mem. 2015, and (the Supp. Plaintiff filed her motion. Def.'s On Reply March 24, Mot. for Supp. 2015, Defendant withdrew his respect 48. motion summary laches. On April 10, judgment motion Notice, 524 Ellerth, reply. to the On March 19, to instant Defendant asserts that, entitled "Faragher/Ellerth defense"); and (2) Mot. the Plaintiff's defenses: of Burlington Industries, filed to the Accordingly, Faragher/Ellerth the matter is now ripe for disposition. II. The Federal Rules STANDARD OF of Civil REVIEW Procedure provide that a district court shall grant summary judgment in favor of a movant if such party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 8 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). " [T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties otherwise properly supported motion for will not summary defeat judgment; an the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., fact is and a "material" dispute if is it 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A "might affect the outcome of the suit," "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. If a movant has properly advanced evidence supporting entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere the pleadings, allegations of specific facts in the form of other materials that but instead must exhibits, illustrate a genuine issue Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 Civ. At point, himself matter trial." 56(c). to weigh but to that the evidence determine Anderson, and whether 477 U.S. "the judge's determine there at 249. forth sworn statements, Celotex Corp. v. P. set is a for (1986); function the truth genuine In doing so, or trial. Fed. R. is not of the issue for the judge must construe the facts and all "justifiable inferences" in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, make credibility determinations. Id. and the judge may not at 255; T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. City Council, 674 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012). III. Defendant originally DISCUSSION asserted that summary judgment based on two defenses: defense; and (2) laches. concession that this Defendant However, subsequently Faragher/Ellerth case need only consider (1) in withdrew his whether Plaintiff's coworker harassment, to 48. Defendant to of motion applicable ECF No. entitled the Faragher/Ellerth involves Notice, is light only defense supervisory actions. he is as claims to the involving Therefore, entitled the Court to summary judgment on the issue of laches. A defendant defense of in a Title VII action may assert laches as the equitable a bar to a plaintiff's claim. The defense of laches "'requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, party asserting the defense.'" Nat'l Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121-22 (2002) 514 U.S. 673, of diligence, 687 (1995)). and (2) "The R.R. prejudice to the Passenger Corp. v. (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, first element of laches, lack is satisfied where a plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in pursuing his claim." EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 409 F.2d 99, 102 (4th (4th Cir. Cir. 2005) 1990)). (citing White v. Regarding lack of Daniel, 909 diligence, there is no per se rule establishing when a plaintiff's delay in pursuing her claim becomes unreasonable. Logistics, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 10 2d 433, See 441 EEOC v. Propak (W.D.N.C. 2012) (citation omitted); Telecomm., Inc., U.S. 514 (citations (7th F. omitted); 925, 928 delay, difficult assessment general the sliding scale: claim, the defend on 734 (7th the less many to apply longer laches." Cir. the Smith 2003) v. v. cases the City of is . C.J.) too . asserting or establishing a claimed right, caused by detrimental Lockheed, 514 F. 102). "'Classic reliance Supp. 2d at 803 elements of unavailability of witnesses, pertinent records.'" 668 F.2d 1199, 1203 on Id. the may in be a "in filing 338 F.3d to the her 730, second a disadvantage or some other harm plaintiff's (citing F.3d show in order to As by 472 However, Inc., "[p]rejudice 2007) laches lies on a must element, Md. much' delays omitted). Global (observing, .") . Caterpillar, demonstrated (D. Chicago, doctrine of defendant Martin 801 plaintiff (citations is 797, much the prejudice Lockheed (Easterbrook, "'[h]ow in decision 2d Pruitt 2006) that v. Supp. cf. Cir. regarding EEOC Daniel, undue conduct." 909 prejudice changed personnel, in F.2 at include and the loss of (quoting EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., (11th Cir. 1982)). In addition, in assessing prejudice, courts will consider whether key witnesses' memories Propak, have 884 F. faded. Supp. See Smith, 2d at 444 338 F.3d 734-35 (citations omitted); 514 F. Supp. 2d at 805 (citations omitted). 