Brown v. Walton, No. 3:2017cv00338 - Document 26 (E.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 8/15/2018. Copy to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )
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Brown v. Walton Doc. 26 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division BERNARD BROWN, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 3:17CV338 V. A. WALTON, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Bernard Brown, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 1 The matter is MOTION before the Court on DEFENDANT'S DISMISS ( "Motion to Dismiss, Officer A. Walton, a ECF No. corrections RULE 22) officer 12(B) (6) TO filed by Defendant, at Sussex I State Prison ("Sussex"). I. BROWN'S PARTICULARIZED COMPLAINT In his Particularized Complaint ("Complaint," ECF No. 15) , Brown alleges the following in support of his claims for relief: 1 The statute provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute of any State . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 42 u.s.c. § 1983. Dockets.Justia.com [On] 10-7-2016, [while] being transported to [and] from MCV Hospital, I was injured in a van accident with Officer A. Walton going at a high rate of speed going around the exit, on ramp North 95. Walton slammed on the brakes to regain control of the van to stop from flipping, throwing me from the back to the front slamming against the metal cage headboard. When myself and another prisoner were put in the van to leave the prison, Walton said, Brown, Harris, the seatbelts do not work. No need to put them on, they don't hold. I was [taken] to MCV, DOC holding cell for 5 hours, then taken to the emergency room 5 hours later after the accident that happen [ed] at 5: 17 PM, with injuries to my head, neck, shoulder, [and] back. I was put in a C-collar for my neck, [for my] shoulder, an arm sling, [and was] given 2 medications for pain [and] stiffness. I am on these meds presently, with a pinched nerve in my shoulder [and] neck. ( Compl . 2' ECF No . 15 . ) 2 violated his unusual punishment;" substantive requests Brown alleges that Defendant Walton Eighth Amendment due that process he under monetary damages. stated below, right "to was the (Id. at be free denied 5th, 3, DEFENDANT'S RULE 12 (B) (6) 14th 6.) the from cruel, "right Amendment; For the to and reasons MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 22) will be granted. 2 The Court employs the pagination assigned to Brown's submissions by the CM/ECF docketing system. The Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in quotations from Brown's Complaint. The Court omits the paragraph numbers in its recitation of the facts supporting Brown's claim. 2 II. "A motion sufficiency of to a STANDARD OF REVIEW dismiss under complaint; Rule importantly, contests surrounding the facts, applicability of defenses." tests 12 (b) ( 6) it does the merits of a not the resolve claim, or the Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing SA Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is plaintiff. Cir. in the light most favorable to the Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th 1993) ; applies viewed see also Martin, only to factual considering a identifying pleadings conclusions, motion are not 980 F. 2d at 952. allegations, to dismiss that, can because entitled to however, choose they the are This principle and "a to no assumption court begin more of by than truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, {second alteration in original) U.S. 41, 47 {1957)). 550 U.S. 544, (quoting Conley v. 555 {2007) Gibson, 355 Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard 3 with complaints "formulaic Id. containing only recitation of (citations omitted). sufficient level, "to id. 11 raise 570. (citation factual reasonable inference 550 U.S. to of a relief omitted), cause of action." above stating the a speculative claim that rather than merely "conceivable." 11 facial content that that misconduct alleged." Corp., right "A claim has pleads elements or a Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts a "plausible on its face, at the "labels and conclusions" at 556). Id. plausibility when the plaintiff allows the Iqbal, is the court defendant 556 U.S. is at 678 Therefore, to draw liable the for the (citing Bell Atl. in order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must elements of & Co., "allege facts sufficient [his or] her claim." 324 F.3d 761, Microsoft Corp., 765 to state all the Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours (4th Cir. 309 F. 3d 193, 213 2003) (citing Dickson v. (4th Cir. 2002) ; Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, complaints, 1978), it while Gordon does not the v. Court Leeke, act as liberally 574 the F.2d inmate's construes 1147, 1151 advocate, pro (4th sua se Cir. sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise Carroll, 107 on the F.3d 241, face of 243 his (4th 4 complaint. Cir. 1997) See Brock v. (Luttig, J. , concurring) ; Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F. 2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. ANALYSIS A. Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment Claim On the first page of the Complaint, brings this (Compl. 1.) action under the Brown states that he "8th, In the body of the Complaint, Amendments." 14th Brown adds that he was denied the "right to substantive due process under the 5th, 14th Amendment." (Id. Brown alleges no facts at 3.) in the Complaint that would plausibly suggest that Walton violated his substantive due interpreted liberally, Walton solely Accordingly, rights. 