Jenkins v. Mid Atlantic Detailing, No. 3:2016cv00188 - Document 16 (E.D. Va. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 11/14/2016. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )
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Jenkins v. Mid Atlantic Detailing Doc. 16 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division MAURICE JENKINS, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. V. 3:16cvl88 MID-ATLANTIC DETAILING, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter PLAINTIFF'S No. 10) under is before COMPLAINT BY the Court DEFENDANT on the MOTION MID-ATLANTIC TO DISMISS DETAILING (ECF in which Mid-Atlantic seeks dismissal of the Complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Complaint, {'"Jenkins") , claims. does not However, Complaint appears filed by contain as Maurice separate Mid-Atlantic to posit five Jenkins, counts setting correctly claims, three based on Specifically, assert discrimination; retaliation; for: (3) (1) Title Equal Pay VII Act violations; se out his explains, law and two based on state laws. claims pro the federal Jenkins seems to (2) (4) Title VII Wrongful Dockets.Justia.com Termination under Virginia law; and (5) Defamation under Virginia law. For the reasons that follow, any legally sufficient federal claims will be dismissed discretion the Complaint fails claims, with exercises its under exercises jurisdiction over the and thus the federal prejudice. 28 to assert U.S.C. § Virginia And, 1367 law the and law Court declines claims to which will be dismissed without prejudice. BACKGROUND Jenkins was hired by National Automotive Charging Systems, Inc. in March 2014 as a Class B driver.^ (Compl. i 1). month 14, of given' a worker, manager, employment, raise. Jim, Pat, (Compl. planned asked during this period. [he] was on going to to or ^ about 2). take Jenkins April In a if April two-week he wanted 2014, 2014, Jenkins was Jenkins's co- vacation. to cover Jenkins's Jim's Jenkins states that "Pat assured make a lot of money taking After a route [him] this that route." ^ The COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1) does not include paragraph numbers. Defendant provided a numbered Complaint in the MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT MID-ATLANTIC DETAILING (ECF No. 11-1). All paragraph references to the Complaint are based on Defendant's ECF No. 111. (Compl. ^2) . Jenkins accompanied that Jim In order informed occasion. Jim on him daughter, particular know Chuck, IN the owner. SUPPORT DEFENDANT he (Compl. equal 2014, 6). pay Nicole and MOTION TO due March 4, On March, at 2) . 13, 2014, was the 2016, Jenkins (1) Jenkins on that Nicole, the running that she to did not speak with 2016, See MEMORANDUM OF LAW PLAINTIFF'S (ECF No. filed about his received a 11) a (Defendant's claim with (Compl. erratic the 6). reported that Notice BY 6). ("EEOC"). employer COMPLAINT pay check post-firing (Compl. Jenkins complaints During Jenkins driving. of Right Equal to was JA. On Sue. Id. he instituted this action. In the COMPLAINT, claims: job" indicated Jenkins received a to 24, great fired. DETAILING EEOC investigation, fired told DISMISS Employment Opportunity Commission the a states equally paid for Jenkins was MID-ATLANTIC June ''did route, Jenkins drives. Jim's After driving part of Jim's route while in the amount of his regular pay. On with Id. OF Opening Brief, of his ''about getting about On May 23, one familiar Jenkins asked another employee, route." anything become that (Compl. 53). Jim was on vacation, owner's to Jenkins attempts to allege the following his employer denied him equal pay to which Jenkins entitled pursuant to the Equal 3 Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); (2) his employer retaliated against him for demanding equal pay in violation of Title VII, his VII, employer discriminated 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C.A. against § 2000e-2(a)(1); (4) him in § 2000e-3; violation of (3) Title he was wrongfully terminated in violation of Virginia law after demanding equal pay; and (5) his employer defamed him by making false statements to the EEOC, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-45. He seeks $2,000,000.00 for damages. POSITIONS In its motion to dismiss, OF PARTIES the defendant argues that Jenkins fails, to allege a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, either Douglas through burden direct shifting evidence method of or through discrimination. defendant argues that Jenkins fails to assert a VII claim of retaliation because the there is McDonnell Also, the cognizable Title no alleged casual nexus between his report to the EEOC and his termination. Next, the defendant states that Jenkins's Equal Pay Act claim must be dismissed "as he fails to identify a similarly-situated coworker of the opposite