11 at & n.5; Lockheed, As an Defendant's initial matter, laches before defense, the turning Court will to the assess merits of Plaintiff's contention that Defendant has waived such defense by failing to include it provide in his that answer. "[i]n responding affirmatively state any Fed. R. Civ. P. The Federal Rules to avoidance (8)(c). a of Civil Procedure pleading, a or affirmative party defense must . However, [a]lthough it is indisputably the general rule that a party's failure to raise an affirmative defense in the appropriate pleading results in waiver, there is ample authority in this Circuit for the proposition that absent unfair surprise or prejudice to the plaintiff, a defendant's affirmative defense is not waived when it is first raised in a pre-trial dispositive motion . Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 1999) (internal citations an affirmative defense motion, a court will 180 F.3d 598, 612 omitted). first not Therefore, in considering in a pre-trial raised find dispositive waiver "unless the plead resulted in unfair surprise or prejudice." Edwards & Sons, (4th Cir. 2003) 5 Charles Alan Inc. v. Cincinnati (citing Brinkley, Wright & Practice & Procedure § 1278 Having Defendant has in his carefully the Ins. Co., failure See S. Wallace 353 F.3d 180 F.3d at 612-13); R. Miller, to et al., 367, 373 see also Federal (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2014). considered waived his answer, Arthur (4th Cir. Plaintiff's contention that laches defense by failing to assert Court rejects Plaintiff's argument it because such failure did not result in any unfair surprise or prejudice 12 to Plaintiff. prejudice Plaintiff because has suffered no unfair surprise Defendant specifically defense in his summary judgment motion, asserted his or laches and Plaintiff has had a full opportunity to brief and argue the merits of such defense. See Brinkley, Raap, 386 3land v. 2011) 180 F. F.3d at App'x 455, 459 Fairfax County, (Cacheris, J.) a 612-13; Grunley (4th Cir. 799 F. 2010) Supp. first U.S., LLC (unpublished); 2d 609, (finding waiver due defendant Walsh 612-13 v. cf. (E.D. Va. to unfair surprise and prejudice where Moreover, although Plaintiff argues that it was caught off guard by Defendant's laches defense, the Faragher/Ellerth the way [Defendant] for Summ. J. defense, actions take a at Plaintiff affirmative Under one defendant must of a supervisor, of any defense the that, the plaintiff or based of establish defense at at 745. upon Opp'n Mot. Faragher/Ellerth with respect to "unreasonably failed corrective As part of such inquiry, to opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 524 U.S. trial). primarily Pi.'s Mem. element preventive a "admittedly anticipated conducted discovery." 18. advantage raised Ellerth, courts consider the plaintiff's delay in attempting to take advantage of corrective opportunities Head Island Therefore, inquiry provided by Mgmt. , given into a Inc., the the employer. 259 F.3d similarities plaintiff's 261, between delay 13 in E.g., 270 the Matvia v. (4th Cir. Bald 2001). Faragher/Ellerth taking advantage of corrective opportunities provided by an employer and the laches inquiry into whether asserting her that on claim, the plaintiff Court finds she anticipated Defendant's his unfair discovery strategy surprise or asserting his Accordingly, asserted Court defense. Plaintiff's in admission Faragher/Ellerth defense based also suggests defense via finds delayed his that that from suffered Defendant summary Defendant she first judgment has not no motion. waived his defense. will laches now because racial harassment. specifically, turn to asserts approximately unreasonable that prejudice Court Defendant element of waiting the unreasonably unfair laches laches The More the the the that Supp. waited of Defendant's established laches the first unreasonably delayed before Defendant's she has Plaintiff Def.'s Mem. because he three years in merits reporting Mot. view, almost the for Summ. three alleged J. Plaintiff's in at 22. delay was years to first inform a supervisor of the alleged racial harassment despite the following undisputed facts: (1) the almost immediately when Plaintiff was she allegedly suffered extreme abuse alleged harassment assigned to Telecare, for years, (3) aware of the HVAMC policies on workplace harassment, received training on such policies. prejudice, Defendant argues him in the following manner: See id. that Plaintiff's (1) 14 began at she was and (4) she 19-22. delay (2) As to prejudiced Defendant must defend against "an expansive period of escalating harassment" that he would not otherwise have had to defend against if Plaintiff had complained of the alleged harassment when it began; of the details frequency of Plaintiff on the inception In See id. in prejudice, of no work report of an the (3) environment, harassment opportunity lack of if even its correct to at the diligence, one racial After weighing Defendant . is was "trying [to] and Plaintiff avoid and . and argues . "the will the nature Plaintiff remember exact harassment occur." equities not Id. considering in entitled this to 15 suffered is not an "inordinate allegations exact at summary coworkers no used case, her her As these the through Defendant the language work for Summ. J. at 23. that of to angering two and one-half years carefully the she PI.'s Resp. Opp'n Mot. time" circumstances of hostile regarding Telecare prejudice because acts and 22-25. because by complaining." that at faded; the