Coleman v. Fountain et al, No. 3:2017cv00266 - Document 23 (E.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 05/08/2018. Copy mailed to Jerome Coleman.(tjoh, )
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Coleman v. Fountain et al Doc. 23 ? FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGIN: Richmond Division I E MAY °° 8 2018 JJ CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT RICHMOND. VA JEROME F. COLEMAN, Plaintiff, V. Civil Action No. 3:17CV266 FRANCES M. FOUNTAIN, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Jerome F. Coleman, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.^ The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. I. Preliminary Review Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state ^ The statute provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dockets.Justia.com a claim on which § 1915(e)(2). relief may be 'granted." 28 U.S.C. The first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or "factual contentions are clearly baseless." claims where the Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint plaintiff. is viewed in the light most favorable the Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. applies to only to factual considering a motion identifying pleadings to allegations, dismiss that, because however, can choose they are This principle and "a to begin no more court by than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of Id. (citations omitted). the elements of a cause of action." Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. "plausible (citation on its "conceivable." Id. omitted), face," id. at stating 570, a claim rather that than is merely "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). construes pro se Lastly, while the Court liberally complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her complaint. Cir. 1997) See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). II. Coleman's Complaint By Memorandum Order entered on March 12, 2018, the Court advised Coleman that his complaint failed to identify a particular constitutional right that was violated by a nonimmune defendant's conduct. directed Coleman to file (ECF No. 20, at 2.) a particularized Coleman filed his Particularized Complaint. The Court then complaint. (Id.) (ECF No. 22.) In his Particularized Complaint, Coleman has named Frances M. Fountain, Clerk of the General District Court of Sussex, Virginia,^ and Doris Worley, Deputy Clerk, as Defendants. Part. Compl. 6.)^ (See Coleman alleges as follows: ^ The Court notes that Coleman did not identify at which district court Defendant Fountain was employed as a clerk in his On November 11, 2014, [Coleman] wrote a letter address[ed] to Mrs. Francis M. Fountain . . . to ask two questions: If [the] Court has jurisdiction to hear a warrant in detinue and. If bond if required? Also, [Coleman] stated [he had] no job, no money to pay for service of warrant. On or about December 2014, Mrs. Fountain answered and said, "Can file, no bond necessary in detinue cases. Must file in forma pauperis." On May 3, 2015, [Coleman] filed a warrant in detinue with 12 months accounting statements as requested by Mrs. Fountain, Clerk of the Court. [Coleman] filed in forma pauperis with statements. On May 27, 2015, Mrs. Doris Worley, Deputy Clerk, answered [Coleman's] letter and said [Coleman] would have to pay $56.00 for service of warrant, or request an in forma pauperis. On June 24, 2015, Mrs. Fountain, Clerk, granted [Coleman's] in forma pauperis status per 8.01-691. However, in the same letter, Mrs. Fountain said [Coleman] must pay $5.00 per month to pay for service of warrant. In or about June 2015, [Coleman] sent a second set of accounting statements, showing [Coleman] is indigent [and] has no money to pay for [the] service of warrant. On August 2, 2015, [Coleman] wrote to said Court to inquire about [the] status of [his] case. [There was] no answer from [the] Court. [Coleman] wrote [a] second letter to inquire about [his] case. Particularized Complaint. (See Part. Compl. 1.) However, because Coleman named Frances M. Fountain, Clerk of the General District Court of Sussex, Virginia, in his original Complaint, the Court assumes that he intends Particularized Complaint as well. to name the same in his ^ The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system to Coleman's submissions. The Court corrects the spelling, capitalization, and punctuation in the quotations from Coleman's Complaint. 5 (Part. Compl. 1-2. (paragraph labels omitted) (internal citations omitted).) From what the Court can discern,^ Colman's sole claim for relief is: Claim One As clerks of [the] Court, Defendants [Fountain and Worley] knew or should have known, when they granted [Coleman] poor person status, Va. Code. 8.01-691, but in the same letter denied him the right to use that status, [that Coleman] would lose his property," (id. at 4), and that their conduct violated the First^ and Fourteenth® Amendments (id. at 3, 5). Coleman requests the Court award compensatory damages in an unstated amount, and award punitive damages in the amount of $2,000. (Id. at 7.) III. Analysis It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended Cochran discussion v. Morris, of 73 Coleman's F.3d theories 1310, 1315 for relief. (4th Cir. See 1996) ^ Contrary to the Court's March 12, 2018 Memorandum Order directing Coleman to file a particularized complaint, Coleman did not set out in separate paragraphs his claims for relief. ® "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const, amend. I. ® "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 6 (emphasizing Congress's that vision "insubstantial 319, 324 "abbreviated for claims" (1989))). the (citing treatment" is disposition Neitzke Ultimately, consistent of v. frivolous Williams, Coleman's with 490 Complaint or U.S. will be dismissed for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous. Judicial immunity applies to quasi-judicial officers acting pursuant to court directives. See Butler v. Johnson, No. I:07cvll96 (GBL/TRJ), 2007 WL 4376135, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2007) (citing Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969)). "Quasi-judicial" immunity shields court officers from "the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on judicial adjuncts . . . ." (7th Cir. 1992) clerks, court reporters, and other Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 n.ll (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that clerks have "derivative immunity" when they act under the direction of the court). quasi-judicial having process." immunity an Wymore when integral v. Green, they Clerks are entitled to perform relationship 245 F. "judicial with App'x the 780, act[s] judicial 783 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In his Particularized Complaint, Coleman faults Frances Fountain, Clerk of the District Court of Sussex, Virginia, and Doris Worley, Deputy Clerk, for granting him forma pauperis status, but still requiring him to pay $5.00 per month for his detinue case. (See Part. Compl. 1-2.) Coleman further argues that Defendants Fountain and Worley are not immune from his suit because they "impede[d the] filing of [Coleman's] warrant in detinue" (id. at 4), that this was "in direct violation of their statutory duties" (id. at 5), and that their actions violated Coleman's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 3-5.) Contrary to Coleman's assertion. Defendants Fountain and Worley's actions of assessing a small filing fee for Coleman despite being granted forma pauperis status were not contrary to their statutory duties."' Virginia's ^ forma pauperis statute states, "[a]ny prisoner granted leave to proceed in fomna pauperis shall nonetheless make payments, in equal installments as the court directs, towards satisfaction of the filing fee and costs." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-691 (West 2018). Thus, Coleman fails to allege that Defendants Fountain and Worley's actions It appears that had Coleman not been granted ^ forma pauperis status, he would have been required to pay a $56.00 filing fee for the warrant in detinue. 8 fall outside the scope of their judicially mandated duties and thus they are immune from suit. See, e.g., Wymore, 245 F. App'x at 783 (finding clerk entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when refusing to file inmate's court documents); Hutcherson v. Priest, No. 7:lO-CV-00060, 2010 WL 723629, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2010); Butler, 2007 WL 4376135, at *3. Coleman's claims against Defendants Fountain and Worley will be dismissed. IV. For the foregoing Conclusion reasons, Coleman's claims will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim and as legally frivolous. The action will be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition of the action for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). It is so ORDERED. /s/ t Date: /(A/kt S) Richmond, Virginia Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge
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