sex who performing the same duties." wrongful termination failed to cite a claim, received (ECF No. the greater 11). defendant compensation for As to the state law contends that Jenkins specific statute as the basis for his claim, as required for Finally, a cognizable protected by the basis for 13, 15) the claim under the a attorney-client dismiss. privilege RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT issues raised Instead, by MOTION TO that probationary the he was period unaware when he he submitted submitted after his Likewise, describing also his the (2) work following Jenkins's covered Jim's a hotel behavior appearance to of the driving two route; to (3) driving delivery Jenkins's under in the his be Nos. motion (1) and did that was to Jenkins (90) explains to not the day that EEOC include Jim's his statement false. employer's Jenkins statements to Jenkins's failure to show up week period he turn ninety co-workers habits" of the a Jenkins states truthfulness failure while by Jenkins the EEOC about the following: to (ECF specifically, hired. termination "terrible contests DISMISS defendant was was forms signature. cannot Jenkins explains that the EEOC investigation harassment were and Jenkins does not address any of uncovered falsehoods made by his employer; the law. defamation claim. ("Jenkins's Response"), legal asserts Virginia the defendant argues that all statements it made to the EEOC are In Bowman in his covered log book Jim's for the route; days he Jenkins's failure to stay overnight in Jim's route; recipients; delivery 5 (4) and while Jenkin's (5) the covering aggressive disheveled Jim's route. Jenkins further against him attorneys, states that Mid-Atlantic must have discriminated because first they offered Jenkins, $1,000 and then $5,000 through their to settle the claims. Jenkins explains that the EEOC issued him a right to sue letter ''which cannot be obtained if the EEOC doesn't find any merit in [the] charges." termination Jenkins concludes by stating, turned my life upside down and "[t]his wrongful it was an obvious retaliation for just requesting the payment that I was owed." In the PLAINTIFF'S No. 14), that he REPLY COMPLAINT the he was finds BY defendant fired established Finally, BRIEF as that IN SUPPORT DEFENDANT argues MOTION MID-ATLANTIC that, because "retaliation" his OF for termination Jenkins not as to the race discrimination claim, DISMISS DETAILING demanding was TO (ECF admitted ''equal pay," based on race. the defendant also it significant that Jenkins's "Complaint is devoid of any allegations of Jenkins' race or membership in a protected class // LEGAL A motion challenges to the dismiss legal Alternative Resources Fed. R. Civ. P. statement of the STMUDABD under sufficiency Corp., 8(a)(2) 458 Fed. of F.3d "requires claim showing that 6 a R. P. complaint. 332, only the Civ. 338 a 12(b)(6) Jordan (4th Cir. short pleader is and v. 2006). plain entitled to relief, . . . in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Evans v. F.3d Maryland 582, Twombly, 585 Pep't (4th 550 U.S. of Transp., Cir. 2015) 544, 555, 127 a motion State Highway (citing S. Ct. Bell 1955, McCleary- Admin., Atl. 780 Corp. 167 L. Ed. v. 2d 929 (2007)) . When deciding reasonable inferences Chevrolet, Ltd. (4th Cir. 2009). pleader's description that can accept the be v. in to favor Nonetheless, of reasonably facts." *4 a Dominion (E.D. Va. Sec. what drawn the 2014). court 'Mraw[s] plaintiff." Inc., happened" and therefrom," the encompassing the Charles Co., a 591 Nemet F.3d 250, A. L.L.C., Wright 1357 No. "any 8 68 Iqbal, 556 U.S. (2009) . analytical court "need legal effects & Arthur (3d ed.l998); 3:13CV820, 2014 dismiss amount requires to mere not R. of Miller, Chamblee v. WL 1415095, Nor is the court required to accept as true 662, "Twombly approach 253 conclusions legal conclusion unsupported by factual allegations. V. all while the court "will accept the Federal Practice and Procedure § Old of Consumeraffairs.com, conclusory allegations pleaded dismiss, for courts formulaic 678-79, and 129 Iqbal evaluating to reject recitation 7 S. Ct. also 1937, made Rule of the 173 L. clear 12(b)(6) conclusory Ashcroft Ed. that elements the motions allegations of a 2d to that claim and to conduct a context-specific analysis to determine whether the well-pleaded entitlement to factual relief." allegations Wright plausibly & Miller, suggest supra; an Chamblee, supra. Although the court will ''construe the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally, a court considering a motion to dismiss must still evaluate the pro se plaintiff's pleadings according to the standards developed under Rule 12." Images, (E.D. Inc., Va. 2012 U.S. 8, Dist. LEXIS 111682, (internal pro se plaintiffs are properly accorded some leniency, the court and should not conclusory 'conjure up allegations.'" 