Taylor v. Hunter et al, No. 3:2015cv00635 - Document 37 (E.D. Va. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Please Read Opinion for complete details. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 11/15/2016. Copy mailed to Plaintiff.(ccol, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Taylor v. Hunter et al Doc. 37 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA p" ^ jL, E_ Richmond Division IL j MOV I 6 2016 GREGORY TAYLOR, .J Plaintiff, V. Civil Action No. HUNTER, ^ 3:15CV635 al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Gregory Taylor, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S. C. § 1983 action.^ is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss by Superintendent Hunter,^ the Court's complaints by individuals proceeding U.S.C. § September 1915(e)(2), 27, 2016, and the directing (ECF No. authority 31} to in forma pauperis, Court's Taylor This matter to Memorandum show cause filed review see Order as to 28 of why ^ That statute provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ^ Hunter is the Superintendent at the Piedmont Regional Jail ("PRJ"). Dockets.Justia.com Jenkins and Williams^ should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve them in a timely manner. Roseboro'' notice, Dismiss. without For the Taylor has reasons prejudice all pursuant to Rule 4(m) not that claims responded follow, the against Despite receiving to the Court Motion to will Jenkins and dismiss Williams of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, grant the Motion to Dismiss {ECF No. 31} filed by Superintendent Hunter, and dismiss Taylor's claim against Duty Sergeant.® The action will be dismissed. I. FAILURE TO Under Federal Rule ninety The (90) days summonses SERVE JENKINS AND WILLIAMS of Civil from April 14, issued to Procedure 2016 Defendants 4(m),® Taylor had to serve Jenkins the Defendants. and Williams ^ Jenkins and Williams are Correctional Officers at PRJ. ^ Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). ^ Duty Sergeant is a Correctional Officer at PRJ. ® Rule 4(m) provides, in pertinent part: If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court-on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend appropriate period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). the time for service for an were returned as unexecuted on June 24, 2016. (ECF No. 24, at 2, 5.) With stated: respect to Williams, the Marshal "Unable to determine which Off. Williams is referenced in summons; multiple Williams located @ Piedmont Reg. identifiers and time frame." Jenkins, Giles, the Marshal noted: Admin. at 5.) does not know where Lt. Per Gloria (Id. (I^ at 3, 6.) summonses were Taylor made identifying information, current Accordingly, the "No longer employed[.] works Williams, a With respect to Jenkins After the (2) at 2.)"' Copies of the Marshal's service documents were sent to Taylor. and (Id. Please provide more Has no forwarding info regarding whereabouts." currently. Asst. Jail. Court place returned unexecuted as no attempt to such as a first name, of employment or to Jenkins provide (1) more for Williams and address for Jenkins. by Memorandum Order entered on September 27, directed Taylor "to show good cause why his 2016, claims against Defendants Jenkins and Williams should not be dismissed without prejudice." (ECF No. 33, at 1.) Taylor has responded, stating: I received a[] Memorandum Order October 4, 2016 to show good cause for the failure to serve defendants Jenkins and Williams. I have no way to serve them and need the help of the federal marshals to assist me again. I'm not sure but I believe Jenkins does not work here anymore but Williams is still employed at ^ The Court corrects the capitalization in the quotations from the submissions in the record. Piedmont Regional Jail. Defendants can be reached at Piedmont Regional Jail 801 Industrial Park Road Farmville, VA 23901. (ECF No. 34, at 1.) Rule 4 (m) requires that, absent a showing of good cause, the Court must dismiss without prejudice any complaint in which the plaintiff fails 90-day period. to serve the defendant within the allotted Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Courts within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found good cause to extend the 90-day time period when the plaintiff has made "'reasonable, diligent defendant.'" 5145334, Access to effect service on the Venable v. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:05cv821, 2007 WL at *1 Floors, efforts (E.D. Va. Inc. , Feb. 31 F. 7, Supp. 2007) (quoting Hammad v. Tate 2d 524, 528 (D. Md. 1999)}. Neither pro se status nor incarceration constitutes good cause. Sewraz v. Long. No. 3:08CV100, 2012 WL 214085, at *1-2 Jan, 24, 2012) (E.D. Va. (citing cases). Taylor's response fails to demonstrate good cause for his failure to serve Williams and Jenkins in a timely manner. June of 2016, Taylor was advised that the United States Marshal Service would need more Williams since In identifying information for Defendant there were multiple name Williams employed at PRJ. individuals with the last Taylor was also advised that Jenkins no longer worked at PRJ, and that the Marshal was unable to obtain information regarding a current place of employment or a forwarding address. Despite this notice, Taylor failed make an attempt to submit such information to the Court. provides no reason for his lack of diligence. to Taylor Accordingly, Taylor's claims against Defendants Jenkins and Williams will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4 (m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. II. PRELIMINARY REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act Court must dismiss any action filed by a determines a the action claim on which § 1915(e)(2); includes theory,'" The s^ claims "is frivolous" relief 28 U.S.C. based upon Clay v. Yates, (quoting Neitzke v. second standard is motion sufficiency contests of to a the complaint; 952 or (2) "fails to state granted." The 28 first indisputably U.S.C. standard meritless legal "'factual contentions are clearly 809 F. Supp. 417, 490 U.S. familiar under standard Rule importantly, facts, applicability of defenses." 980 F.2d 943, prisoner if the Court 1915A. "'an this 427 319, (E.D. 327 for a Va. (1989)). motion to P. 12(b)(6). dismiss surrounding the § be Williams, dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. "A may or claims where the baseless.'" 1992) (1) ("PLRA") the merits 12(b)(6) it of does a tests not claim, the resolve or the Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is plaintiff. viewed in the most favorable to the Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 {4th Cir. 1993); s^ also Martin, applies light only to factual considering a identifying pleadings conclusions, motion are allegations, to dismiss that, not 980 F.2d at 952. entitled to however, can because This principle choose they the and are "a to court begin no more assumption of bythan truth." Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to *give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, (second alteration in original) U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Id. 544, (quoting Conley v. 555 (2007) Gibson, 355 Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "formulaic 550 U.S. recitation of (citations omitted). the "labels and conclusions" elements of a cause of or a action." Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. "plausible (citation on its omitted), face," stating at 570, a claim rather than that is merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference misconduct alleged." that the defendant is Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 Corp. , 550 U.S. at 556). liable must "allege elements of [his or] & Co-/ F.3d 761, 324 Microsoft Corp., United States. the (citing Bell Atl. In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiff for facts her claim." 765 sufficient 289 F.3d 270, state all the the Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours (4th Cir. 309 F.Sd 193, to therefore, 213 281 2003) (citing Dickson v. (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, the 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), inmate's advocate, sua sponte it does not act as developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 {4th Cir. Hampton, 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. SUMMARY OF TAYLOR'S ALLEGATIONS In his Complaint, Taylor states:® ® The Court utilizes the pagination assigned to Taylor's Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system. The Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in quotations from Taylor's Complaint. I was told by officer Shearn and Williams to pack up my things. I was moving to A pod. I immediately told them I had an enemy over there. They asked me what was his name. I told them "Inferno" was his nickname. They said so you're moving anyway. So I packed up and went into A pod. And immediately as soon as I went in, I was told to leave or I was going to get my ass kicked. Both officers heard this. They left. The inmates told me again to get out or they were going to whip my ass. both officers came back. kept saying. I I banged on the door and told them what the inmates Officer Shearn told me "It's not my problem you deal with it." And they left again. I then went into my cell and was confronted