Wilson v. Arthur et al, No. 3:2023cv00082 - Document 3 (E.D. Va. 2023)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. See Opinion for details. Signed by District Judge David J. Novak on 3/14/2023. Memorandum Opinion was mailed to the plaintiff. (sbea)

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Wilson v. Arthur et al Doc. 3 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 1 of 12 PageID# 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division VINCENT ELLIOT WILSON, Plaintiff, v. Civil No. 3:23cv82 (DJN) BETH ARTHUR, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Vincent Elliot Wilson, a Virginia inmate proceeding prose, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 1 Wilson's request to proceed informa pauperis will be granted. (ECF No. 2.) The matter is before the Court for evaluation of Wilson's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Complaint, (ECF No. 1), and the action will be DISMISSED. I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines that the action (I) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claims where The statute provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. 42 u.s.c. § 1983. Dockets.Justia.com Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 2 of 12 PageID# 20 the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court accepts a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations as true and views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). The plaintiff cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id at 570, rather than merely "conceivable," id "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 2 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 3 of 12 PageID# 21 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell At!. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore,the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761,765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193,213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270,281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,while a court must liberally construe pro se complaints,Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate,sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig,J.,concurring); Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274,1278 (4th Cir. 1985). II. PERTINENT SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS In his Complaint, Wilson names as Defendants: Arlington County Detention Facility Sheriff Beth Arthur,Corizon Health ("Corizon") and Mediko Correctional Healthcare ("Mediko"). (ECF No. 1,at 2.) Wilson alleges the following: 2 10. On July 14,2021,in the afternoon,I arrived at Defendant Beth Arthur's facility, Arlington County Detention Facility. 11. I went through the intake medical screening during processing and told the nurse my problems,but I wasn't examined right. 12. A few months later, I told Defendant Corizon Health that I have a severe rash on me but was ignored and not treated. 13. The doctor that was representing Defendant Corizon Health . . . was Mr. Ashby. 14. The very severe rash is on the bottom of my stomach and at the top of both thighs,on and near the groin area,red and light black looking. 15. In the past and upon arrival,I informed Defendants Corizon Health and Mediko Correctional Healthcare verbally and in writing sick calls that I have a very severe rash on me and need to be treated. 2 The Court employs the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system. The Court corrects the capitalization,spelling,and punctuation in the quotations from the Complaint. 3 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 4 of 12 PageID# 22 16. In between January 13-24, 2022, I let a lady nurse representing Defendant Mediko Correctional Healthcare know that I got a severe rash me while on medical unit cell #11 when I was down there when I caught corona. 17. I believe she lied and told me she was going to treat me and prescribe me something but didn't. 18. Defendant Beth Arthur's policy requires that all inmates have a right to adequate medical care or attention, per inmate handbook. 19. It has been over a year before I received treatment and the severe rash has gotten worse due to Defendants Corizon Health and Mediko Correctional Healthcare delaying examination and treatment. 20. On October 27, 2022, at approximately 7:35 a.m., I filled out a Defendant Mediko Correctional Healthcare sick call request and told them that a nurse had told me that I was going to be called to medical concerning the rash, back then in January 2022, but was never called. 21. November 1, 2022, at approximately 1 :05 p.m., I went down to medical and seen Corizon Health Nurse Donna, I believe that's her name, and I was basically examine[d] once I informed her about the severe rash while I was originally down there for something else more important. 22. Next, I was given and prescribed some Hydrocortisone by Defendant Corizon Health Nurse Donna was a keep on person (KOP) contract from Defendant Mediko Correctional Healthcare with their name on it. 23. Due to the death of inmates of color in Defendant Beth Arthur's facility, Corizon Health was supposed to leave back then in December 2021, per Washington Post newspaper, but some nurses stayed. 24. Then Defendant Beth Arthur let Defendant Mediko Correctional Healthcare take over after Defendant Corizon Health's departure at the Arlington County Detention facility. 25. November 26, 2022, at approximately 3:41 p.m., I filled out a sick request for a refilling of the cream Hydrocortisone and it was brought to me the day after. 26. December 27, 2022, at approximately 10:10 p.m., I filled out a sick call request for a refill of my cream Hydrocortisone for the severe rash. 27. January 15, 2023, at approximately 10:15 p.m., I got a sick call request from the nurse and filled it out and turned it in but had to give it to the housing unit deputy on unit l lA cell #8 about a refilling of my Hydrocortisone cream. 