Streza v Federal National Mortgage Association, et al, No. 3:2015cv00168 - Document 38 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 8/19/2015. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )
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Streza v Federal National Mortgage Association, et al Doc. 38 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION ELIZABETH STREZA, Plaintiff, v. Action No. 3:15-CV-168 FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 13, filed by Defendants Com m onwealth Trustees, LLC (“CT”), ECF No. 13, a Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 15 filed by Rosenberg & Associates, LLC (“Rosenberg”), and a Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 18, filed by Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Also before the Court is a Motion for Leave of Court in Order to Am end Com plaint (“Motion to Am end”) filed by pro se Plaintiff Elizabeth Streza (“Streza”). ECF No. 35. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT CT’s Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 13, GRANT Rosenberg’s Motion to Dism iss, ECF No, 15, GRANT Fannie Mae’s Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 18 and DENY Streza’s Motion to Am end, ECF No. 35. I. PROCED U RAL BACKGROU N D Streza previously filed several lawsuits, all related to the foreclosure of the property at issue in the instant m atter and the attem pt to obtain a loan m odification. Streza’s first com plaint was filed in 20 12 against Bank of Am erica, N.A. (“BANA”), which was dism issed by dem urrer in the Henrico County Circuit Court. Streza filed her second com plaint in this Court, which issued an opinion in August 20 14 dism issing the case. See Streza v. Bank of Am erica, 20 14 WL 3810 363 at *1 (E.D. Va. 20 14). Streza filed a third com plaint in the Henrico County Circuit Court in October 20 14. However, Streza agreed to a dism issal without prejudice in that 1 Dockets.Justia.com m atter. On March 20 , 20 15, Streza filed a Com plaint alleging that three nam ed Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. 1681(a)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) in handling the foreclosure of her hom e. On April 28, 20 15, CT filed a Motion to Dism iss, which included a Roseboro notice pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 30 9 (4th Cir. 1975). ECF No. 13. Streza has not filed a response and has m issed her deadline to do so. On April 28, 20 15, Rosenberg filed a Motion to Dism iss, which included a Roseboro notice. ECF No. 15. Streza has not filed a response and has m issed her deadline to do so. Finally, On April 30 , 20 15, Fannie Mae filed a Motion to Dism iss, which also included a Roseboro notice. ECF No. 18. Here too, Streza declined to file a response and has m issed her deadline to do so. This Court has since issued an Order, granting Streza additional tim e until J une 8 , 20 15—i.e., the day before the previously scheduled m otions hearing—to file her responses to the aforem entioned m otions. On May 5, 20 14, Defendants subm itted an electronic request for oral argum ent. A m otions hearing was conducted on August 18, 20 15. II. FACTU AL BACKGROU N D 1 On J anuary 24, 20 0 6, Streza entered into a m ortgage loan transaction by executing a note (the “Note”) payable to Countrywide Hom e Loans, Inc., (“CHL”) in the am ount of $ 176,0 0 0 to purchase property located at 2244 Orion Road, J arratt, Virginia 23867 (“Property”).2 The Note was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded as Instrum ent Num ber 0 60 0 0 127 in Greensville County, Virginia. See Com plaint (“Com pl.”) ¶ 7. Streza’s m ortgage was originally serviced by Countrywide Hom e Loans Servicing, LP, which becam e known as BAC Hom e Loans Servicing, 1 The Court assum es all of Streza’s well-pleaded allegations to be true, and views all facts in the light m ost favorable to Streza. T.G. Slater & Son v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan, LLC, 38 5 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 20 0 4) (citing My lan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 , 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). 2 Streza additionally describes her m ortgage as being “backed” by Fannie Mae. See Com plaint (“Com pl.”) at ¶ 15. 2 LP, in 20 0 9. Both of these entities as well as Countrywide Bank, FSB, m erged with and into Bank of Am erica, N.A. (“BANA”), prior to the initiation of this lawsuit. Streza describes herself as a “distressed” hom e owner; however, she does not allege whether, or the extent to which, she is in arrears on her m ortgage. Id. ¶ 20 . Streza does allege that in 20 10 , she travelled with her m other to an event sponsored by the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of Am erica (“NACA”) event in Atlanta, Georgia for the purpose of obtaining a hom e loan m odification.3 Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Streza alleges that by 20 10 , the Property was significantly overvalued, as was the tax-assessm ent of the Property. At the NACA event on J une 13, 20 10 , Streza m et with a representative of BANA to discuss the possibility of a hom e loan m odification based on the current value of her hom e. Id. ¶ 14. Streza alleges that the BANA