3 process as any the Court Taken as construes the claim of substantive due a a claim and against indifference. deliberate process whole claim will be dismissed. Brown appears to argue that Walton violated both his Eighth Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, "it is now well established that the Eighth Amendment 'serves as the primary prisoners,' source and of the Due substantive Process protection Clause affords to a convicted prisoner no greater substantive protection 'than does the Cruel and Unusual 3 Moreover, because Walton is a state actor, any due process claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 must be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment. The ref ore, the claim asserted under the Fifth Amendment will be dismissed. 5 Williams v. Punishments Clause. ' " {4th Cir. 1996) (1986)) . Accordingly, Benjamin, {quoting Whitley v. Albers, 77 F.3d 756, 475 U.S. 312, 768 327 to the extent that Brown challenges the conditions of his confinement or the deliberate indifference to his health and safety, the Court will evaluate those claims under the Eighth Amendment. B. Eighth Amendment Claim Although Brown includes Eighth Amendment language {such as "deliberate indifference") in the Complaint, the Rebuttal to the Motion to Dismiss negligence law. {ECF No. 25) couched in terms of state However, Brown does not allege state law claims for negligence in the Complaint. 4 below, is It is settled, as explained that negligence or gross negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation. So the proper analysis of whether the Complaint passes muster under Rule 12 {b) (6) must be made using Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. To allege an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts showing: (1) objectively that the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was (2) subjectively 'sufficiently serious,' that the prison officials 'sufficiently culpable state of mind. '" 4 to the inmate; acted Johnson v. with and a Quinones, For example, Brown repeatedly states that Walton's actions constituted gross negligence or that he "states a constitutional claim of gross negligence." (Rebuttal 7, ECF No. 25.) Brown provides allegations about duty, breach, causation, and harm. (See id. at 8-11.) 6 145 F.3d 164, 167 {4th Cir. 1998) U.S. 294, 298 the inmate (1991)). must (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 Under the objective facet of the test, allege facts showing that the deprivation complained of was extreme and amounted to more than the "routine discomfort" that is "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Strickler v. 989 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.3 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 1, extreme 9 {1992)) . satisfy the "Only objective component deprivations of regarding conditions of confinement." F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) are Waters, 503 U.S. adequate an Eighth Amendment to claim De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 (citation successfully plead such extreme deprivation, omitted) . To Brown "must allege 'a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.'" Id. at 634 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381). The subjective facet of the test requires the plaintiff to allege facts showing that deliberate indifference. 837 (1994). a particular See Farmer v. defendant Brennan, acted with 511 U.S. 825, "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it." 195 F.3d 692, 695 {4th Cir. 1999) Grayson v. Peed, {citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)) . [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of 7 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial risk of harm is not enough. prison official general facts inmate." 837); must and also the draw specific the risk Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 see Rich v. (stating same) . requires a Bruce, Thus, plaintiff 129 the inference of those confronting the (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at F. 3d 336, deliberate to assert harm between The facts 338 (4th Cir. indifference sufficient 1997) standard to permit an inference that "the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that the official in question subjectively recognized that his actions were light of that risk.'" F.3d 294, n. 2) 303 (4th Cir. Parrish ex rel. 2004) 'inappropriate in Lee v. (quoting Rich, Cleveland, 372 129 F.3d at 340 • Brown's complaints against Walton appear to be two-fold. Brown argues that he is entitled to relief as follows: Claim One: Walton was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Brown when she transported him in a van that had inoperable seatbelts. Claim Two: Walton was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Brown when she entered the ramp to the interstate above the speed limit knowing that Brown did not have 8 a seatbelt, injuries. As discussed below, which caused him to sustain Brown fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that Walton violated his Eighth Amendment rights. 1. Claim One In Claim One, Brown faults Walton for transporting him and According another inmate in a van that had broken seat belts. to Brown, when he [Defendant] work, was "put Walton said, in the van to "Brown, no need to put them on, However, Harris, leave the prison, the seatbelts do not (Compl. they don't hold." 2.) the failure to provide seatbelts while transporting an inmate "standing alone" does not give rise to a constitutional claim. 