by 4 to 6 inmates questioning me about a tattoo on my neck. They were saying a lot of racial comments to me. Then they said you're the one who killed two black guys in Buckingham. I said no I am accused of killing two white guys in self-defense. make up my bunk and someone Then I turned around to said hey so I turned around and was punched above my left eye, also in my left ear. I was bleeding so badly I could barely see. They started going through my things taking what they wanted. They told me to go "beat the door" also they said you better clean up all that blood and someone gave me a rag and some kind of cleaning stuff. So I cleaned up all the blood really quick. Then I went and banged on the window and got the officers' attention. I then had my things by the door and the inmates started taking more of my things. I could not do anything because I was literally afraid for my life. Finally the officers came back. They took me out and handcuffed me. had done it. Officer Shearn asked me who I told him again I only knew the one inmate's nickname "Inferno." Then I said look at the video. Officer Shearn laughed and said "Oh um the video is broken." They took me to medical. Then I was placed in a room beside the officers' station where I remained 3 to 4 hours still covered in blood. Lt. Jenkins took pictures of my injuries. Then they put me in segregation 8-20 to 8-27. Then I was placed back in B-pod where I had been for 9 months with no problems. The officers removed two inmates about two hours out of A pod after all this happened. said to be my attackers. They were (Compl. 4-5, ECF No. 2.) Taylor seeks $2,000,000.00 "for pain and suffering." (Id. 3.) appointment an officers with fired and at He also requests optometrist, "charged Court construes CAT scan, criminally," perpetrators brought to justice." The a and surgery, to to an have the have "the assert the (Id.) Taylor's Complaint to following claims against Hunter and Duty Sergeant: Claim One: Superintendent Hunter violated Taylor's Eighth Amendment® rights by permitting and inciting racially motivated violence at PRJ. (Compl. 1.) Claim Two: Duty Sergeant violated Taylor's Eighth Amendment rights by "t[aking pictures and [doing] nothing to the officers or inmates who assaulted [Taylor]." IV. (Id. at 2.) ANALYSIS In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 Cir. the 1998) . (4th "Government officials may not be held liable for unconstitutional theory of Total respondeat conduct of superior." their subordinates Ashcroft v. Iqbal, under 556 a U.S. ® "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, Const, nor cruel amend. VIII. and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (citations omitted). "[A] that each Government-official defendant, plaintiff must plead through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." A. Id. Claim Against Superintendent Hunter In Claim One, Taylor contends that Superintendent Hunter violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by permitting and inciting racially motivated violence at PRJ. Court construes Taylor's claim to assert (Compl. 1.) that The Superintendent Hunter failed to protect Taylor from assault by permitting such violence to occur at PRJ. It is clear that the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials "'to protect hands of other prisoners.'" 833 (1994) F.2d 556, caused by liability prisoners (1st Cir. 1988)). another for the prisoner's safety. inmate the 825, 842 Nevertheless, not every harm into officers at 834. constitutional responsible for the In order for a plaintiff to state a claim for failure to protect, facts 511 U.S. Jimenez-Nettleship, translates corrections S^ violence at Farmer v. Brennan, (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. 558 from a plaintiff must allege that plausibly suggest that he or she was "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm," id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, the defendant danger. acted with 509 U.S. 25, "deliberate Id. at 837. 10 35 (1993)), indifference" and that to that 1. Siibstantial Risk of Harm "Any time an individual is incarcerated, that he inmates may . (E.D. Va. of . be a . 1995). of of violence at the Westmoreland v. Brown, constitutional risk victim harm there is some risk hands 883 F. Supp. As was the case in Westmoreland, import presented in this becomes so substantial of 67, 74 "[t]he issue action is that fellow when the 'deliberate indifference' to it, within the meaning of Farmer v. Brennan, is the legal equivalent Westmoreland, of inflicting 'punishment.'" Id.