Bile v. RREMC, LLC Denny's Restaurant et al, No. 3:2015cv00051 - Document 25 (E.D. Va. 2015)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 6/24/2015. (sbea, )

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Bile v. RREMC, LLC Denny's Restaurant et al Doc. 25 fl L JUN 2 4 2015 IN THE UNITED FOR THE STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT Richmond Division AMANGOUA J. RICHMOND, VA BILE, Plaintiff, Civil Action V. No. 3:15CV51 RREMC, LLC, AND DENNY'S CORPORATION, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is CORPORATION'S FED. No. 8) . For before R. the CIV. the P. reasons Court 12(b)(1) stated on DEFENDANT DENNY'S MOTION TO DISMISS below, the motion (Docket will be granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND On January "Plaintiff") 27, filed a 2015, Amangoua civil action against and Denny's Corporation ("Denny's") alleging violations Title 1964, U.S.C. Rights 42 Act of § of 2000e, 1866, J. 42 et VII seq. U.S.C. Compl. fSI 1, 4-6 (Doclcet No. 1). § Bile RREMC, ("Bile" LLC (collectively, of the Civil ("Title 1981 VII") or ("RREMC") "Defendants") Rights and ("Section Act of the Civil 1981"). See RREMC is a Florida corporation with restaurants located in the Commonwealth of Virginia doing business under the trade name "Denny's." South Carolina corporation that owns the Id. f 5. franchise Denny's is a license for Dockets.Justia.com "Denny's" operations in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Id. SI 6. Bile alleges that the Defendants failed to promote him because of his id. 45, race and national origin, 56, and retaliated against him because of his complaints of discrimination, 49, 50, 60, id. 61. DISCUSSION Denny's moves to dismiss Bile's claims pursuant to Fed. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) "Where, as here, the complaint, matter for on its complaint are true, Carter Arlington (E.D. Va. Supp. 1091, Unlike 2000) a evidence 1094 motion outside concerning for face, 50 F.3d 299, jurisdiction. thus providing the plaintiff with the same Pub. a Sch. (quoting Lane v. (E.D. under of Va. Rule (4th Cir. F. 2d brackets "courts may resolve converting factual the (citing Williams 1995)). determination.'" 561, Jacobson & Co., however, to facts Supp. (internal complaint Id. 82 David P. 1995)) all 12(b)(6) Sys., 12(b)(6), the 'assume basis for subject the judgment." 304 matter in as must jurisdiction without summary subject fails to state a courts protections v. of a defendant seeks dismissal on the ground that jurisdiction, procedural lack R. v. motion 564 880 F. omitted). consider disputes into one United States, I. Plaintiff s Denny's T i t l e VII argues Claims that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Bile's Title VII claims against it because Bile "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against Denny's Corp. by naming and including this entity during the administrative phase Opportunity Commission Law in Supp. (Doclcet No. of Fed. 9). Nat'l Fairfax failure by concerning a Group, 82 F. Ltd., Supp. Under 155 Def. Employment Denny's Corp.'s Mem. 12(b)(1) and [Equal Mot. Denny's to Dismiss, recognize available to him. F.3d 681 VII 435 F.3d plaintiff Title subject matter the to claim (4th 593 (4th 591, exhaust 551 F.3d 297, Cir. the 2012). 301 (4th Cir. civil action Jones 2009); a v. "[A] remedies federal claim." 2 First Sydnor administrative deprives jurisdiction over the 1998); of exhaust Tinsley v. Cir. at that claim of discrimination must first Va., the P. Bile remedies Bank, County, Civ. Both the administrative Union {"EEOC")]." R. plaintiff pursuing a before courts v. of Calvert see also Carter, 2d at 564. Title VII, a can only be prosecuted "against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved." Causey v. Balog, 162 389 U.S. 877 U.S.C. § 795, F.3d South Carolina State Empl. denied, 42 800 (4th Serv., (1967). 