representative prom ised Streza that the desired loan m odification would be offered and, thereby, created an enforceable contract. Id. Specifically, Streza alleges that the BANA representative signed a docum ent indicating that BANA would provide a hom e appraisal. Id. Streza alleges that the BANA representative prom ised that after the appraisal was com plete and Streza subm itted certain docum ents, BANA would reduce the principle owed on Streza’s loan. Id. Streza alleges that shortly after m eeting with the BANA representative on J une 13, 20 10 , she provided the requested docum ents and waited for BANA to provide a hom e appraisal. Streza alleges that no hom e appraisal ever occurred despite her repeated attem pts to contact Defendants. Id. In J uly of 20 10 , Streza was offered a loan m odification; however, the proposed loan m odification did not reduce the principal of the loan and carried a forty-year term , to which Streza objected. Id. ¶ 15. Streza alleges that she never accepted the offered loan m odification because BANA would not respond to her requests for an explanation of the m odification loan’s 3 Streza indicates that this trip was costly and that contributed to her m other’s death in April 20 13. However, she does not appear to assert a claim for prom issory estoppel and, even construing the Com plaint liberally, does not plausibly allege that Defendants’ representations caused her to attend the NACA event. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. 3 term s. Id. ¶12. The servicing of the Note was eventually transferred to Green Tree, and Green Tree foreclosed on the Property because of Streza’s default on the Note. See id. at 2. Streza alleges that she received notice of an im pending foreclosure sale on Septem ber 15, 20 14. Id. ¶ 21. The Property was sold at a foreclosure sale held on October 7, 20 14 (the “Foreclosure Sale”). Fannie Mae owns the Note and now has title to the Property. Id. ¶¶ 13, 21. Fannie Mae has filed a com plaint for unlawful detainer against Streza in the Greensville County General District Court (“the Unlawful Detainer case”) and has obtain ed a judgm ent of possession against Streza. From before the collapse of the real estate m arket in 20 0 8 until approxim ately August 20 11, Streza was em ployed as a real estate agent. The Com plaint includes m any broad allegations regarding BANA and Fannie Mae’s participation in events and practices that ultim ately led to the collapse of the real estate m arket. On the basis of these allegations, Streza claim s that the Fannie Mae “elim inated [Streza’s] career” and, by destroying her career as a real estate agent, “took away her ability to pay her m ortgage.” Id. ¶ 40 . III. LEGAL STAN D ARD 4 a. Rule 12(b)(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 allows for a num ber of defenses to be raised to a com plaint at the pleading stage. Am ong these are the defenses that a Court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction over the case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and that the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Once subject m atter jurisdiction has been challenged, it is the plaintiff’s “burden of proving that subject m atter jurisdiction exists.” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). 4 The Court assum es all of Streza’s well-pleaded allegations to be true, and views all facts in the light m ost favorable to Streza. T.G. Slater & Son v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan, LLC, 38 5 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 20 0 4) (citing My lan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 , 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). 4 When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss, unlike a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “the district court m ay regard the pleadings as m ere evidence on the issue and m ay consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for sum m ary judgm ent.” Velasco v. Governm ent of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.20 0 4) (citing Adam s v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982)). Therefore, this Court m ay weigh the evidence and resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction by considering evidence outside the Com plaint. W illiam s v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 30 4 (4th Cir.1995). Even though such a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss is not converted into a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, district courts “should apply the standard applicable to a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, under which the nonm oving party m ust set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of m aterial fact exists.” Richm ond, Fredericksburg & Potom ac R.R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768. Only when “the m aterial jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the m oving party is entitled to prevail as a m atter of law” should the Court grant the m otion. Id. b. Rule 12(b)(6) A m otion to dism iss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim , rather than the facts supporting it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Goodm an