^° In this Court observed that: The decisions finding constitute unconstitutional that prison assaults "punishment" have most often done so upon finding one of three species of particularized harm. In the first, the plaintiff has been at some particularized risk individually because of: (i) a personal trait; or (ii) membership in an identifiable class that is particularly vulnerable to harm. In the second, the person who committed the assault has demonstrated an unusually violent nature of which the defendant knows and which makes the assailant a substantial risk to his fellow inmates. In the third, the defendants were aware that the specific assault was ongoing or had occurred, yet had failed to respond to protect, or to treat, the victim. Westmoreland, 883 F. Supp, at 74 (internal citations and Hunter permitted and parentheticals omitted). By alleging that Superintendent incited racially motivated violence at PRJ, Taylor appears to In Farmer, the Supreme Court expressly declined to define " [a] t what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes." 834 n.3. 11 Farmer, 511 U.S. at suggest that he because of . . was . at "some particularized risk membership in an identifiable class that particularly vulnerable to harm." 74. action probable'" 377, 379 allegations he was white (5th that that his cell-mate was because officials where 911 {7th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., App'x plaintiff's prison it that a particular attack will occur. 398 F.3d 904, F. by a he is Westmoreland, 883 F. Supp. at A risk of assault may be sufficiently substantial as require 78 individually Cir. is to "'highly Brown v. Budz, Purvis v. Johnson, 2003) (concluding informed officials four that times racist and threatened him every day were sufficient to state a claim for failure to protect). Here, however, Taylor's Complaint only alludes to race when Taylor alleges that the inmates in A pod "were saying a lot of racial comments to me. Then they said you're the one who killed two black guys in Buckingham. I said no I am accused of killing two white guys in self-defense." (Compl. 4.) Taylor fails to allege facts setting forth his race and the race of the inmates who assaulted him. facts Thus, Taylor has failed to allege sufficient to support an inference that he faced a substantial risk of harm from racially motivated violence at PRJ. 2. "A prison Deliberate Indifference official shows deliberate indifference if he 'knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 12 safety.'" Cir. Odom v. 2013) S.C. Dep't of Corr., (quoting Fanner, 511 U.S. at 349 F.3d 765, 837) . 770 (4th Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial risk of harm must is not enough. The prison official also draw the inference between those general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting 164, 168 the {4th Cir. V. Bruce, inmate." 1998) 129 F.3d 336, Here, Johnson v. (citing Farmer, 340 Quinones, 511 U.S. F.3d at 837); Rich (4th Cir. 1997)). Taylor merely alleges that Superintendent Hunter was "aware of these violations and failed to respond." This 145 conclusory allegation is insufficient (Compl. to demonstrate 1.) that Superintendent Hunter was aware that Taylor faced a substantial risk of harm disregarded from that Farmer, 511 U.S. allege sufficient racially risk. at See 837) . facts to motivated Odom, Thus, 349 violence P. 3d at at 770 because Taylor has support an PRJ and (quoting failed Eighth Amendment to claim against Superindentent Hunter, Claim One will be dismissed. B. Claim Against Duty Sergeant In Claim Two, Taylor bases Duty Sergeant's liability on the fact that he "took pictures [after the assault] and did nothing to the officers or inmates who assaulted [Taylor]." Taylor fails to allege facts (Compl. 2.) indicating that Duty Sergeant was personally involved in the deprivation of his rights. Moreover, to the extent that Taylor contends that Duty Sergeant failed to 13 take action against the inmates who assaulted him, private citizen lacks prosecution or Richard P., 410 U.S. a judicially cognizable nonprosecution 614, of 619 another." (1973). Taylor "as a interest Accordingly, the R.S. Linda in v. Claim Two will be dismissed. V. For to the Dismiss will be claims foregoing (ECF No. dismissed against reasons, 31) as will to Jenkins CONCLUSION The be Hunter and prejudice pursuant to Rule Procedure. Superintendent granted. and Williams 4 (m) Claims Duty will of the Hunter's One Sergeant. be and Two Taylor's dismissed Federal Motion Rules without of Civil The action will be dismissed. Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to Taylor and counsel of record. It is so ORDERED. ML /s/ Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: November , 2016 14
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