2015 WL 224989, at *3 2006 U.S. citations 2012 WL 3257888 "Though Virginia, 2012) ^14, Imaginary omitted). need not Aug Jones v. Gray (E.D. Dist. Va. v. facts Home Jan. Depot, 15, LEXIS 101668 not plead to support 2015) No. 3:14CV488, (citing Easter v. (E.D.Va. Aug. 29, 2006)). DISCUSSION For the reasons asserted by Jenkins be granted declines to and set fail those forth to state claims claims entertain the below, state will be the federal upon which dismissed. law claims. claims relief can The Court A. Jenkins Failed to Allege that he Received Less Pay Because of His Sex, as Required to State a Claim Under the Equal Pay Act The Equal ''No employer . the basis Pay Act . of establishment (^^EPA") , 29 U.S.C. . shall discriminate . sex by a rate at paying less . wages than § 206(d)(1) states: . between employees on to the employees rate at in which such he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on skill, effort, jobs the performance and responsibility, of which requires equal and which are performed under yy similar working conditions . . . (emphasis added). Jenkins has not alleged that he received less pay because of his sex. Jenkins's Hospital case is Corporation Africa-American male, Act claim against 2014) -. Jones similarly Jones alleged statute of alleged, he presented wherein 16 that F. his Jones, his Supp. salary pharmacists believed continues: that among other claims, employer. situated that to America, ''suspect [ed] other ^ The his similar . . . "white, "except where in a pro Va. equal ." male Pay (E.D. not at to 627. co-worker such payment v. se, an Equal 3d 622 was Jones was is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this order to comply with the provisions the wage rate of any employee." 9 of subsection shall this subsection, not, in reduce paid a higher salary position." even However, though he and Jones held the same ''[t]he Complaint fails to allege that Jones receives less pay because of his sex as required to state a claim under the federal (emphasis added). not a female claim ^'as a Here, Equal Act." at therefore the matter of law." Jenkins alleges at that (Compl. SI 6) . Court dismissed Jones's 629. he failed Jenkins' to receive he covered told him he (Compl. ^ himself to prohibits Jenkins's Jim's would 2). route. receive As another was true male discrimination claim must be ''a Jenkins lot in of Jones, Jenkins between The for the time his manager, taking Jim. pay dismissed. claims of money employee, equal pay theory of liability is that he is entitled to receive the same pay as Jim, that 628-29 Jones compared himself to a male pharmacist, pharmacist; for his work.^ Pay this is route." comparing Because opposite dismissal Pat, will the EPA sexes, be with prejudice because there is nothing to suggest that Jenkins could legitimately posit a female comparator. ^ "I asked Nicole about getting equally paid for running that particular route. . . ." (Compl. 1 6); see also the List of Claims at the bottom of Complaint, "equal pay act" (ECF No. 4). 10 B. Jenkins's Complaint Contains No Statements Regarding Race ''discharg [ing] any or Racial Discrimination Title VII prohibits an or otherwise . individual, employer . . from discriminat[ing] individual with respect to his compensation, or privileges of employment, 42 U.S.C.A. § Under Title VII, (1) circumstantial through are direct under 1817, a 36 L.Ed.2d plaintiff 668 must two ways evidence; to (2) through scheme Green, (1973). 411 U.S. ^^In provide or prove burden-shifting the established in McDonnell Douglas v. proof, conditions, because of such individual's race." there evidence S.Ct. terms, any 2000e-2(a). discrimination: 93 against the 792, first ^evidence of 802-05, method of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and decision.'" that Spain v. 2009 WL 2461662, V. FDIC, evidence, 257 bear at *7 the elements are: (E.D. different outside the of a (1) treatment protected Va. 391-92 the Aug. (3) from class." in CIV A 3:09CV266, 2009) 2001)). employment (citing Rhodes ^^Absent direct case of discrimination protected class; (2) adverse employment action; and a similarly Coleman 11 No. 11, (4th Cir. membership contested Univ., prima facie satisfactory job performance; (4) on Virginia Com. F.3d 373, under, Title VII directly v. situated Maryland employees Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 {4th Cir. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, Ed. 2010), aff d There respect is to no plausible either claim Jenkins's for pay or racial 1327, nom. (2012) . 