damages will be assessed based to Defendant has including that her delay in reporting the alleged harassment was unreasonable amount the failure response, difficulties to of Plaintiff's memory harassment, conversations, period deprived situation. not alleged establishes liability, Plaintiff's contends the certain entire though of (2) dates, when is the these such exact types of 24. parties' the Court judgment submissions concludes on his and that laches defense because of genuine prejudice element of laches. this case from the onset of than two and one-half of fact years—compared Caterpillar, the subsequent to her "sliding scale" prejudice to two genuine and the initial warrant of laches, of laches 730, 734 well as years complaint, in (7th continuous even indicates Cir. the fact that was and cases, occurred that on the make a fairly strong showing of dismissal disputes F.3d harassment one-half Defendant must under the doctrine are that 338 other (eight and one-half year delay) , as throughout Inc., to 2003) alleged the the alleged harassment—a little more Smith has regarding The comparatively short delay e.g., Plaintiff v. disputes of Plaintiff's see id. material entire at However, fact 733-34. as to the action there degree of prejudice Defendant has suffered from Plaintiff's faded memory. Likewise, the there are genuine disputes of material fact extent to which the alleged racial Plaintiff's harassment failure to more caused prejudice regarding timely report to Defendant by subjecting him to liability for harassment that was more severe, or over a longer period, than what might otherwise have occurred if Plaintiff reported such alleged harassment at its inception. In short, genuine disputes of material fact regarding the extent of prejudice Defendant suffered from Plaintiff's alleged delay preclude summary judgment in Defendant's favor and dismissal of 16 Plaintiff's Jeffries 1985) entire v. Chi. Transit (noting that subject to if facts the action the Auth., 770 doctrine F.2d of 676, laches.5 679 See (7th Cir. "[1]aches is generally a factual question not summary at under judgment" trial (citations establish omitted)) . that Plaintiff That said, unreasonably delayed in complaining of the alleged harassment and such delay prejudiced will Defendant, craft the under the appropriate doctrine remedy of to laches, the achieve Court equity. •• To the extent that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the prejudice element of laches, the Court need not assess the sufficiency of Defendant's showing with respect to the diligence element. Cf., e.g., Pruitt, 472 F.3d at 929 (in dicta, stating: "There remains the final question posed by Morgan: 'what consequences follow if laches is established? The district court assumed that the upshot of laches must be outright dismissal. Yet that's not the only possible consequence. A less severe consequence would be to carve off the aspects of the plaintiffs' claim that are no longer subject to meaningful adversarial testing." (internal citations omitted) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122)) . In this case, Defendant did not seek summary judgment on laches with respect to any particular subset of instead seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's the alleged harassment, Defendant's generalized evidence of entire action. In addition, prejudice through Plaintiff's lapsed memory does not present a sufficient any factual particular basis subset for of the the Court to conclude allegations in that laches Plaintiff's bars claim. Furthermore, the Court notes that in his summary judgment motion, Defendant did not contest whether Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that any harassment by Plaintiff's coworkers is attributable to Defendant. Neither did Defendant seek summary judgment on any claims of harassment alleged to have occurred prior to the point at which a reasonable juror could conclude Defendant was on actual or constructive notice of the alleged harassment. See Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for alleged harassment occurring prior to point at which the defendant was on notice of the alleged harassment). And Defendant has not sought to file a second summary judgment motion in accordance with Local Rule 56(C) and now, seven days prior to trial, any such motion likely would be denied. While it is possible that the jury might be asked to decide by interrogatory when Defendant had actual or 17 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the defense of laches. IV. For Motion the in reasons Limine CONCLUSION stated above, No. 1, ECF the No. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, The Clerk is REQUESTED to Order to IT all IS SO counsel of Court 35. GRANTS The ECF No. send a copy of Defendant's Court DENIES 24. this Opinion and record. ORDERED M Mark S. Davis United States District Judge Mark S. Davis United States District Judge Norfolk, Virginia April 14, 2015 constructive notice of any harassment and instructed that Plaintiff's damages are limited to harm sustained after such notice, that issue presently is not before the Court.
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