v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 20 0 7); Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion m ust accept all of the factual allegations in the com plaint as true, see Edw ards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); W arner v. Buck Creek N ursery , Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254-55 (W.D. Va. 20 0 1), in addition to any provable facts consistent with those allegations, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (198 4), and m ust view these facts in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff, Christopher v. Harbury , 536 U.S. 40 3, 40 6 (20 0 2). To survive a m otion to dism iss, a com plaint m ust contain factual allegations sufficient to provide the defendant with “notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 5 (1957)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires the com plaint to allege facts showing that the plaintiff’s claim is plausible, and these “[f]actual allegations m ust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. The Court need not accept legal conclusions that are presented as factual allegations, id. at 555, or “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or argum ents,” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 18 0 (4th Cir. 20 0 0 ). IV. AN ALYSIS Because Streza brings this action pro se, the Court has liberally construed the Com plaint. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). a. CT and Rosenberg As to CT and Rosenberg, the Com plaint fails due to lack of subject m atter jurisdiction. Streza’s Com plaint does not concern a federal question, nor is there diversity between the parties. Therefore, there is no subject m atter jurisdiction for this Court to hear the instant m atter. Even if subject m atter jurisdiction existed, which it does not, the Com plaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a com plaint contain a “short and plain statem en t of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Courts m ust liberally construe pro se com plaints. Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Nevertheless, “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se com plaints are not . . . without lim its.” Beaudett v. City of Ham pton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Streza’s allegations fail to provide CT and Rosenberg with fair notice of the facts upon which their liability rests. See Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 544. The Com plaint alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated the FCRA with regard to loan servicing, foreclosure proceedings, and loan origination. As a general m atter, m ost of the allegations contained in the Com plaint include a significant num ber of legal conclusions and claim s insufficiently supported by facts to be nudged “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570 . From the face of the 6 Com plaint, it is entirely unclear what cause of action is being asserted against CT and Rosenberg. Streza’s allegations are unsupported by facts specific to Streza, herself, or to CT and Rosenberg’s interactions with her regarding her m ortgage loan. In fact, the Com plaint does not discuss CT or Rosenberg whatsoever. Therefore, as to CT and Rosenberg, Streza’s Com plaint fails to state a claim and m ust be dism issed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). b. Fannie Mae In Streza’s Com plaint, she essentially alleges that Fannie Mae breached the provisions of the FCRA by causing her real estate business to decline and her default on the note. The text of Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a “short and plain statem ent of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, the Suprem e Court explained in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7), that a com plaint m ust contain m ore than a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents or bare legal conclusions in order to survive a challenge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 55556 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Although detailed factual allegations are not needed, the com plaint m ust contain sufficient factual allegations to create m ore than a m ere suspicion that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1216, pp. 235– 236 (3d ed. 20 0 4)). In other words, a com plaint m ust contain plausible, rather than m erely speculative, grounds to infer the existence of each elem ent of the cause of action. See id. at 556. Many of Streza’s allegations fail this standard either because they are underm ined by contradictory inform ation in the Com plaint or because they are m erely bare legal conclusions. For exam ple, Streza adm its that she was “very behind” on her m ortgage. Com pl. ¶ 28 . Although she adm its that she refused an offered loan m odification in 20 10 because, she claim s, the offered m odification was not reasonable, see id. ¶ 12 (adm itting she was offered a m odification and elected not to accept it), she blam es Fannie Mae in particular and the m ortgage industry in 7 general for creating the conditions that lead to the recession, which in turned caused her real estate business to suffer. See e.g., id. ¶ 23 (stating, without further explanation, that Fannie Mae “cook[s] its books, sm ooth[es] out earnings, and violat[es] 30 generally accepted accounting principles”). The Com plaint lodges m any conclusory allegations against Fannie Mae, including, without lim itation, claim s that Fannie Mae failed to properly gather loan docum entation. Id. 15, 23-24. These allegations are sim ply unsupported by any additional factual m aterial in the Com plaint and, to be taken as true, would require the Court to draw unsupported legal conclusions regarding the adequacy of Fannie Mae’s conduct. For these reasons, such allegations raise only a speculative, rather than a plausible right to relief and, therefore, fail as a m atter of law. To the extent that the Com plaint includes allegations sufficient to m eet the pleading standard of Rule 8, the Court will now address those claim s below. i. Res J udicata The bulk of the Com plaint’s allegations center around Streza’s attem pt to obtain a hom e loan m odification based on the appraised value of the Property. Fannie Mae characterizes these allegations as a claim for violation of the Hom e Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) and argues that Streza’s lawsuit against Fannie Mae is barred by res judicata. In sum , Fannie Mae m oves to dism iss the Com plaint, arguing that Streza’s claim s are barred because she brought substantially sim ilar allegations against parties in privity with one another before, which were previously adjudicated. “Motion to dism iss under the doctrine of res judicata are properly reviewed under the standard for dism issal set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). W alls v. W ells Fargo Bank, N .A., No. 1:13CV623, 20 13 WL 3199675, at *2 (E.D. Va. J une 20 , 20 13). Therefore, the court should assum e that the facts alleged in the com plaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. Res judicata bars allegations which were brought, and allegations which could have been brought, in the previous suit. Pueschel v. 8 United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 20 0 4). Res judicata applies when the following three elem en ts are satisfied: “(1) a judgm ent on the m erits in a prior suit resolving (2) claim s by the sam e parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the sam e cause of action.” Feliciano v. Reger Grp., No. 1:14CV1670 , 20 15 WL 1539617, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 20 15) (quoting Aliff v. Joy M fg. Co., 914 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1990 )). The Fourth Circuit has stated that “[T]he test for deciding ‘whether the causes of action are identical for claim preclusion purposes is whether the claim presented in the new litigation ‘arises out of the sam e transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgm ent.’” Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. W ilson, 519 F.3d 156, (4th Cir. 20 0 8) (quoting Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 70 4 (4th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations om itted). “Newly articulated claim s based on the sam e [transactional] nucleus of facts m ay still be subject to a res judicata finding if the claim s could have been brought in the earlier action.” Id. (quoting Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency , 322 F.3d 10 64, 10 78 (9th Cir. 20 0 3)). Regarding the first and third elem ents of res judicata, in Streza I, the m ajority of Streza’s allegations centered on her attem pt to obtain a loan m odification. See Streza I, 20 14 WL 3810 363 at *6. Likewise, the instant suit raises claim s regarding Streza’s attem pt to obtain a loan m odification. As to the first elem ent in particular, the Court, in Streza I, concluded that Streza provided no legitim ate basis on which to bring a claim for violation of HAMP and, accordingly, dism issed the com plaint with prejudice to the extent that it sought to bring such a claim . Further, the Court also found that there is no guarantee in HAMP that a borrower will receive a loan m odification. See Streza I, 20 14 WL 3810 363 at *6. Additionally, the Court confirm ed that there is no private right of action under HAMP. Id. The alleged violations in the instant m atter em erge from the sam e conduct that gave rise to her other previously alleged injuries, and therefore could have been brought in the previous suit. See Laurel Sand, 519 F.3d at 163. Therefore, the first and third elem ents of res judicata are satisfied. 9 As to the second elem ent, to establish privity, som e relationship m ust exist between the parties so as to perm it one party to assert the legal rights of the other in the original suit. Blick v. Soundview Hom e Loan Trust 20 0 6-W F1, No. 3:12CV0 62, 20 13 WL 139191, at *4 (W.D. Va. J an. 10 , 20 13) aff'd, 521 F. App'x 20 7 (4th Cir. 20 13). Fannie Mae, the owner of the loan, see Com pl. at ¶ 21, is in privity with BANA, the prior loan servicer because Fannie Mae would have been able to assert its rights to enforce the Note in Streza I. “Virginia courts typically find privity when the parties share a contractual relationship, owe som e kind of legal duty to each other, or have another legal relationship such as co-ownership.” Id. (quoting Colum bia Gas Transm ission, LLC v. David N. Martin Revocable Trust, 833 F. Supp.2d 552, 558 (E.D. Va. 20 11)). Privity exists in this case as Fannie Mae had a contractual relationship with BANA (now Green Tree) regarding the servicing of the Note. See Com pl. ¶ 21 (adm itting that Fannie Mae owns the Note). Because all of Streza’s allegations either were brought or could have been brought in her com plaint filed in Streza I against the sam e parties or their privies, and those allegations were adjudicated on the m erits, res judicata applies and Streza’s Com plaint will be dism issed. ii. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C § 2883 Streza requests that the Court enter an order enjoining the Unlawful Detainer case and enjoining Defendants from “conveying, selling, m ortgaging or otherwise encum bering or disposing the Property.” Com pl. ¶¶ 36-37. Fannie Mae filed a com plaint for unlawful detainer against Streza in the Greensville County General District and obtained a judgm ent of possession against Streza. Therefore, this issue is now m oot. iii. Declaratory J udgm ent and Monetary Dam ages Streza requests that the Court “[e]nter declaratory judgm ent that the foreclosure sale and Trustee’s Deed were void or voidable and should be put aside.” Com pl. ¶ 39. However, Streza is not entitled to a declaratory judgm ent because she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 10 A federal court m ay properly exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory judgm ent proceeding when three essential elem ents are m et: (1) the com plaint alleges an ‘actual controversy’ between the parties ‘of sufficient im m ediacy and reality to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgm ent;’ (2) the court possesses an independent basis for jurisdiction over the parties (e.g., federal question or diversity jurisdiction); and (3) the court does not abuse its discretion in its exercise of jurisdiction. Luther v. W ells Fargo Bank, N .A., No. 4:13CV0 72, 20 14 WL 6451667, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 20 14). Here, there is no basis for the Court to award Plaintiff a declaratory judgm ent because she fails to state a cause of action. See Luther, 20 14 WL 6451667, at *2 (noting that there m ust be a cause of action for the court to issue a declaratory judgm ent). Sim ilarly, Streza’s claim for m onetary dam ages in the am ount of $ 75,0 0 0 is deficient. Com pl. ¶ 40 . There are no facts to support the conclusory allegation that the foreclosure proceedings or behavior by Fannie Mae caused Streza pecuniary loss in the am ount of $ 75,0 0 0 . c. Motion to Am end Under Rule 15(a)(2), a party m ay am end its pleading with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The rule suggests that courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. This broad rule gives effect to the “federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their m erits instead of disposing of them on technicalities.” Laber v. Harvey , 438 F.3d 40 4, 426 (4th Cir. 20 0 6) (en banc) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted Rule 15(a) to m ean that “leave to am end should be denied only when the am endm ent would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the m oving party, or the am endm ent would have been futile.” Laber, 438 F.3d at 426 (citing Johnson v. Orow eat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 50 3, 50 9 (4th Cir. 1986)). Courts should only deny leave to am end on the grounds of futility when the proposed am endm ent is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face. See Johnson, 785 F.2d at 10 . If, 11 however, a court determ ines that the am endm ent would be futile, leave to am end m ay be properly denied. See GE Inv. Private Placem ent Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 20 0 1). In order to avoid denial on the basis of futility, a party seeking to am end m ust m eet the requirem ents for the particular cause of action by plausibly alleging facts sufficient to survive a m otion to dism iss. See Pfizer v. Teva Pharm s. USA, Inc., 8 0 3 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461 (E.D. Va. 20 11). Streza seeks to am end the com plaint to “include the fact that the acceleration notice received on February 6, 20 15 from [attorney] J oseph Patry [sic] was after the foreclosure conducted on October 7, 20 15.” Mot. to Am end at 1. Based on the Motion to Am end, Streza cannot overcom e any of the deficiencies noted in the foregoing analysis. The proposed am endm ent is clearly insufficient and com pels the determ ination by this Court that said am endm ent would be futile. The Motion to Am end, therefore, will be denied as futile. V. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT CT’s Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 13, GRANT Rosenberg’s Motion to Dism iss, ECF No, 15, and GRANT Fannie Mae’s Motion to Dism iss, ECF No. 18 . The Com plaint, accordingly, will be DISMISSED. Further, the Motion to Am end will be DENIED, ECF No. 35. Let the Clerk send a copy of this Mem orandum Opinion to all counsel of record and to Streza. ___________________/s/________________ James R. Spencer Senior U. S. District Judge An appropriate Order shall issue. ENTERED this 19th day of August 20 15. 12
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