377 2000e-5 (f) (1) ; Cir. F.2d 239 1998); see also Mickel (4th Cir.), v. cert. "A party not named in the initial charge with the EEOC, ordinarily, may not be subsequently sued for alleged discrimination. This requirement serves two purposes: (i) notifying the charged party of the asserted violation and (ii) bringing the charged party before the EEOC to facilitate the goal of securing voluntary compliance with the law." Carter, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 568. Here, Bile filed a singular Charge preceding the institution of this action, his no only employer; reference to lists Denny's RREMCs or its of Discrimination and it names RREMC as principal principal office office; address and with complains of actions taken by RREMC employees without alleging explicitly or implicitly that some shape, form, Law in Supp. (Docket No. Rights, that it RREMCs [sic] No. Denny's was directing the RREMC employees in or fashion. of Fed. 9-3). R. Civ. copied only corporate Fed. R. Civ. P. Similarly, dated October 31, was See Def. 12(b) (1) Mot. to Dismiss, to Ex. of 3 the EEOCs Dismissal and Notice of 2014 and issued to Plaintiff, RREMC s address. P. Denny's Corp.'s Mem. PI. 12(b)(1) Human Resources Amangoua Mot. Bile's to Dismiss, Director at 0pp. Ex. reflects to 10 Defs. (Docket. 16-2). Bile "named disputes and this, identified Discrimination." PI. Def. to Denny's Mot. claiming in Amangoua Dismiss, that Denny's was, in fact, Plaintiffs [sic] Charge of Bile's of in to at 3 Mem. (Docket. No. Law 16-1). 0pp. That, however, use of is the simply wrong. "Denny's" the Charge of It label is next to Discrimination was Denny's franchisee. clear from the RREMC that solely to parenthetical the "naming" in identify RREMC as a The separate corporate entity of "Denny's, Corp." is nowhere to be found in the Charge of Discrimination. Denny's, to Plaintiff s ("[A]n No. against a 19); be party also been to was Carter, recognized to invoke rule not F. for cases the prohibiting named in Reply, Supp. that 2d at at where the 15 567-68 there is identity between the defendant and the party named satisfy this that of the interests party's interests named that, exception, party for voluntary conciliation and compliance, be the so "courts require similar to purpose it of the obtaining would be unnecessary to name the party in the EEOC proceedings." 2d at reply Corp.'s 82 To unnamed its the Denny's in the charge."). the in attempting that Def. see has observes exception charge. exception substantial might identity" administrative (Docket credit, counsel "substantial prosecution its Carter, 82 F. Supp. 568. The substantial identity exception does not apply here for the allege that there is a substantial identity between RREMC and Denny's. Nor does threshold the reason record or that this the motion Complaint show that does the not interests of RREMC and Denny's are "so similar" that "it would be unnecessary" to include matter Denny's of in law, the the EEOC proceedings. relationship and between example, the relationship that exists "between a Because exhausted subject Bile's with matter not similar a legal to, for corporation and Id. administrative respect is as separate of individual directors." franchisee Indeed, the entities its franchisor Id. to remedies Denny's, jurisdiction this over have Court Bile's not does Title been not VII have claims. Denny's motion to dismiss will therefore be granted with respect to Bile's Title VII claims, II. Plaintiff s Counts I Section 1981 Claims Denny's also argues that jurisdiction over Bile's Section failed to and II. show that a the "joint Court 1981 Def. Supp. 12(b)(1) Fed. (Docket No. Denny's are (Docket No. R. Civ. 9) . P. Although distinct 1), the corporate claims employer" between RREMC and Denny's. of lacks subject because Bile relationship Denny's Corp.'s Mem. Mot. to parties see has exists of Law in Dismiss, at 1-2 that RREMC and Compl. 5 & 6 agree entities, matter that does not mean that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Denny's cites several cases in which the court examined the factual record whether a V. and "joint Gibraltar determined employer" Indus., statutory relationship Inc., 307 F.2d liability existed. 