2d 296 132 S. Ct. sub 182 L. discrimination termination. Jenkins in has offered neither in the Complaint nor in the briefing any direct evidence that his employer discriminated against him on account of his race. Indeed, regarding race, the Complaint does not mention any facts the race of the Plaintiff, or the race of other employees working at the defendant's operation.'' The only reason that a Title VII claim is even being discussed at all is because Jenkins what hand appears words wrote to a be note an at the outline of bottom his of his claims, Complaint, containing in the '"race." Additionally, there are no statements that support a prima facie showing of discrimination under Title VII. not make statements in his of a protected class. the Complaint was treated that Complaint that shows Jenkins does he is a member He also does not make any allegations in would differently permit from a plausible similarly inference situated that he employees of The claim filed by Jenkins with the EEOC does include race. 12 another race. Therefore, discrimination fails C. Jenkins's as a or Any claim alleging Title VII matter of law. Retaliation Activity the Claim Casual Fails Nexus to to Provide an a Protected Adverse Employment Action It whether that unclear Jenkins's his Based No. is the facts retaliation claim employer on violated Jenkins's 13), from the RESPONSE it seems that, TO alleged stems Equal EEOC. Jenkins states termination turned my retaliation for In any because event, there just the is in life his upside requesting claim neither for a down the Act Title VII. DISMISS {ECF that is what he told that and retaliation ^'[t]his it payment protected allegations or TO COMPLAINT the retaliation claim And, brief the his MOTION in Jenkins's view, is based on his demand for equal pay. the from Pay DEFENDANT in was that must activity, wrongful an I obvious was owed." be dismissed nor a casual nexus to an adverse employment action alleged in the Complaint. To state a claim for retaliation under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, showing: (1) employment "a plaintiff must provide factual allegations engagement in a action; activity and Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, claim); see the and also (3) a employment 190 Reardon protected activity; causal action." (4th Cir. v. link between Coleman an adverse the v. protected Md. Ct. of 2010) (Title VII retaliation Herring, 13 (2) No. 3:16-CV-34, 2016 WL 3181138, at *15 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2016} (laying out identical factors for an Equal Pay Act claim of retaliation). Protected participation activities or fall opposition. into See two 42 distinct U.S.C.A. § Participation occurs when an individual "oppose[s] made "To in an unlawful qualify as the formal employment voicing process procedures one's employer's of as well opinions is in discriminatory imperative this a staging order to utilizing bring employer Id. engage claim informal protests attention Lauqhlin 149 F.3d 253, 259 the need not informal activities." that any practice discrimination encompasses as 2000e-3(a). subchapter." employee adjudicating activity Washington Airports Auth., It by opposition activity an Opposition grievance practice categories: v. to and an Metro. (4th Cir. 1998). understand that the employee is engaging in opposition activity because the decision maker's knowledge of the protected activity is "''essential to a retaliation claim.'" Francisco v. Verizon S. 705, 795, 725-26 803 In Office (E.D.Va.2010) (quoting v. Balog^ 162 F.3d (4th Cir.1998)). Reardon of the v. Herring, Attorney 2016 WL 3181138 Reardon, General alleging an EPA claim and a 34, Causey Inc.^ 756 F.Supp.2d a female ("OAG"), employee filed claim of retaliation. (E.D. Va. June 3, 14 2016). a No. at the complaint 3:16-CV- Starting in 2011, Reardon made salary several falling received an In was attorneys at 2015. her the salary matrix OAG. She was in alleged that the other five (5) all male, Reardon), with in classified employer to made 2015. a regarding at 2011 and her guidelines She fired were her Reardon mentioned below the guidelines. matrix in 2014, ''paid to the below increase 2013. she complaints *2. then again and/or annual in complaint attorneys in her section in 2015 as AAG Ills similar responsibilities, Reardon's male complaint Reardon's in that other (the same and that level salary was $11,304.00 as they received salaries ranging from $76,584.00 to $95,000.00 in 2014. 