2017) See Thompson v. (quoting 2012)). Jabbar Specifically, Virginia, v. Fischer, Brown has facet of the Eighth Amendment test. 878 F. 3d 89, 683 not F.3d 54, 101 (4th Cir. 57 satisfied the (2d Cir. objective That is because the failure to provide seatbelts is not an excessive risk to inmate safety, and thus, is not sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Jabbar, 683 F. 3d at 58; Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906-07 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted) (transporting seatbelts did not pose a inmates in vehicles substantial risk of serious harm to passengers); Smith v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corr., 304 (11th Cir. 2007) without (explaining that 9 the 252 F. App'x 301, failure to provide seatbelts is not a "sufficiently risky condition" under the Accordingly, Brown fails to state an Eighth Eighth Amendment). Amendment claim, and Claim One will be dismissed. 2. Claim Two In Claim Two, indifferent to a Brown faults Walton for being deliberately substantial risk of harm to Brown, when she recklessly entered a ramp to the interstate highway knowing that Brown had no operable seatbelt. Brown contends that Walton merged on to the ramp "going at a high rate of speed" and that she had to "slam[] on the brakes to regain control of the van to stop [it] from flipping, throwing me from the back to the front, slamming against the metal cage head board." (Compl. 2.) Brown contends that he sustained injuries to his head, neck, shoulder, and back, for including a pinched nerve, which required a "C-collar [his] neck," a sling for his arm and shoulder, and two pain medications. (Id.) At this juncture, the Court assumes that Brown's injuries were sufficiently serious to satisfy the Eighth Amendment pleading standards. However, Brown has not alleged facts that plausibly suggest that Walton knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Brown while she was transporting him. Rather, Brown's claim sounds in negligence and thereby fails to state a claim of constitutional dimension. The unusual Eighth living Amendment protects conditions. Rhodes 10 prisoners v. from Chapman, 452 cruel and U.S. 33 7 (1981). However, right (1) even if "individuals to be free it causes from a an do not have a constitutional government employee's negligence, injury, or ( 2) to have the government protect them from such an injury. ,, Ball v. City of Bristol, Va., Jail, 2754320, at July 12, No. 7:10CV00303, 2010) (1986)). (citing 2010 WL Daniels v. (W.D. Va. 474 Williams, *1 U.S. 327 Brown has pleaded no facts indicating that, by driving above the posted speed limit for a brief period, and with the knowledge that Brown was not wearing a seatbelt, Walton knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk of harm to Brown's health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 83 7. Thus, the allegations that Walton knew that the seat belts were inoperable, combined with speeding onto the ramp, does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Although negligence, Brown likely has adequately alleged a claim of that is not a viable constitutional claim and thus is not actionable under§ 1983. See Spencer, 183 F.3d at 906-07 (citations that omitted) (holding injuries sustained from transportation in vehicles with no seatbelts failed to present a "substantial negligence risk of at most"); 2007 WL 2214520, at *6 seat belt speed a limit serious Young v. harm," Dept. of does not Corr., (E.D. Mich. July 27, prisoner during transport constitute 11 an "constitute[d] and and No. 2007) 04-10309, ("Refusing to then exceeding 'excessive risk to the inmate health or safety.'" (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)); Jones v. Collins, Civil No. 05-663-JPG, 2016 WL 1528882, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 1, 2006) "reckless driving present, never at be Thompson, courts (citations omitted) or best, held 879 found the claims liable F.3d no at (stating that allegation of failure of fasten negligence, under 101 to § 1983 but for (distinguishing Eighth Amendment seatbelt a defendant can negligence"); those cases cf. where violation on the basis that there was no malicious intent shown); Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 556, (8th 560-62 2008) Cir. deliberate (finding indifference for inmate's safety when inmate asked for officers to fasten inmate, and recklessly, his seatbelt, then, officers subsequently, refused, drove and taunted consistently and ignored inmates' pleas to slow down, fast the and ultimately resulting in a collision). The Court recognizes that, that an officer acted with a inmate may state excessive force. a in cases where the facts malicious cognizable Eighth intent to punish, Amendment S e e , ~ , Thompson, 878 F.3d at 99. 5 claim show an of However, that is not what is alleged in this case. 5 In Thompson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit indicated that the excessive force standard is appropriate for a case where an officer used force "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm," 878 F.3d at 98 (citation omitted), whereas the deliberate indifference standard is appropriate in the instance of an officer who knew of and 12 For the foregoing reasons, Claim Two will be dismissed. IV. The Motion to CONCLUSION Dismiss {ECF No. 22) will be granted. Brown's claims and the action will be dismissed. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Memorandum Opinion to Brown and counsel of record. /s/ Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: August 15, 2018 disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, see id. at 107. The Fourth Circuit went to great lengths to distinguish those cases where the facts failed to show that an officer acted with malicious intent to cause harm or where the facts failed to show that an officer drove knowing that there was a substantial risk that an inmate would suffer harm, such as intentionally driving recklessly to scare or injure an inmate. See id. at 101-02; 107-09. The facts as alleged by Brown, fall squarely in line with those cases found factually inapplicable to, or distinguishable from, the facts in Thompson. 13
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