428 (4th based See upon N.L.R.B. Cir. 1962) (granting enforcement substantial evidence conclusion" viewing petition based on in the employing enterprise"); 435 F.2d 1270 based on [the (4th finding defendant] substantial McDonald^ s grant not of "employer" 356 F.3d 942 judgment 936 judgment (9th Cir. to of the Title v. Hertz Cir. of the 2014) (granting summary defendants "were not employers Corp., (granting summary judgment "failed to integrated 1070 (E.D. present any companies"); Tenn. 887 F. 1995) Evans franchisor v. was Air France, of grant leave v. (affirming summary circumstances 15 F. Supp. judgment or and the with us 1435 Title VII evidence v. that and the 1240 finding that record"); where Okla. the 909 of Scales 1995) plaintiff defendants] Inc., summary 1225, employers (E.D. [the Shoney's, (granting 3d joint Supp. under Raines on 1991) Plaintiffs" based "[u]pon consideration of the Inc., "determined should not be considered a joint Fla. Indus., not Moreau still (M.D. Sonic petition or that (affirming Jerome V. single "whether was VII); employer"); the of finding situation [the defendant] a defendant]"); (10th on totality as is Board's enforcement issue" [the 1087 2004) the entities employer" based under "the reality' conclusion that F.2d "there Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp., "factual joint that support (granting adversely liable where ^economic the to legal v. 1970) a evidence summary "separate Cir. is record N.L.R.B. that Corp., the finding F. judgment are Supp. where plaintiffs "failed to show an agency relationship existed with the requisite control needed to impose liability"); Comcast Corp., summary 740 judgment F. Supp. based 2d upon 683 (D. detailed Md. Jacobson v. 2010) factual (granting analysis and conclusion that defendant "is not Plaintiff's joint employer"). All cannot of those be extended relationship. were decided course, cases in They based the also upon is because the laden one. reflect principle absence have a the of something developed a that joint else factual in liability employment common: record. That, joint-employer-status inquiry is a Civ. has P. of fact- Denny's has submitted and cited various declarations in support of its argument that it cannot be considered a employer. they Def. Denny's Corp.'s Mem. 12(b)(1) contested Mot. the to Dismiss, of Law in Supp. at characterization 4-9 of (Docket some of No. those joint of Fed. 9). R. Bile facts and has pointed to his own pleadings and exhibits in support of the argument that Denny's can be considered a Amangoua Bile's Dismiss, at additional 5-8 Mem. of Law (Docket. discovery to in 0pp. No. to 16-1). reinforce his the court observed: in Tietqen v. "Defendants' succeed on a Def. Denny's Moreover, contention should be held liable as a joint employer. As joint employer. Mot. Bile that to seeks Denny's Id. at 9. Brown's Westminster Motors, argument here is too motion to dismiss." 921 F. Supp. 8 PI. fact Inc. dependent 1495, 1504 to (E.D. Va. 1996). find Bile has alleged sufficient subject matter jurisdiction as to facts the Whether or not Denny's will be liable as a factual record has been developed is a for this Court to Section 1981 claim. joint employer once a different question for a different stage of this litigation. Based on the current record, i t appears quite possible that Bile's joint employer theory could fail on a motion for summary judgment based upon a substantially undisputed set of But, dismissal at the present stage would be premature. motion to dismiss will therefore Bile's Section 1981 claims, be denied with facts. Denny's respect to Counts III and IV. CONCLUSION For the FED. R. CIV. foregoing P. reasons, 12(b)(1) MOTION granted with respect to and denied with II) claims It and DEFENDANT DENNY'S CORPORATION'S TO DISMISS Plaintiff's Title VII respect to (Docket claims Plaintiff's No. 8) (Counts Section (Counts III and IV). is so ORDERED. /s/ Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: June i-'X 2015 is I 1981

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