28. As a result of the Defendants Corizon Health Care and Mediko Correctional Healthcare being negligent, injured me physically and made the severe rash worse by waiting too late to treat me, failing to give me necessary medication once I informed them of the issue. (Id. at 3-5.) 4 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 5 of 12 PageID# 23 Wilson contends that all three Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him adequate medical care3 and that Defendants Corizon and Mediko were also negligent and committed medical malpractice under state law. (Id at 6-7.) Wilson asks for monetary damages and for the Court to "[i]ssue and injunction requiring that Defendants Corizon Health and Mediko Correctional Healthcare provide the much-needed treatment to cure medical need until gone." (Id. at 8.) III. ANALYSIS It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of Wilson's theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310,1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that "abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition of frivolous or "insubstantial claims" (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,324 (1989)). As discussed below,Wilson's Complaint will be dismissed for failing to state a claim for relief. A. No Personallnvolvement First,in order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653,658 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). "Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted). To state a legally sufficient claim for an alleged violation of a federal constitutional right,"[a] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,through the official's own individual actions,has violated the Although Wilson has five separately numbered paragraphs for his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, these five paragraphs allege one claim of denial of adequate medical care. (ECF No. 1,at 6-7.) Further,as explained below in Part 111.B., the Eighth Amendment does not apply to Wilson's claims,because Wilson is likely a pretrial detainee. 3 5 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 6 of 12 PageID# 24 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 7 of 12 PageID# 25 employees] when such liability is predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior." Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715,728 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Instead,"a private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the Corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). An unconstitutional official policy or custom can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission,such as a failure to properly train officers,that "manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens"; or (4) through a practice that is so "persistent and widespread" as to constitute a "custom or usage with the force of law." Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463,471 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215,217 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Austin, 195 F.3d at 729 (explaining that principles applying in context of municipality and local governments "are equally applicable to a private corporation acting under state law"). Here,Wilson has made no effort,as he must,"to identify the offending [corporate] policy [or custom] with precision." Carter, 164 F.3d at 218. Because Wilson fails to identify any policy,much less a specific policy or custom of Defendants Corizon or Mediko,that deprived him of his constitutional rights,he fails to state a claim for relief. For this reason alone,Wilson's claims against Defendants Corizon and Mediko should be DISMISSED. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Wilson fails to allege facts that support any one of these three factors. Accordingly, Wilson has failed to state a claim for supervisory liability. 7 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 8 of 12 PageID# 26 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 9 of 12 PageID# 27 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 10 of 12 PageID# 28 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 11 of 12 PageID# 29 result in sufficiently serious harm under the Fourteenth Amendment, Wilson fails to allege any such injury here. See Hanrahan v. Mennon, 470 F. App'x 32, 33 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that a condition is sufficiently serious if it is '"a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain "' (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996))). Instead, Wilson does not allege facts indicating that he suffered any injury, much less a serious or significant physical or emotional injury, from Defendants' failure to treat his rash. Wilson also alleges no significant adverse effects from the delay in receiving hydrocortisone cream from Defendants. See Mata, 427 F.3d at 751. At most, Wilson claims that the rash got worse, and he "suffered further injury and physical injury" without any further explanation. (ECF No. 1, at 5, 7.) This is insufficient to plausibly suggest that he suffered any substantial harm from the delay. Thus, Wilson fails to allege facts indicating that the delay in receiving treatment itself caused him substantial harm. See Webb, 281 F. App'x at 166. In sum, because Wilson alleges no injury from Defendants actions, he fails to satisfy the objective prong of the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry. Wilson's claim of denial of adequate medical care will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. C. State Law Claims Wilson also vaguely suggests that Defendants Corizon and Mediko committed ''the tort of medical malpractice" and the "tort of negligence" under state law. (ECF No. 1, at 7.) Again, Wilson fails to allege the bare minimum required to state a claim for relief. Generally, pendant state law claims should be dismissed if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In light of the preliminary dismissal of the federal claims and the vagueness of Wilson's state law claims, the Court declines to exercise its 11 Case 3:23-cv-00082-DJN-MRC Document 3 Filed 03/14/23 Page 12 of 12 PageID# 30

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