Jenkins v. Obrien et al, No. 3:2018cv00168 - Document 17 (E.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 9/18/18. (copy mailed to Jenkins).(jtho, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Jenkins v. Obrien et al Doc. 17 D IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 0= FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division SEP • DARYL JENKINS, 2018 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT RICHMOND. VA Plaintiff, V. Civil Action No. 3:18CV168 WILLIAM O'BRIEN, ^ al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Daryl Jenkins, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.^ PARTICUARIZED COMPLAINT. is before the Court The action proceeds on the ("Complaint," ECF No. 16.) for evaluation pursuant to The matter 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state ^ The statute provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dockets.Justia.com a claim on which § 1915(e)(2); includes see claims relief 28 may U.S.C. based upon § be granted." 1915A. "an The indisputably 28 first U.S.C. standard meritless legal theory," or claims where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). second standard is the familiar standard for a The motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A motion sufficiency of to a dismiss complaint; under Rule importantly, 12(b)(6) it does tests not the resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is plaintiff. viewed in the light most favorable only to factual considering a identifying pleadings conclusions, the Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. applies to motion are not to allegations, dismiss that, can because entitled to however, choose they the are This principle and "a to begin no assumption Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). more of court by than truth." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to *give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. (second alteration in U.S. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the Id. (citations omitted). sufficient "to level," id. "plausible raise a its "conceivable." Id. of a cause of action." Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts right (citation on elements to relief omitted), face," id. above stating at 570, the a speculative claim rather that than is merely "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference misconduct alleged." that the defendant is liable for the Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient elements of [his or] her claim." & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d United States, 289 F.3d (4th state all the Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Cir. 2003) 193, 213 (4th 270, to 281 (4th (citing Cir. Dickson v. 2002); lodice v. Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 {4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 {4th Cir. 1985). II. In William criminal his Complaint, O'Brien, who proceedings, ALLEGATIONS Jenkins presumably and argues presided Julie Fink, that over the Defendant Judge Jenkins's state prosecutor in Jenkins's state criminal proceedings, violated his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 2.)^ {Compl. Jenkins contends that: My rights were violated by not being recognized as a natural person, living man 28 U.S.C. 1391. My rights were violated by conducting my trial while I was not present violating my due process rights, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated by having the wrong charge on the Indictment and my right to counsel was violated by Judge not holding a colloquy with me. My rights were violated by the Court inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on me going over my ^ The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system to Jenkins's submissions. The Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in quotations from Jenkins's submissions. Jenkins failed to identify either Defendant's title in the Particularized Complaint. Nevertheless, Jenkins identified each Defendant by title on the first pages of the original complaint. {ECF No. 1, at 1, 3.) guidelines and jury recommendations of 6 years causing me physical, psychological, and emotional damage. (Compl. 1.) Jenkins argues that "Julie Fink is liable because of prosecutorial misconduct." "William O'Brien bench." (Id.) is liable Jenkins asks (Id. at 2.) for violating for He also argues that my rights a "declaration that on the the acts and omissions described herein violate his rights," and monetary damages. (Id. at 3.) III. ANALYSIS It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of Jenkins's terse theories for relief. Cochran v. Morris, (emphasizing Congress's that vision "insubstantial 319, 324 73 "abbreviated for claims" (1989))). F.3d the (citing 1310, 1315 treatment" disposition Meitzke Jenkins's Complaint v. (4th is Cir. 1996) consistent of frivolous Williams, will See 490 with or U.S. be dismissed for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous. A. Judicial Immuni'ty Jenkins faults Judge William O'Brien for several perceived errors during his state criminal proceedings. However, judges are absolutely immune from suits under § 1983 for acts committed within their judicial discretion. 349, 355-56 (1978). Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. "Absolute judicial immunity exists 'because it is recognized entrusted must that be judicial officers able to exercise in whom discretion discretion vigorously is and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.'" 3:09CV012, 2009 WL 4730716, at *2 Lesane (E.D. Va. v. Spencer, No. Dec. 3, 2009) {citations omitted) (quoting McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972) overruled on other grounds. Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1995)). Judges are entitled to immunity even if "the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . ." 356. Only two exceptions apply to Stump, 435 U.S. at judicial immunity: (1) nonjudicial actions, and (2) those actions "though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles V. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (citation omitted). Jenkins fails to allege facts suggesting that either exception applies in this instance. Accordingly, his claims against Judge O'Brien will be dismissed. B. Prosecutorial Immunity Prosecutorial immunity, however, bars Jenkins's claims for monetary 424 U.S. damages 409, against Julie 430 (1976). Fink. See Imbler Prosecutorial v. Pachtman, immunity extends to actions taken while performing "the traditional functions of an advocate," Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (citations omitted), as well as functions that are "intimately associated with the judicial Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. falls within functional the approach, administrative advocate's for 259, duties of protected distinguishing and the criminal conduct, acts process." the (citation initiation Buckley omitted); 257, 261-63 (4th Cir. 1994). v. courts employ of investigative tasks proceedings." (1993) of To ascertain whether a specific action preparation for judicial 273 ambit phase advocacy from unrelated "to an of a prosecution or Fitzsimmons, Carter a v. Burch, 509 U.S. 34 F.3d Absolute immunity protects those "acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Jenkins vaguely suggests that Fink engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, but fails to identify with the requisite specificity how she rights. was personally (Compl. 1-2.) involved in the deprivation of his In his terse allegations, Jenkins fails to allege facts suggesting that Fink acted outside of her role as advocate for the Commonwealth of Virginia. See Sprinqmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The doctrine of absolute immunity squarely covers a prosecutor's decision to go forward with (explaining a prosecution."); that "although Carter, the trial had 34 been F.3d at 263 completed, [the prosecutor's] functions in representing the State in . . . post- conviction motions process . . . . . Thus, very much implicated Jenkins's claims for the judicial monetary damages against Fink are foreclosed, and will be dismissed.^ IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the action will be dismissed as frivolous and for § 1915(e)(2). failure The Clerk to state will a be claim under directed to 28 U.S.C. note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Memorandum Opinion to Jenkins. It is so ORDERED. /s/ Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Date: Richmond, Virginia ^ ^ To the extent that Jenkins wishes this Court to invalidate his state conviction or sentence, he may not seek such relief in § 1983. "[T]he settled rules [provide] that habeas corpus relief is appropriate only when a prisoner attacks the fact or duration of confinement, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); whereas, challenges to the conditions of confinement that would not result in a definite reduction in the length of confinement are properly brought" by some other procedural vehicle, including a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Olajide v. B.I.C.E., 402 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. Va. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (internal parallel citations omitted) (citing Strader V. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263, 1269 (4th Cir. 1978)).
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