2014, She supervisor similar lA. her less JA. In than the lowest paid male AAG III attorney in Reardon's section. Id. Defendants The Court because her duties filed determined the male granting some that degree motion that in to to sufficient her dismiss motion, in of the protected formality dismiss Reardon's EPA to section responsibilities." motion participated a Complaint was attorneys and a filed Id. Reardon's Court was that to plausible Reardon Defendant's determined necessary claim. ''substantially *15. The EPA was retaliation first activity. claim infer had at Reardon's Court claim. that in equal also In Reardon explained engage and that protected activity such that '''a complaint must be sufficiently clear and 15 detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the for statute and (citing Kasten U.S. 14, the 1, a v. 131 in that coworkers' the 1325, the determined that belief their Saint-Gobain S.Ct. allegations Court call the L.Ed.2d most was between because 379 at *16 Corp., 563 (2011)). to Viewing Reardon, the ''on notice of Reardon's her of JA, Plastics favorable employer was discrepancy salaries Performance 179 light protection.'" salary her and her sex. male Reardon's allegations that she complained of being paid less than her male coworkers satisfy the pleading threshold required for the first element of *16. an EPA claim However, for because retaliation Reardon under failed the to EPA." at demonstrate sufficient casual nexus to the adverse employment decision, Court dismissed the claim, a the explaining that ''[t]he Complaint does not state specifically the duration between Reardon's complaints in early 2015 and her termination on June 15, 2015." JA. at *18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike the allegation that casual nexus employment plaintiff he Reardon, Jenkins engaged in protected activity; between decision in protected simply cannot activity exist. and In Jenkins filed the EEOC claim after he was fired. 16 makes no therefore, a the this adverse instance, Therefore, it would, be impossible to participation theory. base Thus, retaliation claim U.S.C.A. 2000e-3{a). § would be It a retaliation because, as by alleging is opposition. impossible based on claim mentioned his terminated receiving equal Jenkins pay because equal Plaintiff that he pay. complained could claim. to equal way for the defendant-employer to are no the only one he was about not Reardon, where the other employees employee. another male 42 is that employer about here, regarding a Jenkins's allege alleges his the opposite sex being paid more, pay read Therefore, unlike employer See there possibly Jenkins complained her to previously, However, to on racial complaint to his statements in the Complaint regarding race. retaliation based the only way for Jenkins to bring a Complaint as alleging retaliation for a employer claim of Jenkins complained about There understand that would be Jenkins no was engaging in protected activity because there was no violation of any statute, male even if Jenkins were not paid equally to the other employee. Jenkins's complaint ''sufficiently clear," did not "assert a statute." Kasten v. S.Ct.-1325, 1327-28. to his employer, while right protected by any Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 Because there was no protected activity of which the employer was, or should have been, aware, there can be no casual nexus between that activity and the adverse employment 17 action. Therefore, Jenkins's retaliation claim under the EPA, must be dismissed. D. Having Dismissed All Federal Claims, the Court Declines to Exercise Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Remaining S t a t e Law Claims ^'Subject matter to hear a 467 U.S. jurisdiction defines the court's authority given type of case. . . United States v. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 Morton^ (1984). With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a federal court has subjectmatter jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it may (or may not) choose to exercise ... whether to dismissing A district court's decision exercise that jurisdiction after every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary . . . . Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. S. Ct. 1862, 1866-67, 173 L. Ed. 2d 843 Jenkins COMPLAINT asserted (ECF No. both 4). As federal and state explained above, 1367, court law jurisdiction if over there which 1367(c) (3). this That may district is has decline court federal happened 18 129 has Under 28 to in his And, U.S.C. exercise dismissed jurisdiction. here. claims the federal claims legally insufficient. district 639-40, (2009). must be dismissed as the 635, 28 all pendent claims U.S.C. Jenkins's § § state claims are rather novel and best left to resolution by the state courts. Those claims will be dismissed without prejudice. CONCLUSION For the PLAINTIFF'S No. 10) the Equal foregoing COMPLAINT BY will be granted. Pay Act, reasons, the MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT MID-ATLANTIC DETAILING The violation federal of Title claims VII for for (ECF violation retaliation of and the Title VII discrimination will be dismissed with prejudice. The state law claims for wrongful termination and defamation will be dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to the plaintiff. I t is so ORDERED. /s/ Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: November /y , 2016 19
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